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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART XVIII

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JANUARY TO JUNE 1926

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PART XVIII

JANUARY TO JUNE 1926

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CONFIDENTIAL

Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs.

PART XVIII.

CHAPTER I.—MOSUL.

[E 62/62/65]

No. 1.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 4, 1926.)

(No. 940.)

Sir,

Constantinople, December 28, 1925.

I HAVE read with great interest Sir H. Dobbs's memorandum of the 6th December on a suggestion I had made for a transfer of Kurdish areas of Irak to Persia, and I cannot pretend to be surprised that a proposal put forward with considerable diffidence should meet with so numerous and so cogent objections. I can quite see that it may be distasteful, prejudicial, even disastrous, to Irak, Persia, Turkey and the Kurds, alike; unfortunately, I cannot see how the present apportionment of territory is destined to produce any better results, for it must induce an unrest in Kurdistan which, sooner or later, may involve all four races alike in common disaster, and profit only Russia.

2. Though the Kurdish question is never mentioned in the press in connection with Mosul, and seldom officially in conversation by Turks (the only two cases I know of are the words of Ismet Pasha to me on the 9th November and those of Zekiai Bey to yourself on the 21st January), it causes a feeling of deep-seated danger to the Turkish Government. Angora may, indeed, have aggressive ideas towards Persian Azerbaijan—even a wish to establish closer relations across it with the Turcophone inhabitants of Russian Central Asia; but there are also factors more vital and nearer home impelling the Turkish Government to stamp out Kurdish nationalism (see my despatch No. 785 of the 16th October), and it feels that its existence will be menaced by the allotment of any considerable body of Kurds to the care of a third Power who will treat their national susceptibilities with kindness. Just as before the war the existence of a well-administered Egypt (the most insular country in the world) predisposed the Arabs in general to disaffection towards the Ottoman Empire, so also to-day, but to an infinitely greater degree, must a decently administered Southern Kurdistan exercise a perpetual drag on the Kurds of Eastern Turkey. It is, I fear, quite impossible to hope that explanations to the Turkish Government, however careful and patient, of Irak policy towards its Kurds, will afford the smallest satisfaction. A cession of territory, say, the mountainous country down to Rowanduz, as suggested in my telegram No. 133 of the 29th November, might possibly now appease Turkish *amour-propre* and afford an immediate satisfaction, but I could not feel sure that it would be a real solution of the difficulty. I cannot help wondering whether Persia may not, too, in the course of time find herself affected in the same way as Turkey.

3. At the present juncture, then, the future of Turks, Kurds, Arabs, and possibly Persians, is at stake, and we may have arrived at a sort of parting of the ways, where much will depend on the course which His Majesty's Government will

choose to follow. In considering the problem it is not enough to think of British interests alone, or of the interests of any one of the States concerned, but it becomes necessary to think of the group of States as a whole. Taking into consideration the probable tendencies of Russian policy for the next two generations, the interests of peace and of His Majesty's Government alike will best be served by the development of friendly relations between Great Britain and Turkey, and to achieve this result it may be necessary to pay a price, but it is no good thinking that Turkey can be made to pay the whole price, especially where the benefits are to accrue equally to all. Each party concerned will have to put up with something distasteful for the common advantage.

4. I feel, therefore, that the question requires examination by His Majesty's Government as a whole and from a very broad point of view. For my own part, I fear I do not possess the detailed knowledge that would enable me to put forward any concrete proposals, but if and when negotiations with the Turkish Government are about to begin, or even earlier, I should be glad if you would consider attaching to this Embassy some official of standing and knowledge from Irak who would be able to give me guidance on technical points.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Irak and to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 63/62/65]

No. 2.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 4, 1926.)

(No. 941.)

Sir,

Constantinople, December 29, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to report that Tewfik Rushdi Bey, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, returned here yesterday morning from Geneva and Paris, having stopped forty-eight hours *en route* at Belgrade, and I had a conversation with him of over an hour's duration in the afternoon. His Excellency's mind works on very subjective lines, and he was, therefore, full of his recent experiences at Geneva, and whatever efforts I might make to turn the conversation into other channels, he always brought it back to the past. He spoke bitterly of the proceedings before the League and characterised the decision as an injustice. He maintained, as Turkish newspapers always do, that the report of the League's Sub-Commission of Enquiry was in favour of the inclusion of Mosul in Turkey, and yet its conclusion was set aside by the Council. He said that Turkey had never agreed to arbitration or to anything more than mediation by the League. If she had wanted arbitration, she would not have accepted as arbitrator any body of men who merely voted as their Governments instructed them to vote, but would have asked for some individual who would act independently. Nor would she have accepted any body of men among whom not a single one could be counted as a friend, for if Turkey had had a single friend on the Council unanimity would not have been attained and the present finding could not have been rendered. He himself had gone to the utmost limits of conciliation; he had been ready to accept partition at the line of the Lesser Zab, with demilitarisation of the contested area, a security treaty, an economic agreement to preserve the economic unity of the vilayet, and he thought an exchange of population, too, might be desirable. The exchange should be a voluntary exchange only, on the lines of the Græco-Bulgarian Convention, and he was sure there were just as many Turks and Turcophiles in Irak anxious to emigrate northwards as there were native Christians in Turkey who would wish to move to the south. Beyond this point of concession Turkey could not possibly go; nor could she possibly accept and recognise a decision which gave every single point against her and afforded her no satisfaction whatever.

2. To these observations I rejoined that Turkey had only herself to blame. Twice last spring I had warned his Excellency not to let public opinion get over-excited about Mosul. I had said that a decision would be given by the League which would certainly be distasteful to Turkey, and if national feeling were over-heated a difficult situation would ensue for the Turkish Government. This is precisely what had now happened. For months past the press had been allowed and encouraged to indulge in every possible excess. Not only had Great Britain been overwhelmed with opprobrium, but every day the League of Nations was grossly insulted. Was this the way favourably to predispose a tribunal before which an

appearance had to be made? If, as he said, Turkey was friendless, whose fault was it? What friendship could survive the spectacle of a deportation of Christians at the very moment when the League was in session? As to the question of arbitration or mediation, it was submitted to The Hague Court, and why should his Excellency now quote the opinion of Maitre Gidel against the court's decision? These arguments should have been stated to the court itself, as the Turkish Government was invited to do, and if they chose not to plead they also forfeited their right to complain. To this Tewfik Rushdi Bey's answer was that he could not appear before The Hague Court because by doing so he would be casting doubt on the correctness of his Government's view!

3. There was thus a good deal of recrimination in our conversation, but it was, nevertheless, conducted in a tone of friendliness, and we did succeed in exchanging some views as to the future. His Excellency told me that he had not yet seen Ferid Bey's report of what Mr. Baldwin had said in London, and I repeated to him briefly the substance of what had passed, asking him what the Turkish Government would do about it. Tewfik Rushdi Bey expressed natural reluctance to pronounce himself till he had seen his Ambassador's report and consulted with his Government, but he did say that no negotiations would be possible "on the basis of the League's verdict" and that no solution would be possible that did not provide for the cession to Turkey of a large area of the Vilayet of Mosul.

4. One other point I made to the Minister. If, I said, things so turned out that I should be negotiating with the Turkish Government, and if the Turkish Government should desire the negotiations to succeed, then I must beg them not to appoint a commission to conduct the discussions on their behalf. Tewfik Rushdi Bey said he shared my view on this point and would support it. I should inform you that in making this proposal I was bearing in mind the experience of the French in their efforts to settle the Syrian frontier question. Here M. Sarraut has been confronted by a commission on which local deputies sit. These men put up a first-class fight over every market-garden and there is no possibility of any progress.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Irak and to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 107/107/44]

No. 3.

Mr. Kennard to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 5, 1926.)

(No. 486.)

Sir,

Belgrade, December 30, 1925.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 171, I have the honour to report that the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs arrived here on the 24th instant and left for Constantinople on the 27th instant. His arrival was heralded in the local press with a great flourish of trumpets and he was much fêted during his stay here. He was received by the King, the President of the Council and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, with whom he had long conversations. I have the honour to transmit herewith a summary of Tewfik Rushdi Bey's statements to the press and also a translation of the official communiqué, which was issued on the conclusion of his visit. He made the most of the fact that he was made a prisoner by the Serbs during the Balkan wars, while a doctor in a Turkish military hospital in Macedonia, and that during his internment at Kumanovo he was in excellent relations with the local Serbian authorities.

2. The Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed me that Rushdi Bey spoke to him in a reassuring manner about the Mosul question, in regard to which he hopes to reach an amicable settlement with His Majesty's Government. M. Nincic has further assured me that there has been no question of concluding any far-reaching agreement with the Turkish Government, though it was agreed that the Treaty of Peace which was recently signed should be ratified forthwith, and that a Commercial and Consular Convention should be negotiated. It was further probable that some arrangement will be come to as regards the emigration of Moslems from Yugoslavia to Turkish territory. It will be remembered that the S.C.S. Government have been encouraging Moslems, more especially in Southern Serbia, to emigrate to Anatolia, but that the Turkish authorities have of late refused to

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admit such persons. It is presumably with a view to securing the modification of this attitude that this arrangement will be concluded.

3. While in official circles it has been denied that any closer relations with Turkey are imminent, there have been rumours that Rushdi Bey had come here with the intention of concluding a similar treaty to that recently signed with the Soviet and also of approaching the S.C.S. Government, with a view to their resumption of relations with Moscow. It has been further suggested that, while the Government have come to no immediate decision in this sense, they have not definitely declined to entertain these proposals, and that their attitude may indicate an orientation of foreign policy towards Moscow and Angora. While one can never place implicit confidence in official assurances here, I can hardly believe that this country would at the present moment enter upon so drastic a reversal of policy. M. Pasic generally lives in an atmosphere twenty years behind the times, but while he still cherishes friendly recollections of the Russia of the Tsarist régime, he is believed to be opposed to intimate relations with the Soviet Government. It is true that fear of Italy and desire for Salonica are perhaps the main factors in Yugoslav foreign relations at the present time, and that there are signs of some instability in M. Nincic's attitude regarding the future orientation of this Government. As reported in my despatch No. 467, he seems to have, a short time ago, seriously contemplated a rapprochement with Turkey as a counterbalance against any combination of Italy, Greece and Bulgaria against Yugoslavia, and, as he seemed to be in an uncertain frame of mind on the subject, I ventured to go perhaps further than might have appeared advisable in insisting on the desirability of genuinely considering a Balkan pact (see my despatch No. 474). It is possible that our conversations have brought M. Nincic to a saner realisation of the best interests of his country, as I have reason to believe that he has been carefully studying the possibility of a pact within the last few days. I fear, however, that we shall have to wait a long time before the true Locarno spirit spreads throughout the Balkans.

4. My Greek and Italian colleagues have been naturally in a great state of perturbation during Rushdi Bey's visit here. The former told me yesterday that, while he agreed that no definite arrangement has yet been come to, he feels sure that the door has not been closed on an understanding between Belgrade, Angora and Moscow. He stated that he has been endeavouring to induce this Government to take up the renewal of the alliance again, and that there are signs of a slight improvement in the relations between the two countries. The question of the erection of a Serbian mausoleum on the Island of Vidos, near Corfu, had been satisfactorily settled, and there seemed no reason, except the lack of goodwill here, why an agreement should not be come to as regards the Salonica Railway question. The French Government have declined to intervene any further, and he considered it essential that His Majesty's Government should take the matter up. Six months hence it might be too late, and unless immediate steps were taken, he could not tell what might happen. I urged that the real remedy for this mutual mistrust and friction was the conclusion of a Balkan pact. Unfortunately, the Greek Government had recently taken the initiative in this matter at an ill-timed moment, and their action had probably done more harm than good. There seemed, however, no reason why the matter should not be reopened perhaps from another quarter, and in a manner more likely to lead to the adhesion of all the Powers concerned. M. Polichroniades agreed, but felt that the Salonica question would always prove the main obstacle, unless its solution be brought about by foreign intervention, more especially that of His Majesty's Government.

5. I certainly see no likelihood of the S.C.S. and Greek Governments finding any satisfactory compromise which would save the faces of both parties, unless it be suggested to them from some disinterested quarter. In the meantime they are drifting further apart. A large meeting has just taken place at Monastir to protest against the ill-treatment of Yugoslav subjects in Greek Macedonia. One must suspect that this demonstration was perhaps engineered by the local authorities. I see no signs of modification in the anti-Greek atmosphere at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, although one is always assured that this country has no territorial designs on Salonica, and the Greek Government have only to agree to a minimum percentage of Yugoslav representation on the administration of the railway. M. Radic has not improved matters by contributing one of his usual indiscretions in a recent speech and urging the necessity of a Yugoslav outlet on the Aegean.

6. My final impression as regards Rushdi Bey's visit here is that it has been utilised to intimidate Greece and possibly Italy, but there is little likelihood that

this Government will pay undue heed to Turkish blandishments. It is possible that Rushdi may have endeavoured to ascertain what attitude this Government would assume in the event of her being called upon under article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations to contribute forces to enforce the authority of the League against Turkey, but I have no authoritative information to confirm this suggestion. The press have, of course, exploited the visit to the full, and no doubt the vanity of certain elements here has been flattered by the idea that Belgrade has been anxiously watched by the whole of Europe during the past few days as a factor of the highest importance in the struggle between Western and Eastern Europe.

7. I would add that it may be misleading to attach too much importance to information which may appear in the British press from their correspondents in Belgrade, as with the exception of Mr. Bryce, "The Times" correspondent, who is at present absent, practically all the local correspondents of important British newspapers are Serbs, and the majority are employed in Government Departments, more especially the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The acting correspondent of "The Times," for instance, is a Russian lady, who is employed in the press bureau at the Ministry. On two occasions, after recent conversations with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, I have found Mme. Samsonova awaiting me outside M. Nincic's door, and I have found it prudent to give evasive replies to the leading questions which she has put to me.

8. I am sending copy of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Constantinople, Sofia and Athens.

I have, &c.

H. W. KENNARD.

Enclosure 1 in No. 3.

Rushdi Bey's Interviews with Representatives of the Belgrade Press.

Thursday, December 24, 1925.

ON the day of Rushdi Bey's arrival Hikmed Bey, Turkish representative at Belgrade, gave an interview to the "Vreme," in which he stated that Rushdi Bey would spend two days in Belgrade, in order to discuss with M. Pasic, M. Nincic and His Majesty the King, various outstanding questions between Yugoslavia and Turkey. He took the opportunity to announce the terms of the new Russo-Turkish Treaty, and, when asked about the Mosul question, he stated that Turkey had no intention whatsoever of accepting the League's decision.

Friday, December 25, 1925.

On his arrival at Belgrade Rushdi Bey granted interviews to the correspondents of the three principal Belgrade papers, "Vreme," "Politica" and "Pravda." Having outlined the main points of the above-mentioned treaty, he described it as one of non-aggression.

As regards Mosul, he made the following statement:—

"We cannot surrender Mosul, even if we wish to do so. I should like a peaceful solution to the question to be found. There are ways of avoiding a conflict without prejudicing our sovereignty in Mosul. We proposed a plebiscite, but that was not accepted. Let them find another solution. But we cannot abandon our sovereign rights in Mosul. Apart from this question, we have no differences with England, and it is to be hoped that this fact will be made use of to ensure peace. We are desirous of peace. . . .

"Turkey has not entered the League of Nations and I cannot say whether she will do so. . . . Since we are not a member of the League of Nations the Pact of the League provides only that in case of a conflict no member of the League of Nations can take our side and assist us."

Rushdi Bey then pointed out that according to the Turkish Constitution and the "National Oath" of 1919 Turkey has no right to alter her frontiers, either by conquest or by surrender.

Having been asked whether the treaty with Russia provided for a Russo-Turkish sphere of influence in Mahometan districts, Rushdi Bey replied that there had been no question of such a sphere of influence in the Mussulman provinces under Russia.

"Present-day Turkey is not a pan-Islamic country, but the land of the Turkish people." The real pan-Islamic States are England and France, and the Sultan of Egypt wants the Caliphate. Turkey's attitude towards the Moslems of Jugoslavia is one of disinterested "bienveillance."

Asked what further action he proposed to take in the Mosul question Rushdi Bey replied:—

"First of all we must examine the details of the new English offer. But time is working in our favour and we are not in a hurry. British public opinion is also working for us, and we shall wait for it to prevail."

As regards the relations between Turkey and Jugoslavia, Rushdi Bey stated that these were excellent, and that Turkey regarded this country as a dominant Power in the Balkans. In Balkan relations everything must start from the basic fact of the dominant situation of Jugoslavia, and all work must aim at consolidating Jugoslavia's position.

Sunday, December 27, 1925.

Before his departure Rushdi Bey gave interviews to the principal papers on his conversations with M. Nincic.

He stated that he had discussed with M. Nincic all questions which could interest the two Powers. He himself was greatly in favour of the emancipation of the Balkans. All those who were sincerely in favour of peace could only be encouraged by what he had discussed with M. Nincic. But of those who had not a clear conscience he could say nothing.

To the question whether he had discussed with M. Nincic the question of a possible conflict between Turkey and Great Britain, he replied that he was a man of peace and not of conflicts. Turkey had banished the word "war" from her dictionary and substituted the expression "national defence." He had only discussed peaceful matters with M. Nincic, and concluded with the words: "I do not really know whether any danger threatens us, even from the side of England."

Enclosure 2 in No. 3.

Official Communiqué, issued on December 27, 1925.

ON the occasion of the meeting between the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Turkish Republic and the S.C.S. Kingdom, questions of general politics were reviewed, especially those which directly interest the two countries, i.e., commercial and consular treaty and conventions, a convention regarding establishment and the emigration question.

In the course of their conversation the two Ministers noted the friendship that exists between the two countries and the complete harmony of their views. They expressed their desire for the consolidation of peace and for sincere and friendly relations with all States.

No. 4.

Sir W. Tyrrell (for the Secretary of State) to Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople).

(No. 3.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, January 5, 1926.

FOLLOWING from Prime Minister:—

"The Turkish Ambassador this morning communicated to me, in reply to my statement of 22nd December (see my telegram No. 152), a memorandum to the following effect:—

"The Turkish Government is animated by the hope that its point of view concerning the programme to be followed in the question of the delimitation of the Turco-Irak frontier has been clearly set forth by the negotiations which have taken place up to the present and by the official declarations which have been made on various occasions. The Turkish Government is convinced that in the dispute regarding the Mosul Vilayet, which is in reality a question of territorial

sovereignty as well as a question of peace and security, the fixing of a stable frontier is of primary importance. The Turkish Government is ready to resume new negotiations to settle the dispute which exists between the two States. The choice of Angora as the place of negotiation is also convenient to the Turkish Government. That Government has not failed from the outset to indicate by the line of conduct which it has followed hitherto its preference for a direct solution of the question between the two Governments. Turkey, taking into consideration the value and the importance of the happy expansion which would ensue in the relations between the two Powers in consequence of the solution of this dispute, has always desisted, on condition that a final result should be reached, from claims which were of vital interest to her. The proposals which the British Government will be so good as to make for the discussions relative to the fixing of the frontier in the disputed territory and for the procedure which it will follow in these discussions will render it possible to foresee the result of the negotiations. Turkey desires very sincerely to live on terms of perfect and cordial friendship with Great Britain. It is specially desirable that the single dispute which exists between the two countries should be brought to a happy conclusion."

"I have informed his Excellency in reply that, in taking note of the agreement of his Government to Angora being the most convenient place for negotiation, I would gladly authorise you to proceed to the capital in order to explore the ground and ascertain what *accommodements* or alleviations might be possible in connection with the decision given by the Council of the League of Nations on 16th December. I also assured him that I cordially reciprocated the desire of his Government for the promotion of the friendliest relations between our two countries, and that I shall spare no effort to achieve that end."

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 1.)

[E 137/62/65]

No. 5.

Sir W. Tyrrell to Ahmed Ferid Bey.

My dear Ambassador,

Foreign Office, January 5, 1926.

WITH reference to your Excellency's conversation this morning with the Prime Minister, the latter desires me to confirm to you that, in view of the agreement of the Turkish Government in the selection of Angora as being the most convenient place for the forthcoming conversations, he is requesting His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople to make the necessary arrangements to proceed to the capital of your country for the purpose of ascertaining what *accommodements* are possible in connection with the recent decision of the League of Nations on the 16th December relating to the Turkish-Irak frontier.

Mr. Baldwin also wishes me to renew to you his assurance that he cordially reciprocates the desire of your Government for the promotion of the friendliest relations between our two countries, and that he proposes to spare no effort to achieve that end.

Believe me, &c.

W. TYRRELL.

[E 137/62/65]

No. 6.

Note communicated to the Prime Minister by the Turkish Ambassador, January 5, 1926.—(Received in Foreign Office January 6.)

LE Gouvernement turc est animé de l'espoir que son point de vue concernant le programme à suivre dans la question de la délimitation de la frontière turco-irakienne s'est dégagé clairement des négociations qui ont eu lieu jusqu'à présent et des déclarations officielles qui ont été faites à diverses occasions.

Le Gouvernement turc est convaincu que dans le différend du vilayet de Mossoul, qui est en réalité une question de souveraineté territoriale en même temps qu'une

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question de paix et de sécurité, la fixation d'une frontière stable est d'une importance primordiale.

Le Gouvernement turc est prêt à reprendre de nouvelles négociations pour régler le différend existant entre les deux États.

Le choix d'Angora comme lieu de négociations convient également au Gouvernement turc.

Ce dernier, dans la ligne de conduite qu'il a jusqu'ici suivie, n'a pas manqué, dès le début, de manifester ses préférences pour une solution directe de la question entre les deux Gouvernements.

La Turquie, prenant en considération la nature et l'importance de l'heureux épanouissement qui résulterait dans les relations des deux Puissances par suite de la solution de ce différend, s'est toujours, à condition d'arriver à un résultat final, désistée des réclamations qui ne lui étaient pas d'un intérêt vital.*

Les propositions que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique voudra bien faire pour les pourparlers relatifs à la fixation de la frontière dans le territoire contesté et pour la procédure qu'il suivra dans ces pourparlers permettront de prévoir le résultat des négociations.

La Turquie désire très sincèrement vivre en termes de parfaite et cordiale amitié avec la Grande-Bretagne.

Il est particulièrement désirable que le différend unique qui existe entre les deux pays aboutisse à un heureux résultat.

*Ambassade de Turquie, Londres,
le 5 janvier 1926.*

[E 226/226/44]

No. 7.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 11.)

(No. 6. Confidential.)

Sir,

Constantinople, January 6, 1926.

IN my despatches Nos. 942 and 945 of last week I reproduced some of the sayings of Tewfik Rushdi Bey to various diplomats on his passage through Constantinople on the 28th ultimo.

2. While the German Ambassador was with him the talk turned on the approaching adhesion of Germany to the League of Nations, and Herr Nadolny said something about Turkey's being now far from taking any such step. Tewfik Rushdi replied that it was so and that the matter was at present academic. The Ambassador said it was more than that—it was impossible. Turkey had bound herself not to enter into any combination directed against Russia; Russia would certainly maintain that the League was so directed and would not allow Turkey to join it. Tewfik Rushdi was startled at this idea; he maintained rather indignantly that the League was not in any way aimed against Russia and said he would have to combat vigorously any suggestion that it was.

3. It is interesting to see Tewfik Rushdi reacting strongly against a suggestion that Turkey is now bound irretrievably to Russia in any particular.

4. The French Ambassador has given me no precise details of what passed between himself and the Minister, but expresses the conviction that Tewfik Rushdi had been much sobered by the conversation he had had with M. Briand. M. Sarraut thinks that he now only seeks some face-saving arrangement, but that at present Turkey would not consider that anything less than the cession of Mosul town would meet the case.

5. Last of all the foreign representatives came the Persian Ambassador. By this time Tewfik Rushdi had been talking incessantly for seven hours; he was in a high state of febrility and was moving at a terrific speed; Tabatabai, who is no mean talker, was left miles behind from the moment he entered the room, when the Minister informed him that war was inevitable and that the alliance of Yugoslavia and Russia was assured. From the latter unlimited ammunition would be obtained. The plan was to abandon Constantinople to the English if they chose to take it and to retreat to the interior of Anatolia, and for every pound Turkey spent Great Britain would have to put down fifty. The Ambassador was quite dazed at this and had no opportunity to say anything

* This paragraph has been amended at the request of the Turkish Ambassador.

at all, and at ten minutes past ten the Minister, having completed a busy day's work, joined the dinner party which had been waiting for him since half-past eight.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad and to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 216/62/65]

No. 8.

Ahmed Ferid Bey to Sir W. Tyrrell.—(Received January 11.)

*Ambassade de Turquie, Londres,
le 9 janvier 1926.*

Chère Excellence,

J'AI l'honneur de vous accuser réception de la lettre que vous avez bien voulu m'adresser en date du 5 courant.

Lors de notre entrevue du 5 janvier, j'avais communiqué textuellement à son Excellence le Premier Ministre la réponse de mon Gouvernement au désir que le Cabinet britannique avait manifesté pour la reprise des négociations.

Comme votre Excellence a dû le remarquer, la réponse de mon Gouvernement aux propositions britanniques ne contenait aucune allusion se rapportant de près ou de loin aux délibérations de la Société des Nations, et j'informai M. le Président du Conseil que j'en comprenais que mon Gouvernement désirait, uniquement pour arriver à déterminer une frontière acceptable de part et d'autre dans les territoires contestés, que la question fût remise en discussion, sans aucune réserve.

J'avais, en outre, eu le plaisir d'ajouter que mon Gouvernement était animé des meilleures intentions pour arriver à une bonne entente et que, en agissant avec une bonne volonté réciproque, on était certain d'arriver à un résultat satisfaisant.

Je vous priai, d'autre part, afin de faciliter les négociations, d'éviter de mentionner dans les communications, la recommandation et la décision formulée par la Société des Nations.

Du désir exprimé par son Excellence le Premier Ministre, à l'issue de notre entrevue, de donner à l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté britannique en Turquie l'instruction de se rendre à Angora, j'avais compris que ce voyage devrait être entrepris pour entamer des négociations en vue de régler la question d'une frontière acceptable de part et d'autre, et j'avais avisé mon Gouvernement dans ce sens.

J'ai transmis télégraphiquement à mon Gouvernement la teneur de la lettre du 5 janvier de votre Excellence, tout en lui adressant le texte par courrier.

En réponse aux informations que je lui ai télégraphiées, je viens d'être invité par mon Gouvernement d'aviser votre Excellence que le Gouvernement de la République, lors des négociations qui seront entreprises à Angora et de l'examen des propositions qui lui seront faites ainsi que dans les contre-propositions qu'il fera, se basera sur ce principe qu'il se trouve en face d'une question pendante et non encore résolue et, sous cette réserve, est prêt à entrer en pourparlers, dans l'espoir d'arriver à une entente finale.

Mon Gouvernement enregistre avec une grande satisfaction les nouvelles assurances du Gouvernement britannique de répondre cordialement au désir du Gouvernement turc pour l'établissement des relations les plus amicales entre nos deux pays et son intention de ne rien ménager afin d'arriver à ce but.

Je suis également chargé de renouveler à votre Excellence les sentiments de cordialité réciproque que le Gouvernement de la République nourrit à l'égard du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

A. FERID.

No. 9.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 12.)

(No. 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, January 11, 1926.

I HAVE sent Helm to Angora to try to secure Salih's house on lease for period which will elapse before we complete purchase. If, as I hope, he succeeds, I might go to Angora myself in about a week. Meanwhile I think no harm is done by proceeding without precipitation.

Turkish delegate here has communicated to me verbally substance of a second note to you from Turkish Ambassador, according to which, apparently, Turkish Government stipulates that in conversations about to take place no mention, direct or indirect, shall be made of Geneva proceedings. I said to delegate that your declarations to Turkish Ambassador should have been regarded by Angora as wide enough to afford them satisfaction. I had myself intended in forthcoming conversations to avoid the past, simply because that line of discussion would not help matters, but that I thought it very foolish of Turkish Government to put stipulations of this sort in an official note.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 1.)

No. 10.

Sir W. Tyrrell (for the Secretary of State) to Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople).

(No. 7.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 14, 1926.

YOUR telegram No. 4 of 11th January: Mosul negotiations.

We have received letter from Turkish Ambassador in sense communicated to you. Nevertheless, it is desirable, in order to avoid any appearance of not wishing to give effect to Ministers' statements in House of Commons, &c., expressing willingness to negotiate, that you should proceed to Angora to hear what Turkish Government desire to say. If, however, Turks stipulate as *sine qua non* discussion of subject *de novo*, you must express regret at the inability of His Majesty's Government to ignore decision of Council and their promise loyally to observe it, and return to Constantinople.

No. 11.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 29.)

(No. [18].)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, January 28, 1926.

I HAVE to-day returned from Angora, where I had two interviews with Minister for Foreign Affairs and one with Prime Minister.

With former, conversations were friendly and, on the whole, quite businesslike. There was in his language an absence, though unusual and incomplete, of quibbles, insincerities and false arguments. We soon disposed of preliminary question of conditions or reservations formulated in note of 9th January from Turkish Ambassador in London. I made it unmistakably clear that views of His Majesty's Government as to Geneva proceedings were radically different from those of Turkey in the note, and on this Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his readiness to continue conversations, each side, as he said, maintaining its own opinion.

I said that I had come to ascertain what adjustments were possible to facilitate matters for Turkish Government, and to do so I was anxious to find what were reasons of State underlying their wide territorial demands. He said first point was question of security as affected by Kurdish situation. With Persian Kurds he said that no trouble need be anticipated, but with passing of any considerable number of Kurds under a third Power interminable difficulty was to be anticipated. He gave an odd turn to this question by maintaining, I think insincerely, that southern Kurds would always be desirous of joining themselves to their kinsmen in Turkey, and would therefore be impelled to organise constant raids across northern frontier and keep up a state of perpetual insecurity. He said that Turkey did not wish to incorporate Arabs in the State and that Turkish Government had no hostility to Irak and no desire to reconquer lost territories. He referred more than once sympathetically to "Arab ethnic [entity]." Turkey had no fear of any Arab aggressiveness against herself. It is particularly to be noticed that he stated no arguments in favour of inclusion of Mosul town in Turkey.

Another point made was what he called "floating frontier." At a previous stage of dealings between the two countries, he said, frontier claimed or held by Great Britain during last six years had been steadily pushed further north till now we have a *de facto* line more unfavourable than that of rejected Treaty of Sèvres. To convince

Turkey of permanence of any arrangement now made, frontier must go a good way back to the south.

I asked him to develop idea he had in mind at Geneva, when he had suggested a guarantee pact. He replied that, presupposing settlement of a frontier, he had contemplated a three-Power pact, including Persia, and guarantee of joint frontiers between them; then later on he had hoped for a similar pact for Syrian frontier bringing in French. This, he said, would have necessitated conclusion of similar arrangements with Russians, and so attainment of her final aim, which was neutralisation of Turkey.

He made no mention of any idea of demilitarisation, though I gave him every opportunity. I also ascertained that commercial [adjustments] had no attraction for him. He was not in the least interested in a scheme for transit of Turkish goods through Irak to Basra, which has been mentioned in a newspaper.

With Prime Minister I had a good deal more difficulty. He told me quite frankly that he wanted to leave Mosul negotiations solely to Minister for Foreign Affairs and did not wish to discuss it with me, and I found it hard to make him talk till quite at the end, when he relaxed somewhat. He said at one moment that possession of Mosul City was the crux of the whole question, but perhaps the remark may be discounted somewhat, as it was in reply to a challenge which I put. He referred to Kurdish question, as he did last [November], but rather subordinated it in importance to territorial and frontier question. Latter, he said, was only aggravated by existence of former. He referred to Minister for Foreign Affairs' suggestion about "floating frontier," saying that, as a result of it, everyone in Eastern Turkey and Western Persia now believed that English intended to push to Van and that resulting disquietude was intolerable. The frontier to be fixed could not be acceptable unless it was such that tribes would be convinced by its nature that it was final and that no further expansion northwards would take place.

My general impression is that Turkish Government have now made up their mind to give up claim to Mosul town, but that they are determined to obtain a cession of territory further east and to have as much as they can possibly get. I obtained no indication as to what line would satisfy them. I do not think that they have any idea of other alleviations in their mind at present.

General atmosphere at Angora is calm and there is no longer any talk of war. The tone with regard to my visit, both at the capital and in Constantinople press, is one of indifference and scepticism over outcome of negotiations. This, I think, is an inspired *mot d'ordre*.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 2.)

No. 12.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 29.)

(No. [19].)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, January 29, 1926.

[REFERENCE omitted.]

Neither of Ministers mentioned internal prestige of Government as a factor impelling them to demand concessions from His Majesty's Government, but it was stated very explicitly to me by Yunus Nadi, a scurrilous Deputy-journalist, who is well in the presidential circle. He said British pressure over Mosul question was constituting a peril to the republican régime. I think this is true. The hat orders have caused wide dissatisfaction to lower classes. New taxation proposals are likely to make it extend to upper classes, while new civil code, which is to be voted *en bloc* in a few days by Assembly and put into force at once, affecting as it does whole status of the family, and of women in particular, is giving serious misgivings even to President's friends. Thus, though Government is strong, it is also menaced at its base. If, as I believe is the case, it is to the interest of His Majesty's Government that present secular and republican régime should continue in Turkey, then this matter of prestige is an argument in favour of finding some solution for Mosul question which will give Turkish Government something to be proud of.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 10.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, January 29, 1926.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

I had intended to return to Angora in about a week and continue discussions with Turkish Government until you were ready for any further step, but I fear this idea will not work. Both Turkish Ministers were restive under cross-examination and showed impatience to get to business. If, therefore, I revisit the capital as I had meant to, I feel sure I shall elicit no further information as to Turkish views, and I might do more harm than good. If there is any specific point on which you require further enlightenment or have any message of any sort for Angora, I could either go there or communicate through Turkish delegate here, but at present I am in a quandary as to how to proceed and should be most grateful for any guidance you can give me within the next three or four days.

[E 752/62/65]

No. 14.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 45. Confidential.)

Sir,

Angora, January 22, 1926.

I ARRIVED at Angora yesterday to negotiate with the Turkish Government regarding the Irak frontier question, and I had an interview with Tewfik Rushdi Bey in the evening. As a late hour was fixed for our meeting our conversation lasted only three-quarters of an hour, and we only dealt with three preliminary questions.

1. I informed his Excellency that I desired, before entering on the main negotiation, to establish beyond possibility of doubt the meaning of the reservations to which the Turkish Government, according to Ferid Bey's note of the 9th January, were proposing to subject their participation in the conversation. I had no desire now, or in the forthcoming discussions, to harp on the past; to do so would probably not help towards an agreement; but as to what had passed at Geneva and before the League of Nations His Majesty's Government had very decided and definite views, and did not intend to abandon them; on the other hand, the views of the Turkish Government on the same matters, though not stated very categorically, seemed to be very different, and His Majesty's Government could not admit their justification. It seemed to me that the language you had used to Ferid Bey in your conversation with him of the 5th December opened the door sufficiently wide for future negotiation to be possible, and that without talking about any common basis we could easily find a starting point; but if the Turkish Government desired to involve us in any admission that we regarded the proceedings or decisions of the League of Nations as "nul et non avenue," then he must understand that our negotiation was menaced by an extreme peril from the very outset. Tewfik Rushdi answered that the object of the Turkish Government was to eliminate from the discussion topics alien to it and which, if the discussion happily were to result in an agreement, would cease to have anything but academic importance; his language was all in the sense that the Turkish Government did not stipulate that we should abandon any rights we may have acquired at Geneva, but as his language was not without ambiguity, I took Ferid's note of the 9th January and read out the following passage:—

"Le Gouvernement de la République, lors des négociations qui seront entreprises à Angora . . . se basera sur ce principe, qu'il se trouve en face d'une question pendante et non résolue, et, sous cette réserve, est prêt à entrer en pourparlers. . . ."

It was unnecessary, I said, to state precisely what the views of His Majesty's Government were, but I must say that they were radically different from those of the Turkish Government, as defined by Ferid Bey in the passage quoted above. Was his Excellency, nevertheless, ready to proceed with the conversations? Tewfik Rushdi replied that he was ready; each side might hold its own views as to Geneva and yet negotiate; if the negotiation failed, then the two rival views might have to come into conflict. On this reply I felt that I could proceed.

I asked Tewfik Rushdi Bey why he had sent his note and formulated his reserve, which seemed to me rather pointless. His answer was that he had had to do it because Geneva was referred to in Sir W. Tyrrell's note of the 5th January, an answer at which I could not help smiling when I had looked again to see what Sir W. Tyrrell had said. Another possible solution has occurred to me. Tewfik Rushdi is essentially shallow and imitative. It is a favourite trick of his to take something you have said, give it a dishonest twist, and shoot it back at you as his own. Now when I saw him in Constantinople on the 28th December I kept on saying to him "let's drop the past and talk about the future," and I think it quite possible that this "reserve," which he has made Ferid put in, is merely his own distorted reflection of my own attitude.

2. I then asked his Excellency with whom I was to negotiate, and expressed my pleasure at learning that it was to be with himself and not with a commission; but he also added "unless the circumstances of the negotiation require that it should be surrounded with special solemnity," a suggestion the meaning of which escaped me altogether. I then said that the widest issues were involved in our conversations, and that I was anxious to keep contact also with other Ministers, especially with Ismet Pasha with whom I should like to talk politics. To this Tewfik Rushdi assented, though he said that Ismet would not be able to give me answers about the negotiations; and he undertook to talk to him and arrange for me an appointment in the near future. I cannot, however, help remembering that the last time his Excellency rendered me this service the answer I got was that Ismet was unable to see me at all.

I am glad not to have a commission to deal with, and on the whole I am content to have to do with Tewfik Rushdi. He is a terrible person to deal with, but he has done a lot of negotiating with foreigners and has learned something of the necessity of give and take. He is said to be shaky in his office now, after his check at Geneva, and for the sake of his position is therefore personally anxious to come to terms; and I fear that if he went we might get worse. Shukri Kaya is mentioned as the most likely alternative. He was Fethi Bey's Foreign Minister in the early part of last year, and I should much prefer Tewfik Rushdi to him. However, while ready to talk with Tewfik, I am anxious to keep a back door open to Ismet, and with Tewfik's assent.

3. I then turned to another question. I said I was perfectly aware of the close relations which for long had existed between Turkey and Russia. With those relations I had no concern; I might have my own view as to the benefit that might accrue to Turkey from her friendship with Russia, but I would quite admit that Turkey could judge best for herself in such a matter. His Excellency would therefore remember that since he and I had been in relations together I had never even alluded to Russia in conversation with him. My attitude in the past therefore gave me to-day this right, namely, to request that in the negotiations now about to begin the Turkish Government would admit of no interference whatever on the part of the Russian Government. I was not at all sure that Russia would regard it as in her interest that Turkey and Great Britain should come to terms over Mosul; our negotiation was going to be difficult enough anyhow, and I must express the hope that the Turkish Government would not allow them to be hampered by extraneous influences. Tewfik Rushdi Bey thereupon started off on a tangent—then on another and yet another, and in half a minute was talking glibly about anything but Mosul and Russia. I waited awhile and then remarked that I had put a very simple matter before him, but that I was entirely unable to understand his answer. He then went off on the subject of Russian newspaper articles and his own independence of judgment, and after being twice brought back to the subject, he steadied down and at last informed me quite distinctly that of course the Turkish Government would admit of no such interference by Russia in the Mosul discussions. To conclude, he said to me: "Je vous dis tout franchement que je mène une politique très liée avec les Russes, mais chacun de nous reste entièrement libre chez soi." The observation, I think, is very likely true, but I dare say it was intended to frighten rather than to reassure me.

When I introduced this topic to Tewfik Rushdi I had expected to receive nothing but instantaneous and voluble assurances that no interference would take place, and I was quite surprised to see how completely his Excellency was taken aback at my question; he was quite a time talking sheer nonsense while trying to collect his thoughts. I am at a loss to explain his emotion. The natural thing to suppose is that he has promised the Russians to keep them *au courant* of what passes; yet if he had done so, he would surely have been all the readier with the assurance

he finally gave. He may have thought that, familiar with his well-known Russophile proclivities, I was starting an attack on his own position as negotiator or as Minister, yet this is rather far-fetched. No certainty can be had, and conjecture is useless.

I should perhaps mention that the Tewfik Rushdi of yesterday was very different from the man I saw last month in Constantinople, just back from Geneva, Paris and Belgrade, excited and talking thirteen to the dozen. Yesterday, except in the last few minutes, he was cautious and almost reticent, and he refrained from taking any initiative in bringing up subjects for discussion or in suggesting any ideas. I am to see him again to-morrow.

I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Irak and to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 753/62/65]

No. 15.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 46. Confidential.)

Sir,

Angora, January 24, 1926.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 45 of the 22nd January respecting the negotiations about the Irak frontier, I have the honour to report that I had a second interview with Tewfik Rushdi Bey last evening. As on the previous occasion, his Excellency seemed unwilling to open the conversation, and I, for my part, was not unwilling to take the initiative and to start talk in the channel that best suited.

2. I led off by saying that we were now confronted by a situation which, as His Majesty's Government knew, caused dissatisfaction to Turkey, and I myself was now in Angora to discover what *accommodements* could be found to render the situation more acceptable to the republic. The difficulty of my task was that I found myself in great ignorance of what it was that the republic really desired. I was aware of a persistent demand for territory—the more the better—but the mere acquisition of territory in itself was no object of policy, and might be only a source of weakness to the acquirer. Behind the demand for territory there must be solid reasons of State, and it was these reasons of State which I was anxious to ascertain and report to you, so that His Majesty's Government might know the exact dimensions of the problem. It would be useless to present His Majesty's Government with suggestions based on misstatement of fact; the British authorities had now administered Irak for six years and they knew all about the country—its population, ethnology, commerce and aspirations. His Excellency and I were there to talk frankly together and it was useless for us to try to gain advantage by deceiving each other or to score off each other by verbal victories.

3. Hereupon, Tewfik Rushdi took up the thread of the discourse and held it mainly for the rest of the interview, though I frequently had to interrupt in order to elucidate his meaning. His Excellency is always voluble, and, at best, almost incomprehensible, and in reporting what he said I despair of reproducing the order of his arguments or the language in which he clothed them. The utmost I can do is to endeavour to give you their general sense as accurately as may be.

4. The first point was security as affected by the Kurdish question. With the Kurds of Persia Turkey had no concern; they were entirely rooted in the Persian Empire, they were Shiah, and their existence caused no trouble in Turkey. But with the allotment of a considerable number of Kurds to another State a situation of permanent danger and insecurity arose. The republic aimed at having a compact territory comprising all that existed of those ethnic elements of which it already consisted, and it must have all the Kurds outside Persia. Arabs, said the Minister, were not wanted, and their inclusion in the Turkish State could only be a source of weakness. More than once he referred to Arab ethnic unity. He was not afraid of Irak aggressiveness; Arab irredentism, such as it was, lay in a different direction; nor could there be any danger of Turkish aggressiveness now. Under an Imperial or Ottoman régime it would be different, but the republic had quite other aims. As to the nature of the Kurdish danger, Tewfik Rushdi surprised me. It was not that the Turkish Government feared the creation of discontent among their own Kurds, whose eyes would be turned to their compatriots across the Irak frontier—at least so he said. On the contrary, he anticipated that the Southern Kurds, being a

minority, and with a certain hostile complex against the Arabs, would be permanently dissatisfied with their lot, and perpetually endeavouring to increase their own ethnic importance by exciting the sympathy of their Turkish kinsmen. They would be impelled thus to create a lasting state of unrest on the frontier by organising raids across it, and they would influence the Irak Government to sympathise with and encourage their efforts.

5. This astonishing diagnosis of the Kurdish situation seems to me, and no doubt is, sheer nonsense, and the boot really is on the other leg. I did not hide my surprise, and I questioned Tewfik Rushdi closely as to his views, assuring him that the Southern Kurds, so far as I knew, were fairly content, and enjoyed a favourable position in Irak politics. I therefore feel that, nonsensical as the theory seems to me, I have correctly reproduced what the Minister said; but, as to what he thinks, it strikes me, on reflection, that he may have remembered that some time ago he denied to me that the Southern Kurds would cause any unrest among the Turkish tribes. A feeling of false pride now would prevent him both from going back on something he once told me, and from admitting the existence of any weakness in the Turkish body politic; and he would argue to himself that he could emphasise to me the Kurdish danger, and it would not matter whether that danger proceeded from north to south or from south to north—it would create the same impression on my mind. I rather incline to think, therefore, that Tewfik Rushdi's talk is merely emphasis on a point which I have drawn your attention to long since, though he has disguised it in a foolish manner, and though he knew that I had had a direct admission of the truth from Ismet Pasha.

6. I told him I did not see how Irak could divest herself of her Kurdish mountains without giving herself a completely indefensible frontier against invasion from the north. At the mere danger of hostilities the military frontier of Irak would have to be drawn back to the Diala. To grant such a concession would make Irak's existence impossible, and we could not do it. Tewfik Rushdi endeavoured at length to prove the contrary, but his arguments were of an elusive nature and I am unable to reproduce them.

7. He made two, what he called, psychological points. The first was what he called the "floating frontier." When hostilities ended, the line was south of Mosul; then Mosul town was included in it; then it advanced in its eastern part; then came the Sèvres line, and soon after that Amadia was taken in; and at the Constantinople Conference an effort was made for a line in Hakkari Vilayet. To-day we have a Brussels line more unfavourable than that of the Treaty of Sèvres, which Turkey rejected. Every international contact had resulted in something worse for Turkey, and to-day the mind of the country was such that it would not believe in permanence of any settlement unless the line took a good turn back to the south. This is an argument which is played on a good deal in the Turkish Red Book of last September. I am always surprised that it is not exploited more vigorously.

8. The other "psychological" point he made was that, at the Lausanne Conference, a line had been privately hinted at by Sir W. Tyrrell, that the Turkish Government had decided not to accept it, and that no Government could to-day face the Assembly and recommend it to accept less. I expressed my ignorance of this transaction and asked him how the line ran, but he was very vague in his reply, and I am not sure that he himself knew, but he implied that it included Suleimanieh. I believe, however, though I am not sure, that really Sir W. Tyrrell at Lausanne, with Lord Curzon's approval, indicated to Ismet Pasha, by a gesture of his hand across the map, a line running through the neighbourhood of Rowanduz. This is the first time I have ever heard the incident alluded to by a Turk.

9. Then came a juridical argument—that of sovereign right. Sovereignty, he said, could pass either by the complete incorporation of a vanquished State, or, failing that, only in virtue of a treaty. If a treaty was forced on a State, nothing but bad relations could ensue; if there was no treaty, but merely the perpetuation of a *de facto* situation, then legality was set aside. I disputed this. International law, I said, was not fixed, and the rise and development of the League was creating whole new chapters. It seemed to me that in certain conditions the League could give valid title to territory, treaty or no treaty.

10. Finally, his Excellency suggested to me that we had had enough beating about the bush and that we should come now to concrete proposals. I said I was not prepared to make any proposal; I still had a lot to find out; I did not see that there was any good in he and I fencing together as to who should make the first move; perhaps in talking together some idea would come up of which neither of us could

claim sole authorship; there was only one diplomatic victory to be won in this business, and that lay in the conclusion of an agreement, and it would be shared equally between the two parties. If I found a suggestion agreeable to His Majesty's Government and likely to help Turkey, I would put it forward at once, and I hoped he would act likewise. With these sentiments his Excellency agreed, and, as he had attended an aviation ball the previous evening, had gone to bed only at 9.30 in the morning and was showing visible signs of physical fatigue, I took my leave.

11. I came away with two strong impressions. The first is that Tewfik Rushdi Bey was genuinely anxious for serious business. He was quiet and moderate in manner and there were no fireworks, exaggeration or claptrap. There was an abundance of common ground on which we could both stand for purposes of argument. I think he was genuinely endeavouring to be sincere, though, as I have reported, he had one terrible lapse. Still, I may say he was quite at his best.

12. The second point is more significant. We talked a lot about the Southern Kurds—never once did he mention Mosul town or attempt to adduce any arguments for its incorporation in Turkey. On the contrary, he admitted freely and more than once the existence of Arab ethnic entity and the perfect legitimacy of it. These are encouraging signs, but, as they may not last, I do not propose to report them to you by telegraph till I return to Constantinople, probably on the 28th January.

13. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Irak and to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 754/62/65]

No. 16.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 47. Confidential.)

Sir,

Angora, January 25, 1926.

IN continuation of my despatches Nos. 45 and 46 of the 22nd and 24th January respecting negotiations with the Turkish Government on the Irak frontier question, I have the honour to report that I had a third interview this evening with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. I may say at once that the conversation took place with the same tone and general character which had marked my two previous talks with his Excellency.

2. I reminded Tewfik Rushdi Bey that when at Geneva in September last he had put forward a proposal for the solution of the Mosul question which, presupposing the settlement of some frontier line, contemplated also a guarantee pact of States and other subsidiary arrangements too. I was aware that his proposal had come to nothing because there was then no agreement possible on the frontier line, but by turning over old and discarded ideas it might be possible to find in them some element of value at the present time, and I should be grateful if he would develop to me the thoughts that were in his mind at the time when he made his suggestion.

3. Tewfik Rushdi told me that his suggestion had been made by himself on his own authority and without specific instructions from his Government, though the general trend of the orders he had received assured him that his action would not be disavowed. His idea, in its simplest expression, had been that Turkey, Great Britain and Irak should, having agreed on a line, guarantee that line in a solemn manner, and so induce in the whole complex of States a feeling of security and permanence. He agreed with my remark that this was no more than was done by any and every treaty fixing a frontier, but he had been anxious to include Persia in order that, when Great Britain's mandate in Irak terminated, there should still be a third Power interested closely in the region and committed to ensuring the permanence of the territorial arrangements. But this was not all. The Turko-Persian-Irak frontier knot was not the only one; there was also the Turko-Syrian-Irak point of meeting, and he would have wished—perhaps later on—to have a similar guarantee for this part of the frontier also, bringing in Russia also, and the result would be what he most desired, namely, a Turkey not in equilibrium among various forces, but neutralised between them.

4. These remarks of Tewfik Rushdi's struck me as being very interesting, though I must say he put them forward in a very academic manner and not in the least as if he regarded them as matters now of any practical importance. I was not called on to

make any observations in regard to them, and the conversation passed on to other features of his Geneva proposal which are of less importance. He made no mention whatever of the demilitarisation part of that proposal, though I gave him every chance to do so. As to the economic features of it, I ascertained that he was not interested in the least in any idea of facilities for Turkish trade to transit through Irak to the port of Basra.

5. We then had a good deal of conversation on matters of no particular importance, and as I was about to leave Tewfik Rushdi Bey began again to suggest that I should commit myself soon to some concrete proposals. He said that interest was aroused in the negotiations and that he would be pressed to state how they were progressing; at present he would be unable to make any reply. I answered, as before, that I was in Angora, as he knew, to ascertain what *accommodements* were possible to render the situation more acceptable to the Turkish Government, and at present I was not ready to make any proposals at all to him. He said he expected to have to reply to interpellations in the Assembly, and I remarked that I supposed that he could, as Ministers do in other countries, reply that it would not be in the interest of the negotiation to make any public declaration. He said he could indeed adopt an attitude of reserve, but was it to be a pessimistic or an optimistic reserve? He even began to sketch out the answer he might return to an interpellation. I expressed my regret at being unable to advise him what he could best say to his Assembly.

6. I am to see Ismet Pasha to-morrow. The day after I return to Constantinople, where I propose to remain for seven or eight days before returning here again.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Irak and to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

No. 17.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople).

(No. 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 2, 1926.

YOUR telegram No. 10 of 29th January: Angora negotiations.

Whole matter is being sympathetically considered, but it is quite impossible to send any definite reply for some time. This, then, is merely to explain that it would in my opinion be undesirable for you to return to Angora for the present.

[E 884/62/65]

No. 18.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 52.)

Sir,

Constantinople, February 2, 1926.

IN continuation of my despatches Nos. 45–47 of last week about the Irak frontier negotiations, I have the honour to report that, as regards my conversation with Ismet Pasha, which took place on the 26th ultimo, I have really little information to add to what I have already given in my telegram No. 8 of the 28th January. His Excellency, though courteous and friendly as always, gave me to understand from the very outset that he was not proposing to conduct the negotiations, and that it was his fixed principle to avoid the system followed in Ottoman days, when the Grand Vizier was perpetually interfering in the business of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. It was therefore Tewfik Rushdi who must conduct the frontier negotiations. He evinced reluctance to talk about Mosul at all, and availed himself of any opportunity to turn the conversation into other channels, and I have no doubt that, realising that I was in Angora to discover, if possible, how cheaply Turkey could be pacified, he considered it well that I should not have the advantage of cross-examining two persons separately on the subject. He does not often receive foreign representatives, and I attribute the fact that he received me this time merely to his reluctance to offend His Majesty's Government again at this present juncture by a refusal such as I received last May. The result is that the conversation was not, on the whole, on the comparatively businesslike lines which Tewfik Rushdi and I had followed, and his Excellency seemed to welcome

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opportunities of launching into barren discussions about such things as the report of the League's sub-commission and unrest in the Suleimanieh district. He recalled, however, what he had said to me last November about the existence of Kurds in Irak causing perpetual trouble in Turkey, but he said that it was now essentially a territorial and frontier question, and that that question was only aggravated by the fact that the frontier affected the destinies of Kurds. Throughout that part of the country now nobody believed that the British advance northwards was ever going to cease, and the resulting unrest throughout the whole region was inducing an intolerable state of affairs. I said I could perhaps understand Turkey's difficulties about the Kurds, but I could not see why she insisted on claiming Mosul town, which was Arab. On this he sat up and said that Mosul town was the crux of the whole matter, and, when I asked why, answered with energy that it was a vital interest to Turkey. I think my challenge was rather too direct and that in the circumstances he could hardly have answered otherwise, but it is not easy to be subtle when you are yelling at the top of your voice into the ear of a deaf man. He disclaimed any desire of territory for Turkey *per se* and other than was necessary for Turkey's security, and reminded me reproachfully that in last March I had said to him that Turkey was aiming at recovering the frontiers of the old Ottoman Empire. I replied that I might have thought so then, and many people in England thought so still, but that I had got to know Turkey better since then and had personally abandoned that opinion. It was to find out what Turkey's real aims and desires were, and what solid reasons underlay her demand for territory, that I was interviewing his Excellency to-day. This seemed to strike Ismet Pasha as reasonable; he thought for some moments and, after searching for words in which to clothe his thoughts, brought out something in the nature of a formula: the frontier, to be acceptable to the Turkish Government, must be of a nature to give satisfaction to Turkey and to convince the people residing in the frontier region that finality had been reached and that there would be no further advance of the line to the northwards.

2. Like Tewfik Rushdi Bey, Ismet Pasha expressed disappointment that so much time should be spent in preliminaries and the desire that we should enter into the heart of the business at once—in other words, that His Majesty's Government should make concrete proposals. I explained to him, too, as I had to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, what the position was. He asked me very insistently whether I was pessimistic or optimistic as to the situation. Having heard that Tewfik Rushdi had been expressing himself in the gloomiest terms about my attitude and behaviour, I confined myself to telling Ismet that I was not as pessimistic as the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

3. When leaving, I asked his Excellency if I might come and see him again in the course of the negotiations. He answered that he was always happy to see foreign representatives and would always be glad to see me and chat, but that it must not be about Mosul, which was the province of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. It seems to me that I still have a door open to Ismet Pasha, but that I had better not attempt to use it unless a serious emergency arises in the future course of the negotiations.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 961/62/65]

No. 19.

Sir A. Grant Duff to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 10.)

(No. 28.)

(Extract.)

Stockholm, January 29, 1926.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 27 of the 27th instant, I have the honour to inform you that in the course of the debate therein reported M. Östen Undén, the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, made a statement upon certain foreign questions, including that of Mosul.

7. M. Undén then passed to the Mosul question. He emphasised the fact that the task imposed on the League was a delicate one. It was never seriously suggested that the League should refuse to settle the dispute, inasmuch as both parties had appealed to it. The parties had undertaken to abide by the decision of the League. The speaker next dealt with the view that Sweden should never have undertaken the duty of being reporter. According to the rules of the Council, the chairman decided

who should be reporter in a question. A country could not refuse to undertake that duty. Sweden accepted the post of reporter when M. Trygger was Prime Minister, and M. Ljunglund should apply to the head of the former Conservative Government for information as to the reasons which made it inexpedient to decline the nomination as reporter.

8. On the reception of the report of the Commission of Investigation, of which a Swedish diplomatist was chairman, the Council had naturally to consider it. The sub-committee of the Council appointed for this purpose was impeded in its work by the fact that new divergencies as to the functions of the Council arose. The sub-committee was compelled to lay the situation before the Council in order that a solution of the difficulty might be arrived at.

9. The British delegate had already suggested that, if there were any doubts as to the competence of the Council as an arbitrator, the matter should be referred to the International Tribunal at The Hague. M. Undén had himself no doubt on the point, but his colleagues considered it advisable that the question should be so referred, as also the question respecting the system of voting which should be applied. The decision of the court of justice on both points was accepted by the Council.

10. The discussions in the Council were based on the report of the commission. Convincing proof was given that a plebiscite could not be carried out. The majority of the population, however, wished to be united with Irak, provided Great Britain retained the mandate for some years. According to one of the solutions proposed, Mosul was to remain unchanged. A division of the territory was also suggested. The Council decided against the latter alternative.

11. The whole question was a typical dispute as to interests to which no distinct rules applied. M. Ljunglund's assertion that the Council had "departed from the sphere of right in order to betake itself to that of might" rested on a misunderstanding. The settlement was left to the Council and this was the view taken by the International Tribunal at The Hague. As regards the condition which the Council thought it advisable to link with its decision, viz., that Great Britain should retain the mandate for twenty-five years, the Minister for Foreign Affairs emphasised the fact that, in the event of Great Britain refusing to accept, the Council would have to take up the question for further consideration.

12. M. Undén pointed out that the dispute concerned the relations between two States—Turkey and Irak—which were outside the League of Nations, and added that the Covenant did not contain express stipulations as to the responsibility of the League for mandated territories, while the conditions of the mandate did contain rules which apparently assumed that the mandatory Power had a certain responsibility towards the League as regards the limitation of the mandated territory to definite boundaries. As the parties had referred the question to the League it would have been deplorable if no decision had been taken. If the Council had not been unanimous, the result would have been a continuation of the *status quo*—that is to say, the territory south of the Brussels line would have been incorporated with Irak, but no means of determining the question in a legal manner would have been available. Such a state of things would hardly have been favourable to peace. The Swedish representative would have assumed a serious responsibility if he had broken up the unanimity of the Council and had thus done away with the possibility of settling the question on the lines indicated in the Treaty of Lausanne.

13. There was no reason to think that there was any risk of a conflict. The tension appeared to have already relaxed.

14. M. Undén declared that he could not understand what M. Ljunglund meant when the latter said that the foreign policy of Sweden was too active in comparison with her means of defence. Did M. Ljunglund really think that the Swedish Government could have carried out another policy if the country had a stronger army and navy? He was unable to credit the honourable member with such "primitive" ideas, and accordingly he made no attempt to grasp his meaning. The Minister for Foreign Affairs added that he had taken note of M. Ljunglund's recommendations and advice in the Mosul question with the greatest satisfaction, but he also confessed that he had valued still more highly the advice which he had received during the discussion of the question from the members of his staff, who were drawn from the most efficient and sagacious members of the Swedish Foreign Department.

Speeches delivered by Mr. Amery and Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons on February 18, 1926.

ANGLO-IRAK TREATY.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES (Mr. Amery): I beg to move—

“That this House approves the treaty signed between representatives of His Majesty and of the King of Irak, in order to fulfil the stipulation made by the Council of the League of Nations in connection with the settlement of the Irak boundary.”

It is just two months since the Prime Minister asked this House to approve the action taken by the representatives of the Government at Geneva in accepting the award of the League of Nations in connection with the Irak frontier. In commending that resolution to the House, the Prime Minister showed, and showed conclusively, I think, that the line pursued by the Government in this matter involved no new departure in policy, no violation of assurances and pledges given to the House in the past, no fresh commitments of a costly, dangerous or unnecessary character, but that, on the contrary, it embodied and gave effect to the consistent policy pursued by each successive Government as they came face to face with the problem of our obligations, our interests and our responsibilities in the Middle East. Also, that it gave effect to the principle, approved by all parties, of extending as far as possible the use of the League of Nations as an instrument for the peaceful settlement of international differences and of strengthening by our support its authority for that purpose.

In doing so, the Prime Minister made it clear to the House that the approval which he invited it to give was only an approval of the general policy of the Government, and did not cover the actual detailed provisions of the new treaty which, in conformity with the decision of the League and the decision of this House, we proposed to conclude with Irak. He said the treaty would not be ratified before it had been submitted to this House for its approval. The House approved the Prime Minister's motion and affirmed the general policy of the Government by an overwhelming majority.

My duty to-day, in asking the House to approve the actual treaty now signed and awaiting ratification, is not to argue all over again the general case for our position in Irak, but to show that the terms of the treaty fulfil the stipulations laid down by the League of Nations, and that in so doing they have not exceeded or run counter to the general policy enunciated by the Prime Minister and accepted by the House.

Before doing so, however, I ought, perhaps, to say something about the alternative policy—if policy it be—which is advanced in the amendment put down officially by the Opposition. On the last occasion that this matter was before the House, hon. and right hon. gentlemen opposite decided that they could not decide on such a question within the short space afforded by a week-end, and they absented themselves from the debate. It may be due to the internal organisation of the party opposite, to the employment, shall I say, of propulsive rather than of tractive motive power, that their heavy artillery, though powerful, is not always very mobile. They have now had two months of preparation, and have been able successfully to push their big guns into position and train them at a definite target. [Hon. Members: “Successfully!”] Certainly, successfully that far. I would only add, for the hon. member's benefit, that it is the target of last December at which this amendment is aimed; it is aimed not at the motion which I have the honour to bring before the House, but at the motion which the Prime Minister introduced in December last. It is aimed not at this particular treaty, but at the whole principle of giving effect to the resolution of the League of Nations, which the House of Commons affirmed by an overwhelming majority while hon. members opposite were still engaged in making up their minds. Incidentally, I might add that the guns are now so trained as to fire, not only at the enemy on these benches, but into the backs of some of their own troops.

This amendment is not only a condemnation of His Majesty's Government, but it is equally a condemnation of their predecessors in office. The Prime Minister showed clearly in the last debate that the protocol of the treaty of 1923 contemplated

and provided explicitly for the renewal of our treaty relations with Irak after 1928. But if we concluded that treaty, it was the right hon. gentleman opposite who brought it before the League of Nations and who before the League assumed responsibility for it. More than that, Lord Parmoor, acting on behalf of the late Government, and more specifically on behalf of the right hon. gentleman who was then Foreign Secretary, gave a definite undertaking to the Council that, if by 1928 Irak had not been admitted to the League, the Council would be invited to decide what further measures were required to give effect to article 22 of the Covenant—in other words, to prolong the mandatory relationship. I really should like to ask hon. members opposite to look at M. Unden's report to the Council of the 16th December last, on which the decision of the Council was given. They will see, on p. 8 of that report, that this undertaking is not only quoted in its actual terms in order to show that the League was determined to insist that the mandatory relationship should not disappear before Irak entered the League, but also that the stipulation as to the submission of a new treaty which was attached to the fixing of the frontier was regarded by M. Unden and his colleagues as nothing more than securing the immediate fulfilment of Lord Parmoor's pledge. The treaty is Lord Parmoor's treaty as well as mine. It is not, however, only Lord Parmoor's dug-out which is threatened by the guns opposite. If there was anyone who stoutly defended the just claim of Irak to retain her territory, it was the right hon. gentleman the Member for Derby (Mr. Thomas). He defended it not only in word, but he defended it also in action. When he heard that there was some anxiety in Irak as to the exact line the Government here at home were taking, he telegraphed out—this was on the 28th July, 1924—a statement to be published throughout the length and breadth of Irak to the following effect. I had better, perhaps, quote the precise words:—

“His Majesty's Government has no intention whatever of abandoning their support of the frontier claim which they have brought forward on behalf of Irak at Constantinople.”

I may say that that was a rather larger claim than that which we have now accepted. Two months later the air forces, under the right hon. gentleman's orders, successfully repulsed a determined attempt by the Turks to invade Irak territory and to rush the position while the discussions were going on at Geneva. Now that the right hon. gentleman's efforts have been crowned with success, now that the frontier which he so stoutly defended in arms and which he vowed never to abandon is secure, having been recognised by the League of Nations and only awaiting the approval of this House in the treaty now before it in order to become definitely established in international law, he endorses an amendment which, if it were carried, would not only destroy the present treaty, but would mean the rejection of the whole award of the League, and would once more throw the whole question of Irak's frontier into the melting-pot. I hope, in justice to the right hon. gentleman, that the House by its vote to-night will prevent him from committing the crime of infanticide against his own policy.

The House need be under no illusion whatever as to what would be involved in the acceptance of this amendment. It would, of course, involve not only the rejection of the present treaty, but also the reversal of the policy affirmed by this House in December. It would mean the loss of that frontier for the sake of maintaining which the whole policy of this Government has been influenced during the last three years. It would mean that we should undo all the work of the last three Governments. It would mean more. It would mean that we should make ourselves ridiculous in the eyes of the League of Nations, contemptible in the eyes of the Turks, and odious in the eyes of the people of Irak, whom we should have betrayed. It would mean the desertion of Christian populations who, during the last seven or eight years, have experienced a freedom and happiness they never dreamt possible before, and who have had only too recent and too terrible an example in their immediate neighbourhood of what would be their fate if this amendment were carried.

MR. THURTLÉ: The old, old story!

MR. AMERY: It may be an old story, but I am glad to think it is not an altogether modern phase, for this country has always considered its responsibilities for the happiness and welfare of people in whose interests it has been directly concerned. At any rate, until 1928, if not for a much longer period, we should still be obliged to continue to support an Irak which would have no defensible frontier, whose revenue and resources would have shrunk away, whose country would be swarming with hordes of starving refugees, and to do so not with the prestige of

men who have kept their word, but dishonoured, discredited, and despised. It is under these conditions that the amendment of the right hon. gentleman opposite asks us to expedite the admission of Irak into the League of Nations. I can assure the House that the Government need no exhortation from the benches opposite on this subject. We are as eager as they to bring about that result, and in clause 3 of the treaty before us you will see that we have specially provided that this object should not be left out of sight, but should be brought before Irak at frequent and regular intervals.

MR. RAMSAY MACDONALD: It is worse than it was before.

MR. AMERY: Not at all. If the right hon. gentleman will read that clause carefully, he will see that it is without prejudice in any way to article 6, which states that at the earliest possible date we shall bring the matter before them. This provision of four years does not mean that in any month or in any year in those four years we may not actively consider the question of bringing Irak into the League before. I would say there is only one effective way of securing that. It is by securing her frontier, by enabling her to provide her own defence, by co-operation with her in the building up of a stable administration, and in the development of her economic resources; in other words, by the policy which we, following the right hon. gentleman opposite, have consistently pursued. The biggest step forward in that direction that could possibly be taken will be the approval which I hope the House will give to this treaty to-night. The most disastrous set-back to that policy, the policy urged in the second half of the right hon. gentleman's amendment, would be the acceptance of the first half of that amendment. I really wonder, when he put down that amendment what he conceived would be the actual measures that he would take, if he were responsible, if he rejected this frontier settlement, and if he had to begin all over again with a weaker hand to play and faced with all the actual practical problems which would be involved in the weakening of our position. This is not only a matter of treaty obligations, but it is also a question of the actual situation. Whatever the right hon. gentleman opposite may wish to put forward, now in opposition, he knows perfectly well, if he were in office, he could not simply clear out and abandon the situation in the Middle East to chaos.

Let me come to the actual terms of the treaty before the House. That treaty has been approved by both Houses of the Irak Legislature, and only awaits the approval of this House before it is ratified and brought before the Council of the League. As soon as that is done, the present frontier of Irak will, in pursuance of the decision of the League on the 16th September, become the definite frontier fixed in accordance with the provisions of article 3 of the Treaty of Lausanne, and the Turkish renunciation in article 16 of all rights and claims to any portion of the territory of Irak will become completely and finally effective. Of the three clauses in the treaty, the only one of any serious importance is the first. The second clause refers to a number of minor points, mostly of a departmental character, arising out of the existing military and financial agreements. The most important of these refer to the settlement of the claims of His Majesty's Government in respect of the actual value of certain transferred assets, works of public utility, railways, and so on, and members who are interested in these points will find them very fully dealt with in the appendix to the admirable report of the Financial Commission presided over by my right hon. friend the Member for Norwich (Mr. Hilton Young). These matters are also referred to in article 3, which, as I have already mentioned, also provides that the question of Irak's admission to the League shall be definitely brought up and actively considered at regular intervals of four years, as well as actively considered during the interval.

Now as to clause 1. In order to understand the full purport and effect of this clause it is essential that the House should have clearly in mind the existing treaty position. The main treaty of October 1922 established a general relationship between the British Government and Irak, and embodied those mandatory obligations with which the League of Nations is concerned, and for the sake of which it has insisted upon the renewal of the treaty. I need not go into all the articles of that treaty, because they are in the main concerned with the maintenance of a civilised and progressive type of Government in Irak. They provide for an organic law ensuring freedom of conscience and worship, for racial, religious and linguistic equality, for the rights of communities to maintain schools in their own languages, for the protection of foreigners resident in Irak, for the safeguarding of antiquities, and for the due fulfilment of international obligations.

In return for these undertakings by Irak the Government undertake in article 1 to give its general advice and assistance, and in articles 7 and 15 to give the military and financial assistance defined in the separate military and financial agreements. Other separate agreements safeguard the position of British officials in the service of the Irak Government and regulate the conditions for judicial proceedings in which foreigners are concerned. The main treaty was originally to be in force for a minimum of twenty years, irrespective of Irak's entry into the League of Nations, and was only terminable after twenty years if the high contracting parties were of opinion that it was no longer required. The protocol of April 1923 reduced that period to the date of Irak's entry into the League of Nations, or to four years after the ratification of peace with Turkey, which ever was the earliest; but it also provided that negotiations for a further treaty to regulate the subsequent relations between the parties should be entered into before the termination of that period.

In accepting that treaty as the fulfilment of our mandatory obligations, the Council of the League in September 1924 exacted, as I have already mentioned, an undertaking from Lord Parmoor that if Irak had not entered the League of Nations by 1928, then the League should decide how those obligations should be carried out. Apart from the general limit of time laid down in the protocol, the military and financial agreement provide, specifically in clause 1 of the military agreement and clauses 1 and 3 of the financial agreement, that Irak shall accept full military and financial responsibility for the maintenance of internal order and for the defence of Irak against external aggression within that same period of four years.

MR. THURTLÉ: Has the right hon. gentleman not left out two important words? Are the words "In principle" included in that phrase?

MR. AMERY: I think the words, "In principle," refer to the "earliest possible date," and that the obligations terminate as specifically provided. What I want to make clear is that the effect of clause 1 of the new treaty upon the situation established by the treaty with the protocol and its subsidiary agreements is that the four years mentioned in the protocol become twenty-five years as from the 16th December last, unless, as I confidently believe, Irak is admitted before that date into the League of Nations, and I have every confidence that she will be admitted many years before that. On the other hand, the specific undertaking of Irak to become fully responsible for its own external and internal security remains unaffected and unaltered by the new treaty. The treaty thus fulfils the conditions laid down by the Council of the League, which is only concerned with the maintenance of a certain type of government and administration in Irak. I may add, in presenting that treaty to the League, we shall, of course, follow the example set by our predecessors in office and carry out the other assurance which they gave to the League that this treaty shall not be altered or amended without the consent of the League. Those are briefly the objects of the treaty which this House has been invited to approve of, and, apart from any conditions laid down by the League, we should be equally concerned in securing them in any new agreements entered into before 1928 in accordance with the terms of the protocol.

On the other hand, the policy which successive Governments have laid before the House, the policy of helping Irak to stand on its own feet, and of bringing to an end within a definite period of time the burden of our military and financial responsibility for Irak, remains unchanged. There is nothing in this new treaty which imposes any new military or financial obligation of any kind whatsoever upon this country or in any way prolongs any existing military or financial obligations.

The hon. and gallant member opposite (Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy) asked me the other day why this treaty was not brought before the House in the shape of a Bill like some other treaties. The Prime Minister pointed out, as the right hon. gentleman the Member for Derby (Mr. Thomas) had pointed out to him eighteen months before when the original treaty was before the House, that treaties are only submitted in the form of Bills when legislation is required to give effect to them. The hon. and gallant member was not satisfied and suggested that as this treaty means an expenditure of money there should be a money resolution to support it. I am not aware that money resolutions are required for every act of policy which might conceivably involve, directly or indirectly, the expenditure of money. In any case, I can assure the hon. and gallant member that there is nothing whatever in the present treaty which involves any new financial obligation or commitment at all.

LIEUT.-COMMANDER KENWORTHY: It means a continuation.

MR. AMERY: On the contrary, I have already made it clear that the policy on which we are working of bringing our military and financial responsibility in Irak to an end in 1928 still holds the field and remains unchanged. What is more, I believe that we can substantially fulfil that policy within the date laid down two years ago. I would like to remind the House of the steady progress that has been made in this matter since the present policy was established. In 1921, when the present policy was laid down by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, we were spending over £23 million a year in Irak. The following year, in 1922-23, we spent under £8 million; in 1923-24 we spent £5,750,000; in 1924-25, £4,500,000, and in the current year, 1925-26, we are spending £4 million. In spite of all the difficulties and anxieties of the present circumstances, we are prepared to estimate in the coming year for figures in the neighbourhood of £3,800,000, and I am hopeful that it may be possible to reduce those figures still further during the year and bring about a still more substantial reduction in the following year.

I would further remind the House, and if my voice may reach the press I would like to remind them also, that this expenditure, though it is expenditure in Irak, is not all necessarily expenditure on Irak. Four years ago the Chancellor of the Exchequer put all military and air expenditure in the Middle East, within the sphere of the Colonial Office authority, on the Middle East Vote. The object of doing this was that those who control the policy should have a direct interest in forcing down expenditure. This policy in the main has worked well up to the present, though it has certain objections to it, and it has created a misleading impression at any rate in comparison with the cost of our other imperial responsibilities and obligations. Nobody is proposing to debit Malta with the cost of the naval and military forces stationed in that island. In the same way no prejudice is raised against the general policy of the British Government in Egypt and the Sudan by the fact that our total air force and military expenditure in those regions is slightly larger than our military and air expenditure in Irak.

LIEUT.-COMMANDER KENWORTHY: But you have not the Suez Canal there.

MR. KIRKWOOD: No, but you have the oil wells.

MR. AMERY: I am not suggesting that our imperial interests in Irak are of the same magnitude, but we have some imperial interests in Irak too, and is it not reasonable to credit to them some part of the expenditure in that region on the maintenance of the admirable air force units which are stationed there, and which provide such an excellent training ground for them? They would certainly not be disbanded altogether if we left Irak. In any case I think that expenditure can be substantially reduced within the next few years, first of all because the whole situation will not, I believe, require so large a force and also because Irak is going to be progressively more capable of shouldering its own burdens. I do not know whether the House realises that Irak already bears the whole cost in its civil administration, of a most efficient police force, and also of a small army of 8,000 men which is steadily increasing in efficiency.

When the right hon. gentleman the Member for Norwich went into the finances of Irak less than a year ago, he budgeted for a current revenue of 518 lakhs, equal to about £3,880,000. I have since had information from the Acting High Commissioner that in spite of the heavy unforeseen expenditure on famine relief and Christian refugees, and in spite of the fact that certain of the reforms advocated by my right hon. friend have not yet been put into execution, the financial position in the current year is at least 15 lakhs, or about £112,000, better than it was before. It has also been calculated that next year the revenue and expenditure will balance at about 555 lakhs, or about £4,200,000.

Considering the position in which that country was when we took it over after the war and comparing it with what was done in Egypt in the early days, I regard that as a most satisfactory achievement in the administration of Irak. In other respects, also, I have every confidence that Irak will steadily improve her position. Her export and import trade is already very far from negligible. In the last two years her export trade stood at about £3,250,000, and her import trade at about £6,750,000. Of that total, 33 per cent., or about £2,250,000, came from the United Kingdom. That is a trade not far off the volume of our trade with such important

countries as Poland, or Mexico, or Austria. I would add that another 30 per cent. of Irak's import trade came from India, so that the Empire imports into Irak amount to not far off two-thirds of her total import trade. I have every confidence that that trade will expand steadily, and will expand more rapidly the moment this treaty is passed and Irak knows where it stands.

LIEUT.-COMMANDER KENWORTHY: May I ask the right hon gentleman a question on the budget? It is quite a simple one. Does the estimated revenue of 555 lakhs next year include the service of Irak's share of the Ottoman Debt?

MR. AMERY: Yes, it does include provision for that share. What I wish to impress upon the House is that it is no use deriding the economic possibilities of a great country like this, which once was the centre of a wealthy and populous empire. It is the kind of thing that we have so often heard in the past. All that has been said about Irak in the last few years was said about Egypt when we first went there. When the great project of the Canadian Pacific Railway was first launched in Canada, the Opposition committed itself, through its leaders, to the statement that the railway would never pay for the cost of its axle grease. It was only about fifty years ago that a committee of this House, after long deliberation, solemnly recommended that we should abandon the whole of our West African colonies as entirely worthless encumbrances. Much more recently, barely thirty years ago, not only members of the Opposition, but supporters of the Government of the day, derided the project of the Uganda Railway as a ludicrous waste of money, and even those who defended it advocated it, not on the strength of its economic possibilities, but on the strength of our missionary obligations and of our duty to suppress the slave trade. To-day, if there is one item in the programme that was laid before the House a few days ago which commanded approval, it was that we should guarantee a loan for the expenditure of £10 million on the construction of railways in East Africa. One of the reasons why the House attaches value to that expenditure is that it might contribute appreciably to the solution of that great difficulty with regard to the supply of cotton which is menacing Lancashire. Irak too, can make her contribution to the solution of that problem. I will not detain the House by going into that matter, but would suggest that hon. members should read the special report of the British Cotton Growing Association on the possibilities of cotton growing in Irak.

There are other great possibilities. An hon. member opposite made an interjection about oil. Oil has not had the slightest influence, one way or another, in determining our policy with regard to Irak. But if oil should be found, it would certainly play its part in the general economic development of the country, though I would say that in that development there is a liquid far more important than oil, namely, water—the development of those great irrigation projects which made Irak rich in the past, and will make it rich again.

I know there are hon. members opposite who will say that it is no use giving a glowing account of the future of Irak, even if it should be justified by the economic facts, if you leave out of account all consideration of the menace on her northern frontier. That, I suppose, is the point of the amendment put forward by some hon. gentlemen opposite, who ask for a "peaceful solution." We, too, want nothing better than a peaceful solution. The difficulty in the past has been that we could never get near a peaceful solution, because we had no common basis from which agreement could be reached.

As long as Turkey claimed that the largest and richest province in Irak was hers by right, and as long as all she understood by compromise was the mere concession of some small strip in the very heart of Irak, we had not the beginning from which to start to come to an understanding. Now, for the first time, we have a firm, juridical basis to go upon, or will have as soon as this treaty is ratified, and from that as our starting point, there is, as the Foreign Secretary made clear at Geneva, room for discussion, room for adjustment, taking into account both our desire to live on the friendliest possible terms with Turkey, and also the Council's decision and our duty as mandatories to protect the people of Irak. After all, they are our first obligation. Both to Moslems and Christians alike we owe a great responsibility. The amendment of the hon. and gallant Member for Central Hull (Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy) aims at securing—

"the welfare of religious and racial minorities"

by a sort of Locarno Treaty. By all means let us have such a treaty. But how can you have a Locarno Treaty before there is a boundary fixed? And I would also ask, is their welfare likely to be secured by a boundary which takes them out of the country in which they are living happily and contentedly, and hands them over to share the fate which has befallen the Chaldeans and Assyrians, in spite of the protection of minorities clauses of the Treaty of Versailles.

There are other questions in this connection which we shall do our best to cover. The League has asked us to continue our policy of granting large liberty in cultural matters to the Kurdish population. We shall certainly do that, but I want to make it quite clear that, by a liberal policy which takes account of the customs, habits and language of the Kurds, we aim at reconciling the Kurds with the Irak State, as, indeed, they are reconciled to-day. If they are so reconciled, the last thing they will wish them to do is to look across the border and chase the dream of an independent Kurdistan carved out of Turkey and Persia. The last thing we want to bring about is any state of affairs in that part of the world which would breed unrest; what we want is stability, and we are prepared to do anything in reasonable measure that will ensure stability. The last thing we want is to be otherwise than at peace with our neighbours. We wish Turkey to be strong and prosperous within her borders. But peace is not best assured if, in face of what you believe to be an unjust demand, you make a cowardly surrender to menace, more particularly if the menace comes, not so much from the party with whom you are discussing, but from your own newspapers in rear. Nor is peace won by the betrayal of those who trust in you. It is won by goodwill; it is won by readiness to co-operate, to compromise, if need be, on unessentials, but also by justice, by firmness and by courage.

This country has gone through some very difficult years since the war. It has had to face a financial and economic situation of immense difficulty. We have stood the almost incredible strain of those years without once giving way to the temptation to dishonour our obligations, either domestic or external, or to attempt to evade our problems by short-sighted devices which would only have postponed and aggravated our difficulties. To-day the country is just beginning to feel that it is nearing the turning point, and the time is coming—it may not be very far off, after all—when we shall begin to reap the reward of our sacrifices and of our steadiness. I believe the same is true of the Middle East. Government after Government has steadily, if sometimes very reluctantly, pursued the same policy of honouring its obligations and working patiently towards the building up of a self-dependant structure in Irak. We are far nearer that goal than we have ever been before, and nothing will advance that goal so certainly or so rapidly as the ratification of this treaty, and the new start that it will give both to the internal life and to the external relations of Irak. Is this the time when we should begin to play fast and loose with our whole Imperial policy in the Middle East? Is this the time when we should begin running away from our obligations and abandoning all that our efforts and sacrifices have won for us in the last few years? We have been a great commercial and industrial nation in the past. We have been an Imperial Power, with great creative and constructive tasks before it, and I am not one of those who believe that our destiny, in either of these respects, is played out. Our real destiny is in the century that is before us, and it is only beginning. This is not the time for pessimism and faintheartedness, but for steadfastness, courage and vision.

SIR A. CHAMBERLAIN: The speech of the hon. and gallant gentleman the Member for Central Hull (Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy) drew my attention to an amendment which he and others have placed upon the paper but which they have not had the opportunity of moving. He said that he preferred it to the one for which he proposes to vote. I would say on it that, as far as I understand it, I agree with it, that I am flattered by the allusion to Locarno and naturally attracted to it by the words of it. But what Locarno has to do with this matter he did not explain and I cannot make out.

I came down to the House under the impression that at the close of this debate I should have to reply on behalf of His Majesty's Government to an attack on them. If that were all that there had been in the debate, I should be quite content to rest the defence of the Government policy—I will not say on the speech of my right hon. friend the Colonial Secretary, but on two speeches delivered from opposite sides of the House, that of my hon. and gallant friend the Member for Ripon (Major Hills) and of my right hon. friend the Member for Norwich (Mr. Hilton

Young). I invite the House to consider whether it really has been the conduct of the Government which has been challenged on this occasion. The right hon. gentleman the leader of the Opposition was very anxious to defend himself and his party against the suggestion that our policy was the natural consequence of their own, and he sought industriously, but as it seemed to me with little success, to dissociate himself from the natural consequences of the action for which he and his colleagues were responsible. If he asks us to believe that he did not foresee the inevitable results of the action he took, we shall be obliged to accept that assurance; but if he asks us to admit that he ought not to have foreseen the natural consequences of his action, then he is making too great a draught upon our credulity.

But that was not the most serious or the novel part of the right hon. gentleman's speech. By far the most serious part of his speech was contained in those brief passages in which, for the purpose of his attack upon His Majesty's Government, he attacked the Council of the League of Nations. The example which the leader of the Opposition—a man who has attended, who has professed his devotion, who has urged again and again that the salvation of the world depended upon the League and upon the success of the League, who has accused us on the other side of the House of half-heartedness and lukewarmness in its support—the example of the leader of the Opposition in attacking the League has been taken up by his followers behind him. Again and again, in speech after speech, the attack to-day has not been upon His Majesty's Government but on the integrity, the impartiality, the judgment of the Council of the League of Nations. The hon. Member for Shoreditch (Mr. Thurtle), who is one of those who brought the impeachment against the Council of the League, agrees that that was the gravamen of the speeches to which we have listened.

I take a different view. I have sat on the Council and I am proud to have done so. I have learned something by being permitted to share in its deliberations. We meet there, it is true, as accredited representatives of particular nations; but we meet there not to pursue a selfish policy, but to preserve the peace of the world. We meet there, not to impose an unjust judgment at the bidding of this Power or that on some weaker nation, but to seek with patience to reconcile differences and, if our efforts at conciliation fail, then to render, without fear or favour, just judgment. I say this the more freely because I took no part in this discussion, because, Great Britain being interested, her vote did not count, and when the Council arrived at its decision we were not present. I think those charges are very grave. If these views are preached by a great party they cannot but diminish the influence and the authority of the League.

Although I have never used any high-flown language about the League, although I have carefully avoided the expression of exaggerated hopes or confidences, the League has grown steadily in strength during the last twelve months. There is everything to encourage us in the belief that in time it will rise to the fulfilment of the hopes of its founders, and there is nothing to justify the slanderous charges which, directed against a national Government in its own Parliament, may be repudiated with indignation, but which, directed against this great Council of all the nations, are an injury to the peace of the world and an insult to every nation that is represented there.

What has happened? The right hon. gentleman says for his Government, for himself as Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister, "I undertook to defend the interests of Irak before the League. I undertook to present the case of Irak to the League. I warned the Turkish Government that until the League decided, we would tolerate no attack on Irak, for which we were then responsible. I undertook to stand by the decision of the League." Very well. If he had remained in office, what would he have done other than that which we have done? He would have gone before the Council, as my right hon. friend the Colonial Secretary did, to defend the interests and the rights of Irak.

MR. SAKLATVALA: Without giving the "glad-eye" first!

SIR A. CHAMBERLAIN: He would have gone, as my right hon. friend did, to defend the interests and the rights of Irak. He would have gone, as my right hon. friend did, to secure a verdict from the Council. I have no doubt that, with the same material to work upon and with his powers of advocacy, no less than the powers of advocacy of my right hon. friend, he would have secured the same verdict. What would he have done when he got it? He who had undertaken to defend the rights of Irak, he who had undertaken to maintain her interests, he

who had pleaded her cause before the tribunal and had obtained a verdict in her favour—would he then have turned round upon the tribunal and said: "You are a body of unjust men. I have bamboozled you and corrupted you. I fling your verdict back in your face. I have done with the interests of Irak and with her rights. I have done with you. I clear out of the whole concern, and reprobate your injustice and your partiality." When you bring the right hon. gentleman's loose language down to the test of action, that is what he meant, if he meant anything. He did not mean that. He meant nothing! He would have done exactly what we did. If he were still in office, he would stand here to defend the agreement and the treaty which we defend. I pity the right hon. gentleman, who has to come forward using weapons which he himself cast aside attacking a policy which he knows is the right policy, and so hard up for material that he cannot make even a shadow of a case against the Government which he is criticising without impugning the honour of the Council of the League.

MR. RAMSAY MACDONALD: Needless to say, I did nothing of the kind.

SIR A. CHAMBERLAIN: If the right hon. gentleman says that he does not impugn the honour of the Council of the League, I shall be delighted to hear him repudiate the possibility of that construction being placed on his speech.

MR. MACDONALD: I have been listening with a great deal of amazement to the right hon. gentleman. If the right hon. gentleman really means to say that he thinks that anything which I have said has justified all this, then either he is or I am in an extraordinary intellectual position. I will assume that I am. In that event, I wish to say that nothing was further from my thoughts, and nothing will be further from the printed word as it appears to-morrow, than any construction such as the right hon. gentleman has been making upon what I said this afternoon.

SIR A. CHAMBERLAIN: I am very glad to have drawn that explanation from the right hon. gentleman. He said that the Council decided against the weight of evidence. He has been followed by—ought I to say his followers? on the back benches, at any rate, by those who sit on the back benches, by the hon. member who sits for Shoreditch. When I described the meaning of the speech of the right hon. gentleman and the other speeches which followed, the hon. Member for Shoreditch nodded his approval to my reply.

MR. THURTELL: Will the right hon. gentleman permit me to explain? What I said was this: The League of Nations Council had developed a habit of finding always in favour of the strong as against the weak.

SIR A. CHAMBERLAIN: Was it to lead up to that observation that the leader of the Opposition said the Council had decided against the weight of the evidence? What other effect did he expect his words to have? Does he not see my point, and does he not see that the hon. member behind him took the point long before I did?

MR. MACDONALD: I am very glad the right hon. gentleman was a follower of his.

SIR A. CHAMBERLAIN: Then the right hon. gentleman and I make an alliance, openly in front of the House and across the table, to repudiate the suggestion of the hon. Member for Shoreditch, and we pledge our honour as to the impartiality of the Council.

MR. W. BAKER: Italian melodrama!

SIR A. CHAMBERLAIN: The hon. gentleman opposite and I are going to share the rest of the evening. How much is left for him depends on him. I admit that the right hon. gentleman did not intend to attack the Council, and I put that on record. I hope that we shall hear no more of such attacks from those who profess to be his followers.

I am not going to spend time at this hour of the night in further elaborating the Government case. There is only one matter with which I think I must deal before I sit down. The hon. Member for Shoreditch—and he was not alone—drew a very pessimistic picture of the future. He said it was easy to conceive that, in the course of a few years, Russia and Turkey would combine to make war on Irak

and on Great Britain. The hon. gentleman's particular friends seem to be of very bellicose tendencies. I wonder whether that is what endears them to him. I do not accept it. I do not believe that Turkey will dispute the decision given by the Council. The hon. gentleman said that they were not under any obligation to accept it. He is mistaken. It is quite true, as my right hon. friend reminded the House earlier in the day, that their representative specifically undertook, in answer to a question put by the late M. Branting, at that moment President of the Council, to abide by the decision of the Council when it should be given. The obligation of Turkey does not depend upon that undertaking, given solemnly by her representative to the Council and embodied in the Council's resolution. The obligation of Turkey depends upon the Treaty of Lausanne, and was found so to depend by the Permanent Court of International Justice when the Council sought their advice. It is a treaty obligation which she has undertaken, to accept the decision of the League in this matter, and I do not believe that she will be so ill-advised as to dispute the decision which she has given her undertaking to accept, and which carries so much authority and weight.

But there is more than that. This is, I hope, not the end. No sooner had the Council given its decision than, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, I made a declaration upon which we have acted, that now there was a boundary fixed which might be the basis of discussion, we would be glad to open conversations with the Republic of Turkey and to see whether any means could be found of rendering that decision more palatable to them. My right hon. friend the Prime Minister, in my absence, at once invited the Turkish Ambassador to meet him and begin these conversations. Since then, our Ambassador has been at Angora, and we are now considering the report which he has rendered to us of the conversations which he had, and considering what are the next steps and what are the possible proposals that we can make to the Turks. I will not speak with confidence of the results of these negotiations. I can only say that, on our side, they will be conducted with an earnest desire to arrive at a friendly settlement of our trouble and put our relations with Turkey on the footing which we all desire, and which for many years they occupied.

I am a little consoled for the denunciations of the Conservative Government to-day by the almost universal praise which the policy of their predecessors has met with from the members of the parties opposite. It is true that, in the days when the Conservative Government were doing that which the hon. and gallant Member for Central Hull now points to as singular wisdom contrasting with our present policy, his predecessors in title were denouncing our predecessors in title with a vehemence equal to his own and an eloquence that none of us possess to-day in the House of Commons. I cannot help hoping that, while we may never meet with his approval, his lineal successors, when we are dead and gone, will point to the wisdom of our actions, will argue how right we were, and will dispose lightly of himself and his fellow critics. In regard to restoring friendly relations with Turkey, I carefully avoided taking up any one of those criticisms or observations on one side or the other which, if answered or commented upon by a Foreign Secretary, might make the conduct of such negotiations more difficult.

LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER KENWORTHY: Does the right hon. gentleman repudiate some of the insults hurled at the Turks by the hon. Member for Oldham (Mr. Cooper) and others of his followers?

SIR A. CHAMBERLAIN: But there is one observation which has been current which I must answer. There is a suggestion that His Majesty's Government have been actuated in this question by the desire to secure the oil of Irak. Were the party opposite actuated by that desire when they undertook to defend the interests and the rights of Irak and contended for the same frontier for which we have contended? Why does the oil well up when we are in office, and only when we are in office? But never was there a more palpable untruth. I was approached by the Turkish representative with a proposition in March of last year to settle this question apart from the League of Nations. What was the basis of the proposition? It was that Turkey should have so much as she desired of the Vilayet of Mosul. That was one side of the bargain. The other side was that a British company, approved by His Majesty's Government, should have the exploitation of all the oil. Pipe lines were to be necessary, and a British company should have the construction of the pipe lines. A port or two ports would be required, and a British company should have the concession for the ports. Five other ports and the

concession for, I think—I speak from memory—3,000 kilom. of railway were offered. If we were after oil, we could have had a concession for all the oil in Mosul and concessions for anything else we liked. The reply of His Majesty's Government was that they were trustees for Irak; that they were not possessors, but mandatories, and that as mandatories and trustees they could not bargain away the rights and interests of Irak and her people in exchange for concessions to British capitalists. There never was a shameful allegation made with less shadow of foundation.

[E 1388/62/65]

No. 21.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 1.)

(No. 83.)

Sir,

Constantinople, February 23, 1926.

FOUR weeks have now elapsed since I went to Angora to begin discussions on the Irak frontier question, and, though no developments of that question have since taken place, I have the honour to report that the general tone here on the matter is one of calm. Now and then some speech by Mr. Amery or some English newspaper article provokes a more or less hot retort in the Constantinople press, and there have been one or two unprovoked outbursts, but on the whole journalists keep quiet and some days Mosul is not even mentioned at all. Perhaps the Turkish Government, feeling fairly certain that His Majesty's Government will make a first offer of some sort for the settlement of the Mosul question, are content for the time being with this measure of success. Doubtless, too, they have realised that all the excursions and alarms of last autumn have served no useful purpose, and have merely put them in a difficult position with their own public opinion.

2. I hear from many quarters that there has been a cooling off of relations between Turkey and Russia, and to this also may be ascribed some of the calm with which developments of the Mosul question are awaited. The only reason ever given for the change of feeling towards Russia is the disappointment felt over the very tepid support which was forthcoming in December when, after the League's verdict had been given, Russia's previous protestations of sympathy were put to a practical test. The recent closing of the Russian frontier to all Turkish imports, even if it is due to commercial considerations only, confirms the loss of cordiality in relations between the two countries.

3. I do not think the Turco-Syrian Convention recently signed by M. de Jouvenel at Angora (my telegram No. 22 of yesterday) will exercise any prejudicial effect on Mosul prospects, though I shall be glad to have closer knowledge of some of its stipulations. On the contrary, I should say that, if anything, the manner in which the Turks have come to terms with the French and the great exertions they made to get the whole negotiation finished in four days indicate some approach to the "western orientation of politics," even when we make allowances for Tewfik Rushdi's personal wish to consolidate his position in office by achieving success in negotiations. Especially noteworthy is the clause admitting arbitration and more especially that contemplating arbitration before the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague. I would remind you here of the impression left in the mind of the French Ambassador, that in pressing this negotiation to a successful conclusion the Turks were thinking all the time of the yet more important negotiation over Mosul which is shortly to begin.

4. On the whole, therefore, the Turks are at present displaying a very proper patience, and the general atmosphere is not unfavourable so far as I can see. Of course their patience will not last for ever, and as soon as I detect any symptoms of restiveness I shall report to you by telegraph. And when we begin actual negotiations we must be prepared for endless difficulties and delays. Still, there is nothing to complain of here to-day.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Irak.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

No. 22.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 1.)

(No. 23.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, February 28, 1926.

FOLLOWING for Mr. Oliphant:—

"Your letter of 22nd February.

"I assume that major policy is no longer to be thought about, and that we had better now concentrate on a less ambitious scheme. The problem is how to get a frontier which Turkish Government will recognise in a formal treaty.

"My own views on this have changed considerably in the last two months, and my estimate of Turkish requirements in such a negotiation has steadily become lower. Though I do not yet know terms of French treaty, I rather think that its conclusion helps our chances. Italian Ambassador, who has just returned here after ten days in the capital, tells me that Minister for Foreign Affairs spoke to him optimistically about Mosul prospects. 'Why,' he said, 'should British choose to fling us into arms of Russia when they could satisfy us by cession of a few square kilometres?' Ambassador thinks it would be a considerable satisfaction to Turkey now to achieve neutrality pacts covering all her land frontiers. Fact is that, since Geneva, Turkey has become very much aware of weakness of her position in international politics, and I am told on every side that she is having more difficulty now than ever before in laying hands on any cash.

"I now incline to think that we might perhaps bring Turkish Government to terms with a treaty embodying whatever is sound in the French treaty, plus additional territorial concessions. As to latter, I fear we cannot hope to get off as cheaply as French have done.

"My present view is—

"1. That it would be useless to expect and impolitic to ask seriously for any cession of territory now Turkish.

"2. That we should have to give up something more than minor rectifications of frontier.

"3. That perhaps we might get off with something rather less than line south of Rowanduz.

"Above view is put forward with diffidence, and its correctness can only be tested in the course of bargaining. Of course I do not know what frontier lines can be drawn across the north-east corner of Irak, nor how much territory Irak would cede in order to get a northern frontier recognised by Turkey.

"As to my opinion of such a settlement as above, see my memorandum of 8th February; but it might enable us to carry on for a year or two and see how things develop, especially the internal politics of Turkey."

[E 1367/44/65]

No. 23.

Foreign Office to League of Nations.

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 2, 1926.

IN compliance with the invitation conveyed in article 2 of the decision recorded by the Council of the League of Nations on the 16th December, 1925, I am directed by Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain to transmit to you herewith, for submission to the Council, the text of a new treaty between Great Britain and Irak which was signed at Bagdad on the 13th January, 1926.

2. By a decision dated the 27th September, 1924, the Council accepted the terms of the Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and Irak supplemented by certain undertakings given by His Majesty's Government, as giving effect, in respect of Irak, to the provisions of article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. By article 2 of their decision of December last the Council made the further condition that the régime established by the aforesaid Treaty of Alliance and undertakings should be continued for a specified period. The requisite extension of the duration of the Treaty of Alliance is provided for by article 1 of the new treaty. In submitting this treaty to the Council, His Majesty's Government declare that so long as it remains in force they will regard as binding the undertakings given by

them to the Council in September 1924, and will continue to act in conformity therewith.

3. His Majesty's Government are thus in a position to inform the Council that the stipulations of article 2 of the decision of December 1925 have been fulfilled, and that the necessary steps have been taken to ensure the continuance for twenty-five years of the present régime as approved by the Council in September 1924, unless Irak is, in conformity with article 1 of the Covenant, admitted as a member of the League before the expiration of that period.

4. Provision for periodical review of the question of the admission of Irak to the League of Nations is made in article 3 of the new treaty.

5. By article 4 of their undertakings, approved by the Council in September 1924, His Majesty's Government engaged that they would agree to no modification of the Treaty of Alliance without the consent of the Council of the League. They hereby give a similar undertaking in regard to the treaty of the 13th January, 1926. This undertaking will apply to any proposals that may be made, as a result of the discussions contemplated in articles 2 and 3 of the new treaty, for the revision or amendment of the agreements subsidiary to the treaty of the 10th October, 1922.

6. In the light of these explanations His Majesty's Government request that the Council may now be moved to take action, as contemplated in article 2 of their decision of December last, to declare that their decision in regard to the Turco-Irak frontier has become definitive.

7. The Treaty of the 13th January, 1926, has now been approved by the British House of Commons and by the Chamber of Deputies and Senate of Irak.

8. With reference to article 3 of the Council's decision of December last, I am to enclose, for the information of the Council, a memorandum dealing with the administration of the Kurdish districts in Irak.

I am, &c.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

Enclosure 1 in No. 23.

Treaty between His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the King of Irak.

HIS Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, of the one part; and His Majesty the King of Irak, of the other part:

Anxious to give full effect to the stipulations in the decision of the Council of the League of Nations dated the 16th day of December, 1925, fixing the frontier between Turkey and Irak in pursuance of article 3 of the Peace Treaty signed at Lausanne on the 24th July, 1923, to the effect that the relations between the high contracting parties now defined by the Treaty of Alliance and by the undertaking of His Britannic Majesty's Government approved by the Council of the League of Nations on the 27th September, 1924, should be continued for a period of twenty-five years, unless Irak is, in conformity with article 1 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, admitted as a member of the League before the expiration of that period:

Bearing in mind the intention which the high contracting parties have mutually expressed in the protocol of the 30th April, 1923, to conclude a fresh agreement regulating subsequent relations between them:

Have decided by means of a new treaty to ensure due fulfilment of the said stipulations, and have for this purpose named as their plenipotentiaries:

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India: Bernard Henry Bourdillon, Esquire, C.M.G., Acting High Commissioner of His Britannic Majesty in Irak:

His Majesty the King of Irak, Abdul Muhsin Beg al-Sa'dun, Prime Minister of the Irak Government and Minister for Foreign Affairs:

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:—

ARTICLE 1.

The provisions contained in article 18 of the treaty between the high contracting parties signed at Bagdad on the 10th day of October, 1922, of the Christian era, corresponding with the 19th day of Safar, 1340, Hijrah, and in the protocol signed on the 30th day of April, 1923, of the Christian era, corresponding with the 14th day

of Ramazan, 1341, Hijrah, in so far as they relate to the duration of the said treaty are hereby abrogated, and the said treaty shall remain in force for a period of twenty-five years from the 16th day of December, 1925, unless before the expiration of that period Irak shall have become a member of the League of Nations.

The various agreements between the high contracting parties subsidiary to the said treaty of the 10th day of October, 1922, shall, in so far as their duration is made dependent on that of the said treaty, likewise remain in force for the period laid down in the present treaty, but in other respects their provisions shall not be affected.

ARTICLE 2.

The high contracting parties agree, immediately after the ratification of the present treaty and its approval by the Council of the League of Nations, to continue active consideration of the questions which have already been under discussion between them in regard to the revision of the agreements arising out of articles 7 and 15 of the Treaty of the 10th October, 1922.

ARTICLE 3.

Without prejudice to the provisions of article 6 of the Treaty of the 10th October, 1922, in regard to the admission of Irak into the League of Nations or the provisions of article 18 of the said treaty which permit the revision at any time, subject to the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, of the provisions of the said treaty or of certain of the agreements subsidiary thereto, His Britannic Majesty undertakes that, at the time when the Treaty of the 10th October, 1922, would have expired under the protocol of the 30th April, 1923, and at subsequent successive intervals of four years until the expiry of the period of twenty-five years mentioned in the present treaty or until the admission of Irak into the League of Nations, he will take into active consideration the following two questions, namely:—

- (1) The question whether it is possible for him to press for the admission of Irak into the League of Nations.
- (2) If it is not so possible, the question of the amendment, on account of the progress made by the Kingdom of Irak or for any other reason, of the agreements referred to in article 18 of the Treaty of the 10th October, 1922.

The present treaty, in English and Arabic, of which in case of divergence the English text will prevail, shall be ratified and ratifications shall be exchanged as soon as possible.

In witness whereof the above-named plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty and have affixed thereunto their seals.

Done at Bagdad the thirteenth day of January, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-six of the Christian Era, corresponding to the twenty-eighth day of Jamadial-Ukhra, one thousand three hundred and forty-four, Hijrah, in three copies, of which one shall be deposited in the archives of the League of Nations at Geneva and one shall be retained by each of the high contracting parties.

B. H. BOURDILLON,

His Britannic Majesty's Acting High Commissioner in Irak.

ADBUL MUHSIN-AL-SA'DUN,

Prime Minister of the Irak Government and Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Enclosure 2 in No. 23.

Memorandum on Administration of Kurdish Districts in Irak.

THE third paragraph of the decision of the Council of the League of Nations in the matter of the Turco-Irak frontier read as follows:—

"3. The British Government, as mandatory Power, is invited to lay before the Council the administrative measures which will be taken with a view to securing for the Kurdish populations mentioned in the report of the Commission of Enquiry the guarantees regarding local administration recommended by the commission in its final conclusions."

[15026]

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2. The recommendations of the Frontier Commission regarding the Kurdish populations referred to in the Council's decision were as follows:—

"Regard must be paid to the desires expressed by the Kurds that officials of Kurdish race should be appointed for the administration of their country, the dispensation of justice and teaching in the schools, and that Kurdish should be the official language of all these services."

3. In his speech before the Council on the 3rd September, 1925, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, when referring to this subject, stated that the existing system of administration did, to a large extent, carry out the recommendations of the commission. This statement is fully borne out by the following facts regarding the measures adopted by the Irak Government for the administration of predominantly Kurdish areas.

4. Out of a total number of fifty-seven administrative officials employed under the Ministries of Finance and the Interior in the Kurdish districts, forty-three are Kurds, while nine Kurds are employed in similar posts in non-Kurdish districts. There has been a steady progressive reduction in the number of non-Kurds employed in Kurdish districts, and the policy of employing only Kurds, where suitable men are available and willing to serve, is being steadily followed.

5. The Ministry of Justice employs thirteen officials (judges and chief clerks) in the Kurdish districts. Ten of these are Kurds. Cases are heard in Kurdish, and in Sulaimaniya and the Keui Sanjak qadha of the Arbil Liwa the record of the proceedings is in Kurdish, though an Arabic translation is attached when a case goes to the Court of Appeal or Cassation. Six Kurdish officials are employed in similar posts in non-Kurdish districts.

6. The various departments other than those dealt with above (*e.g.*, Wakf, Posts and Telegraphs, Public Works, Jails, Customs, Irrigation, Tapu, Agriculture), employ fifty-five officials in the Kurdish districts, of whom thirty-eight are Kurds, while seventy-eight Kurds are employed in non-Kurdish districts.

7. Kurds also take their full share in the Central Government. Two Senators out of twenty are Kurds (another being half-Kurdish) and fourteen Deputies out of eighty-eight. The Minister of Finance is a Kurd and so is the Minister of Communications and Works.

8. Kurds form about 17 per cent. of the total population of the country. Twenty-four per cent. of the whole police force of the country are Kurds, and 14 per cent. of the army, while 23 per cent. of railway employees are Kurdish. The police, army and railways combined give employment to over 20,000 persons, of whom just over 4,000, or 20 per cent., are Kurds.

9. There are twenty-five schools in the Kurdish districts. Five of these are Christian, the language in use being Chaldean and Arabic. In sixteen of the remainder the language of instruction is Kurdish. In the four remaining, where the pupils are partly Christian and partly Kurd, Arabic is the main language of instruction, but Kurdish is freely used for purposes of explanation. The number of masters employed in these schools is fifty-two, of whom all but eight are Kurds. These eight are Arabs, all fully conversant with Kurdish. They are mostly engaged in teaching Arabic, the use of which is of course necessary for advanced education. Their number was thirteen a short time ago, and is shortly being further reduced.

10. In addition to these there are twenty-two Kurds and a large number of Kurdish-knowing Arabs and Turcomans employed as teachers in non-Kurdish schools outside the Kurdish area. It will therefore be seen that the educational policy now being followed is in full accord with the commission's recommendations. Development demands no alteration of the policy, but merely an increase in the number of schools as and when the country is able to afford this increase.

11. The above figures have been compiled from headquarters records. They exclude menial and minor clerical appointments (which are filled by local recruitment), and probably underestimate the number of Kurds actually employed, as only those definitely known to be Kurds have been so classified. Most officials have recorded their race as "Iraki," and it is probable that a number of these are really Kurds who are not known to be so at headquarters.

12. As regards the use of the Kurdish language, it must be remembered that before the war Kurdish was not used as a means of written communication, either private or official. A fair number of poetical works in Kurdish were in existence, but the development of the written language as a means of communication is entirely due to the efforts of British officials. Persian, Turkish and Arabic were previously

used. The use of written Kurdish has not yet spread to the Mosul liwa, where Turkish and Arabic are used. It has gradually spread to Arbil, where it has recently been recognised as the official language for purposes of written communication with Government offices. Sulaimaniya has for some years possessed a Kurdish newspaper, and the use of written Kurdish for both private and official communications has been general for some time. The work begun by the Government of occupation is being loyally carried on by the Irak Government. Two Kurdish news sheets are published in Bagdad, and everything possible is being done, not only to permit, but actively to encourage, the free use of the Kurdish language.

13. It is confidently submitted that the foregoing information demonstrates a complete accord between the Kurdish policy as recommended by the Frontier Commission and that adopted by the Irak Government.

14. Possibly the best indication that the Irak Government fully realise their responsibilities towards Kurdish sentiment, and the best earnest of their determination to continue and if necessary extend their present liberal policy of granting the widest opportunities for the development of Kurdish cultural and linguistic aspirations within the State of Irak, is provided by the following extract from a speech made by the Irak Prime Minister in the Chamber of Deputies on the 21st January last. He said:—

"Gentlemen, This country cannot live unless it gives all Iraki elements their rights. . . . We should give the Kurds their rights. Their officials should be from among them; their tongue should be their official language, and their children should learn in their own tongue in the schools (applause). It is incumbent upon us to treat all elements, whether Moslem or non-Moslem, with fairness and justice and give them their rights."

15. This declaration of policy, which was received with loud applause by the Irak Deputies, was followed up by the issue to all Irak Ministries of the circular instructions which are quoted below:—

"Your Excellency has no doubt seen the speech made by the Prime Minister in the Chamber of Deputies and published in the press on the following day. This speech embodies the policy which the Government pursued and will pursue in the administration of the Kurdish zone, namely, that the officials should be Kurds and the official language the Kurdish. His Excellency has therefore directed me to request your Excellency to endeavour to carry out this policy and adhere thereto in all that appertains to the establishments of the zone in question."

16. Further evidence of the Irak Government's intentions is afforded by the speeches made on the occasion of a banquet given at the British Residency to celebrate the signing of the new treaty. In the course of his speech the Acting High Commissioner defined the aim of the Irak Government in the following terms:—

"The aim of the Irak Government should be, and is, to make all its component elements into good citizens of the Irak State, and it will do this best by encouraging rather than by discouraging their pride in their religious or ethnic individuality. The Kurd is not an Arab, any more than a Scotsman is an Englishman, and you will make him into a good Iraki citizen not by forcing him to adopt Arab speech and habits, not in short, by trying to make him a good Arab, but by giving him every opportunity and encouragement to become a good Kurd. That unity of the State which is essential to its progress will be obtained not by stamping out the special characteristics of the different component elements, but by encouraging all that is good in these characteristics, and by making it possible for the different communities to progress upon the lines most suited to the particular genius of each of them. That is the policy which your Majesty and your Majesty's Government have already adopted, and a consistent following of that enlightened policy will do as much as anything else to persuade the League of Nations that the Irak State is fit to be numbered among her members."

17. In his reply King Faisal also referred to the subject. He said:—

"Among the first duties of every real Iraki will be to encourage his brother, the Iraki Kurd, to cling to his nationality and to join him under the Irak flag—common emblem of their country for the material and intellectual happiness

of all. They will be, by their union and co-operation, active members in the prosperity of a common home. I also have no doubt that every true Iraqi is imbued with this same feeling towards all the racial elements in his country."

London, February 24, 1926.

No. 24.

Consul London to Sir W. Tyrrell.—(Received March 9.)

(No. 6.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Geneva, March 8, 1926.

FOLLOWING from Mr. Cadogan:—

"This morning Council met and adopted its agenda. It was decided that item regarding Irak frontier should be divided into two portions—first, examination by Council of instrument giving effect to its decision of 16th December last; second, pronouncement by Council of its final decision in the dispute. For former portion Turkish representatives would not be invited, as matter is one between Council and His Majesty's Government; for latter portion they would be invited to attend. Turkish Government have already been invited to send representatives and have replied that they are considering the matter. It was agreed that this question, involving practically only final execution of provisional decision by Council of which Germany was not member, need not await Germany's inclusion in the Council. Rest of agenda postponed until Germany elected.

"Replies to general questions on mandate removed from agenda.

"This afternoon Assembly met under temporary presidency of Viscount Ishii, president of Council, and elected Senhor D. Costa, Portuguese delegate, its president. It also nominated two committees to deal with (1) Germany's application for admission and (2) financial questions and erection of conference hall. Secretary of State is chairman of the former committee, which meets to-morrow afternoon."

[E 1729/44/65]

No. 25.

Thirty-ninth Session of the Council, League of Nations.—Extract from Minutes of the Second Meeting, Public, held on March 11, 1926, at Geneva.—(Received in Foreign Office, March 15.)

1660. *Irak: Application of the Principles of Article 22 of the Covenant to Irak and Administration of the Kurdish Districts in Irak.*

M. UNDEN submitted the following draft resolutions:—

"1. The Council of the League of Nations, supplementing its decision of the 27th September, 1924, approves the terms of the letter from the British Government dated the 2nd March, 1926, to which the text of the Treaty between Great Britain and Irak dated the 13th January, 1926, is annexed, as giving effect to the provisions of article 22 of the Covenant.

"2. The original of the letter of the 2nd March, 1926, from the British Government and the copy of the treaty communicated therewith shall be deposited in the archives of the League of Nations. Certified true copies of these documents and of the present report and resolutions of the Council shall be forwarded by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to all members of the League.

"3. The Council forwards to the Permanent Mandates Commission the memorandum from the British Government dealing with the administration of the Kurdish districts in Irak, with a request that they submit to the Council such observations upon this matter as they may deem desirable in view of paragraph 3 of the Council decision of the 16th December, 1925, and of the recommendations on this subject, which are contained in the final conclusions of the report of the Commission of Enquiry which considered the question of the frontier between Turkey and Irak.

"4. The Council decides to communicate a copy of paragraph 4 of its resolution of the 16th December to the Permanent Mandates Commission, with the request that its provisions be taken into consideration when the annual reports concerning Irak are examined."

(The resolutions were adopted.)

[E 1732/62/65]

No. 26.

Thirty-ninth Session of the Council, League of Nations.—Extract from Minutes of the Second Meeting, Public, held on March 11, 1926, at Geneva.—(Received in Foreign Office, March 15.)

1661 *Question of the Frontier between Turkey and Irak: Entry into Force of the Council's Decision of December 16, 1925, fixing the Frontier between Turkey and Irak.*

M. UNDEN read the following report and draft resolution:—

"By its resolution dated the 16th December, 1925, the Council decided:

"1. That the frontier between Turkey and Irak should follow the so-called Brussels line;

"That: "2. The British Government is invited to submit to the Council a new treaty with Irak, ensuring the continuance for twenty-five years of the mandatory régime defined by the Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and Irak and by the British Government's undertaking approved by the Council on the 27th September, 1924, unless Irak is, in conformity with Article 1 of the Covenant, admitted as a member of the League before the expiration of this period.

"As soon as, within a period of six months from the present date, the execution of this stipulation has been brought to the knowledge of the Council, the Council shall declare that the present decision has become definitive and shall indicate the measures required to ensure the delimitation on the ground of the frontier line.

"3. The British Government, as mandatory Power, is invited to lay before the Council the administrative measures which will be taken with a view to securing for the Kurdish populations mentioned in the report of the Commission of Enquiry the guarantees regarding local administration recommended by the commission in its final conclusions.

"4. The British Government, as mandatory Power, is invited to act, as far as possible, in accordance with the other suggestions of the Commission of Enquiry as regards measures likely to ensure pacification and to afford equal protection to all the elements of the population, and also as regards the commercial measures indicated in the special recommendations of the commission's report."

The British Government forwarded officially to the secretariat, for communication to the Council, the new treaty, which was signed at Bagdad on the 13th January, and accepted by the Irak Chamber of Deputies and Senate on the 18th January, and which has since been approved by the British Parliament. The Turkish Government was immediately informed and invited to send a representative to the present session of the Council. The reply of the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs has been brought to the knowledge of the Council.*

* Telegram from the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary-General:—

"Following upon my telegram of yesterday, I have the honour to inform you that I have submitted to the Cabinet your telegram of the 4th March inviting us to attend the Council on the 8th March, though, as I have already stated, we did not receive it until the evening of the 6th. The treaty between the British Government and Irak and the covering letter from the British Government, which you informed us had been despatched by the same mail, have not yet been received, and we are therefore, of course, still ignorant of their contents. Under these circumstances it is obvious that any participation by the Government of the Turkish Republic in this session has become physically impossible. Further, the Turkish Government's views on the Mosul question were clearly explained by the Turkish delegation at Geneva at the earlier meetings of the Council at which this question was debated; and the question was not merely not decided, but was left open, no attempt being made to find a solution.—DR. TEWFIK ROUSHDI.

[15026]

The Council has just approved the conclusions of my report on the application to Irak of the provisions of article 22 of the Covenant. From an examination of the new treaty upon which this first report is based, it is clear that that treaty, which was brought to the knowledge of the Council before the expiry of the time-limit of six months laid down, ensures the continuance for twenty-five years of the mandatory régime under the conditions stated in the Council Resolution of the 16th December, 1925. I think, therefore, that the Council will be prepared to declare that its decision of the 16th December, 1925, has thereby become definitive.

As regards the measures required to ensure the delimitation of the frontier line on the ground, the Council will no doubt desire to postpone the examination of this question to one of its forthcoming sessions.

I therefore propose the following draft resolution:—

"The Council,

"Having regard to paragraph 2 of its resolution dated the 16th December, 1925, which reads as follows:—

"2. The British Government is invited to submit to the Council a new treaty with Irak, ensuring the continuance for twenty-five years of the mandatory régime defined by the Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain and Irak and by the British Government's undertaking approved by the Council on the 27th September, 1924, unless Irak is, in conformity with article 1 of the Covenant, admitted as a member of the League before the expiration of this period.

"As soon as, within a period of six months from the present date, the execution of this stipulation has been brought to the knowledge of the Council, the Council shall declare that the present decision has become definitive and shall indicate the measures required to ensure the delimitation on the ground of the frontier line."

"And having taken note of the new treaty between Great Britain and Irak signed at Bagdad on the 13th January, 1926, and approved by the House of Commons and by the Irak Chamber of Deputies and Senate:

"considers that this treaty, which was brought to its knowledge within the time-limit laid down in its resolution, ensures the continuance for twenty-five years of the mandatory régime under the conditions laid down by it, and accordingly declares that its decision of the 16th December, 1925, has become definitive."

(The resolution was adopted.)

No. 27.

Mr. Hoare to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 17.)

(No. 35.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, March 16, 1926.

PRESS reports repulse of attempted raids from Irak in neighbourhood of Jezret Ibn Omer and Midiat.

I telegraph as report may be prelude to frontier incidents.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 5.)

[E 2137/1827/65]

No. 28.

Sir E. Drummond to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 31.)

Sir,

League of Nations, Geneva, March 27, 1926.

WITH reference to your telegram of the 25th March concerning the sending of two officers to the Irak frontier in accordance with the Council's decision of the 18th March, I have the honour to confirm a telegram which I sent to you yesterday in reply thereto, the text of which is as follows:—

"Am submitting your telegram of 25th March concerning officers on Irak frontier to Acting President Council. Think he may wish to have your views on the following points: (1) minimum period of appointment; (2) whether you prefer exclusively military officers; (3) whether both officers of same nationality.

Difficult to give approximate estimate before consulting Government or country supplying officers but inclusive monthly sum of about £150 for each would seem reasonable, travelling expenses to and from Irak extra. What would lieutenant-colonel employed staff duties Irak receive, allowance included?—DRUMMOND."

I suggest that it might facilitate the task of the Acting President of the Council in finding these two officers if you would be so good as to indicate as precisely as is possible the functions which His Britannic Majesty's Government would wish these officers to perform.

The mission confided to General Laidoner, and subsequently continued by some of his subordinates, arose out of certain specific charges and counter-charges presented to the Council by the British and Turkish Governments in connection with the Irak frontier settlement. It may be that the mission to be given to the new officers may be considered to be of a somewhat different character, and I do not doubt that the Acting President of the Council would be glad to have the views of His Britannic Majesty's Government on the subject.

I have, &c.

ERIC DRUMMOND,

Secretary-General.

No. 29.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Hoare (Constantinople).

(No. 31.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, March 31, 1926.

BAGDAD telegram No. 110 of 22nd March to Colonial Office, repeated to you: Visits of Turkish troops to Sul, Nuzur and Sinat.

You should address note to Nusret stating that Turkish forces are reported to have visited Sul, Nuzur and Sinat despite fact that these villages, though wrongly marked on map, unquestionably lie to south of Brussels line as explained in conclusion No. 2 of Laidoner report. You should inform Nusret that small contingents of Irak troops are about to be sent to the district, and ask him to arrange for immediate instructions to be sent to Turkish frontier authorities in order that all risk of incidents may be avoided.

No. 30.

Mr. Hoare to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 1.)

(No. 47.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, March 31, 1926.

NEWSPAPER "Milliet" published on 30th March what purported to be telegram from London correspondent to the effect that His Majesty's Government are considering following three proposals:—

1. Irak to retain Mosul and Great Britain to guarantee integrity of Turkey.
2. Turkey to receive 50 to 100 kilom. (presumably east to west) of territory on frontier, and economic advantages in Irak.
3. Mosul to be demilitarised neutral zone under neither Irak nor Turkey.

[E 2176/62/65]

No. 31.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople.)

(No. 305.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 5, 1926.

HIS Majesty's Government have had under consideration your Excellency's reports on your recent conversations with the Turkish Government at Angora with a view to arriving at a final and friendly settlement of the Irak frontier dispute; and the question has further been discussed with you, during your visit to London for consultation regarding the proposals which you should be authorised to make to the

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Turkish Government on your return to Angora. As a result of these discussions, the following instructions have been prepared for your guidance.

2. Your Excellency is already aware that His Majesty's Government are desirous of coming to a friendly agreement with the Turkish Government in regard to a definitive frontier between Turkey and Irak, and thus removing the one subject which has of late rendered difficult the relations of friendship which both countries are anxious to see restored. Such an arrangement should, moreover, be one that will benefit the populations on both sides of the frontier.

3. Your main object on your return to Angora will therefore be to conclude an Anglo-Turkish Treaty laying down a frontier which, while involving substantial concessions to Turkey to the south of the eastern section of the "Brussels" line, shall not involve such considerable transfer of population as would create serious unrest throughout Irak, increase the administrative difficulties and military expenditure of His Majesty's Government in that country, and be out of harmony with the principles of the League of Nations. The limits within which you are authorised to offer territorial concessions to Turkey will be communicated to you separately.

4. In view of the responsibilities assumed by His Majesty's Government towards the League of Nations in respect of Irak, as set forth in the League Council's decision of the 27th September, 1924, in the Anglo-Irak Treaty of 1922 annexed thereto, and in the new Anglo-Irak Treaty of the 13th January, 1926, which was approved by the League Council on the 11th March, 1926, the sanction of the Council will have to be obtained before any territory now included in Irak is transferred to Turkey. Article 8 of the 1922 Treaty provides that no territory in Irak shall be ceded or leased or in any way placed under the control of any foreign Power; paragraph IV of the British undertakings accepted by the League Council on the 27th September, 1924, provides that no modifications of the 1922 Treaty will be agreed to by His Majesty's Government without the Council's consent; and the Council on the 11th March, 1926, pronounced the "Brussels" line, as described in their decision of the 16th December, 1925, to be the definitive frontier between Turkey and Irak, while postponing to a later date consideration of the steps required to ensure its demarcation. The sanction of the Council will therefore be required for the transfer to Turkey of any territory south of the "Brussels" line; the most convenient time for obtaining such sanction will probably be after the signature of the treaty and before the exchange of ratifications.

5. As regards the general form of the treaty, it should be concluded, in view of the international status already acquired by Irak as a State capable of making treaties, between Great Britain and Irak of the one part and Turkey of the other part. The question whether an Irak plenipotentiary is to take part in the negotiations or whether you are to act as sole negotiator and signatory on behalf of both Great Britain and Irak is reserved for further consideration. You should ascertain from the Turkish Government as soon as you arrive at Angora whether they agree that an Irak plenipotentiary should take part in the negotiations and sign the treaty; and you should at once report their reply to His Majesty's Government. Further instructions will then be furnished to you on the point with the least possible delay.

6. It appears preferable that the treaty shall be drawn up in the French language only, provided that the Turkish Government agree to a single authentic French text. If they insist on an authentic Turkish text also, you will explain that His Majesty's Government and the Irak Government must in that event claim authentic texts in English and Arabic.

7. In accordance with the usual practice as regards treaties laying down frontiers, the treaty shall not contain any clause limiting its duration to a particular period. It will, however, be necessary to include in it a provision releasing His Majesty's Government, on the termination of the special Anglo-Irak relations created by the existing Anglo-Irak treaties, and the League's decisions in regard thereto, from any obligations under the new Anglo-Turco-Irak Treaty except those mentioned in paragraph 9 below.

8. No full and accurate geographical survey has yet been made of the country through which the frontier line to be agreed upon must pass; and it will therefore be necessary, in defining the frontier in the treaty, to indicate as far as possible the physical features, villages, &c., which are to be assigned to Turkey and Irak respectively. This description must cover the whole line from Syria to Persia, including the portion of the "Brussels" line which it is not proposed to alter. The actual demarcation of the frontier line should, in accordance with the usual procedure, be effected by a commission composed of representatives appointed by the contracting parties, with a neutral president chosen by the Council of the League of Nations.

9. His Majesty's Government regard it as important that the treaty shall provide that the contracting parties accept as final and definitive the Turco-Irak frontier laid down therein, and will make no attempt to alter it.

10. Apart from the territorial clauses indicated above, the treaty should comprise articles designed to promote good-neighbourly relations between Turkey and Irak, by means of provisions dealing with matters such as tribal disputes, migrations, brigandage, and in general all matters usually regulated by a treaty of *bon voisinage*. It should provide, in particular, for the establishment of a standing joint commission, meeting periodically, to discuss questions arising out of matters of this kind and to settle them in an amicable manner.

11. The treaty should contain provisions on the lines of those in the Treaty of Lausanne regarding the nationality of residents in transferred territories and their right to opt within a certain period for Irak nationality.

12. It should, if possible, be laid down in the treaty that the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt shall decide what portion of the debt attributable to the former Mosul Vilayet shall be borne by Turkey and Irak respectively in consequence of the new determination of the frontier. This arrangement should be proposed to the Turkish Government as a reasonable and equitable solution; but you are authorised to drop the proposal if they make serious difficulty regarding its acceptance.

13. The treaty should provide for the application as between Turkey and Irak, of (a) the convention respecting conditions of residence and business and jurisdiction, and (b) the Commercial Convention, both signed at Lausanne in 1923.

14. His Majesty's Government would welcome the conclusion of a Turco-Irak extradition treaty in accordance with the usages prevailing among friendly States; and the agreement of Turkey and Irak to enter into negotiations for this purpose as soon as possible might well be embodied in an article of the new Anglo-Turco-Irak Treaty.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[E 1914/44/65]

No. 32.

Foreign Office to League of Nations.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 12, 1926.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain to inform you that he exchanged with the Irak diplomatic agent in London on the 30th March the ratifications by His Majesty the King and by King Feisal of the treaty signed at Bagdad on the 13th January, 1926, which was approved by the Council of the League of Nations on the 11th March.

2. I am to transmit to you herewith, for registration, and for custody in the archives of the League in accordance with the final clause of the treaty, one of the three original signed texts of that instrument.*

I am, &c.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

[E 2244/27/65]

No. 33.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to M. de Fleuriau.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, April 14, 1926

IN your note of the 21st November, 1925, you submitted certain considerations in support of the argument that your Government are entitled to share in the development of oil-fields in the Vilayet of Basra.

2. I have carefully considered the matter, but I must confess to some perplexity in regard to the French Government's claim, since it is largely based upon a number of inevitably hypothetical assumptions. In the first place, there is at present little reason to suppose that oil deposits exist in this vilayet, and there certainly was not, at

* See No. 23.

the time when the San Remo Agreement was signed, any reason to suppose that the Basra Vilayet had oil potentialities. It was probably largely owing to this circumstance that the Mesopotamian oil-fields were not defined in the San Remo Agreement as meaning oil-fields in the Vilayets of Bagdad and Mosul, since it was not then supposed that there existed oil-fields outside those vilayets.

3. In your note your Excellency claims that the letter signed by M. Berthelot and Sir John Cadman on the 29th January, 1921, can only be held to interpret the second part of article 7 of the San Remo Agreement, which refers to the eventuality of the development of oil in Irak by a private company, and that it does not affect the first part of article 7, which provides for the development of oil-fields in Irak by Government action.

4. It is the belief of His Majesty's Government that the development of oil-fields in Irak by Government action is an eventuality so remote as to be negligible. Should it, however, happen during the continuance of the present special relations between His Majesty's Government and Irak, that the Irak Government decide to develop the hypothetical oil-fields in the Basra Vilayet, I shall be happy to inform your Government and to concert with them on the question of the application of the first part of article 7 of the San Remo Agreement to this eventuality.

5. In the remote event of oil deposits being discovered in the Basra Vilayet and of their development by a private petroleum company, it seems unlikely that such company will be other than the Turkish Petroleum Company, in which His Majesty's Government have already placed a shareholding at the disposal of the French Government. If, however, a private petroleum company, other than the Turkish Petroleum Company, obtains from the Irak Government a concession for the development of such oil in Basra Vilayet, His Majesty's Government cannot admit that they are under any obligation, under the San Remo Agreement and the authoritative interpretation of that agreement contained in the letter of the 29th January, 1921, to place at the disposal of the French Government a share of 25 per cent. in any such company.

6. They are compelled to take up this attitude in view of the fact that they are not in a position, and never have been in a position, to promise to the French Government a shareholding in any private petroleum company used for the development of oil-fields in Mesopotamia other than the Turkish Petroleum Company. It was in order that the situation in this respect might be clearly defined that the letter of the 29th January, 1921, signed by M. Berthelot and Sir John Cadman, was drawn up and signed, and from the fact that your note contends that the letter in question interprets only the second paragraph of article 7, I infer that the French Government do not now dissent from this view of the situation.

7. With regard to the transferred territories, to which your communication incidentally refers, I regret that I must hold to the opinion expressed on this subject in my memorandum of the 8th October, 1925.

I have, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[E 2387/1827/65]

No. 34.

Foreign Office to League of Nations.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 16, 1926.

WITH reference to your letter of the 27th March and previous correspondence relative to the despatch of two neutral officers to the neighbourhood of the Turco-Irak frontier, I am directed by Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain to return the following replies to the questions raised in that letter and in your telegram of the 26th March:—

1. It will be sufficient if the officers are appointed for six weeks in the first instance, at the end of which period the necessity for retaining them could be reviewed in the light of the circumstances then existing.
2. It is considered preferable that military officers should be selected for this duty.
3. It is desired that, if possible, the two officers selected should not be of the same nationality.
4. A British lieutenant-colonel employed on staff duties in Irak would receive emoluments of approximately £4 18s. 6d. a day, including pay, subsistence allowance, marriage allowance and colonial allowance.

5. As regards the functions which the two neutral officers should perform, His Majesty's Government consider that, pending the formal recognition of the Council's frontier decision by the Turkish Government, the presence in the frontier region of officers appointed by the League of Nations, who could note and report to the Council the manner in which that decision is being observed, would have a quietening effect and allay anxiety regarding a recrudescence of the incidents which previously led to charges and counter-charges by the British and Turkish Governments.

I am, &c.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

[E 2499/228/65]

No. 35.

Report by Colonel Jac and M. Markus respecting the Frontier between Turkey and Irak.

Note by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations.—(Received in Foreign Office, April 20.)

(C. 236.)

Geneva, April 14, 1926.

THE following report from Colonel Jac and M. Markus, dated the 12th April, is circulated for the information of the Council.

Report by Colonel Jac and M. Markus.

(Translation.)

Geneva, April 12, 1926.

When General Laidoner left Mosul on the 23rd November, 1925, two members of the mission—Colonel Jac and M. Markus—remained behind, in accordance with telegraphic instructions received from the Secretary-General, to carry on the mission until the question of the frontier was finally decided by the Council which was to meet in the first fortnight of December. The task of the small mission remaining in Mosul did not differ from that of the Laidoner Mission, its chief duty being to watch the situation in the disputed territory, the main part of the work, namely, the enquiry concerning the situation of the Christians in Goyan and the fixing on the spot of certain disputed points in the frontier district, having already been done by General Laidoner.

During this period the mission has been able to ascertain, by visiting various localities and by talking with the representatives of the Irak and British Governments, and with the local population, that peace and order have not been disturbed either on the provisional frontier or in the interior of the territory.

The Council having in December adopted the Brussels line as the final frontier, the mission, in accordance with the Secretary-General's instructions, remained on the spot until the decision became final, in accordance with the conditions referred to in the Council's resolution.

In the opinion of the mission, its duties assumed a different character at the end of this first period, its stay at Mosul being prolonged in order that it might observe (1) the manner in which the Council's decision was accepted by the population; (2) the situation on the frontier which had now become the final frontier; and (3) the situation of the Christian refugees in the Goyan district.

The mission did not consider itself authorised to touch upon the domestic questions referred to in the December decision, being of opinion that these were matters of internal policy.

This second period has been characterised by absolute tranquillity within and without the territory, and by the absence of any incidents which could be regarded as serious.

In particular, the mission has the honour to report as follows:—

1. The decision reached by the Council in December has been accepted with enthusiasm by the educated element of the population and with feelings of satisfaction by the masses. The people are glad to have obtained, after a somewhat protracted period of uncertainty, a solid foundation for the economic restoration of their country. These feelings have found expression not only in the manifestations and ovations with which the mission was everywhere received by the authorities and the population, but

also in a more tangible form; after the decision, the population of the Liwa of Mosul paid 99 per cent. not merely of the taxation of the last fiscal period but also all taxes in arrears for the last two years, and this without any special action being taken by the authorities.

The mission would point out in particular that, although it has enjoyed complete freedom and has had every opportunity of coming into direct contact with the population, no single manifestation of discontent with the decision has ever come to its notice.

2. Peace and order in the frontier district has not been disturbed to any serious extent during the whole of this period. The mission was, it is true, informed that Turkish patrols had visited the villages of Sul and Nuzdur to the south of the frontier on the 14th January and 22nd January and again on the 21st February and 25th February; that they had spent the night there and had commandeered supplies from the inhabitants. The mission did not consider these incidents to be of particular importance from the point of view of general peace, because (a) in its opinion the incidents were not organised by the higher Turkish authorities, but rather by local subordinate commandants or even by soldiers individually responsible; (b) in all the cases reported, the number of soldiers was insignificant (three soldiers); (c) the Irak Supreme Command can at any time prevent the repetition of these incidents by sending outposts to occupy effectively all the villages in the frontier district which, according to the Council's decision, are without doubt situated in Irak territory.

Among the more important events which occurred in the frontier zone during this period, we should mention the emigration from Turkey into Irak of Naïf Bey, chief of the Kurdish tribe of Miran, with most of his tribe (according to his own estimate about 50,000 men). As the mission has not been able to ascertain the causes of this exodus, it can only report the fact.

3. The Christians of Goyan, who were concentrated by the Turkish authorities in the district of Elki last year, continue to cross the frontier in small groups or singly; in most cases they are persons who have maintained relations with the refugees that came into Irak last year and are now in the concentration camps of Zakho and Bersivi.

The general impression of the mission leaving the territory is that peace and order reign along the frontier and in the interior of the country under a well-devised administration whose work has been crowned with remarkable success.

In conclusion, the mission feels bound to make special mention of the extreme cordiality and spirit of co-operation displayed by the Irak and British authorities. In particular, the mission tender its thanks to his Excellency, Mr. Bernard Henry Bourdillon, C.M.G., Acting High Commissioner, Mr. Jardine, administrative inspector at Mosul and his Excellency Abdul Aziz-el-Kassib, Mutessarif of Mosul.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL RUD JAC
(Czechoslovakia).
N. MARKUS (Estonia).

[E 2577/62/65]

No. 36.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople).

(No. 359.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 23, 1926.

THE Turkish Ambassador asked to see me to-day.

He expressed the hope that I was satisfied with the turn which your negotiations had taken. I replied in the affirmative and added that it had given me great pleasure to see that our friendly intentions towards Turkey were finding reciprocal expression in the attitude of the Turkish Government in these conversations. I added that I had this morning received from you what was evidently a most important proposal, but that the text was so corrupt that at present we were able to make out little more than the subject with which it dealt. I could, however, assure the Ambassador that we should study the new proposals of the Turkish Government with the utmost desire to find in them a solution of the question, and that we should act with all the expedition possible in dealing with matters of such importance in which a third Government—that of Irak—had also to be consulted.

The Ambassador said that he attached great importance to the avoidance of delay. Circumstances were now favourable, but it was the character of his people to prolong negotiations, and it was important that we should strike while the iron was hot.

His Excellency then enquired whether he might ask whether I had any information about the reported agreement between Italy and Greece, and he showed considerable concern as to Italian intentions and a great desire to know whether there was anything in the notes exchanged between us and the Italian Government which would point to Abyssinia as a derivative for any Italian ambitions. As he continued to press me about M. Mussolini's intentions I laughingly replied that I supposed my proper course would be to try to increase his anxiety, but I was not going to do so. I believed that M. Mussolini had already instructed his Ambassador at Angora to give reassuring explanations to the Turkish Government. For myself I should accept such assurances as given in good faith. I thought the Italian and Greek Governments had felt the necessity to put an end to the tension which had existed between them ever since the Corfu incident, but I had no reason to suppose that they were contemplating any aggressive action or that they had completed any pact. As to our negotiations about Abyssinia, they were directed to clear up our respective positions under the agreement of 1906, in which, as I observed, France was also concerned. They dealt purely with economic and industrial relations and in no way with territorial claims or ambitions. The three Powers had undertaken to respect the independence of Abyssinia, which country, by the way, was a member of the League of Nations and enjoyed the protection which that membership secured, and none of the three Powers had any desire to invade Abyssinian rights or partition Abyssinian territory.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[T 5095/508/381]

No. 37.

League of Nations to Foreign Office.—(Received April 26.)

Sir,

Geneva, April 22, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 12th April, 1926, by which you have been good enough to forward to me for custody in the archives of the League of Nations in accordance with the final clause of the treaty, and for registration, one of the three original signed texts of the treaty between Great Britain and Irak signed at Bagdad on the 13th January, 1926.

Under the terms of article 18 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the above-mentioned treaty was registered with the secretariat of the League of Nations on the 14th April, 1926, and will be published as soon as possible in the "League of Nations' Treaty Series." The certificate of registration is forwarded to you herewith.

The original text of the said treaty has been duly deposited in the archives of the League of Nations.

I have, &c.

H. McKINNON WOOD,
Acting Director of the Legal Section.

[E 2642/62/65]

No. 38.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 27.)

(No. 193.)

Sir,

Angora, April 18, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to report that I arrived here on the 17th instant and the same evening had an interview with Tewfik Rushdi Bey, in which we entered on the negotiations for the fixation of the Irak frontier.

2. I proceeded to give him a general sketch of the sort of treaty which His Majesty's Government would wish to conclude with Turkey for the settlement of this question, and he made comments on the various points as I developed them. With the broad principle of a tripartite treaty to which Irak would subscribe he was in

agreement, and he appeared to consider that it would be to the advantage of Turkey that Irak should be explicitly bound by the proposed settlement. As to the settlement of the whereabouts of the frontier, however, he maintained that the wording of the Treaty of Lausanne (article 3 (2)) actually precluded him from discussing it with anyone but Great Britain, and, though this theory may lead to strange and illogical results, he was not to be moved from his view. In regard to the suggested articles for delimitation, he was inclined to demur, though without much conviction, to the provision of a neutral chairman with a decisive vote, expressing a preference for a stipulation for arbitration if necessary, but he did not press this idea with any vigour.

3. As to the provisions for the treatment of populations in transferred territory, he maintained that those who opted to preserve their present nationality should have to liquidate their property within a stated period—a proposal which rather horrified me; this, too, however, he did not press strongly.

4. The general lines of the *bon voisinage* articles excited little comment from him, and he had no *prima facie* objections to make against the suggested permanent frontier commission.

5. He seemed to regard as perfectly natural the suggested division, according to the new frontier line, between Turkey and Irak by the Ottoman Debt Commission of the amount of debt allocated by that commission to the former Vilayet of Mosul.

6. When I referred to the provision by which Turkey would explicitly accord to Irak subjects the benefits of the Commercial Convention and the Residence and Jurisdiction Convention, attached to the Lausanne Treaty, he raised the question of the privileges secured to foreigners in Irak by the Anglo-Irak Judicial Agreement of the 25th March, 1924, and said that Turkey would have to claim the extension of them to her subjects. I am aware how difficult, if not impossible, it would be for the Irak Government to meet this request, and shall not fail to keep you closely informed of any developments of this question.

7. Tewfik Rushdi Bey welcomed the suggestion that provision should be made for the early negotiation with Irak of conventions governing subsidiary matters—sanitation, veterinary, plant diseases, insect pests and extradition, especially extradition.

8. He quite appreciated the force of the provision by which His Majesty's Government, when the special relationship between themselves and Irak came to an end, should cease to be bound by the treaty except by those articles defining and guaranteeing the frontier.

9. He demurred with an insistence that rather surprised me to the mention in the treaty of approval by the League of Nations to the treaty prior to its ratification. I explained that in honesty to Turkey we must put in this point, and without disrespect to the League we could not omit it; he maintained that it was a mere matter of internal concern for us; perhaps a necessary step for us to take before we could ratify; but that as such there was no necessity for us to mention the point in the treaty. This is another matter which I may have to refer to you later on.

10. I then handed to the Minister the description of the new frontier line which I had the honour to propose to the Turkish Government, with a map to illustrate it. I attach herewith a copy of the document I gave him.* Tewfik Rushdi Bey glanced at it, but realising that he would not be able to grasp its import, set it aside for more leisurely study.

11. His remarks throughout were nothing but first impressions, and too much importance should not be attached to them.

12. I saw Ismet Pasha this morning. After some general talk we soon got on to the subject of the proposed treaty, but we spoke only of the territorial and political aspects of the question. He said that the transfer of territory was "the whole question," and that what I had to offer was "nothing at all." He spoke at length of Turkey's desire for security and of the apparent impossibility of getting it, and he complained of the difficult position in which the Turkish Government was placed. I said that His Majesty's Government desired earnestly to be on friendly terms with Turkey, and to endeavour to attain that object was spontaneously arranging for a cession of territory. What more striking proof of good intentions could be found? They also desired that Turkey should feel secure within her own boundaries; he had spoken to me last January of the manner in which the great British Empire was slowly advancing further and further northwards till nobody

* Not printed.

imagined it would ever stop; well! here was the line not merely stopping, but turning back again to the south. This treaty would not merely convince the local populations that finality had been reached; it would also put an end to the atmosphere of perpetual crisis that had for the past years pervaded Anglo-Turkish relations, and would also open the door to still greater possibility of cordiality between the two countries.

13. Ismet Pasha said that this was all very fine, and he had little doubt of the desire of His Majesty's Government to be on good terms with Turkey; but His Majesty's Government was one thing and their local agents another. He had himself served in olden days in Yemen, and he knew the mentality of frontier officials in distant regions; they could not keep quiet, and must always be agitating. The Turkish frontier regions were now in hopeless disorder, and it was due to instigations from across the border. I denied this warmly, and gave Ismet Pasha my personal word for it that Irak officials for years past had actively prevented any incitations to disorder in Turkey from Irak territory. I knew perfectly well that in Irak all was quiet and that in Turkey all was confusion, but this was because the Turkish Government had seen fit suddenly to close tekkes and to make everyone wear hats. Ismet said that this could not be the reason of the disorder, because even the "Nestorians" in Turkey were protesting against hats, and I answered that hats had very little to do with it; what had driven people in Turkey into revolt was the violent interference by the Turkish Government with the ancient habits of a backward and primitive people. Irak officials had nothing to do with it; there were, I said, Kurds from almost every tribe in Turkey who had taken refuge in Irak; if we had wanted to cause trouble in Turkey we could have lighted up rebellion from end to end of the country, but we had not done so, and he must know it. Did he not remember an observation I made to him last year in March when Sheikh Said's rebellion was at its height? I had then said to him that doubtless Turkey would soon crush the rebellion; that prisoners would be taken and cross-examined and close enquiries pursued; but that I could then tell him, in advance, that no trace of British instigation of the revolt would be found. And now, I said, what trace of British instigation did you find?

14. This seemed to strike Ismet rather forcibly; he admitted remembering my statement of last year, and he did not attempt any accusation that we had had any part in the Kurdish rising of 1925; but, he said, if you hold that your Irak officials are now having no part in our present troubles, I will ask Tewfik Rushdi to give you some precise details to prove the contrary. I said that if Tewfik Rushdi would do this I should have pleasure in giving him answers (and I have no doubt that with Mr. Jardine's help I shall be able to do so), but I hoped that care would be taken that we should not get into an acrimonious correspondence of a nature to injure our present negotiations. To this Ismet Pasha assented, and the conversation terminated soon afterwards. It was quite friendly in tone throughout.

15. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Irak.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 2772/62/65]

No. 39.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 203.)

Sir,

Angora, April 24, 1926.

WITH the formulation of Turkish counter-proposals on the Irak frontier question a new phase in the negotiations is entered upon, and in the interval I venture to submit some observations for the sake of record perhaps rather than of enlightenment, as I have reported fully by telegram.

2. The Turkish counter-proposal is indeed only put forward unofficially, yet even in this form it must be taken seriously and must affect the Turkish position over the whole case. Tewfik Rushdi may have said to himself that he can always throw over the ideas he has himself put forward and revert to territorial cession as a compensation: in theory he may be right, but in practice he can only do so with an immense loss of leverage. The Turkish Government then has rejected one solution of the question—and a solution which would undoubtedly have caused acute internal difficulty in Irak, when, as they must have guessed, it had only been half-formulated

to them. They have also taken no care whatever to secure to themselves previously an alternative satisfaction. They have indeed put forward simultaneously with their rejection of territory three other proposals: two of them, a guarantee of mutual neutrality and some shadowy continuance of Turkish sovereignty over Irak, were respectively dropped or emasculated by Tewfik Rushdi Bey himself almost in the very moment of their formulation. The third one, that of participation in the oil of Irak, took me considerably by surprise, because, as I said in London, I had not expected that it would appeal to Turkey. I am now somewhat afraid that the arrangements of the Turkish Petroleum Company and of the Irak Government may be so complicated now that they are settled that a concession to Turkey in the matter of oil, even if the Irak and British Governments accepted it in principle, may in practice require many weeks of elaboration; and if so the third satisfaction asked for by Tewfik Rushdi would vanish not through reluctance of the two Governments, but from their sheer inability to give it. I am, however, pinning my hopes on the possibility of doing something in the way of royalties. At first, under the influence of Tewfik Rushdi's suggestion of a nominal continuance of Turkish sovereignty over Irak, I was greatly afraid of touching royalties, and I took great care not to mention the word; but, on second thoughts, it seems to me that if we could definitely establish with the Turkish Government that sovereignty passed unequivocally to Irak, a participation in the Irak Government's royalties might be given without political danger, and might constitute a fairly cheap solution of the question. To this point of cheapness I will revert later.

3. Diplomacy could hardly have fallen more heavily between two stools than has that of Tewfik Rushdi in this matter, and it is all rather typical of his precipitate method of doing things without previously thinking them out. He has thrown away the best part of three possible satisfactions and is now reduced to one only, and that of doubtful practicability. We must anticipate that in a short time, if some concession over oil prove to be practicable, we shall be confronted again with demands for territory, sovereignty, neutrality, perhaps even for a general guarantee of all Turkish frontiers; for I still find it hard to think that we can come to terms with the draft treaty I possess, minus territorial concessions and plus participation in oil.

4. If we are able eventually to reach a settlement on surprisingly easy terms, it will be due mainly to the extremely parlous state of the country at the present moment. The disorder in finance is showing itself in the non-payment of salaries and of contractors for public works, of which instances are coming to light with far greater frequency than ever before in the two years I have been here. The discontent with the Government's policies has extended to the west, and, from what Mr. Jardine tells me, it must have made the Government's position in the eastern and south-eastern vilayets much weaker than I had imagined. Finally, we have just had partial mobilisation, as everyone says, against the Italian menace. What the Italian menace amounts to at this moment nobody here seems to know, but panic fear is of its essence unreasoning. It is also symptomatic of conscious weakness. Now, as it seems to me, it is not to the interest either of Great Britain or of Irak, whose fortunes for some years will be closely bound up with those of Great Britain, that Turkey should be unduly weak; and you, Sir, may shortly find it necessary to decide how far it is right or wise to profit by Turkey's present weakness in driving a bargain.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Irak.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador),
R. A. LEEPER.

[E 2717/1827/65]

No. 40.

Foreign Office to League of Nations.

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 4, 1926.

WITH reference to my letter of the 16th April, relative to the despatch of two neutral officers to the neighbourhood of the Turco-Irak frontier, I am directed by Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain to inform you that this question has now been further discussed in London with Major Abraham, of the League of Nations secretariat. As the result of these discussions, the following information has been furnished to Major Abraham.

2. The object of His Majesty's Government in making the request for the presence of neutral observers in the neighbourhood of the Turco-Irak frontier is to have representatives of the League in that region during the negotiations which are now proceeding between the Turkish and British Governments. His Majesty's Government will not raise objection if the officers selected for this duty are both of the same nationality. It is desirable that the officers selected should proceed to Irak as soon as possible, and that the period of their employment should be three months, counting from the date of their departure from the capital of their own country to the date of their return thither. In the event of the negotiations with the Turkish Government proving successful within the period of three months, His Majesty's Government would probably desire that the officers should return home prior to the expiry of that period, and similarly, if the course of the negotiations were delayed, His Majesty's Government might desire to extend the period of the officers' employment.

3. I am to add that His Majesty's Government are prepared to agree to the two officers selected being paid an inclusive salary at the rate of £150 *per mensem* each for the period of three months mentioned above, together with the cost of their passages to and from Irak, the cost of insurance and an outfit allowance of £100 each.

I am, &c.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

[E 2584/112/65]

No. 41.

Foreign Office to League of Nations.

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 7, 1926.

IN your letter of the 19th April you informed Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain that the Permanent Mandates Commission will hold their ninth session at Geneva on the 8th June next, and that they hope at that meeting to examine *inter alia* the reports of His Majesty's Government on the Administration of Irak for the periods April 1923 to December 1924 and January to December 1925, which are expected to reach Geneva by the 20th May. You further requested the Secretary of State to acquaint you in due course with the names of the representatives designated by His Majesty's Government to attend that session for the examination of the above-mentioned reports.

2. As you are aware, the first of these two reports has already been laid before the commission, to whom it was suggested that that report might be discussed at the extraordinary session held in Rome in February last (see my letter of the 11th January). The time at the disposal of the commission did not, however, permit of the report being examined on that occasion. As regards the second report, every effort is being made to ensure that it shall reach you by the 20th May.

3. His Majesty's Government are anxious to be represented by His Majesty's High Commissioner for Irak, Sir Henry Dobbs, on the first occasion when their reports on Irak are to be examined by the commission. They are, indeed, reluctant, in view of the importance of the occasion, to contemplate any other arrangement, and they have already intimated to the commission that Sir H. Dobbs would be deputed for this purpose. They are, moreover, confident that the attendance of the High Commissioner himself would be welcome to the commission and assist them materially in the examination of the reports.

4. A serious practical difficulty arises, however, as regards the attendance of Sir H. Dobbs at the June session of the commission. He has only recently returned to Bagdad from leave of absence in England, and there would be grave practical objections for administrative reasons to requiring him to leave his post again so early as June. This could, on the other hand, conveniently be arranged in September next. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government earnestly hope that the commission, bearing in mind how far more profitably the Irak reports could be discussed in the presence than in the absence of Sir H. Dobbs, may be willing to postpone the consideration of those reports from June to September. The adoption of this course would also present the additional advantage of giving the commission the opportunity of studying at their leisure the voluminous documents which will come up for the first time for their official consideration.

I am, &c.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

[15026]

E

[E 3019/62/65]

No. 42.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 227.)

Sir,

Constantinople, May 12, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to report further on the Irak frontier negotiations, in continuation of my despatch No. 203 of the 24th April.

2. When the Turkish Government put forward its request for participation in Irak oil instead of for territory, a considerable pause ensued while the complicated issue thus raised was undergoing examination by His Majesty's Government. In the first days of May I began to fear that the atmosphere, which had been very favourable, might deteriorate, and that, in view of the preoccupation of His Majesty's Government with the strike situation in England, the British reply to Turkish overtures might be still further delayed. Accordingly, on the 5th May, in order to keep Tewfik Rushdi in play, I visited him and expressed to him unofficially my personal conviction that an allotment of shares in the Turkish Petroleum Company would be almost impossible, but that it seemed to me likely that something might be done in the way of assigning to the Turkish Government a share in the Irak Government royalties. As to sovereignty, I handed to him, unofficially and without prejudice, the document, of which I enclose a copy herewith, to show him, as I said, how ideas on the subject were moving in London. I expressly warned him that this document was not a draft, and that the ideas in it had not yet been approved by His Majesty's Government. We separated on very friendly terms, agreeing to meet again in three days' time.

3. That was on Wednesday, the 5th May. That very afternoon I received your long telegram No. 14 of the 4th May, telling me exactly how far I might go in the direction of offering to Turkey a participation in the Irak Government royalties. The same afternoon, or in the evening, Tewfik Rushdi met the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Assembly (this I have from a member of the committee, who told me about it on the 8th May), to whom he repeated what I had said, and showed my formula about the transfer of sovereignty. The committee seems to have approved the formula, with one reserve, which is forming the subject of separate discussion with you by telegram; and, according to my informant, to have expressed an actual preference for royalties over shares as regards oil.

4. On Thursday, the 6th May, I met the Minister for Foreign Affairs again by appointment at 10 o'clock in the evening. By then everything was changed. Tewfik Rushdi had just come out of one of the interminable Cabinet meetings in which Turkish Ministers indulge. It had lasted for seven hours. His own affairs had come under discussion—though I have no reason to believe that they had occupied the whole time of the meeting. He was much excited; if he had not been so he might have waited to hear why I should wish to see him at 10 o'clock at night; as it was, he gave me no time to say anything, but plunged straight into what he had to say. He dealt shortly with the question of the transfer of sovereignty, and then, as reported at length in my telegram No. 18 of the 7th May, told me that the Turkish Government, if they could not have shares, which they would prefer, would wish to capitalise their participation in royalties at once. I thus never had any occasion at all to give the Minister the smallest idea of what sort of participation in royalties the Turkish Government might hope to get.

5. I have reported this in some detail to show you to what lightning and radical changes of mind the Turkish Government is liable. I saw Tewfik Rushdi Bey on the 8th May, just before coming away to Constantinople for a few days, and reproached him with this instability of aim, saying that His Majesty's Government might think they were being treated *à la légère*. I said we had been beating about the bush long enough, and the time had come for us to get to business and stick to it. I hoped there were going to be no more surprises such as I had now had twice to suffer from. Tewfik Rushdi Bey agreed in general, assured me that we were now really at business, and that if there were any more astonishing changes of front, they would have to be proposed to me by another Minister for Foreign Affairs and not by himself.

6. I can only suppose that the financial shoe is pinching very seriously. A great effort is being made to produce a budget for 1926-27 (the financial year now begins on the 1st June) which will balance honestly. Drastic measures are being taken to increase revenue; and measures, which seem equally drastic to Turkish Ministers, to reduce estimates. Hassan Bey, the Finance Minister, is engaged in perpetual and acrimonious battles with all his colleagues, who complain that they are being

amputated, and he would not be able to sustain the fight but for the whole-hearted support of Ismet, backed doubtless by the Ghazi. I cannot help suspecting that whatever sum may be realised as the price of peace from Irak will go in alleviating the immediate financial sufferings of Turkish Ministers and their departments.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

Enclosure in No. 42.

(A).—*Dans le Préambule.*

Des "considérants":

1. Rappelant les prévisions du Traité de Lausanne d'après lesquelles certaines questions relatives à l'avenir des territoires au delà des frontières de la Turquie seront à résoudre à l'amiable entre les intéressés.

2. Reconnaisant que l'Irak est devenu un État capable de se gouverner librement, sous réserve du traité d'alliance entre l'Irak et la Grande-Bretagne.

3. Exprimant le désir de reconnaître comme frontière définitive la ligne provisoire de 1924 et de reconnaître que la souveraineté sur les territoires au sud de cette ligne est passée au Roi de l'Irak.

4. Exprimant le désir de prévenir pour l'avenir tout incident de frontière qui pourrait déranger la tranquillité de ces régions.

(B).—*Dans le Corps du Traité.*

Un article donnant une description détaillée de la ligne de 1924, et reconnaissant formellement que la souveraineté sur les territoires au sud de cette ligne est passée entre les mains du Roi de l'Irak.

No. 43.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 23.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Angora, May 18, 1926.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs tells me that Shemsdinan has been attacked by 400 men under four leaders, namely, Seyed Abdullah, Seyed Fehim, Oghus and Ahmed, aided or incited by Seyed Taha. He will send me further details in an *aide-mémoire*.

No. 44.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 36.)

(Telegraphic.)

Angora, May 28, 1926.

AFTER an interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 25th May I thought Turkish Government were going to accept £500,000. Yesterday, however, he told me that difficulties of agreeing to this sum were very great, and asked me what we would give in royalties instead. I offered him 10 per cent. for twenty-five years.

I think it likely that he will revert again to capital sum, and I should hope not to utilise authority given in your telegram No. 25.

I am confident Turkish Government hope to sign treaty and have ratification authorised by Assembly in its present session.

(Sent to Bagdad, No. 34.)

No. 45.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 38.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Angora, May 28, 1926.

I HAVE received Turkish counter-draft.

The first important point is that it omits all mention of League of Nations, viz., article 3, where a Swiss is to act as president, and where League of Nations is left out of last paragraphs, article 20, where mention of League of Nations is also expunged. Paragraph 3 of preamble is also omitted.

On the other hand, article 1 says definitely that "frontier line is that laid down by the Council of the League on 27th September, 1925."

I trust that British and Irak Governments can accept this.

The Turkish counter-draft inserts another article 1 (a), by which Turkey renounces in favour of Irak all sovereignty south of the line.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 36.)

No. 46.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 39.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Angora, May 28, 1926.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs obstinately refuses to admit any mention in treaty of special relations between His Majesty's Government and Irak. In preamble of paragraph 2 he puts: "In view of alliance between Great Britain and Irak." In article 19 he provides that articles 1 to 5 shall be permanent, and remaining articles may be denounced by any party after _____ years on giving six months' notice.

As to first point, I will urge him to accept words "special relations" instead of "alliance." Please telegraph if it is of importance to win on this point.

As to the second, only possible date is 1928, which is earliest moment at which Irak can terminate present relations with His Majesty's Government. As article 18 contemplated revising frontier agreement after two or three years, perhaps His Majesty's Government might accept freedom of all parties to denounce it in 1928.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 37.)

No. 47.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 40.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Angora, May 28, 1926.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Turkish counter-draft says: "Turkey and Irak shall give each other most-favoured-nation treatment both in matters of commerce and establishment." But Minister for Foreign Affairs insists that it must be both or neither. Simplest thing would be to omit the article altogether and rely on articles of Lausanne Conventions for protection of Irak interests. If this course were adopted it would become more important to obtain some recognition of existence of special relations with Irak.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 38.)

No. 48.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 41.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Angora, May 28, 1926.

TURKISH re-draft of treaty.

Following are various other amendments:—

- (i.) Frontier zone is 75 kilom. instead of 50.
- (ii.) Article 4. Turkey reserves the right to refuse Turkish nationality to optants.
- (iii.) Add at end of article 14: "They undertake to allow on their territory, and especially in frontier zone, no meeting or organisation of propaganda directed against each other."
- (iv.) Article 16. Last paragraph is omitted. Minister for Foreign Affairs says that this will be arranged by diplomatic note, which is the more ordinary procedure.
- (v.) New article 17A inserted, by which Irak undertakes not to disturb or molest persons inhabiting ceded territory on account of political opinions or conduct previous to signature of present treaty and to accord to them full amnesty. Sentences pronounced for above reasons shall be annulled and any proceedings instituted stopped. Compare amnesty declaration of Treaty of Lausanne.
- (vi.) Article 13 is excised, and also words in article 15 "notably pasturage and tribal migrations," idea being to leave all these things the more forcibly to Frontier Commission.

Unless I hear to the contrary, I shall assume that there is no objection to these.
(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 39.)

No. 49.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 30.)

(No. 42.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Angora, May 29, 1926.

YOUR telegram No. 26.

For [sic] preamble of paragraph 1 is as follows: "In view of the provisions of the Treaty of Lausanne regarding settlement of the frontier between Turkey and Irak." Paragraph 2, as in my telegram No. 39. Paragraph 3 omitted, but substance inserted in article 1 (a).

There are of course numerous mere verbal changes throughout the counter-draft not worth telegraphing.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 40.)

[E 3317/62/65]

No. 50.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 244.)

Sir,

Angora, May 22, 1926.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 227 of the 12th May, I have the honour to report in general on the progress of the negotiations with the Turkish Government over the Irak frontier.

2. I returned here from Constantinople on Sunday morning, the 16th May. I had then received no instructions from you as to offering a lump sum to the Turkish Government, and, as we had then been marking time for ten days, I thought well to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs on Monday, the 17th, to keep him in play. As I could make him no offer, our conversation was mainly on matters of secondary importance. I gave him a copy of the preamble of our draft treaty and asked him to study it, and he promised to do so. I asked him if it was true that the National Assembly was to adjourn within the next week or so, concerning which I had heard

some rumours on my arrival at Angora and learned that it was likely. This surprised me a good deal, as the last time I had seen Tewfik Rushdi he had told me that he was arranging to have the budget of his department discussed the last of all so that he might be able to make to the Assembly the widest possible declaration on the foreign affairs of Turkey. I expressed to him my disappointment, as it would postpone the ratification of the treaty which we hoped to sign; and he replied that things had gone much faster than he had expected; that his own budget was now passed; and that the Assembly had never before continued its sittings beyond the middle of May.

3. Your telegram No. 55 despatched from the Foreign Office, I imagine, on the 17th May went first to Constantinople. It was repeated to me here and arrived on Wednesday, the 19th, but in so corrupt a form that my staff had to work on it literally all that night to extract sense from it. It contained your instructions as to the offer of a lump sum to Turkey, and I arranged to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs on Thursday evening at 7.30.

4. Now you instructed me here to endeavour to purchase Turkish consent for a sum of from £300,000 to £500,000—the figures I had myself suggested in my telegram to you No. 77 of the 11th May. Though with every desire to spare the pocket of the Irak Government, I decided to go at once for the maximum figure named by you, for the following reasons: In the first place, the very unfavourable view of Turkish finance which I had gathered at Angora in the first days of May was corrected by far more reliable information I obtained when I returned to Angora. The Turks were not as pressed for cash as I had thought. This was confirmed by the fact that the Government did not propose to keep the Assembly sitting, and if they were prepared with equanimity to postpone till late autumn ratification of any treaty we might sign, they could be in no great hurry to receive the money that treaty might bring to them. Finally, I thought it worth trying to get the adjournment of the Assembly postponed for a while so as to secure immediate ratification, especially in view of the contents of Sir H. Dobbs's telegram from Bagdad No. 91 S of the 19th May; but if there was to be any chance of this being achieved I must myself do all I could to accelerate the negotiation, and there would be no time for slow bargaining. I therefore decided to go to your limit at once.

5. I opened the conversation on the evening of the 20th with the subject of the adjournment of the Assembly, urging the Minister strongly to postpone it as long as possible. He was very diffident on the subject, remarking that the signature of the treaty was what mattered and that ratification followed automatically. I strongly contested this view; it was mutual security that mattered and its achievement at the earliest possible moment, and nothing could achieve it but signature and ratification. Neither in England nor perhaps in Turkey would mutual confidence spring up without definite ratification of a treaty; and till then morally and legally both parties had their hands completely unfettered. There was no telling what dangers might arise between now and next winter. Tewfik Rushdi Bey said that he himself would greatly prefer ratification immediately, and would gladly make an effort if it were a matter of two or three days only, but it would be difficult to keep Deputies back for longer; however, he promised to see what he could do, but in a very half-hearted manner, and I doubt his real intention of exerting himself, unless, in the sequel, it is only the question of two or three days.

6. After this I brought up the preamble to the treaty, of which I had given him the draft on the Monday, meaning to test again whether he was still sound on suzerainty and territorial cessions. He stood this test quite satisfactorily, and talked quite openly about the unreserved cession of both to Irak; but he rather surprised me by asking where the stipulations for mutual neutrality came in. This was a try-on, and I hear he has informed one of my colleagues that mutual neutrality will be provided for in the treaty. I went over the ground again as I had done once before to him, and told him that we could not have it, but that he might choose for himself the form of words in which we should bind ourselves to respect the frontier which the treaty will lay down.

7. We then came to the last important point between us, that of the figure. I said that I had now dealt with his Excellency for fifteen months, and from my experience of him I had reached the conclusion that he was a man with whom it was best to go straight to the point and with whom it was possible to do business without haggling. I had been instructed to offer a certain sum to the Turkish Government and given authority to go if necessary up to another figure which was the absolute maximum. At the risk of appearing to present him with an ultimatum, I would so far ignore my instructions as to name to him at once the maximum sum which His

Majesty's Government would offer, viz., £500,000. A long silence ensued; his emotion was quite visible, and I could see that his lips had gone quite dry. He rang for water, drank off a glassful, and in a crushed voice said he could not disguise from me his extreme disappointment. Whatever sum I had named he would have been unable to agree off-hand without consulting his colleagues; he must, of course, do so now, but he had no doubt as to their views. We continued talking on various aspects of the affair for some time, and I came away without any idea whether the Turkish Government would accept its half-million or not; but I think I did convince Tewfik Rushdi that His Majesty's Government would not give more.

8. On Friday, the 21st, I received a request to call on Tewfik Rushdi Bey at 5 o'clock in his private house, about 150 yards from the Embassy. We plunged straight into business, and in half a minute my head was in a complete whirl. I cannot reproduce the obscure and confused language in which Tewfik Rushdi clothes even the simplest ideas, and in the present case it was a long time before I could make any sense at all out of his proposal. However, it was clear that his colleagues had been entirely unanimous with him that half a million was unacceptable. He had a new scheme to propose by which Turkey would get legitimate satisfaction and under which His Majesty's Government need pay practically nothing. Turkey was to be relieved by the Irak and by His Majesty's Government of the payment of the first three annuities that would become due to the bondholders of the old Ottoman Debt under the debt settlement which must some time be arrived at whatever those annuities might amount to. The second part of the proposal, which I never entirely fathomed and which I did not mention to you at all in my telegraphic report because it seemed to me so futile, was that by some mysterious juggling of figures and of interest rates in the debt negotiations between the British and French Governments, His Majesty's Government might be able either to recover the sums paid by them in the shape of the three annuities or might otherwise smuggle them up and make them disappear. I do not see that I need mention this second part of the proposal again. It gradually disappeared from our conversation when I realised its character.

9. However, on the first part, which amounts for His Majesty's Government to an invitation to take a dip into the lucky-bag, we had plenty of discussion. I expressed my lively indignation at this attempt to introduce into the negotiation of a frontier line the altogether extraneous subject of the Ottoman Debt. This was the third time that his Excellency had set back the whole negotiation by changing his mind and introducing new and unexpected proposals. After a month's talk we were now to launch into yet another untrodden path. It seemed to me that the Turkish Government were not behaving seriously and that they were in no anxiety to have any treaty at all. As for the monetary value of what he was proposing, taking the mean between what Turkey had offered at Paris and what the bondholders had asked for (viz., £T. 2 million gold), I supposed he was now claiming about £T. 5 million gold, which was quite preposterous. The claim must be rejected out of hand by His Majesty's Government.

10. Tewfik Rushdi Bey protested that he was most anxious for a treaty, but what could he do? His Majesty's Government would not give more than half a million, his colleagues and he were entirely agreed that they could not accept that sum and he had to seek some device for escaping from the *impasse*. The Turkish Government could not face the Assembly with a treaty offering so insignificant a satisfaction, when he could not point to any material stipulation in the treaty guaranteeing to Turkey the friendship or even the neutrality of Great Britain. It was impossible for the present Turkish Government to disinterest themselves from Irak with a satisfaction less than had been accorded by Austria-Hungary to the first constitutional Government of Turkey for the seizure of the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He believed that £T. 2,500,000 had been paid on that occasion (I shall be able to verify this to-morrow), and the republic could not take less. He believed this was just about the present value of the three annuities he had proposed, for Turkey would not increase her offer of £T. 1,500,000 gold, some time might elapse before a settlement was reached, and then that settlement would certainly provide for a moratorium of some years, so that the present proposal he had made roughly coincided with the Bosnia-Herzegovina settlement in value. It would be an indignity for the Turkish Government to accept the offer of His Majesty's Government. It only represented six days' revenue of the Turkish State.

11. A very long discussion ensued. I absolutely rejected the comparison with the Bosnia-Herzegovina case, reminding him of the attitude of protest against Austrian action which His Majesty's Government had adopted at the time. We

talked about the measure of security which Turkey would acquire by the conclusion of a treaty, and I reminded him of the dangers attendant on any prolongation of the present unsettlement. I called to mind the language used by you to Ferid Bey last November, in which you undertook to seek any *accommodement* by which any verdict adverse to Turkey might be rendered more easy of acceptance, and I pointed out that you had never intended materially to enrich Turkey or indeed to do more than precisely what you said. The offer now made represented a fair fulfilment of your promise; if the Turkish Government could not accept it, they could fall back on the precarious alternative of royalties, but this would afford them even less satisfaction. Tewfik Rushdi said that he would gladly have taken shares, but he did not want royalties; they would only constitute a possibility of quarrels in the years to come. I said that the preferability of a capital over royalties from the political point of view had been taken into consideration by His Majesty's Government. I could hold out no hope of the offer being increased, and I must beg him to consult with his colleagues again.

12. Twice in the course of the conversation Tewfik Rushdi Bey dropped to me the remark that in his most pessimistic moments he had never expected that His Majesty's Government would offer less than £1 million, and one must take this as a suggestion that the Turkish Government would accept that sum as a complete settlement. Just as we decided to offer from £300,000 to £500,000, so the Turks, on equally empiric reasoning, hoped to get something between 1 and 2½ millions. I think we ought to try awhile longer to get our offer accepted. I doubt the Turkish Government suffering much loss of prestige if they do accept it, for it was to the mast of Mosul territory that the flag was nailed, and public opinion has been entirely reconciled to the loss of all the territory of the Mosul Vilayet. Personally I am still quite in the dark as to what sum His Majesty's Government and Irak would regard as a reasonable price of peace with Turkey. It seems possible to me that rather than break off they might be willing to pay more than the half-million which I proposed to them as a suitable sum. I shall telegraph on this subject if I think it necessary. Meanwhile I am asking for an interview with Ismet Pasha, the Prime Minister.

13. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad and to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador)
R. A. LEEPER.

No. 51.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 43.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Angora, May 30, 1926.*
MINISTER for Foreign Affairs informs me verbally but officially that Turkish Government accept 10 per cent. for twenty-five years.
I have asked Irak plenipotentiary to proceed immediately.
Assembly is being kept in session in order to ratify at once.
(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 41, and Constantinople, No. 9.)

No. 52.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 44.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Angora, May 30, 1926.*
ROYALTIES.
1. I have had to give Minister for Foreign Affairs a formula and have drafted following text:—
"For period of twenty-five years after ratification of present treaty Irak will pay to Turkey 10 per cent. of all royalties which it may from time to time receive—
"(a.) From Turkish Petroleum Company in virtue of concession of [? 21st May].
"(b.) From companies or persons exploiting oil under article 6.
"(c.) From subsidiary companies to be constituted under article 33."

I presume that the other stipulations in your telegram No. 22 need not be introduced unless asked for.

2. As introduction to above I proposed following text:—

"Desiring to share her material resources with Turkey and thus widen the field of common interest between the two countries."

3. Minister for Foreign Affairs says that Turkish Government will have no objection to binding themselves to refer first to British or Irak Government if they ever wish to sell their interest in royalties.

If you wish this done please telegraph formula urgently.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 42.)

No. 53.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 45.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Angora, May 30, 1926.*
MY telegram No. [group undecypherable].
Minister for Foreign Affairs' reason for rejecting recognition of special relations was the fear that it would involve Turkish Government in League of Nations' recommendation about Kurdish régime. He has now withdrawn objection and would accept paragraph 2 of preamble as follows:—

"Recognising Irak as an independent kingdom having special relations with Great Britain in virtue of treaties of 1921 and 1926."

He will not admit mention of League of Nations' decisions in this connection.

I trust that above is satisfactory.

If you regard it so, may I simply omit article 16 (see my telegram No. 40)?

I hope to get article 19 restored substantially in its original form, though without mention of League of Nations' decision. It will, however, be necessary to allow Turkey to denounce part of treaty affected when His Majesty's Government withdraw or if any modification is made in existing treaties between Great Britain and Irak.

Would this meet your wishes?

If anticipations in above paragraph are wrong may I accept 1928 as date for demarcation (my telegram No. 39)?

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 43.)

No. 54.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 46.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Angora, May 30, 1926.*
MY immediately preceding telegram.
In return for recognition of special relations, Minister for Foreign Affairs requests insertion of some formula to increase security. What he wants is something anti-Kurdish, but he recognises that he cannot have that. I suggest the following to be inserted as first article of Part 2 (article 5 (a)): "Turkey and Irak, convinced that it is to their mutual interest that a state of peace and order be maintained on both sides of common frontier, will endeavour each in its own territory, and subject to their rights of sovereignty, to check ('enrayer') any move aimed at creating trouble in territory of the other."
Please telegraph if you agree.
(Sent to Bagdad, No. 44.)

No. 55.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 47.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Angora, May 30, 1926.

TURKISH re-draft changes article 9 as follows:—

"Shall arrest these persons and put them at the disposal of the other party, of which they are the subjects, with their arms and booty."

Last sentence is cut out because Turkish Government could no longer get laws passed to enable them to take cognisance of offences committed by their nationals outside the country.

Minister for Foreign Affairs recognises that article so re-drafted is of limited scope only, but regrets that more cannot possibly be done.

He hopes that Frontier Commission will be able to arrange mutually for punishing offenders, who would otherwise escape free, by some administrative method, *e.g.*, by compelling them to reside in a district far from the frontier.

Article 10 is omitted altogether.

I trust that above may be accepted.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 45.)

No. 56.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 49.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Angora, May 30, 1926.

ARTICLE 6.

Minister for Foreign Affairs wants stipulation added: "They will forbid all passage of frontier to persons carrying arms unless these persons shall have obtained a licence from competent authority."

Can this be agreed to?

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 46.)

No. 57.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 50.)

(Telegraphic.)

Angora, May 30, 1926.

AS Turkish Assembly is being kept back to ratify, there will be great pressure to finish and sign as quickly as possible. I will try to refer important questions, but one of my difficulties is that Minister for Foreign Affairs changes his mind twice a day. I hope, therefore, you will treat my telegrams with the utmost expedition, and perhaps you would give some latitude of decision to me and my Irak colleague, who should be here about 1st June.

(Sent to Bagdad, No. 47.)

No. 58.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 52.)

(Telegraphic.)

*Angora, May 30, 1926.*BAGDAD telegram to Angora [*sic*].

If I can receive answers to my numerous telegrams and if His Majesty's Government will give me and my Irak colleague some latitude we should be able to sign treaty here about 6th June. As Bagdad will not get full text till the Irak plenipotentiary returns, it seems to me almost inevitable that extraordinary session will be required.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 50.)

No. 59.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 1.)

(No. 54.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Angora, May 31, 1926.

BAGDAD telegram No. 111 S: Amnesty.

I will try for this solution.

Alternatively could we say "persons inhabiting frontier zone" (of 75 kilom.)?

Which is better?

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 51.)

No. 60.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Angora).

(No. 30.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, June 2, 1926.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 34 to 52 of 26th to 30th May: Turkish negotiations.

I will deal with various points in order:—

Your telegram No. 37: Rectification of frontier.

See Bagdad telegram repeated to you as No. 110.

I agree to proposed rectification (see my telegram No. 31).

Your telegram No. 38.

See my telegram No. 31.

We cannot accept the Turkish draft in article 1 (*a*). According to our view sovereignty over territory to south of Brussels line is already vested in Irak in consequence of Council decision and article 16 of Lausanne. We know that Turkish view is different, and our article 1 was so worded as to enable Turks to accept it without abandoning their point of view; but we are not prepared to accept wording they now propose, which involves express abandonment of our view and acceptance of theirs. We will accept any form of words which you may think suitable and which does not in fact run counter to our view regarding transfer of territory.

Your telegram No. 39.

See replies to your telegrams Nos. 42 and 45.

Your telegram No. 40: Article 16.

Paragraph 1 may be omitted. As suggested in your telegram No. 41, paragraph 2 may be embodied in an exchange of notes, material parts of which should read:—

"The Government of the Turkish Republic recognise the right of the British diplomatic and consular authorities to protect Iraqi interests in Turkey until such time as these duties are taken over by Iraqi diplomatic and consular representatives."

You may agree to Turkish suggestion of most-favoured-nation clause, but it should be made quite clear that the word "establishment" does not include special privileges provided for in Judicial Agreement (see Bagdad telegram No. 105 S to you). In last resort clause might be omitted altogether.

Your telegram No. 41.

Amendments (i) to (iv) are agreed to, subject as regards (i) to any objection by High Commission.

(v.) Amnesty. See Bagdad telegram repeated to you No. 111. You should try to secure a redraft on the lines of clause 2 of the Lausanne declaration, to cover all cases up to the date of signature of the treaty. You should also try to secure reciprocity, but you need not insist on it.

(vi.) Agreed.

Your telegram No. 42.

Text of paragraph 1 of preamble agreed to. Text of paragraph 2 in your telegram No. 45 agreed to. Paragraph 3 and new article 1 (*a*), see reply to your telegram No. 38.

Your telegram No. 44: Royalties.

1. Your formula is accepted subject to following modifications:—

At end of (a) substitute words "in virtue of article 10 of their convention with the Irak Government dated 14th March, 1925."

In (b) after words "article 6" insert words "of the same convention."

In (c) add same words after "article 33."

Other stipulations in my telegram No. 22 need not be introduced.

2. Text accepted.

3. Now see Bagdad telegram No. 113 S to you of 31st May. I suggest the following formula, but I am prepared to leave precise wording to you:—

"The Turkish Government undertake not to part with their interest in the said royalties without previously giving the Government of Irak the opportunity of purchasing such interest at a price not higher than that offered by any third party."

Your telegram No. 45.

Preamble, paragraph 2: See reply to your telegram No. 42.

Article 16: See reply to your telegram No. 40.

Article 19: There is no objection to the Turkish right to denounce. As regards the question of the omission of references to the League of Nations, see my telegram No. 31.

Your telegram No. 46.

I agree to the text proposed, but I am not clear from your telegram where it is to be inserted. Please elucidate.

Your telegram No. 47.

See Bagdad telegram No. 117 S of 31st May, with which I agree. Unless the High Commissioner's suggestion can be adopted I consider that articles 9 and 10 should be omitted.

Your telegram No. 49.

See Bagdad telegram No. 116 of 31st May.

Article 6. If egress only is intended, as I assume, no objection to proposed stipulation subject to any observations by High Commissioner at Bagdad as to practicability of enforcement.

Your telegram No. 50.

The various points raised in your telegrams under reply have been dealt with as expeditiously as possible, but you will, I feel sure, realise that the necessity of consulting other Departments and Irak Government inevitably involves certain delay. I am quite ready to accord you a reasonable degree of latitude, particularly in connection with points with which this Department alone is concerned.

Your telegram No. 52.

It has been suggested to the High Commission that Irak Parliament might be adjourned at once till signed text of treaty is available and so avoid need for extraordinary session.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 8.)

No. 61.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Angora).

(No. 31.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, June 2, 1926.

MY immediately preceding telegram: Turkish negotiations.

I accept the omission from the treaty of the references to the League of Nations. I shall make the necessary communications unilaterally and ask the Council's consent at its meeting next week to the slight rectification of the frontier.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 9.)

No. 62.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 3.)

(No. 55.)

(Telegraphic.)

Angora, June 2, 1926.

TURKISH attitude towards forthcoming treaty is one of openly expressed disappointment combined with resignation which is almost resentful against hard terms imposed. I think it would be wise if British press comment could be influenced in following direction:—

There must be no exultation, but only praise for the courage and statesmanship of Turkish Government in the face of difficult situation. Great Britain will now feel confident that new Turkey has no desire to recover territory lost by old Ottoman Empire. Republic has been assured that there will be no aggressive tendencies from the south and no incitements thence to Kurdish separatism in South-Eastern [group undecipherable]. Path is clear for development of close political relations between Great Britain and Turkish Republic, with consequent strengthening of Turkey's international position. Only possible danger to this lies in obstacles put in the way of development of economic achievements by exaggerated nationalism due largely to Turkey's inability to believe that Capitulations have been abolished for ever. She fears that in allowing foreigners rights which they enjoy so far in every country she will open the door to re-establishment of privileges which are things of the past.

No. 63.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 4.)

(No. 57.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Angora, June 4, 1926.

AFTER long interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs last night, all points except one or two of minor importance were settled and I hope to sign the treaty to-morrow.

Following are the only important changes:—

Article 1 (a): *Sovereignty*.—As Minister for Foreign Affairs would not agree to our requirements, we decided to omit the article altogether.

Royalties.—Minister for Foreign Affairs asked for option to capitalise for one year at £500,000. I agreed.

I hope you will not disapprove.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 52.)

No. 64.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 4.)

(No. 58.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Angora, June 4, 1926.

BAGDAD telegram No. 262.

Minister for Foreign Affairs accepted my draft, which says "sum which third party may be prepared to pay."

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 53.)

No. 65.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Angora).

(No. 32.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, June 4, 1926.

YOUR telegram No. 54 of 31st May: Amnesty clause in Turkish treaty.

Please see High Commissioner's telegram to you No. 120, with which I agree.

Failing either of these alternatives, you should in last resort accept the Turkish

draft, with, however, exception in case of Sheikh Mahmud. His exclusion might be secured by an exchange of notes specifying that the article does not debar Irak Government from taking such disciplinary measures against Sheikh Mahmud or his followers as they may consider necessary or desirable.

Air Ministry have concurred, on understanding that amnesty will not fetter their liberty to prosecute individuals for offences committed in the future, *i.e.*, after signature of the treaty. I think this is quite clear, but you should bear it in mind in drafting.

No. 66.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Angora).

(No. 34.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, June 5, 1926.

YOUR telegram No. 57 of 4th June: Turkish Treaty.

Omission of article 1A is approved.

As regards royalties, sentence is not clear. If you mean that one year is period within which Turks will have right to exercise option, I approve.

[E 3444/62/65]

No. 67.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 262.)

Sir,

Angora, May 28, 1926.

I RESUME to-day the account of the negotiations over the Irak frontier, which, in my despatch No. 244 of the 22nd May, I had brought down to the evening of Friday, the 21st May. I had then decided that the time was come to see the Prime Minister, and an interview with him was arranged for me on Sunday morning, the 23rd May.

2. I opened conversation with Ismet Pasha with a strong indictment of the manner in which the Turkish Government had conducted the negotiation and retarded progress by their constant changes of mind. We had imagined they wanted territory and had been astounded to find that they wanted oil. This raised at once a question of the utmost complexity, but we had immediately set to work and had been prepared to make them an offer in terms of oil. Then came another surprise, when we found that they wanted to turn purely hypothetical oil into terms of hard cash. Nevertheless, we did what we could and made them an offer of cash, and, in view of the delay that had already occurred, I had taken it on myself to offer at once the maximum sum which His Majesty's Government were prepared to pay. Whereupon we found ourselves confronted with a new suggestion, by which the problem, which had been reduced to simple terms, was hopelessly involved with the question of the Ottoman Debt. This was quite intolerable, and His Majesty's Government could not accept it. I had now been negotiating for five weeks, and here I was, at exactly the point where I had started. The Assembly was about to adjourn and, even if we could come to terms, ratification must be postponed till November, with a consequent prolongation of uncertainty and insecurity. This was now the best we had to look forward to, but there was worse; I had hitherto believed that the Turkish Government was anxious to come to terms, but how could I now persuade His Majesty's Government that they were not wilfully putting obstacles in the way of negotiation, with the intention of postponing indefinitely any solution at all?

3. Ismet Pasha warmly repudiated my suggestion. He was, he said, most anxious to conclude an arrangement at once, but the delay had been caused by the slowness with which His Majesty's Government had formulated their proposals, and he took credit for not having worried me to accelerate their formulation. Our territorial proposal was inadequate. As to shares in oil, was it conceivable that there were none for Turkey when they could be given to the French, the British, Americans and Dutch, while royalties, he was told by his experts, were of no value to Turkey. And now, when a derisory financial proposal was put forward by His Majesty's Government, and one derogatory to the dignity of Turkey, all they asked was that it should be increased to some total between £T. 4,500,000 (gold) and £T. 7,500,000 (gold).

4. A long discussion ensued, in which we dealt exhaustively with the characteristics and relative advantages of shares and royalties, with security in all its aspects, with the present value of their annuities of undefined amount and deferred for an undefined number of years, with the value of £500,000 to the Turkish Government and with the difficulty His Majesty's Government must have in paying to Turkey a fine to induce her to accept a settlement she had already solemnly undertaken to accept. Finally, however, he made a definite offer about ratification. He asked if all questions were settled except the one of satisfaction to Turkey, and I replied that I believed it was so. He then said that, if in the next two or three days we could come to terms over the one outstanding question, he would keep the Assembly sitting and put the treaty to it for ratification before it adjourned. But, he said, he must have absolute assurance. He could not make all the fuss of keeping the Assembly back and then adjourning it without presenting a treaty to it. I warned him that it would take seven or eight days for the Irak plenipotentiary to get here when I telegraphed to him to start, and he understood this point.

5. I came away with the strong impression that Ismet Pasha really wanted an early settlement, but it also seemed to me likely that in the next two or three days I might be confronted by a sort of ultimatum from the Turks to accept some offer at once or to refuse it and see the Assembly adjourn the next day. I anticipated that in that case I might have to make some addition to the £500,000 which you had instructed me to offer, and I accordingly telegraphed to ask for the necessary authority, though I was painfully aware that I was putting to you a difficult Cabinet question in the very middle of Whitsuntide.

6. Another point was also clear. Having told Ismet that there were none but the one important outstanding question between us, I must communicate to the Turkish Government the draft treaty in my possession, which I had hitherto been keeping back in the hope that I might defer its discussion till the arrival of the Irak plenipotentiary. Accordingly, the next day, the 24th May, I called on Tewfik Rushdi Bey and handed to him my draft. In the course of the conversation which ensued I ascertained from him that the Assembly was not as near adjournment as I had imagined, and that it had work before it to keep it busy anyhow till the end of May.

7. Next morning, the 25th May, I received an interim telegram from the Department indicating, as I had already guessed, that there would be great difficulty in increasing the financial offer already made. This intimation, Ismet Pasha's evident desire to reach a settlement quickly, and Tewfik Rushdi's amiability in taking away the sword of Damocles from over my head (*viz.*, the possibility of the Assembly adjourning immediately), considerably strengthened my hand. I thought I had better bring things to a head at once. I therefore called on Tewfik Rushdi that evening. He began talk by saying he was preparing a counter-draft to my draft treaty, but it was not yet complete. He gave me verbally some details, which I reported under reserve to you by telegram. I then entered on the main subject. In our conversation of Friday, the 21st May, I said, I had noticed a remark he had twice made *en passant*, to the effect that in his most pessimistic moments he had never expected that His Majesty's Government would offer less than £1,000,000. Rightly or wrongly I had surmised that this was a sum which the Turkish Government were prepared to accept, and I had telegraphed to you accordingly. (Here Tewfik Rushdi interrupted me to intimate that my surmise was correct.) Unfortunately, I continued, it did not much matter. I was able to tell him that the offer of £500,000 was the result of a Cabinet decision and that the matter had been examined from every point of view. There was no way of justifying an increase of that sum before Parliament or British public opinion and I could not honestly encourage him to hope that it could be increased. Thereupon Tewfik Rushdi practically collapsed. He said that he would have to report to his colleagues before he could give me any decision, but the whole burden of his talk was the difficulty of his personal position, the words he had uttered at Geneva and elsewhere which he would now have to eat, and the gloomy fate that was to-day remorselessly overtaking his own political career. The Turkish Government, he said, was not out for mere money but must preserve its dignity. A million was a dignified figure, and if it was not attainable it did not matter whether the sum was £300,000 or £800,000. He did not know how the difficulties of the position were to be faced. I replied with expressions of personal sympathy; I admired the courage of his Excellency's struggle and admitted that he would have to display yet more of it in the immediate future. It was deserving of a greater reward than it would apparently receive. We separated, the Minister undertaking to send for me the next day or the day after, and I came away with the impression that if it only depended on Tewfik

Rushdi, the fight was over; but doubtful as to what the effect would be on him of consultation with his colleagues.

8. On Thursday, the 27th May, the Minister sent for me and began by presenting to me his counter-draft of the treaty, which we went through in a cursory manner and the nature of which I have reported to you by telegram. Then, after repeating much of what he had said before about the difficulty of accepting half a million, he asked what we were prepared to offer in royalties. Now, I have had so many surprises from Tewfik Rushi that I ought to have been prepared for this, especially as I had always told him that, if he did not like our money offer, he could always have royalties; yet I had never had occasion to name a percentage, and he had never asked me to do so; and now, naturally enough, the Ministers, tardily repairing Tewfik Rushi's negligence, would wish to ascertain the alternative before dealing with the pecuniary offer. Yet, I was taken aback; but on the spur of the moment I shot off at him: "10 per cent. for twenty-five years. He asked me to give him a formula, and to-day I sent to his house the document enclosed herewith.

9. I do not know what the next development will be, for, so far as the British and Irak Governments are concerned, my royalty offer may be intrinsically less valuable than the £500,000; but politically a capital payment is preferable to an arrangement lasting for many years and perhaps pregnant with possible difficulties and disputes. As for the Turks, they have to compare the dignity of the per cent. with the dignity of half a million, and I have no idea how or what they will decide.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

Enclosure in No. 67.

Formula sent to the Turkish Government by Sir R. Lindsay on May 27, 1926.

PENDANT une période de vingt-cinq ans à partir de la ratification du présent traité, le Gouvernement irakien payera au Gouvernement turc 10 pour cent sur toutes redevances qu'il pourra de temps en temps recevoir :

- (a.) De la Turkish Petroleum Company en vertu de sa concession du 14 mars 1925;
- (b.) Des compagnies ou personnes qui pourront exploiter le pétrole en vertu des termes de l'article 6 de la concession susindiquée;
- (c.) Des compagnies subsidiaires qui pourraient être constituées en vertu des termes de l'article 33 de la concession susindiquée.

[E 3445/62/65]

No. 68.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 263.)
Sir,

Angora, May 31, 1926.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 262 of the 28th May respecting the conduct of the Irak frontier negotiations, I have the honour to report that on the 29th May I heard that the Turkish Deputies had been told that they could not adjourn at once, but must wait to ratify the treaty with Great Britain and Irak. I realised at once that this could only mean that the Turkish Government had decided definitely to accept one of the offers I had made to it on behalf of the British and Irak Governments, otherwise they would never have burned their boats by making Deputies postpone their vacation.

2. Accordingly, when I saw Tewfik Rushdi Bey that evening, I neglected the main point of the negotiation, but attacked him very strongly on the most important secondary point on which we desired a satisfaction I had hitherto been unable to obtain, viz., the recognition of the special relations existing between Irak and Great Britain. I had the utmost difficulty in eliciting from him the reasons for his refusal to accord this recognition, but once he had admitted that he feared lest the Turkish Government should somehow be involved in the League's recommendation of a special régime for the Kurds of Irak, his opposition collapsed fairly soon, and he assented to the insertion

of a formula in the preamble of the treaty in a sense which I imagine will be satisfactory to the British and Irak Governments. I have reported on this point by telegram. He asked only, in exchange, for some form of words to help him to show to the Assembly that Turkey was getting some security out of this treaty. He begged me to devise something, saying that what he would like most would be some assurance by His Majesty's Government that they would have nothing to do with any sort of Kurdish autonomy, but admitting the impossibility of such a concession almost in the same breath. Remembering that His Majesty's Government were prepared almost to let the Turks say anything they liked within reasonable limits in article 5 of the treaty, I said I would try to devise something; and I yesterday telegraphed to you a text for your approval.

3. On the main point, that of the *accommodement* to be accorded to Turkey, he simply notified me that the Turkish Government accepted the offer of royalties I had made, asking me only to lend him a copy of the Turkish Petroleum Company's concession, as he had lent his own to Iemet Pasha and could not get it back. He assured me, when accepting, that he was speaking officially as Minister for Foreign Affairs on behalf of the Turkish Government. This was rather a tame ending to a very long game.

4. It is to be presumed that the signature of a treaty will now ensue, as the remaining points in discussion are hardly such as would justify either Government in breaking off negotiations.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Irak and to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 3446/62/65]

No. 69.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 264.)
Sir,

Angora, May 31, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of the draft treaty for settling the Irak frontier,* which I handed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 24th instant. I also enclose copy of the Turkish counter-draft* given me by Tewfik Rushdi Bey on the 27th May.

2. Neither of these drafts, of course, has any mention of the "accommodement" which His Majesty's Government is preparing to offer the Turkish Government, and which was still under discussion when they were prepared.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch and its enclosures to His Majesty's High Commission for Irak.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

No. 70.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 59.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Angora, June 6, 1926.

TREATY was signed last night. I return to Constantinople to-morrow.
(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 54.)

No. 71.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 60.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Angora, June 6, 1926.

FRONTIER treaty.

Following are principal last-moment changes:—

1. Formula about security (see my telegram No. 46) has been dropped altogether.

* Not printed.

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2. Also provisions about crossing frontier with arms in article 6.
3. Article 14. Prohibition of propaganda is only in the frontier zone.
4. Royalties. At the request of Minister for Foreign Affairs we have transferred to an exchange of notes, having equal force with the treaty, provisions by which the Turkish Government undertakes not to sell its rights without reference to Irak and by which the Turks received [group undecypherable] for one year to sell rights for £500,000 to Irak.
5. I greatly regret I could not persuade Minister for Foreign Affairs to admit Irak [?mandate] under Lausanne Commercial and Establishment Conventions. [Group undecypherable] was judicially privileged in Irak. Article 16 is therefore omitted altogether.
6. Part II of the treaty remains in force for ten years, but after two years any part [sic: ?party] may denounce it for himself alone on giving one year's notice.

Copy of treaty by bag
(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 55.)

No. 72.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople).

(No. 61.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, June 7, 1926.

YOUR telegram No. 29 from Angora of 21st May: Occupation of three villages of Sul, Sinat and Nuzur.

In order to avoid friction, Irak High Commissioner is prepared to allow the question of the occupation of Sul, Sinat and Nuzur to be left over pending final delimitation of the Turco-Irak frontier, provided that the Turks also undertake not to reoccupy these villages in the meantime.

Please ascertain whether Turkish Government are willing to give such undertaking, unless you see strong objection to this course.

No. 73.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople).

(No. 62.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, June 7, 1926.

YOUR telegram No. 59 of the 6th June: Signature of treaty.

His Majesty's Government have learned with utmost gratification of the signature of the Treaty of Angora, and desire to congratulate your Excellency most heartily on the skill with which you have brought the difficult negotiations to such a satisfactory issue.

I desire to add my personal congratulations and thanks for your untiring energy and help throughout.

No. 74.

Consul London to Sir W. Tyrrell.—(Received June 8.)

(No. 115. L.N.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Geneva, June 7, 1926.

FOLLOWING from Secretary of State:—

"At this morning's session of the Council I stated, in accordance with wish expressed by President at December session of Council and with declaration which I had made on behalf of His Majesty's Government in reply to this request, negotiations had been proceeding with a view to a friendly settlement between Great Britain, Turkey and Irak of frontier of Mosul. I was happy to inform Council that these negotiations had been successful and that treaty either had been signed yesterday or was on the point of signature. I thought it right to call attention of Council to a slight modification which had been made in Brussels line with the object of leaving in Turkish territory road from Ala[?mun] to Ashuta. I explained with reference to a map the very slight

territorial modification which was involved. I also informed Council that Governments concerned had agreed to provide for delimitation of frontier by a commission composed of their representatives with a president nominated by President of Swiss Confederation. It would therefore be unnecessary to trouble Council further with the question of delimitation. I added that treaty would in due course be registered by His Majesty's Government with Secretary-General in accordance with article 18 of the Covenant.

"Signor Scialoja, who was president at the December session, and Señor Guani, who is presiding over the present session, expressed great gratification at this statement. It was another instance of the success of the League in dealing with problems of this kind, and Council formally took note of above-mentioned modification of frontier."

No. 75.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 82.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, June 8, 1926.

RATIFICATION of treaty authorised yesterday by the Assembly after a lively debate in which Opposition seems to have taunted the Government with their mismanagement in the past of Mosul question.

Discussion of treaty by Government party in secret on 6th June was also prolonged and angry, and Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was in charge, had to send for Prime Minister to help him out. I am informed that opposition here was from a handful of extremists protesting against cession of any territory.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 25.)

No. 76.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 14.)

(No. 277.)

Sir,

Angora, June 6, 1926.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 263 of the 31st May, it is pleasant to be able to report that these wearisome negotiations over the Irak frontier are at last terminated, a treaty having been signed last night by the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs of the one part, and myself and Nuri Pasha Said, the Irak plenipotentiary, of the other.

2. In the course of the 31st May I received from Tewfik Rushdi Bey a counter-proposal about royalties, the gist of which was that Turkey should receive 5d. per ton on oil produced in the area of the concession for twenty-five years from the moment when oil was first produced. I called on him late that night and found him in a terribly nervous and jumpy state, but persuaded him eventually to put up with the offer I had already made; but when I tried to do other business with him he was so childishly unreasonable that serious work was impossible.

3. For the next two or three days, while I was awaiting your instructions on the numerous points raised by the Turkish counter-draft, I was in some suspense as to how Tewfik Rushdi would finally react to the treaty, the general purport of which was now virtually settled. He meanwhile sent along to me a counter-draft on what he and I call "security," of which more hereafter, and a preposterous draft "Protocole de signature," of which I enclose a copy herewith.

4. On Wednesday evening, the 2nd June, Nuri Pasha Said, the Irak plenipotentiary, arrived from Bagdad. On the 3rd June I received your long telegram No. 30, dealing with virtually all points in doubt. After mastering its contents and explaining the whole position to Nuri Pasha, he and I called in the afternoon on Tewfik Rushdi Bey, and we were fortunate enough to find him at his very best. The "Protocole de signature" soon went by the board, and in the course of a couple of hours we went through and decided every point except that of "security," in regard to which I undertook the forlorn task of trying to give my own draft a more appetising appearance. That evening I and my staff evolved a complete new counter-draft embodying the result of all discussions, which I delivered at his house on the morning of Friday, the 4th June. On Saturday, the 5th, Nuri Pasha and I met him again in the afternoon, when he made a last supreme

but vain effort to get out of recognising the special relations of His Majesty's Government with Irak, and we signed on the 5th June at about midnight. I will now deal with various main aspects of the treaty, both general and particular.

Turkish General Attitude towards the Treaty.

5. The truth is that in this long-drawn-out diplomatic struggle over Mosul, the Turks were beat last autumn, and the fact became patent when Tewfik Rushdi Bey returned to Turkey from the League meeting of September last. The press was, indeed, allowed or encouraged to give tongue until December, but ever since you wisely promised the Turkish Government some *accommodement* to help them towards the acceptance of an unpalatable verdict, they made up their minds that they must have peace somehow, that with relations towards Great Britain unsettled they could never feel comfortable internationally, and that the sooner they came to terms with His Majesty's Government the better it would be. The Italian scare of April came as a practical illustration of the truth of these conclusions, and for the past month or so the only question for them has been how much face they would be allowed to save. They knew they could not have Mosul town, and abandoned their territorial claims after a very perfunctory consideration of the matter, thinking perhaps, too, wisely enough, that the less Kurds they had, the less immediate trouble there would be. Probably they fixed on £1 million as the very minimum *accommodement* they would accept, and there is no telling how far the ebullient Tewfik Rushdi may have gone in assuring his colleagues that he would be able to extort this much satisfaction out of His Majesty's Government, to save the prestige of the republic; for the new régime in Turkey is a vigorous plant indeed, but its roots have not yet struck deep in the soil. For the other members of the Government the mere fact of coming to terms with Great Britain and signing a treaty is an honour, so high does the honour of His Majesty's Government stand in the world; still more so perhaps for the ordinary Turk, unconnected with Angora and the Government and concerned only slightly with politics; for these men the treaty may have its obvious advantages; but Tewfik Rushdi, with whom I have had to deal, is more directly affected than any of his colleagues or anyone else in the land by the events of the last twelve months, for it is he who has thumped the tub and he who has brought Turkey to a point from which withdrawal without some loss of dignity has been impossible, and he who now has to eat his brave words. Small wonder, then, that he has spent six weeks or so in twisting and turning, and seeking to devise ingenious forms by which he can hide up an unmistakable diplomatic defeat. Three times lately I have found him completely crushed, and I never saw anyone gloomier than he was last night when he signed the treaty. He has said to me frequently, in substance, "A mere treaty with you is not enough, half a million is nothing, and I must have something tangible to show. Give me international security, a promise of your general neutrality, a nominal sovereignty over Irak, something really anti-Kurdish, something resembling the Austrian reparation for the Bosnia Herzegovina *coup de main*, or even something completely incomprehensible about oil; but, as it is, I have nothing in this treaty to flourish about." I have really, at times, felt quite sorry for the horrid fellow; but when you have a fish by the tail, you cannot relax the grip even of your little finger without its slipping back into the water again.

6. I will now deal with various particular points in the treaty which have formed the subject of telegraphic correspondence with you lately, and may require some elucidation.

"Security."

7. When Tewfik Rushdi agreed to recognise explicitly the special relations existing between Irak and Great Britain, he asked me to give him in exchange something about security, and to show him some formula. He would not define what he wanted, but probably he hoped against hope for some definite and tangible pronouncement of goodwill for Turkey by Great Britain, preferably without Irak, for whom he has always professed contempt to me. The utmost I could venture to was the following, for insertion in the "Bon Voisinage" agreement:—

"La Turquie et l'Irak, convaincus qu'il est de leur intérêt mutuel de maintenir l'ordre et la paix des deux côtés de leur frontière commune, s'efforceront, chacun dans son territoire et sous réserve de ses droits de souveraineté, d'enrayer tout mouvement qui pourrait avoir pour but la création de trouble dans le territoire de l'autre."

Tewfik Rushdi's criticism of this was that he wanted something from Great Britain specifically—something more than the mere guarantee of execution involved by a British signature of the treaty; and that an undertaking in which Irak was the principal party was valueless. Still, on thinking it over, it apparently occurred to him that he might, by slightly changing his line, make something out of my draft, so he made me an anti-Kurd counter-proposal in the following terms:—

"Dans l'intérêt mutuel du maintien de l'ordre et de la paix des deux côtés de la frontière, l'Irak s'engage, sous réserve de ses droits de souveraineté, à ne créer aucun régime politique local susceptible de troubler l'état de choses existant dans le territoire de la Turquie."

Of course, it was out of the question to accept anything so obviously intended to annul the League's inept recommendations in favour of Kurdish local administration in Irak; at Tewfik Rushdi's further request I did what I could with my own draft to make it look a little more palatable, but on the day we signed he told me he had no use for a rind with no fruit in it and preferred to drop the article altogether.

8. The same fate at the same time overtook his proposal to prohibit the passage of the frontier by persons carrying arms unless they had a permit. The final form which I proposed to him for this, after discussing it carefully with Nuri Pasha, was as follows:—

"Autant que possible, les hautes parties contractantes défendront à toute personne de sortir de leur territoire dans le territoire de l'autre partie avec des armes à feu sans s'être préalablement munie d'un permis pour le port d'armes donné par l'autorité compétente."

I feel fairly sure that Tewfik Rushdi's real aim in bringing along this proposal was to get some stipulation into the treaty which would force Irak to disarm the whole of her frontier population.

9. I was very glad at the dropping of these two provisions from the treaty. At the best they could have been of no practical utility. Quite possibly, from their very vagueness, they might have been dangerous.

Royalties.

10. There is not much to be said about this. I was surprised when, having once talked about cash, he should have reverted to oil; and still more so when he accepted the 10 per cent. for twenty-five years which I offered. I never hid from him my personal conviction that the half-million was worth more than the 10 per cent., but I could not press it strongly for fear of exciting his suspicion. He said quite frankly that he shared my belief, but that for face-saving purposes an unknown quantity with an oily glamour to it was better than the cash. However, he relented on the day of signature—perhaps his Cabinet colleagues told him not to be a fool—and I was glad enough to give him a year in which to take the cash and let the credit go. I should think that by next autumn the Turkish Government may be exercising its right, and I daresay the Irak Government will be glad enough to pay up and have done with it.

11. He insisted on having this option and the obligation on Turkey to refer to Irak if she wanted to sell her oil rights put into a subsidiary exchange of notes. He has a perfect lust for protocols, "actes additionnels," appendices, and tags of all sorts to treaties, and I do not know how many I did not head him off from in the course of the negotiation; but within a few hours of signing one is too tired to resist a mere amiable weakness, and I contented myself with stipulating that His Majesty's Government should be entitled to give the same measure of publicity to the exchange of notes as to the treaty itself.

Diplomatic Representation.

12. In this matter we came across Turkish *amour-propre*. He first said that he would prefer to arrange for British protection of Irak interests in Turkey by ordinary notes, and that no difficulty could arise; but when we came to talk about the notes, he said he would take advantage of the occasion to appoint a Turkish consul-general in Bagdad. I remembered hearing Sir H. Dobbs say in London last March that he would sooner not have a Turk in Bagdad yet awhile, so I answered at once by saying that we should in that case want to have a British consul at Van, and there we were at once talking about reciprocity, in which Tewfik Rushdi found the scale inclined against Turkey. We had a long wrangle, but finally I had to give up all idea of having any special stipulations at all on the subject, consoling myself only

with the thought that it might well end by having no practical importance, and that Turkey would certainly take care not to lose touch with Irak so long as there was a chance of there being some money in the contact.

Commercial and Establishment Conventions.

13. I am disappointed not to have induced Tewfik Rushdi to admit explicitly that Irak must benefit by the stipulations of these two Lausanne conventions, but here, too, I came up against Turkish *amour-propre*. On the last day I made a strong appeal to him, but without avail. He had made a perfectly fair offer of mutual most-favoured-nation treatment in both matters for an unlimited time, and the existence of some petty privileges in judicial matters in favour of the subjects of European States (with the nature of which he was perfectly familiar), to which Turks could not possibly be admitted, made acceptance impossible. I was able to offer the perfect reciprocity of the two Lausanne Conventions, but that was no use to him. He explained that modern Turkey considered herself as entirely European, that it was her ardent desire to be regarded so by other Powers, and that he simply could not acquiesce in putting Turkish citizens abroad on a footing with Asiatics—from which, incidentally, the Japanese were excluded. The difficulty proved quite insurmountable, argue as I might. He suggested that we provide for the negotiation of commercial and establishment conventions in article 16. This I could not accept, because it implied an admission that Irak had no inherent right to come under the Lausanne conventions; thereupon, in a fine frenzy, he struck out of that article the promises to negotiate with Irak sanitary, veterinary, locust and customs agreements. It is a pity. I have little doubt that, if it is desired to negotiate these latter agreements, he will not refuse, and he has not actually said that the Turkish Government will refuse to Irak subjects the benefits of the Lausanne Commercial and Establishment Conventions. But I greatly regret not having been able to settle the matter beyond possibility of doubt.

14. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Irak and His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

Enclosure in No. 76.

Protocole de Signature.

AU moment de procéder à la signature du présent traité, les parties contractantes sont convenues des dispositions suivantes :

1. Il est entendu que le présent traité ne porte aucune atteinte aux dispositions du Traité de Lausanne du 24 juillet 1923.
2. La Turquie, en renonçant, en faveur de l'Irak qui se gouverne librement, à tout droit de souveraineté sur les territoires situés au sud de la ligne déterminée à l'article premier du présent traité, confirme les déclarations d'Ismet Pacha à Lausanne en ce qui concerne l'établissement de mandat sur les territoires détachés de l'Empire ottoman.
3. Il est convenu que les articles permanents ainsi que ceux d'une durée limitée du présent traité constituent un tout indivisible jusqu'à l'année. . . .
4. Le présent protocole fait partie intégrante du traité signé à la date d'aujourd'hui.

[E 3623/62/65]

No. 77.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 14.)

(No. 279.)

Sir,

Constantinople, June 9, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 7th instant I called on Ismet Pasha to take leave of him on the termination of the negotiations about the Irak frontier.

2. I said to his Excellency that now that the treaty was signed I did not desire to speak to him about the past, but rather to look to the future, and I was anxious in the first place to call his attention to one particular article in the treaty, viz., that instituting a Permanent Frontier Commission. I assured him that His Majesty's

Government and the Irak Government were as anxious as he could possibly be that order and harmony should reign on the frontier, and what was possible to stipulate in a treaty to that end had been stipulated in the "Bon Voisinage" chapter. It was not, however, possible to do all by the formulation on paper of mutual assurances and guarantees, and the Frontier Commission was devised and endowed with wide powers in order that a serious effort might be made in practice to bring about co-operation between the frontier authorities, so that the real objects of both parties might be attained. I attached the utmost importance to the successful working of the commission, and I begged him to do the same. I would ask him to appoint as the Turkish representative some man endowed with qualities of statesmanship who would have the courage to tell his colleagues of the other side what he wanted and the wisdom to realise that even though they might not be able to do all he wanted, yet they would be disposed to go as far as they could to help him. In this way, with mutual forbearance and mutual help where it was possible, I believed that much more might be done in the commission in fact than was capable of being expressed in formal treaty undertakings.

3. Ismet Pasha listened intently to what I said, and promised to attend to the matter. At his request I promised to write to the High Commissioner for Irak expressing my views and the hope that the Irak representatives on the commission would inspire themselves with something of the spirit of my language to him.

4. I then turned to economic matters in general between Turkey and Great Britain. I said that, having cleared away political difficulties, the next step would be to face economic obstacles, and he immediately and with some eagerness suggested the question of the Turkish debt. I was not prepared to talk about the debt, so I said that, while I agreed that this stood in the foremost rank, what I was thinking of was rather the obstacles put by the Turkish authorities everywhere in the way of every form of foreign enterprise throughout the country—to such a point that the impression was abroad that Turkey desired to see the last of foreigners on Turkish soil. I then, at his request, gave him three or four probant instances, with the details of which I need not trouble you. I said that I perfectly understood the nature and causes of Turkish nationalism and I had sympathy with its reasonable objects; but it was being pushed to exaggerated lengths so as to actually damage Turkey's material interests and to constitute a great impediment in the way of international harmony and co-operation. The Turkish Government was still inclined to confuse foreign privilege as practised in the old days with foreign rights as accorded to strangers by every Government in the world. Between the aims of a nationalist Turkey and the due respect for foreign right it should be perfectly possible to find a compromise. An opportunity for doing so was now being presented to Turkey, and I earnestly hoped he would not let it slip.

5. Ismet Pasha listened closely to what I said, and we had some discussion on more than one of the points as they arose. I think he was impressed with what I said, and I hope he understood; but he is so ignorant of all economics that I cannot feel sure.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 3641/62/65]

No. 78.

Sir R. Graham to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 14.)

(No. 485.)

Sir,

Rome, June 11, 1926.

THE weekly press summary contains a résumé of the opinions in the Italian newspapers regarding the Mosul Agreement, which has, on the whole, been well received here. The Secretary-General to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs recently congratulated me on the subject. He asked whether I had any information to the effect that Turkey would now apply for admission to the League of Nations. I said that I knew nothing beyond what had appeared in the press. Count Bordonaro replied that he understood that Turkey attached the condition of a permanent seat on the Council to her application. He added that Signor Mussolini had been pleased to hear of the agreement reached after what had appeared to be a rather sudden Turkish *colle-face* in the matter. His Excellency had remarked, smiling, that he thought that His Majesty's Government owed the success of the negotiation more to his own voyage to Tripoli than to anything else. Count Bordonaro added that the Italian Government were doing all they could

to dispel Turkish apprehensions as regards sinister Italian intentions towards them, but rumours cropped up at regular intervals in every part of Europe, and the last of them came from Spain. As a matter of fact, official Turco-Italian relations at the present moment were altogether satisfactory.

I have, &c.
R. GRAHAM.

No. 79.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople).

(No. 68.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, June 16, 1926.

MY telegram No. 62 of 7th June: Signature of Treaty of Angora.

Secretary of State for the Colonies desires to associate himself most cordially with the congratulations of the Irak High Commissioner and of the Irak Government.

He feels that he cannot let the occasion pass without expressing his grateful appreciation of the skill and ability with which you have brought the negotiations to a successful conclusion.

No. 80.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 18.)

(No. 85.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, June 18, 1926.

YOUR telegram No. 61.

Despite strong personal appeal, Minister for Foreign Affairs would give no assurance. I feel that it is useless to raise matter pending decision of Delimitation Commission.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 28.)

[E 3641/62/65]

No. 81.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Graham (Rome).

(No. 872.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 18, 1926.

I HAVE read with interest the account given in your despatch No. 485 of your conversation with Count Bordonaro.

2. I think it not impossible that the conclusion of our treaty and the general trend of events will lead Turkey eventually to desire membership of the League, but it cannot be said that the League is at this moment popular in Turkey, and the Turkish Government were determined not to admit into the treaty any words which might imply that they recognised the decision of the Council.

3. Signor Mussolini's reference to his own share in promoting the conclusion of the treaty shows a pleasant humour, which I heartily appreciate. I am far from wishing to deprive him of whatever credit is due to him for a most satisfactory result, but perhaps other factors also had their weight. In any case, if he were aware of the language I held to the Turkish Ambassador when questioned by the latter as to Italian intentions (see my despatch No. 359 of the 23rd April to Sir R. Lindsay) he would see that I had carefully abstained from playing on Turkish fears and had done full justice to his pacific intentions. I trust that he will feel as grateful to me as I profess myself to him.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[E 3770/62/65]

No. 82.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 21.)

(No. 292.)

Sir,

Constantinople, June 16, 1926.

DURING the days immediately preceding and following the signature of the treaty, a series of articles appeared in the "Hakimiet-i-Millie," over the name of Mahmoud, Deputy for Seird. As these articles can be taken as illustrating the kind of views which the Government wished to see presented to the public, it is worth while recording their main arguments here.

2. On the 4th June the writer announced that, although the treaty was contrary to Turkey's rights, the attitude taken by the Government was in accordance with the interests of the country, and was necessitated by the existing situation. It must be remembered that the present rulers of Turkey inherited from the old régime fatal mistakes in policy which could only be cleared up by heavy sacrifices. The main task of the present Government was to obtain security, which is far more important than territory to the new Turkey, engaged as she is in reconstructing the whole of her social and economic life. One cannot be sure that absolute security has been obtained, as no real confidence can be placed in British colonial policy where local officials are given such wide latitude and allowed at times to behave in quite an irresponsible manner.

3. After this opening the writer drove home his argument on the following day by a reference to the short-sighted policy of Abd-el-Krim, who, if he had been wise, could have obtained much better terms by cutting his losses a month earlier. Fortunately the Turkish Government had been far more realistic and had accepted in good time the inevitable.

4. On the 7th June, after the signature of the treaty, Mahmoud once more laid emphasis on the difficult situation created by the Mosul dispute. The very continuance of this dispute destroyed confidence in Turkey abroad and held up the promotion of many enterprises necessary for the development of the country. It only tended to confirm the erroneous ideas of foreigners that no serious work could be done in Turkey as it was always a centre of hostilities. The Government had done a good service to their country in showing Turkey's desire for peace and destroying this malicious propaganda against her.

5. In substance the same attitude has been adopted with slight variants by all the press of Turkey, and Tewfik Rushdi himself, in the statement to the Assembly on the 7th June, presenting the treaty for ratification, did not depart from this line of argument. I enclose copy of his speech.*

6. In the Assembly proceedings were brief, lasting only half an hour, during which time both the Mosul and the Franco-Syrian treaty were disposed of, but they were saved from the charge of being perfunctory by the intervention of Kiazim Karabekir Pasha, the leader of the Opposition, such as it now is. The Pasha's speech was as follows:—

"At the beginning of this session I stated my conviction as to the necessity of preventing discussion on the internal and external situation of my country, and I had hoped that the Government would come out of the difficulties into which they had fallen. At that time my utterances were considered vague and objections were made to them.

"In these circumstances we were compelled to secure, by our silence, the assistance which the Government required owing to the great difficulties in which our country found itself.

"Events revealed the truth of my statements. Success for Governments and nations is secured by harmony and co-operation of internal and external policies. Unfortunately there is nothing for us to do in the present Mosul situation, except to express our regret from this tribune."

7. This reappearance of the opposition, for the first time since February, is interesting, as giving a measure of the defeat which the Turkish Government has suffered in having to accept the treaty. The same can be observed from the proceedings in the People's (governmental) party the day before in which, as the meetings were private, opinions were voiced very freely. They lasted five hours, and Tewfik Rushdi

* Not printed.

was entirely unable to master the opposition of some extremists who preferred war or anything else rather than the surrender of an inch of the fatherland; and finally Ismet Pasha was sent for, and had to make a long speech to quiet the opposition.

8. On the whole it is a good sign that for the last few days the press has ceased to write about Mosul, and I hope we may infer that Turkey will remember her lesson, but forget her resentment.

9. The foreign diplomatists in Turkey, in their private utterances, have greeted the termination of the Mosul question with outspoken pleasure, and seem to expect that henceforth half their difficulties with the Turkish Government will vanish. I hope their expectations may not be deceived.

10. Even my Russian colleague, in talking to Mr. Knox, has expressed satisfaction at the conclusion of the treaty, to which he added his appreciation of the moderate and moderating attitude His Majesty's Government adopted over the matter of the recent Russo-German Treaty. You may also recollect the similar language he used to me, as reported in my despatch No. 201 of the 23rd April. Nevertheless, there may be some doubt as to what Russian views really have been. In Angora, in the first days of May, I heard that the Russians were putting it about that the general strike in England would assume such proportions that negotiations at Angora would have to be interrupted, and the utterances of the *Izvestia* and the *Pravda* about that time (Sir R. Hodgson's despatch No. 376) breathe anything but goodwill to Anglo-Turkish relations. One of my best informed Angora colleagues tells me that M. Suritz was very angry because from the first Tewfik Rushdi kept him completely in the dark as to the progress of the negotiations; that he then spoke, as stated above, about the general strike, and that he suffered a set-back in prestige when his prognostications were disproved by events. A Turkish Deputy told me that he had called on M. Suritz soon after the treaty had been signed and found him more critical of it than any Turk.

11. And finally, there is Tewfik Rushdi himself. It was always said that he would vanish the moment a treaty was concluded, and rumours to this effect were very rife indeed as the moment drew near. Now his stock has risen slightly in the market; it is said that a telegram came from the Ghazi at Brussa refusing his resignation, and that it helped the passage of the treaty through the People's party on the 6th June; and, indeed, if Tewfik were to go now, it would be hard for the Government to continue making the best they can of the treaty, as they are now doing. Tewfik always says he is the luckiest man in the world. "I make blunder after blunder," he says, "and I always come out on top." Apparently his luck is standing the test of the present supreme crisis. He has gone to Smyrna on leave, and it is said that later on he may go to Carlsbad for a cure.

(Copy of this despatch has been sent to Bagdad.)

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

CHAPTER II.—ARABIA.

[E 180/180/91]

No. 83.

India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 7.)

Sir,

India Office, January 6, 1926.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to transmit to you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, on the subject of relations between Ibn Saud and Great Britain.

I am, &c.

A. HIRTZEL.

Enclosure in No. 83.

Viceroy to Secretary of State for India.—(Received January 5.)

(Telegraphic.)

Shillong, January 5, 1926.

JEDDAH telegram No. 191.

Presumably Ibn Saud, in his public reference to his relations with Great Britain, spoke deliberately merely as the ruler of Nejd and not as the holder, permanently or temporarily, of the Hejaz. His possession of the Hejaz has clearly brought about a completely different situation from that which the 1916 treaty was designed to cover. What was then appropriate is no longer appropriate when applied to Moslem Holy Land, and Ibn Saud's consciousness of the danger to himself of admitting any Christian Power to any sort of exclusive or protectorate position in the Hejaz, such as is accorded to Great Britain by articles 2, 3 and 4 of his treaty, is possibly at the back of his desire for a new treaty; *vide* Clayton's letter dated 16th December to London Colonial Office. Point is no doubt clear to His Majesty's Government; question is of importance in India because, though it appears beyond question that the existing treaty only applies to territories possessed by the Sultan Nejd at the time of signing that treaty, Ibn Saud's public utterances above referred to, as reported, may give rise in India to the misconception that the terms of the treaty may be taken to cover territories in the Holy Land now acquired by him. It is most desirable, as far as India is concerned, to avoid any such misconception by the Moslem public.

No. 84.

Sir W. Tyrrell (for the Secretary of State) to Mr. Jordan (Jeddah).

(No. 1.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, January 7, 1926.

YOUR telegram No. 194 of 28th December: Sir G. Clayton's mission to the Yemen.

You may inform Ibn Saud that object of Sir G. Clayton's proceeding to Sanaa is to endeavour to conclude with the Imam a treaty of amity, for which negotiations have long been in progress.

You should explain to him that even if it is not feasible to keep you in touch with trend of negotiations, we will inform you of result in due course for communication to him.

[15026]

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No. 85.

Sir W. Tyrrell (for the Secretary of State) to Lord Lloyd (Cairo).

(No. 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 8, 1926.

THE Idrisi, Seyid Ali, is reported deposed by his uncle, Seyid Hassan. Resident at Aden has been authorised to offer him temporary refuge at Aden or Perim, and asks whether arrangements can be made to admit him to Egypt, if necessary, as Idrisi has relatives of good position there.

Please telegraph your observations.

No. 86.

Sir W. Tyrrell (for the Secretary of State) to Lord Lloyd (Cairo).

(No. 5.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, January 9, 1926.

PLEASE telegraph following instructions to His Majesty's consul at Jeddah:—

"Your telegram No. 193 of 28th December: Appointment of Nejdian representative at Cairo.

"Please inform Ibn Saud that His Majesty's Government have no objection to his appointing an official representative in Egypt, and that His Majesty's High Commissioner in Cairo will accord his good offices to his Highness's delegate. Ibn Saud will realise, however, that he must obtain the consent of the Egyptian Government."

No. 87.

Sir W. Tyrrell (for the Secretary of State) to Lord Lloyd (Cairo).

(No. 6.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, January 9, 1926.

YOUR telegram No. 465 of 30th December: Nejdian representative at Cairo.

Mr. Jordan's relations with Ibn Saud already amount to recognition of his Highness as *de facto* ruler of the Hejaz, but we do not anticipate a request from him for *de jure* recognition, in view of his published projects for self-government in the Hejaz under joint patronage of various Moslem States.

Nejdian representative at Cairo would represent Ibn Saud primarily as Sultan of Nejd, in which capacity he has long been recognised by His Majesty's Government, and only incidentally as *de facto* authority in Hejaz.

Please repeat to Jeddah.

No. 88.

(No. 6.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jeddah, January 11, 1926.

IBN SAUD has been elected King of the Hejaz by notables of Hejaz on 8th January.

He now assumes the title "King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd and its Dependencies."

He declares that Hejaz administration shall be kept separate from that of Nejd and that Hejaz is for the Hejazis, but that public security and safety of roads will be maintained by his army.

(Sent to India, Cairo, Jerusalem, Bagdad and Aden.)

[E 363/11/91]

No. 89.

Acting Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 18, 1926.)

(No. 120.)

Sir,

Jeddah, December 28, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith a report of negotiations with King Ali and the Sultan of Nejd whilst acting as intermediary for the submission of the Jeddah garrison and town.

2. Copies of this despatch and of its enclosures are being sent to Egypt, India, Palestine and Irak.

I have, &c.

S. R. JORDAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 89.

Report of Negotiations with King Ali and the Sultan of Nejd whilst acting as Intermediary for the Submission of the Jeddah Garrison and Town.

THE series of events which eventually led King Ali to request refuge on British territory and also that His Britannic Majesty's representative in Jeddah should act as intermediary between him and his people and Ibn Saud for the peaceful submission of the town have been outlined in the various periodical reports on the internal situation circulated by this agency.

On the evening of the 9th instant, some days after King Ali had received news of the fall of Medina, he, accompanied by the Foreign Minister, Fuad, visited this agency and talked for some time on various subjects, and, just prior to their departure, requested advice as to their future actions. I informed King Ali that I was not in a position to give him advice in view of the strictly neutral attitude adopted by His Majesty's Government. He thereupon left, and on the morning of the 10th requested me to call and see him. This I did, and again the question of his future actions was brought up; but I again replied as previously.

Eventually, as the situation was becoming more and more critical, on the evening of the 13th instant, King Ali verbally requested me to act as intermediary for the surrender of the town. I informed him that I would refer the matter to His Majesty's Government and would acquaint him with the reply in due course. He also requested permission to be allowed to reside in Palestine, Transjordan or Mesopotamia, stating that he was an Arab and wished if possible to live in an Arab country and near his brothers Feisal or Abdullah.

In anticipation of permission being granted by His Majesty's Government, Ali, on the morning of the 14th, confirmed his verbal request in writing (Enclosure 2), and submitted a list of conditions to serve as a basis for the mediation (Enclosure 3).

He also stated verbally that at least fifteen to twenty days were required to arrange for his personal effects to be packed and prepared for transport.

His Majesty's Government's permission for me to act as intermediary was received on the morning of the 16th instant, and I thereupon sent a letter (Enclosure 4) to Ibn Saud by Ihsanullah, an Indian member of the staff of this agency, asking for an audience at Ragama, some twenty-five minutes from Jeddah in the direction of Mecca.

I sent my communication by motor car, and just after the car had passed Ragama and was on the way to Bahra, Ibn Saud's car was seen in the distance.

After reading my letter he informed Ihsanullah that another twenty-four hours would have been too late, as he was actually proceeding to Ragama to direct the attack against Jeddah the next evening at the request of certain people within the town of Jeddah who had promised to assist him. He thereupon proceeded to the camp and dictated a reply (Enclosure 5) agreeing to meet me the following morning.

On Thursday the 17th instant I proceeded to Ragama accompanied by Ihsanullah to act as interpreter, and having met the Sultan Abdul Aziz (Ibn Saud) I informed him of the situation, and, after a lengthy conversation of a most amiable nature, drew up, on the basis of the conditions submitted by King Ali, a series of seventeen conditions (Enclosure 6) which approximately concurs with the conditions set forth by Ali.

During this my first meeting with the Sultan Abdul Aziz, I could hardly withhold my admiration for his charm of manner and the generosity of his nature

in his hour of victory. Many of the conditions are pure acts of generosity, and greatly helped to assure the success of the efforts for peace and the prevention of bloodshed.

He also, at my request, gave me letters addressed to his commanders outside Yambo and requesting them to get into touch with the commandant of Yambo garrison, a certain Hamdi Bey (as the Emir Shakir had left Yambo some days previously and come to Jeddah), and assure the safety of all the army and residents. These, with a letter from Ali, I sent by the Khedivial boat to the Yambo garrison commander, and on the 22nd instant news came through that Yambo had been surrendered in a peaceful manner.

In order to illustrate how anxious the Sultan Abdul Aziz is to avoid bloodshed and possible censure at the hands of the foreign Powers for barbarous methods, I enclose a copy of a letter (Enclosure 7) received from him the day after my visit, requesting that the letters should not be sent by aeroplane, as was at first mooted, owing to the possibility of it being fired upon and the occupants injured.

I returned to Jeddah from Ragama after sunset on Thursday evening, and immediately after dinner saw King Ali, who demurred considerably over the conditions, and which, in reality, were better than he had hoped to obtain, and, indeed, more than he had asked for in some respects. Eventually he accepted and signed them, but requested me to keep it secret for twenty-four hours from the townspeople and my colleagues, as he was afraid of trouble amongst the soldiers and population.

I was at first at a loss to account for his fear, which was most apparent, and which he endeavoured to veil by his concern for the people, but from a chance word gathered that he was afraid of, amongst other things, the Nationalist party so-called, formed by a patriot named Sadik Bey, who had gathered unto him most of the officers and a number of non-commissioned officers and secured their signatures under oath on the sword and Koran to fight to the last against the Wahabis.

In order that the actual situation may better be realised I should point out that the conditions at Jeddah were quite different from any of the other Hejaz towns. The soldiers manning the defences were, with the exception of perhaps 150-200, a pack of nondescript cut-throat mercenaries, and the conditions under which they had been serving for the last fifteen months were hardly calculated to develop their finer feelings. Besides Palestinians and Syrians, there were Sudanese and Somalis, Takrunis, Yemenis, Hejazis and all sorts and conditions of tribesmen from all over Arabia. Each party distrusted the other, and, as is general in such cases, would unite only for trouble and never for good.

This Nationalist party was in fact not so strong as the King imagined, and throughout the whole proceedings I was astounded at the King's lack of appreciation of the true state of affairs.

Despite the fact that Ali had begged me to keep secret the fact that he had signed the conditions it was generally known next morning in the market, and the King, after my departure, had sent his aide-de-camp to inform Sadik Bey that he had received certain conditions from Ibn Saud.

Owing to the persistent methods of procrastination adopted by Ali on account of his chronic weakness of character, and also a forlorn hope that something might yet turn up, and also on account of his double play, I determined to send for Sadik Bey and talk to him personally. He was well known to Munshi Ihsanullah, and, as I anticipated leaving for Ragama to see the Sultan Abdul Aziz early next morning, I asked Ihsanullah to bring him to me.

He came next morning, Friday, at 7-30 A.M., and after a talk of half-an-hour, and finding him an honest man and well-intentioned, and knowing that the conditions signed by Ali the previous night were known in many quarters, I decided to show them to Sadik Bey and ask him if they were not generous and acceptable. He agreed that they were, and, as the King's aide-de-camp had already been around asking me to see the King as soon as possible, as he had not slept and was threatening to commit suicide, I informed Sadik Bey to precede me to the palace, and that, after I had ascertained the King's wishes, I would ask that he be called in to assist in the deliberations.

When I arrived at the palace I was admitted immediately to the King, and such a sight as met my eyes is not easily described. He was in such a state of nervous collapse or funk that he could not control his lips to give the conventional greetings. In order to give him time, I spoke of various little questions of an administrative nature pending between the agency and the Foreign Ministry, and eventually he

started to talk of the conditions and to request further concessions, as he was sure the people would not be satisfied, and surely harm would come of it. It was at this point that I requested that Sadik Bey should be called, and, after a few moments' thought, he asked if about five others of his entourage might come in. I politely requested that he should see Sadik Bey first, and later the others if necessary. He agreed, and when Sadik Bey was brought, he immediately fell on his knees and kissed Ali's feet. This reassured Ali, and, after Sadik Bey's assurance that the conditions were acceptable to the soldiers and that they would surrender their arms, the King thereupon named him commander-in-chief of the forces and became almost gay, laughing, and even joking, at the fact that he would surely be sea-sick when he left on board His Majesty's ship.

I left the palace at once and proceeded to Ragama to inform Sultan Abdul Aziz of Ali's acceptance, and also to put several other demands to him from Ali, the chief one of which was regarding the return of his wife's property in Taif and Mecca, and, if possible, to increase the amount of £5,000 to £7-8,000.

To both these Ibn Saud agreed and again greatly facilitated matters.

I returned to Jeddah immediately and called a meeting of my colleagues, and told them briefly of exactly what had taken place and my suggestions as to my future actions.

This was in order to keep them informed and to ensure their co-operation if necessary, in view of India's telegram of the 15th instant. During the whole of the negotiations I kept them daily informed and discussed various points raised with them.

They approved of all actions taken and had no suggestions to offer to improve upon what was being done.

On the afternoon of the 19th instant I again saw King Ali, who had signed and issued his formal notice of withdrawal from the Hejaz, and sent an identical note (Enclosure 8) to the foreign representatives in Jeddah.

It was on the morning of the 19th that I received an urgent telephone message from Sadik Bey, who had assumed his duties as commander-in-chief, begging me to go to the barracks to assure the officers and non-commissioned officers who were gathered that this was not a further ruse on the part of the Hejaz Government to deceive them. I at once proceeded, and produced the agreement, which most of them had not seen, and Sadik read it over to them. This satisfied them, but they were still unwilling to disarm as long as Ali remained on the throne.

It was in consequence of this that I informed King Ali of the actual state of affairs and requested him to hand over to the Provisional Government and embark on H.M.S. "Clematis" to facilitate the carrying out of the clauses of his agreement with Sultan Abdul Aziz.

He eventually agreed to embark next morning, the 20th instant, at 9-30, and this, in fact, was done. Immediately his departure became known, disarmament commenced, and, with the exception of several hitches, none of which developed seriously, was practically completed by the afternoon of the 21st.

The most serious—or, at least, what might have been the most serious—trouble, which fortunately I was able to avert, was that the Palestinians and Syrians still remaining in Jeddah, and before they became cognisant of the real state of affairs, wrote to this agency and the French consulate threatening to destroy the town unless they received their full arrears. I have not seen the document sent to the French consulate, but the one addressed to me contained some thirty signatures, of which not more than eight were genuine. So I sent for five of them who were known to me and requested an explanation of their action.

They expressed their sorrow, and stated that the document was written before they knew the true state of affairs, and begged leave to withdraw it, and promised to afford Sadik Bey every assistance. This, in fact, they did.

Ali, as stated above, was embarked on H.M.S. "Clematis" on the morning of the 20th and left Jeddah in H.M.S. "Cornflower" on the morning of the 22nd. After paying a final visit to King Ali, I again proceeded to Ragama with the head of the Provisional Government and the commander-in-chief, Sadik Bey, where they officially surrendered to the Sultan Abdul Aziz before his full divan, composed of his brother, Emir Abdullah, his son, Emir Faisul, and some thirty notables, and continued their functions thereafter in his name.

I informed the Sultan that, as the disarmament was practically completed and the heads of the Provisional Government and army had submitted, my duties as intermediary were now finished.

I thanked him for his helpfulness and generosity throughout the negotiations and assured him that His Majesty's Government had allowed me to act as intermediary solely on humanitarian grounds and to prevent further bloodshed in their holy land, to assist in bringing peace and prosperity on the country, and to assure the safety of the pilgrimage for the millions of true Moslems whom His Gracious Majesty King George V had for his loyal subjects.

The Sultan, before his full divan, replied, warmly thanking His Majesty's Government for allowing their representative to act as intermediary, and thanking myself for the noble and successful task which I had accomplished in preventing further bloodshed and assuring the safety and prosperity of Jeddah and its people. He thanked His Majesty's Government and myself in his own name, the name of his people and on behalf of the Moslem world.

He went on to say that all Western Powers had allies, and that this was also most essential for Oriental Powers, and that his sincere friends were the British only, and that he had, and would have, no relations with any other European Power, big or small.

This last the Sultan repeated several times with much vehemence and sincerity, lending power to his expressions by clenching his hand and emphasising each word with a motion of his clenched fist.

He continued, stating that according to the Holy Word, his religion and faith he is bound to recognise and execute the treaty existing between Great Britain and himself, and that he is in full accord with his friends and allies the British people, whose politics were his politics, and that as long as the British respected two things which he held dearer than life and for which he would shed his last drop of blood, that is to say, his religion and his honour, there would, "Insha'llah," always be the closest ties of friendship between himself and his people and Great Britain. He ended by again thanking His Majesty's Government and myself.

Other than the above and in order to show how much the action of His Majesty's Government was appreciated by the Sultan Abdul Aziz, I enclose a letter (Enclosure 9) forwarded by him to this agency on the 20th instant, together with several telegrams, and Nejd flags to be handed to the kaimakam, in which the following appears: "I am sincerely thankful for the splendid services you have rendered to your Government and for your efforts to prevent bloodshed amongst Moslems. For such services you will, 'Insha'llah,' attain honour in all the Moslem world."

The Kaimakam of Jeddah was also most profuse in his thanks and insisted upon embracing me with his hairy face on each cheek.

This ordeal I again sustained with great fortitude on the occasion of my farewell visit to King Ali on the morning of his departure. He, in order to show his gratitude to His Majesty's Government, insisted on doing it twice, once when I arrived and also when I left the ship, much to the delight of some sailors who were on the quarter-deck.

The Sultan Abdul Aziz entered Jeddah on Wednesday morning, the 23rd instant, accompanied by foot and horse troops, himself riding at the head of his horsemen.

A reception was held, which all foreign representatives attended in uniform, as well as all the notables of Jeddah and the population who flocked to see the spectacle.

Since his entry the Sultan has maintained all civil employees in their posts for the present, but certain changes are meditated in the near future, particularly in customs and quarantine administrations.

I take this opportunity of bringing to the notice of His Majesty's Government my appreciation of the help I received during this difficult period from the staff of this agency, who helped me unfailingly throughout.

Also particularly the good work done by Munshi Ihsanullah, whom I employed as interpreter during this period on account of his known ability and discretion and his knowledge of local affairs, and whose invaluable help was of the greatest assistance.

I enclose also (Enclosure 10) a translation of an identic note sent to all foreign representatives in Jeddah by the Sultan on the evening of Christmas Day.

S. R. JORDAN.

Enclosure 2 in No. 89.

King Ali to Acting British Agent and Consul, Jeddah.

28.5.1344 (December 14, 1925).

FOR the sake of avoiding bloodshed I have decided to withdraw and leave the country. I wish to reside in Transjordan or Bagdad or Palestine.

2. I should like that His Britannic Majesty's Government would mediate in the matter of surrendering the country in such calm and peaceful manner that will guarantee the comfort and safety of all the civil and military employees, shereefs and Bedouin, and provide means of transport for those who wish to leave with me from my private suite and those who wish to go back home.

3. Please find enclosed herewith some points which I beg that necessary steps should be taken in applying and carrying them out through your Excellency.

ALI-BIN-HUSSEIN.

Enclosure 3 in No. 89.

List of Conditions submitted by King Ali.

IN order to avoid bloodshed and anarchy in the interior of the country, I found it better, in the name of humanity, to ask His Britannic Majesty's Government to mediate (separately or jointly with some or all of the Powers who have subjects in the Hejaz as His Majesty's Government would like) and to take the necessary measures regarding the following points:—

1. I have decided to leave and depart from the country in order to avoid bloodshed, provided that my rights and those of my country should not be surrendered to Ibn Saud. I wish to reside with my private suite either in Bagdad, Transjordan or Palestine.

2. Immediate steps to be taken to stop the war going on between us and the Sultan of Nejd for a period long enough to transport me, together with my belongings, &c., and to transport my suite and their properties and to provide us with necessary means for transportation.

3. His Majesty's Government should facilitate the transportation of the regular troops, shereefs, warriors and Bedouin who wish to be repatriated.

4. Ibn Saud should guarantee to protect the lives and properties of all the natives of the country, the regular and Bedouin troops—natives or otherwise—and that he should overlook all their past faults.

5. Ibn Saud's army should not enter Jeddah until I have left.

6. For carrying out the affairs of the country and in order to avoid any anarchy, a native local Government should be organised under the command of the British Government until the Wahabi troops enter Jeddah.

7. As the Hejaz Government have no money, the necessary expenses for carrying out articles 1, 2 and 3 should be provided by Ibn Saud.

8. The return of our families' private properties which are lawful belongings and the return of the properties of our relations, and that they should not be damaged.

9. Settling the Government debts taken from the inhabitants as loan and paying even a part of the arrears of pay of the soldiers, officers and employees.

ALI-BIN-HUSSEIN.

28.5.1344 (December 14, 1925).

Enclosure 4 in No. 89.

Acting Consul Jordan to Ibn Saud.

(After respects.)

Jeddah, December 16, 1925.

FOR the sake of humanity and in order to facilitate the return of peace and prosperity in the Hejaz, I would be glad if your Highness will agree to meet me at Ragama to-morrow, Thursday, in the forenoon or as soon after as possible.

(Compliments.)

S. R. JORDAN.

Enclosure 5 in No. 89.

Ibn Saud to Acting Consul Jordan.

(After greetings.)

30.5.1344 (December 16, 1925).

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Excellency's letter dated the 16th December, 1925, noted its contents, and came down at once to the camp to meet your Excellency in the place which Munshi Ihsanullah will tell you of.

With respects,

(Seal of Ibn Saud.)

Enclosure 6 in No. 89.

Agreement forwarded by Ibn Saud to Acting Consul Jordan.

(After greetings and respects.)

1.6.1925 (December 17, 1925).

IN consideration of the abdication of King Ali and of his leaving the Hejaz and surrendering Jeddah, Sultan Abdul Aziz guarantees the personal safety of the civilian and military employees, the shereefs, all the natives of Jeddah, the Arabs, the citizens and tribes and their families, and the safety of their properties.

2. King Ali undertakes to hand over immediately all prisoners of war in Jeddah, if there are any.

3. Sultan Abdul Aziz promises to grant an amnesty to all those mentioned above.

4. All officers and soldiers must surrender at once to Sultan Abdul Aziz with all their arms—rifles, machine guns, guns and aeroplanes, &c., and all war materials and equipments, or such arms and war materials should be kept in the safe custody of the British agent at Jeddah until His Highness the Sultan enters Jeddah.

5. King Ali and all officers and soldiers promise not to damage or to dispose of any of the said arms and war materials.

6. Sultan Abdul Aziz undertakes to repatriate all officers and soldiers who wish to leave, and promises to provide them with necessary expenses for their journey.

7. Sultan Abdul Aziz undertakes to distribute in a fair proportion amongst all officers and soldiers in Jeddah a sum of £5,000.

8. Sultan Abdul Aziz promises to retain in their posts all civil Government employees whom he finds capable of performing their duties honestly.

9. Sultan Abdul Aziz undertakes to grant King Ali the right to take with him his personal belongings, including his motor car, carpets and horses.

10. Sultan Abdul Aziz undertakes to grant to the family of Al Hussein all their personal properties in the Hejaz, provided it is proved that such properties were actually inherited and do not include the immovable properties transferred from the Wakfs by Hussein to himself, neither should they include such buildings erected by Hussein during his reign as King over the Hejaz.

11. King Ali undertakes to quit the Hejaz before next Tuesday evening.

12. All steamers in the possession of the Hejaz, "Tawil," "Ragmatain," "Rushdi" and "Radwa," should pass into the possession of Sultan Abdul Aziz. In the meantime, the Sultan, if necessary, would allow the steamship "Ragmatain" to be used for the purpose of carrying the personal belongings of the abdicating King Ali, and the British agent should arrange for the return of the steamer to Jeddah.

13. King Ali, his people and the citizens of Jeddah undertake not to sell, destroy or otherwise dispose of any public property, such as launches, sambuks, &c.

14. Sultan Abdul Aziz undertakes to grant all citizens, officers and soldiers at Yambo the aforesaid privileges and rights, except the distribution of money.

15. Sultan Abdul Aziz undertakes also to grant, within the general amnesty, pardon to the undermentioned persons:—

Abdul Wahab, Mohammed and Bakri, sons of Yahya Kazzaz;

Abdul Haye-bin-Abid Kazzaz;

Ahmed and Saleh, sons of Abdul Rahman Kazzaz;

Ismail-bin-Yahya Kazzaz;

Sheikh Mohammed Ali Batawi and his brothers Ibrahim and Abdul Rahman

Batawi, sons of Mohammed Ali Saleh Batawi, their sons and their

cousins Hassan and Zain Batawi, sons of Mohammed Nur;

Sheikh Yusuf Khishairim and Sheikh Abbas-bin-Yusef Khishairim;

Sheikh Yassin Bassuni;

Essayed Ahmed-el-Saggof;

and the families and property of all the above mentioned.

16. In case King Ali or his men break or fail to perform any one of the above-mentioned articles, Sultan Abdul Aziz will consider himself, in such case, not responsible on his part for putting into effect the obligations in this agreement.

17. The two parties, Sultan Abdul Aziz and King Ali, undertake to stop hostilities during the progress of the negotiations.

With best respects,

ABDUL AZIZ-BIN-ABDUL RAHMAN.
ALI-BIN-HUSSEIN.

Enclosure 7 in No. 89.

Ibn Saud to Acting Consul Jordan.

(After greetings.)

2.6.1344 (December 18, 1925.)

IT is reported that Yambo has surrendered. As you have informed me that you are going to send the letters to Yambo by the aeroplane, will you kindly make sure of the news and ascertain telegraphically whether Yambo has really surrendered or not, as I fear that if it has actually surrendered the troops will fire on the aeroplane if they see it, and will probably hurt its occupants. If you see the question is complicated you may send the letters by the steamer.

I have also learned that the aviators are resigning their posts and are going away. They might have done some damage to the machinery of the aeroplanes. Please see that they hand them over in good order before they leave.

With best respects,

(Seal of Ibn Saud.)

Enclosure 8 in No. 89.

King Ali's Notice of Withdrawal from the Hejaz.

His Excellency.

3.6.1344 (December 19, 1925).

FOR the sake of peace and in order to safeguard life and property and to avoid bloodshed and to shorten the duration of the war which brought distress, ruin and trouble to the country, I have decided to withdraw, and to leave Jeddah on Tuesday, 6.6.1344 (December 22, 1925), and I have formed a native Provisional Government to carry out matters and affairs under the presidency of the Kaimakam of Jeddah, Sheikh Abdullah Reza. Native employees are remaining at their posts.

I hasten to send this for your information.

ALI.

(Identic note sent to all foreign representatives.)

Enclosure 9 in No. 89.

Ibn Saud to Acting Consul Jordan.

(Greetings and respects.)

3.6.1344 (December 19, 1925.)

I AM sending seven flags for distribution "Insha'llah" among places. I am also sending telegrams for favour of despatch to their destinations, especially that one for His Majesty my father, and that for Medina. You will, "Insha'llah," try to send them all as soon as possible.

I am sincerely thankful for the splendid services you have rendered to your Government and for your efforts for the prevention of bloodshed among Moslems.

For such services you will, "Insha'llah," attain honour in all the Moslem world.

Respects.

(Seal of Ibn Saud.)

Enclosure 10 in No. 89.

Ibn Saud to Acting Consul Jordan.

(Translation.)

(Greetings and respects.)

9.6.1344 (December 25, 1925).

I AM pleased to inform your Excellency that the war in the Hejaz has come to an end by the withdrawal of Shereef Ali from Jeddah and his abdication. I have taken delivery of the besieged garrisons which were resisting our army in the Hejaz. Thus tranquillity and peace prevail throughout all the blessed Hejaz territories.

I was, and have always been, inclined to peace and tranquillity, but necessities compelled me in the past to enter into wars and defence, in which I endeavoured not to harm anybody and to decrease the losses of the war as low as possible, bearing its troubles and its various difficulties, including the stretching out of period so that no loss of life may take place among the innocents and in mercy for the poor.

I have invited the leaders of Moslem Governments, parties and committees to a conference that will be held in this blessed land, for deciding the suitable condition as regards the comfort and interests of pilgrims who come to this country. I am doing my best to make equality and security prevail over all the inhabitants of the Hejaz, indiscriminately and impartially, and to introduce reforms in administrations and their branches, so that the Hejaz may attain its prosperity and comfort.

I have to thank your respectable Government for their neutral state in the case, and to thank your Excellency for the efforts you have done for peace and tranquillity in Jeddah during the hours of the last change.

Respects.

(Seal of Ibn Saud.)

[E 364/180/91]

No. 90.

Acting Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 18, 1926.

(No. 121. Secret and Confidential.)

Sir,

Jeddah, December 29, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to report that on the afternoon of the 17th instant, whilst the negotiations for the submission of Jeddah were proceeding between the Sultan Abdul Aziz and myself, he took the opportunity, whilst waiting for the translators to finish their work, to talk of the situation in and around the frontiers of the territory occupied by him.

2. Referring to Syria and the revolt in the Jebel Druse, he stated that he had received many appeals for assistance, but that he would not interfere, and intended to follow the British policy in all respects as regards that part of the world. Further, he stated that a great deal of Bolshevik money was being supplied to the insurgents, who, though not Bolshevik themselves, were only too glad to avail themselves of the help thus afforded. He continued, and under great secrecy for the British Government only, to inform me that the headquarters of the Bolshevik organisation was in Damascus and carried on from the Persian consulate-general. He assured me that he was certain of this information, and had received it from a most reliable source.

3. As regards Irak, he stated that he had heard nothing but most favourable reports of the situation in that country, and no trouble was to be feared there at present—excluding, of course, tribal raids and suchlike, which were but normal occurrences.

4. He expressed great concern for Transjordan and Palestine, and earnestly wishes to warn the British Government of danger from that quarter where, he stated, Bolshevik money and influence were gaining ground. He several times reiterated this warning and appeared most sincere.

5. As for the Yemen and Asir (Idrissi country), he stated that he was on terms of friendship with both of them, but that the situation at present was uncertain and difficult. I gathered that the trouble actually is the division of the Asir between himself and the Imam Yahya, but he did not enlarge on this point.

6. With reference to my telegram No. 194 of the 28th December, 1925, he later showed a keen interest to know what actually was Sir Gilbert Clayton's mission to the Imam, as practically any arrangements, other than on the southern boundary of the Yemen, will vitally affect his interests in the Arabian peninsula.

7. Continuing on the general subject of Bolshevism, he described a visit he had received from a Bolshevik envoy during the course of hostilities with the Sherifs in the Hejaz. It appears that after a long discussion on various subjects, the Bolshevik envoy asked the Sultan in a most direct manner, "What is it you most want on earth?" Sultan Abdul Aziz explained that he was surprised at the directness of the question and for a few moments did not answer, but eventually said, "Money, I suppose." The Bolshevik envoy stated that he was prepared to give him that, and what else did he want? The Sultan then replied, "Arms and ammunition." To which the Bolshevik replied, "And aeroplanes and guns also if you wish." The Sultan, more and more surprised at the generosity of his visitor, then replied, "Yes, but what do you want from me?" To which the Bolshevik replied that of course there were certain conditions, but that he did not think the Sultan would find them impracticable, and that all he wanted was that the Sultan should "make trouble with the British."

8. His Majesty the Sultan ended with again assuring me of his friendship and the correctness of his information and even went so far as to state that in case of trouble in Transjordan he would assist His Majesty Government.

9. Copies of this despatch have been sent to Palestine, Beirut and Cairo.

I have, &c.

S. R. JORDAN.

[E 366/366/91]

No. 91.

Vice-Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 18.)

(No. 123.)

Sir,

Jeddah, December 30, 1925.

WITH reference to Foreign Office despatch No. 108 of the 20th September, 1923, addressed to the Acting High Commissioner, Cairo, and Foreign Office despatch No. 115 of the 12th October, 1923, and subsequent communications addressed to this Agency, relative to the ownership and working arrangements for the Jeddah-Suakin cable (at present known as the Port Sudan-Jeddah cable), I have the honour to submit that the present moment would appear to be a most favourable opportunity to definitely settle this vexatious question.

2. Owing to the declared friendship Sultan Abdul Aziz holds for His Britannic Majesty's Government and his desire to appear modern and civilised, I am of the opinion that he will accept any reasonable arrangement to secure permanent and satisfactory communication with the outside world.

3. He has, in fact, already requested that his wireless station at Medina, which is more powerful than the others, should be officially recognised under the Berne Convention and opened for international traffic as soon as possible.

4. I enclose a copy of my letter addressed to the Director of Posts and Telegraphs, Khartum, on this subject.

5. I would respectfully suggest that a conference, composed of representatives of the Sudan Government, the Nejd Government, the Eastern Telegraph Company and a nominee of His Britannic Majesty's Government, might be called at either Port Sudan or Jeddah and an effort made to settle the question on the basis of the instructions contained in the Foreign Office despatches under reference.

6. Copies of this despatch and of its enclosure are being sent to Cairo and Khartum.

I have, &c.

S. R. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 91.

Acting Consul Jordan to Sudan Government.

Sir,

Jeddah, December 28, 1925.

WITH reference to my letter of the 3rd instant, relative to the inter-wireless communications within the Hejaz, I have the honour to state that the Hejaz has now been completely overrun by the Wahabi forces and that King Ali left Jeddah on the 21st instant, since which date the Wahabis under the Sultan Abdul Aziz (Ibn Saud) have taken over control.

This change will, of course, bring about an entirely new aspect of the vexatious cable and wireless questions which have for years past been a bone of contention between ourselves and the Hejaz Government.

I have been approached by the Sultan Abdul Aziz on this question, and I informed him that I would refer the matter to you.

He requires the wireless stations under his control to be officially recognised under the Berne Convention and opened for international traffic as such. I shall be glad if you will inform me if there is any objection at present to this course, and, if so, how it may be overcome.

I should add that the Sultan Abdul Aziz is an infinitely more reasonable being than the late King Hussein, and I have every reason to hope that no sensible arrangement will be refused by him.

The Medina station is, I believe, not working at present owing to lack of petrol. Also, the Tebuk station was dismantled and carried over the border into Transjordan by the refugees from that place flying before the forces of the Sultan Abdul Aziz.

I beg to inform you that I am addressing a despatch to His Majesty's Government on the matter and requesting that the question of the ownership of the cable may now be settled.

I have, &c.
S. R. JORDAN.

[E 367/367/91]

No. 92.

Acting Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain. (Received January 18, 1926.)

(No. 125. Secret.)

Sir,

Jeddah, December 31, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to enclose a report on the situation covering the period the 28th November to the 31st December.

2. Copies of this despatch and of its enclosure are being sent to India, Egypt, Khartum (through Port Sudan), Jerusalem, Bagdad, Beirut (for Damascus), Aden, Singapore, Bushire, Koweit, Bahrein and Muscat.

I have, &c.
S. R. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 92.

Report for the period November 28 to December 31, 1925.

(Secret.)

DURING the period under report events have succeeded each other with kaleidoscopic rapidity, and the Hejaz has at last surrendered to His Highness the Sultan Abdul Aziz of Nejd.

2. Medina capitulated on the 5th instant, and as it was realised that the fall of Medina would also mean the end of Ali's régime, Jeddah was expected to capitulate soon after.

3. Events, however, rendered the situation at Jeddah very critical, and I am pleased to be able to report that owing to the efforts of His Majesty's Government to prevent bloodshed many apparently unsurmountable difficulties were overcome, and Jeddah eventually fell into Wahabi hands without any regrettable incidents on the 21st instant. Yambo and Wedj followed suit, and now the whole of the Hejaz is under Wahabi domination.

4. Ibn Saud entered Jeddah on the morning of the 23rd December, and a reception for foreign representatives and notables was held.

5. The last days of King Ali's reign were particularly eventful and troublesome, and the fact that trouble was avoided is entirely due to the prestige of and the trust placed in His Majesty's Government by the people of this country.

6. Since the revolts of the fighting forces mentioned in my last report a further series of demonstrations and protests have been held, and on the 29th November a number of Palestinian troops barricaded themselves in the main mosque of Jeddah and refused to leave unless their demands were granted.

The events leading up to this were as follows: On the afternoon and evening of the 28th November the whole of the forces defending Jeddah decided to combine and loot the town the following morning. The King, hearing rumours to this effect about midnight on the 28th-29th, immediately sent for the sheikhs of the Yemeni and Hejazi tribes and begged them to dissuade their troops from this action. The sheikhs were successful, but the Palestinian and Syrian forces were not contented, and so took action as mentioned above. The mosque was immediately surrounded by the King's bodyguard and armed slaves, and fearing that the Government were preparing to take offensive action against the demonstrators, who were peacefully inclined, I, with my Italian colleague, temporarily charged with French interests, protested against force being employed against the nationals of our respective mandated territories, in view of the possibility of trouble in the town and also in view of the legitimacy of the soldiers' protest. This action on our part was successful, and the slaves and troops were withdrawn, the men given food and water, and eventually, after much discussion, the King persuaded them to return to the trenches, promising to repatriate them within seven days.

7. During this period the Hejaz Government, driven to desperation, obtained a fetva from a certain sheikh named Shengetti authorising the army to bomb the Haram (Mecca) and to use Christian aviators for the purpose. This, in fact, was done, and the aeroplanes, sometimes singly and sometimes two at a time, daily flew over Mecca, at first dropping proclamations only and as a display of force, but later bombing the barracks on the edge of the city itself and the house of one Saggof, where Ibn Saud was supposed to be residing.

No great damage was done, but in view of the congested state of the city and the number of foreigners residing therein, it was decided by the foreign representatives in Jeddah to inform King Ali and his Ministers that our Governments would hold them personally responsible for any loss of or damage to the lives and property of our respective nationals caused by the bombing or machine-gunning of Mecca. This was done verbally on the evening of the 4th instant and confirmed in writing the following day. His Majesty King Ali, without promising to cease the bombing operations, promised to take all possible precautions to safeguard foreign subjects, but in fact did cease bombing, and after our joint protest the aeroplanes went to Mecca but seldom and confined their efforts to the dropping of proclamations.

8. It was at this period that a certain Sadik Bey of Hejaz origin started a Nationalist movement in the forces and town, with the declared object of never submitting to the Wahabis and fighting till the last to support the Shereefian cause. He enlisted practically all the officers and a number of leading townspeople, and so fired them with his enthusiasm that if events had not gone so far before he started his movement it might possibly have been the salvation of the Shereefian cause in the Hejaz. Owing to his efforts the soldiers and officers were more or less contented for a few days, and it was not until some days later that the Syrian and Palestinian soldiers, seeing no preparation for or possibility of their promised repatriation, again protested, and threatened to drag the King to this agency and make him responsible before the British Government.

Several of the soldiers came to the agency and informed me of their intentions, and I was able to dissuade them from this action, and pointed out that so long as they behaved in a peaceful manner and in view of their pitiable condition I would take such action as I was permitted to secure their early repatriation, but that if they used force I should be helpless and obliged to admit the right of the Hejaz Government to suppress revolt and maintain order with whatever means were to their hands.

Eventually, after further discussions, the dissatisfied agreed to accept £1 each, fifteen days' provisions and repatriation by the 10th December.

Another difficulty thereupon arose, as the Hejazi and Yemeni soldiers became discontented at this preferential treatment, and the situation became very critical, and at times it appeared as if the town must be sacked by the combined forces.

9. On the 9th it became generally rumoured that Medina had fallen, but as the telegram announcing the intention of the garrison commander to capitulate came direct to the King in cypher there was no confirmation until the 10th instant, when Sheikh Hafiz Wahba, who was proceeding to Egypt on the Khedivial steamship "Mansourah," broadcasted the information by wireless.

10. It at once became evident that the situation in Jeddah was desperate, as at most three weeks would be necessary for Ibn Saud to transport the guns, &c., captured in Medina and blow Jeddah to pieces.

11. Besides the difficulties in the army, the population were intriguing for and against the Shereefian cause, and, in fact, the party in favour of Ibn Saud had gained several of the army officers to their cause and had made many arrangements to facilitate the capture of the place by Ibn Saud, such as the disconnection of the searchlights along the front line trenches, the breaking of the wire entanglements in certain places, &c. Had they been successful in their efforts to induce Ibn Saud to attack towards the first week in December much bloodshed would have resulted, as even the townsfolk, who are all armed, would no doubt have defended themselves before a lot of Wahabis popularly supposed to be wild men.

12. On the 10th instant it became evident that the end of the Ali régime was at hand, but owing to the intrigues and counter-intrigues and the efforts of many of the leading Ministers and notables of the town to secretly convince Ibn Saud that his eventual victory was entirely due to them, and their total indifference as to what happened to the inhabitants or the soldiers, the situation was anything but pleasant, and at any moment serious incidents might have taken place.

13. On the 10th instant the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Fuad, and the Prime Minister, Abdullah Pasha, left Jeddah to proceed to make, so they said, a last effort to secure support for the Shereefian cause in the Hejaz. Fuad carried letters to King Fuad and to Lord Lloyd, but before he had had time to deliver them the fate of the Hejaz had already been decided.

14. As King Ali is a very weak person and easily deceived I have no doubt that the actions of Fuad and Abdullah were those of cowards, and whilst they may have been going to endeavour to enlist sympathy for Ali, they were primarily saving their hides. Fuad had been responsible for the whole of the scurrilous and lying propaganda conducted in the last months of the war and also responsible for the proclamations dropped on Mecca, in which the terms used against Ibn Saud personally were of a nature to shock the least susceptible.

Another thing which materially affected the decisions of Fuad and Abdullah that they were safer away from the Hejaz was that they had been engineering a revolt in Mecca, and which, indeed, very nearly came to a head, but of its eventual failure there could have been no doubt. Owing to the faithlessness of one of the participants the whole of the details came to Ibn Saud's ears, and he had all the ringleaders arrested. Ibn Saud himself was to have been murdered as he went to or was in the mosque and his body treated in a particularly atrocious manner. These facts no doubt contributed to hasten the departure of these two from the Hejaz, and it was also the failure of this plot, which even more than the distress of his soldiers and people, that hastened Ali to take a decision.

15. Even when he could no longer hide the news of the fall of Medina and after being deserted by his more responsible Ministers and the commander-in-chief of the forces, one Tahsin Pasha, and knowing that discipline no longer existed in the army and intrigues were rampant in the town, he still could not make up his mind to any definite line of action, and from the 10th till the 13th instant was shivering around his palace in a state of mental terror and indecision that was pitiful to behold.

His main ideas were: Firstly, to proceed to the Yemen with the Hejaz steamers at his disposal and join the Imam Yahya, taking with him such war materials as could be loaded conveniently and continue the war against Ibn Saud from the Asir side.

There were several objections to this course, of which the main was perhaps the objections of the townsfolk to the war materials being taken from Jeddah, as this action might incense Ibn Saud after his entry and lead to punishment of the townspeople themselves. Also, the soldiers refused to disarm until they were paid or repatriated, and consequently, as Ali had no money to pay them, the idea was owing to his indecision dropped.

Secondly, he had a desire to request refuge on British territory, but again refrained from asking for this, even though he had been advised to do so over and over again, as he was afraid of a rebuff from His Majesty's Government.

16. On the 12th instant 220 Palestinian and Syrian soldiers left for Akaba on the steamship "Rushdi."

17. On the 13th instant Ali at last requested refuge on British territory, and also that His Britannic Majesty's representative in Jeddah should act as intermediary between him and his people and Ibn Saud for the surrender of the town.

Both these requests were granted, and on the morning of the 17th instant His Britannic Majesty's representative met Ibn Saud and arrangements were made for

the submission of the town, which was satisfactorily accomplished by the 21st instant.

18. Owing to the difficulty of disarming the soldiers whilst Ali was still in Jeddah, he was on the morning of the 20th embarked on H.M.S. "Clematis," lying in Jeddah harbour, and a provisional Government under the leadership of the local Governor (Kaimakam) was appointed. This Provisional Government was formed of the heads of the main administrations, but, properly speaking, never functioned. All civil employees were retained and all the essential services maintained normally.

19. The head of the Provisional Government and the commander-in-chief of the forces officially surrendered to Ibn Saud on the morning of the 21st, and after that date functioned in his name.

20. King Ali left Jeddah in H.M.S. "Cornflower" on the 22nd instant for Aden, after which he will proceed to Bagdad.

21. Ibn Saud with a strong bodyguard entered Jeddah on the morning of the 23rd, and for the present none of the civil employees have been interfered with or replaced.

He intends to remain in Jeddah for some weeks to thoroughly reorganise the various administrations in view of the forthcoming pilgrimage, and expresses the hope that greater comfort and security will be provided for all pilgrims than has even been provided formerly.

22. To date no actual appointments have been confirmed, but a certain Mohammed Turki has the direction of customs in place of Tawil Bey, and a certain Dr. Hari, of Turkish origin, has been appointed Acting Director of Public Health and Quarantine Administration.

23. The town is quiet, and prices of food-stuffs falling rapidly, and there is now hope of a period of peace and tranquillity in this part of the world for several years to come.

24. Sheikh Hafiz Wahba left Rabigh on the steamship "Mansourah" on the 12th instant to visit King Fuad of Egypt and to present him with a costly sword. He also received permission to proceed to Palestine in order to make pilgrimage arrangements, &c.

25. Mr. Philby, who was reported to have left for Lith, actually left for Rabigh, and met Ibn Saud somewhere outside Mecca, and afterwards left Rabigh by dhow and proceeded to Port Sudan, from whence he arrived in Jeddah on the 30th instant.

26. Twenty-seven slaves were repatriated during the period under report. Twenty-one of these were released by King Ali just prior to his departure and handed over to this agency for repatriation.

S. R. JORDAN.

No. 93.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Jordan (Jeddah).

(No. 5.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, January 19, 1926.

PLEASE inform Ibn Saud that the King has received his telegram of 27th December and thanks him for the sentiments of friendship therein expressed. His Majesty is glad to learn that war is ended, and gratified that his representative was enabled to contribute to prevention of bloodshed.

No. 94.

Acting Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 10.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jeddah, January 25, 1926.

MY telegram No. 1 addressed to Foreign Office and my telegram No. 3 addressed to Department of Overseas Trade regarding condenser for Jeddah.

Naval engineer of H.M.S. "Cornflower" has examined local plant and reports that it cannot be expected to produce even present reduced output for more than two or three months without extensive repairs. Fourteen boiler tubes are already plugged.

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I understand that Italians have offered to supply and erect new condensers at two and a half months.

If British firm cannot complete by 15th-25th May, and as matter has been left entirely in our hands by Ibn Saud, it is only fair that I should inform him at once and give him time and opportunity to make other arrangements to provide sufficient water for pilgrims and inhabitants. This question is of utmost importance to health and is main factor in prevention of epidemic diseases.

No. 95.

Acting Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 12.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jeddah, January 25, 1926.

IBN SAUD states that he is transferring all war material captured at Jeddah to Taif, including aeroplanes.

He wishes to employ a British pilot and engineer to take charge of captured aeroplanes and fly same for commercial and postal services only between various towns in Arabian Peninsula.

He requests to be informed if there is any objection to this on the part of His Majesty's Government, and, if not, that he may be informed of best channel through which these persons could be engaged.

[E 734/7/91]

No. 96.

Vice-Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 3.)

Sir,

Jeddah, January 12, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to confirm my telegram No. 6 of the 11th instant, and to forward herewith a translation of a letter received from Abdul Aziz, Sultan of Nejd, proclaiming his election to the kingship of the Hejaz.

Also the translation of a proclamation published by him in the Mecca newspaper, "Umm-al-Kura," on the morning of, but prior to, his election.

Copies of this despatch and of its enclosures are being sent to India, Cairo, Jerusalem, Bagdad and Aden.

I have, &c.

S. R. JORDAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 96.

Translation of Letter from Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdul Rahman-al-Feisal-al-Saud, King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd and its Dependencies, dated 24th Jamad-al-Thani, 1344 (January 9, 1926).

ROYAL PROCLAMATION TO FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS.

BY the grace and help of God the people of the Hejaz have recognised us as King of the Hejaz, ruling according to the Book of God (Koran), Tradition of His Prophet, and the path of the distinguished Caliphs who came after him, and to establish a Constitutional Government in which the affairs of the Hejaz will be left to its own people.

In asking for God's help and succour, we have been pleased to accept that recognition and have assumed to ourselves the title of "King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd and its Dependencies."

We shall restore peace, tranquillity and prosperity and try to bring happiness and comfort to the inhabitants of this country, all pilgrims and visitors. We shall try our best as regards the fulfilment of all the wishes of the Islamic world, and shall make them pleased by the administration in this holy land.

We entreat the Almighty to help us in assuming the duties of that affair. God alone grants success.

Enclosure 2 in No. 96.

Extract from Mecca Newspaper, "Umm-al-Kura," dated 23rd Jamad-al-Thani 1344 (January 8, 1926).

GENERAL PROCLAMATION.

(Translation.)

In the name of God the Most Merciful, the Compassionate.

PRAISE be to God. We thank God, pray and send salutations to His best Prophet and the most honourable of His creatures, our master Mohammed. May prayers and the peace of God be upon him, his relatives and friends.

It has become known to everybody, far and near, what El Hussein and his sons have been doing with us until they obliged us to unsheathe our swords to defend our souls and homes and to defend the sanctuaries of God and His forbidden things.

I have done everything I can for the sake of purifying these holy places until the Almighty God has graciously granted success, conquest of the country and peace.

My determination since I began the work in this country was to follow the decisions the Moslem world (the Hejaz being part of same) will give with regard to the future of such holy country.

I have already on more than one occasion circulated an invitation to the Moslems in general, asking them to hold a Moslem conference to decide what they think best regarding the future of the Hejaz.

I have again made a general and private call and sent a letter to the Moslem Governments and nations on 10.4.1344. That letter has been published in all the newspapers of the world.

It is now more than two months since the date of that letter and I have not received a reply from anybody except the Caliphate Society in India. For they, may God bless them, have and are doing all they can for the comfort and happiness of the Hejaz.

When the Hejaz question was ended in this manner, for which we thank God, the Hejaz people came to me in multitudes and separately asking me to grant them the freedom I had promised them, namely, to decide their own future, and, owing to their repeated requests, I granted them the freedom to decide what they like regarding their country, as the Moslem world had remained silent about such an important matter.

Caring only for the good and welfare of the people as far as I can, I pray for success only from God, on whom I rely and to whom I go back.

ABDUL AZIZ-BIN-ABDUL

RAHMAN-AL-FEISAL-AL-SAUD.

22.6.1344.

[E 882/7/91]

No. 97.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 49.)

Sir,

Constantinople, February 2, 1926.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 296 of the 13th April last, I have the honour to report that Mohammed Emin Sherif called on me yesterday with a message from Sherif Ali Haidar, his father, to the following effect: As Ali Haidar had always expected, Ibn Saud had now succeeded in conquering Jeddah and in finally expelling the Hashimite dynasty. He intended apparently now to establish some sort of autonomous régime in the Hejaz under his own suzerainty. He, Ali Haidar, had always been on good terms with Ibn Saud, and had even kept up a one-sided correspondence with him, sending him letters by hand at rare intervals; he had a number of friends and adherents still devoted to him in the Hejaz, and he had properties there he was anxious to attend to; he felt that he was the most suitable person to act in the capacity of Regent or Governor in the Hejaz under Ibn Saud, who, he believed, would be willing to have him in that position; he had, he said, always been friendly to British interests, and in a position of authority at the Holy Places would be willing and more able than any other person to look after the welfare of the Moslem

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pilgrimages from the British Empire; he therefore hoped that His Majesty's Government would recognise these facts and see fit to help his claims with Ibn Saud, or if not that, at any rate not to oppose them. To all this I returned an entirely non-committal answer to Mohammed Emin. Ali Haidar, I said, knew that His Majesty's Government would on no account intervene in Islamic affairs, and I was entirely unable to see how far such questions as he had mentioned to me were religious and how far political in character.

2. Mohammed Emin said his father would have liked to come and call on me, but did not dare do so on account of the severity of the present Turkish régime. Ali Haidar was anxious now to leave Turkey, and was trying quietly to make arrangements accordingly. He wished to get to Beirut, there to join his son Abdullah, who, you will remember, having married an Ottoman princess, was expelled from Turkey in the spring of 1924 with the rest of the Caliph's family. Once at Beirut Ali Haidar would be able to go anywhere else he liked.

3. It is difficult to believe that even Mohammed Emin would run the gauntlet of the spies at my gate and visit me in the Embassy without feeling fairly sure that the Turkish authorities would not object, and I should therefore expect that the next news of Ali Haidar will be that of his arrival at Beirut. But though he has property in Turkey, and even if he left Turkey with the connivance of the Turkish authorities, it would not necessarily follow that, once arrived at Mecca, he would be a mere Turkish agent.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Cairo.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

No. 98.

Acting Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 19.)
(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, February 11, 1926.

YOUR telegram No. 16.

In view of close relations between His Majesty's Government and Ibn Saud, latter I am sure considers recognition by His Majesty's Government as an accomplished fact, merely lacking definite form to date.

I have consistently addressed him as His Highness the Sultan in all communications, but consider nothing can be gained by delay of full recognition.

I would suggest when he visits H.M.S. "Emerald" as being occasion for me to inform him of formal recognition.

No. 99.

Acting Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 21.)
(Telegraphic.) R.

Jeddah, February 13, 1926.

STEAMSHIP "Alavi," with 360 pilgrims on board, arrived from Mazaran with clean bill of health on 9th February. Ship and pilgrims were placed in quarantine for twenty-four hours by local authorities. Dutch colleague and myself protested to Minister for Foreign Affairs, who some hours afterwards informed me that he regretted he could do nothing. I therefore telephoned direct to Ibn Saud in Mecca, who ordered ship to be released.

As this was the first ship to arrive, and in order to prevent repetition, I sent Moslem clerk to Mecca to approach Ibn Saud, whilst I tackled Minister for Foreign Affairs in Jeddah.

Ibn Saud has now agreed to accept clean bills from recognised quarantine stations, and wishes to become a signatory to International Quarantine Convention, and to send or appoint a delegate to represent Hejaz interests at conference to be held in May or thereabouts.

In view of pilgrimage, Hejaz is probably one of the most important quarantine centres, and Hejaz co-operation with other Powers will greatly add to comfort and safety of pilgrims.

Is it possible for above to be arranged through His Majesty's Government please?

No. 100.

Acting Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 22.)
(Telegraphic.) R.

Jeddah, February 14, 1926.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 21.

Ibn Saud now agrees as follows:—

1. Pilgrim ships arriving at Jeddah presenting clean bill of health from any recognised quarantine station will be allowed to disembark pilgrims immediately after medical examination.
2. Should an outbreak of disease occur after ship has left quarantine or in port of Jeddah the ship shall return to nearest quarantine station for disinfection, unless representative of the Power to which ship belongs accepts local quarantine.
3. Any ship not calling at quarantine station and which on inspection is found to be infected will be quarantined locally.
4. The sum of 70 Egyptian piastres will be charged to each pilgrim arriving at Jeddah. This fee covers all charges, quarantine, passport, &c., both on arrival and departure, but is exclusive of customs duties.

Clause 3 refers to ships carrying less than one pilgrim per 100 tons.

The above is "special arrangement for this year's pilgrimage which will be in force until a final agreement is concluded between Hejaz and foreign Powers."

Above would appear to accord with convention of 1912, and I trust that His Majesty's Government will agree to same and approve of my actions in the matter.

My telegram No. 21 has been sent to Cairo.

(Repeated to Cairo and India.)

No. 101.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Consul Jordan (Jeddah).

(No. 22.)
(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, February 19, 1926.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 21 and 22 of 13th and 14th February respectively: Jeddah quarantine arrangements for 1926 pilgrimage.

Arrangements proposed by Ibn Saud for this year's pilgrimage are acceptable, and your action is approved.

Question of invitation to Ibn Saud to send representative to Paris Sanitary Conference is being sympathetically considered, and a further telegram will be addressed to you when decision is reached.

[E 1148/187/91]

No. 102.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to M. de Fleuriau.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, February 22, 1926.

I DULY received your note of the 23rd July last, relative to the ex-Turkish lighthouses in the Red Sea.

2. I regret the delay in replying thereto, which has been occasioned by the necessity of considerable correspondence with the competent departments of His Majesty's Government in an endeavour to reach a solution of this complicated question.

3. I now have the honour to inform your Excellency that, after careful consideration, His Majesty's Government have reluctantly reached the conclusion that the

practical obstacles to the policy proposed in your note of the 28th July last are so great that they have no alternative but to withdraw their original proposals, which were set forth in my note of the 18th May last.

I have, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

No. 103.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Consul Jordan (Jeddah).

(No. 25.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, February 25, 1926.

YOUR telegram No. 19 of 11th February: Recognition of Ibn Saud as King of the Hejaz.

You are authorised on suitable occasion to address a note to Ibn Saud, using style of "His Majesty," and informing him that His Majesty's Government recognise him as King of the Hejaz.

You should, however, specifically add that while thus recognising His Majesty's authority over the Hejaz, His Majesty's Government continue to regard the régime of the Holy Places of Islam and all religious questions connected therewith as matters solely concerning Moslems, regarding which His Majesty's Government neither ought nor desire to express an opinion.

As H.M.S. "Emerald" is due at Jeddah on 1st March, visit may furnish desired opportunity.

[E 1122/80/91]

No. 104.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to M. van Swinderen.

Foreign Office, February 25, 1926.

Sir,

HIS Majesty's Government have had under careful consideration the proposals set forth in your note of the 25th September last regarding the administration of the quarantine station at Kamaran Island. They are anxious to meet the wishes of your Government as far as possible in order to ensure the proper treatment of pilgrims from the Netherlands East Indies.

2. His Majesty's Government share the view of the Netherlands Government that the International Sanitary Convention should be revised in such a way as to enable pilgrim ships, which call at Kamaran and are ascertained to be free from infection, in certain circumstances to proceed to Jeddah without being compelled to disembark the pilgrims on the island. The Netherlands Government, however, will appreciate the fact that in order to secure the revenues necessary for the maintenance of the quarantine station the pilgrim and other dues levied at Kamaran will normally have to be paid, even if pilgrims are not landed in any particular case. The British representatives at the forthcoming international sanitary conference will be instructed to co-operate with the Dutch representatives in advocating a revision of the clauses of the Sanitary Convention dealing with this point. They will also in collaboration with the Dutch representatives endeavour to secure the revision of the regulations regarding the sanitation of pilgrim ships as to which the hope has been expressed by the Government of India that the maximum number of pilgrims on any one pilgrim steamer may be limited to 2,000. In this connection the Government of India would be glad to be supplied with detailed information regarding the arrangements made at ports of the Netherlands East Indies for the embarkation of pilgrims.

3. In your note of the 25th September you informed me that your Government consider that the joint control of the quarantine station at Kamaran Island by Great Britain and the Netherlands on a footing of complete equality and under international supervision would be the most desirable solution of this question. As regards the future administration of the quarantine station, His Majesty's Government are disposed, as explained below, to favour its future control by the Netherlands and Great Britain on a footing of entire equality. They do not, however, regard as practicable a solution which would involve placing the station under any form of international control. This would, in their opinion, be likely to lead to confusion

between the duties of the civil administrator of the island responsible to the Government of India and those of the health authorities responsible to the League of Nations or international sanitary body concerned with quarantine administration. In this connection, it must be remembered that Kamaran Island has a not inconsiderable indigenous population, which forms no part of the personnel of the quarantine station. Moreover, the extreme inaccessibility of the island would cause great delay if matters of quarantine control had frequently to be referred to an international body, and the administration of the quarantine station might consequently suffer in efficiency.

4. The alternative suggested in your note, namely, that two medical officers of equal standing, one Dutch and one British or British-Indian, might be appointed to an equality of position, is open to the objection that the discipline of the quarantine station would be difficult to maintain unless one of the medical officers were to be definitely recognised as the medical superintendent of the station.

5. His Majesty's Government assume in this connection that no question arises of changing the present system of administration of the Island of Kamaran, apart from that of the quarantine station. As the Netherlands Government are no doubt aware, the island is administered by a British civil administrator appointed by and responsible to the Government of India.

6. It therefore appears to His Majesty's Government that the following proposals might provide the basis of an agreement satisfactory to the two Governments:—

- (a.) The civil administrator appointed by the Government of India shall continue to be responsible for law and order and the administration of the island, including the quarantine station. The medical staff of the quarantine station shall consist of a Dutch medical officer and a British medical officer, to be nominated respectively by the Netherlands Government and the Government of India. The relative seniority of these two medical officers shall be determined by the length of service at Kamaran quarantine station, or in any other way which shall be agreed upon by the Netherlands Government and His Majesty's Government. In effect, the object to be aimed at will be that the British and Dutch medical officers shall rank more or less alternatively as senior medical officer, subject to some reasonable maximum period of tenure of the senior post, which it is suggested should be limited to four years and be arranged so as normally to permit of each medical officer being in charge for two years.
- (b.) The senior medical officer, as medical superintendent of the quarantine station, shall be the technical adviser of the civil administrator in all matters concerning quarantine, except as specified below.
- (c.) The administrator shall decide all administrative questions, including the question which ships should be allowed to proceed in either direction without disembarking pilgrims at Kamaran. When his decision in any matter depends essentially on the precautionary measures which have been taken at Dutch East Indian ports, either in regard to the ship or in regard to the pilgrims carried by the ship, the administrator will be guided by the advice of the Dutch medical officer. He will similarly be guided by the advice of the Dutch medical officer in matters which depend essentially upon the nature of the measures which have been taken on a Dutch ship by a Dutch medical officer during the voyage and also in any matters which depend upon the precautionary measures which will be applied to Dutch pilgrims on their return to the Dutch East Indies. If at any time he should think fit to overrule the advice of the Dutch medical officer on the above points, the administrator shall report the fact by telegram to the Government of India, repeating his telegram to His Majesty's Government for the information of the Netherlands Government. In corresponding circumstances in relation to British-Indian or Colonial ports, pilgrims and ships' medical officers, he will be guided by the advice of the British medical officer.
- (d.) Under existing arrangements the administrator submits each year, as soon as practicable after the conclusion of the pilgrimage, a report on the working of the quarantine service since the preceding pilgrimage. On the coming into force of the new arrangements now proposed he will attach to this a report made to him in respect of the same period by the medical superintendent of the quarantine station, together with any report which

the latter may have received from his colleague on technical questions specially concerning the welfare of the Dutch East Indian pilgrims or of the British-Indian or British-Colonial pilgrims, as the case may be.

The above reports will be communicated by the Government of India for the information of the Netherlands Government and of His Majesty's Government.

- (e.) Financial control of the quarantine station shall be exercised by the Government of Bombay through the administrator. The budget estimates for the quarantine station relating to the following year, after being framed in consultation with the medical superintendent, shall be submitted by the Government of Bombay through the Government of India on the 1st September, and sent to the Netherlands Government for observations before being finally approved.

7. The Netherlands Government may not be aware that the deficit incurred by British and Indian revenues on quarantine administration at Kamaran, from the year 1919, when the quarantine station was reopened for pilgrims, until the year 1922, when the quarantine station became self-supporting, amounts to over £44,000. Arrangements for the gradual reimbursement of this loss will have to be made by the Government of India. For this reason it would not be possible for His Majesty's Government to agree to a larger measure of financial control by the Netherlands Government, unless the latter were prepared to assume their share of responsibility for the deficit by refunding, for division between His Majesty's Government and the Government of India, a moiety of the above sum.

8. I hope that the above proposals, which are, of course, susceptible of elaboration or modification in detail, may prove acceptable to your Government. If they are accepted in their main lines, any such modifications in detail as may be deemed desirable might most conveniently be left for discussion until shortly before the International Sanitary Conference, which is due to take place in May 1926, when a representative of the Department of the Government of India responsible for the control of the quarantine stations at Kamaran will be in this country.

I have, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[E 1397/200/91]

No. 105.

Acting Consul Jordan to Government of India.—(Copy to Foreign Office in despatch No. 8; received March 1.)

(Secret.)

Sir,

Jeddah, January 29, 1926.

IN continuation of my telegram No. 14 of the 28th January, addressed to the Foreign Office and repeated to you, I have the honour to transmit herewith a report on the activities of the Khilafat delegation as far as has been ascertainable by the means at the disposal of this agency.

Copies of this despatch and report are being sent to the Foreign Office.

I have, &c.

S. R. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 105.

Report on the Activities of the Khilafat Delegation.

THE Khilafat delegation, under the presidency of Maulana Zafar Ali Khan, of the newspaper "Zaemendar," and with Shuaib Kureshi as secretary, arrived in Rabigh towards the middle of December, and, after a stay of some days in Rabigh, proceeded to Medina to verify the reported acts of vandalism on the part of the Wahabi forces.

Shuaib Kureshi, who called at this office, informed me personally that the reports on this subject were grossly exaggerated and that he found that the dome of the Prophet's Tomb had been hit in three places only, and one of them was certainly by a bullet fired from the Jebel Silah by the Sherifian forces, who had established their headquarters on that hill.

The Syedna Hamza Tomb was intact except for several marks made by shrapnel fired by the Sherifian forces and the fact that some of the carpets or covering of the bier were missing.

A small tomb not far from the Syedna Hamza had been destroyed, but was later repaired.

Shuaib Kureshi also stated that he had taken photographs of the various monuments and prepared a report on the matter, which would be published in India in due course.

After their visit to Medina was completed they proceeded to Mecca and had several audiences with Bin Saud, but, as far as can be ascertained, they were treated with but scant respect and given to understand that if India really wished to have some say in the control of the Hejaz there were more concrete ways of showing it than by sending penniless delegations who were dependent on the Hejaz even for their food whilst here.

After the fall of Jeddah they came to this place and began to investigate the extent of British interference in the matter of mediation between the Sherifs and Bin Saud and what propaganda they could make out of it.

It must be counted a success on the part of His Majesty's Government's policy that, after these people had been running all over the place endeavouring to find some excuse for criticism and hearing nothing but good spoken on all sides and how, had it not been for the actions of His Majesty's representative, bloodshed could not have been avoided, they were, reluctantly perhaps, forced to admit likewise, and remarked to Munshi Ihsanullah, employed at this agency, and several other local Indians gathered in his house, "that it was the only good thing that Sheitan Government had ever accomplished."

The delegation was still in Jeddah when Bin Saud was declared King of the Hejaz at Mecca, and when news reached them to this effect they became very excited and angry, and declared that Bin Saud, by his acceptance of this position, had given the lie to all his previous declarations about the Hejaz, and had thereby insulted the delegation.

They went so far as to excuse themselves in writing when invited by the King's representative to a reception held at the Governorate, as a protest against the action of Bin Saud and the Hejaz people in choosing him as their King.

Later, when Bin Saud gave a banquet to the foreign representatives and notables of Jeddah, they again refused to attend, though they were accepting his hospitality even to the extent of their daily food.

Seeing that there was nothing further for them to do in the Hejaz, they took the first opportunity of leaving, and actually sailed for India by the steamship "Jehangir," which left Jeddah on the 26th January.

During their stay in Jeddah they exhorted Bin Saud not to surrender Ma'an and Akaba to the British, as they considered it holy territory. This subject, I learned, was also discussed between themselves and Mr. St. J. Philby at Rabigh, who, in addition to informing them that they should insist on this point, informed them also that His Majesty's Government had been paying large sums of money to Bin Saud. This incensed them somewhat, and they were at great pains to verify this information in Jeddah.

They are returning to India rather crestfallen, and it would not be surprising if they launch out on a policy directed against Bin Saud as soon as they return.

Shuaib Kureshi's application for a visa to proceed to the United Kingdom now appears to have been an excuse for calling at this agency, and as soon as I realised this I took no further action in the matter.

S. R. JORDAN.

[E 1715/900/91]

No. 106.

Acting Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 1.)

(No. 9.)

Sir,

Jeddah, January 30, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to report that His Highness the Sultan has at several interviews recently brought up the question of slavery and wished to be informed if, in consideration of the fact that he would take the necessary measures to stop the

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importation of slaves on all sides of the territories under his control, Nejd included, His Majesty's Government would consent to cease giving refuge to slaves at this agency.

2. The above offer was made after a lengthy discussion of a most amiable nature, and was, His Highness stated, whilst recognising in principle the necessity of abolishing this barbarous practice, as far as he could go at present without causing much trouble, and possibly revolution, in the country, and that he hoped that eventually slavery, on account of the stoppage of importation, would die out and the necessity for more drastic measures be avoided. His Highness assured me of his ability to stop the importation of slaves, and would back his iradé with a religious fetva obtained from the Ulema of Mecca.

3. His Highness further stated that if he abolished slavery at once in the territories he controlled, and more particularly the Hejaz, it would give his enemies an excellent opportunity of inciting the tribes against him, and might possibly interfere with the pilgrimage, which of course he was most anxious to avoid.

4. As against these arguments, I informed His Highness that the slave question was an international question, and not a purely private matter to be discussed between His Highness and His Majesty's Government, even though the great majority of slaves in Arabia originally came from territories now under the control of His Majesty's Government, but that, nevertheless, His Majesty's Government, in virtue of this fact, had a peculiar and particular right to protect the subjects of His Gracious Majesty King George, and I considered, without binding or committing the Government in any way, that they would be loath to relinquish in any way or in any circumstance other than that of complete emancipation their duty towards British subjects.

5. I further pointed out to His Highness that it was a contradiction in terms for His Highness to state that Moslems were brothers all the world over and that their interests were common and that they held together for their complete religious and national liberty when actually within the Haramain (the two holy cities of Islam) fellow-Moslems were bought and sold as cattle and employed as such.

6. His Highness stated that he quite agreed, but that it was an established custom of the people for many hundreds and even thousands of years past, and that to abolish the custom at one fell stroke and take all their slaves away would certainly lead to a certain amount of trouble.

7. I again pointed out to His Highness that the complete emancipation of all slaves in His Highness's territories did not necessarily mean that the slaves would be taken away from their masters, but would mean that these fellow-Moslems could not be bought and sold as animals or detained against their wills, and that they would have the liberty of leaving their masters if they so desired, but that possibly not 30 per cent., were they well treated, would avail themselves of their newly-found prerogative, preferring rather to stay and receive a small salary and be no longer considered as slaves but as domestic servants.

8. I further pointed out to His Highness that even the Koran was not in accord with slavery except and unless the slaves were enemies taken in battle, and even this, according to later traditions, was only Mahomet's policy to spare the lives of the prisoners and to provide man-power generally lost in battle.

9. Further, I told His Highness of several particularly revolting cases of ill-treatment of slaves that had come under my notice during my stay in Jeddah, and assured His Highness that if he wished further to show himself to the civilised world as the great reformer of the Moslem religion, as he undoubtedly was, no action on his part could be more eloquent or further redound to his credit.

10. After further discussion on the subject, during which His Highness seemed anxious if possible to discover some magic formula to abolish slavery without the necessary iradé, &c., I still further informed His Highness that the question could be approached not on humanitarian grounds alone, but also on the religious basis, to which he agreed, and also that now was a most suitable moment: as he had in his hour of success shown mercy to his enemies and granted a general amnesty, could he not, as a thanks to the Almighty for his splendid victory, also extend his graciousness and mercy in the form of an amnesty to the many fellow-Moslems who were slaves in bondage in this country.

11. At the end of this discussion His Highness again asked if it would not be possible for His Majesty's Government, in consideration of his stopping the import of slaves, to refrain from protecting slaves at this agency. I informed His Highness that I was not competent to give an answer, but would refer the question to His Majesty's Government and inform him of the reply in due course.

12. The interview, which had been of a most cordial nature throughout, ended by His Highness thanking me sincerely for the frank exchange of views on the subject and assuring me that, in principle, he was against slavery, and would do all in his power to eradicate the barbarous practice from his domains, but that it was necessary to go slowly and explore and utilise every channel possible to satisfy the people whilst assuring the liberty of all slaves.

13. His Highness further promised to consult his ulemas and endeavour by persuasion to obtain from them religious arguments against the practice and so educate the people as quickly as possible to bring about the desired results.

14. There is no doubt that His Highness sincerely wishes his country to be acknowledged as a civilised Power, and to that end is prepared to make many sacrifices of and modifications in a number of the established customs of this country, and I would respectfully suggest that a communication couched in friendly terms from His Majesty's Government and/or the League of Nations exhorting His Highness to bring an end to the deplorable practice of slavery in his territories would go far to assist His Highness to hasten to a favourable decision in the matter; but I would suggest that His Majesty's Government should not accede to His Highness's request regarding the cessation of the practice of protecting slaves at this agency, irrespective of any action taken by His Highness for the amelioration of the conditions of slavery other than that of complete emancipation.

15. His Highness the Sultan left for Mecca this morning, and has expressed a desire to further discuss the question on his return after he has consulted the ulemas and given further thought to the subject.

16. I venture to hope that my actions in this matter will be approved, and I shall not fail to communicate to you any further expressions of policy or desires on the part of His Highness.

I have, &c.

S. R. JORDAN.

[E 1399/367/91]

No. 107.

Vice-Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 1.)

(No. 11. Secret.)

Sir,

Jeddah, February 4, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz during the period the 1st-31st January, 1926.

2. Copies of this report are being sent to Egypt, Jerusalem (2), Bagdad, Aden, Delhi and Beirut (for Damascus).

3. In view of the cessation of hostilities in the Hejaz I would respectfully suggest that the necessity of sending copies of this report to Bushire, Maskat, Khartum, Singapore, Koweit and Bahrain would appear to no longer exist, and that henceforth the practice should cease unless there be some special reasons of which I am not cognisant.

4. I shall be glad to receive instructions on this point.

I have, &c.

S. R. JORDAN

Enclosure in No. 107.

Report for the Period January 1 to 31, 1926

(Secret.)

THE military situation during the period under report has been calm, with perhaps the exception of the action of certain of Ibn Saud's forces in the direction of Jizan and Sabia, who are rumoured to have occupied the former town, whilst the forces of one, Ali, the cousin of the Idrissi, has taken a stand against his cousin Hassan in the latter. Hassan is supposed to have invoked the assistance of Ibn Saud and the occupation of Jizan was the immediate result.

2. The King's (Ibn Saud's) representative and Minister for Foreign Affairs in Jeddah, a certain Abdullah Bey Damluji of Mosul origin, informed me that the situation in Asir was by no means calm, but that Ibn Saud has sufficient forces to cope with any eventuality. That the Imam Yahya knew his own strength and the strength of Ibn Saud, and consequently there would not be war between them.

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3. It really appears as if the Idrissi as a force has practically ceased to exist, and his territories are being divided between Ibn Saud and the Imam Yahya.

4. The Emir Mohammed, Ibn Saud's third son, who went to Medina to receive the submission of that city, arrived in Jeddah with a part of his forces on the 20th January. During his stay in Jeddah he proceeded on board H.M.S. "Cornflower," Red Sea sloop, and was shown over the ship.

5. The arrangements for the future military control of the Hejaz has been finally settled as follows: Ibn Saud assumes control of the whole of the military forces and assures the safety of the roads, &c. For this the Hejaz people are to subscribe £140,000 per annum, and the disbursement of the money is left to Ibn Saud. Other than the above, Ibn Saud receives an annual amount of £60,000 as King of the Hejaz and Commander-in-chief of the military forces. No armed forces, except police, are to be recruited in the Hejaz, and the forces of occupation will be Ibn Saud's own people from Nejd.

6. Two small robberies have occurred on the Jeddah-Mecca Road, and consequently a chain of gendarme posts have been established to further guarantee the safety of travellers. Ibn Saud has also announced his intention of transferring all war materials taken in Jeddah to Taif, including aeroplanes, as the climate of Jeddah is too severe.

7. It is as yet too early to remark upon the financial situation as the many measures, economic and otherwise, are still being discussed by the so-called Hejaz Assembly in Mecca.

The majority of the new employees in the various administrations would appear to consider themselves entitled to and worthy of fabulous salaries, but I have no doubt that eventually this question will be settled in a much more reasonable manner than is at present proposed by certain members of the Assembly.

8. The Assembly, which is supposed to be a representative assembly, can hardly claim that distinction at present, though in Mecca and Medina some pretence was made of an election, but at Jeddah several notables went to Mecca as representatives by common assent rather than election, and have taken their seats. The business done to date, with the exception of the formal recognition of Ibn Saud as King of the Hejaz, the allotment of an annual allowance, and the military occupation subsidy as mentioned above, appears to have been nil, and various reports are arriving daily from Mecca of the squabbles that are going on, particularly over financial matters and the salaries of the heads of the different administrations.

9. The following appointments have been made to date:—

- (1) Dr. Mohammed Hamuda (Syrian), Director-General of Health.
- (2) Dr. Kheri Bey (Syrian), Inspector-General of Health Department.
- (3) Dr. Abdul Hadi Bey (Egyptian), Inspector-General of Quarantine.
- (4) Dr. Ramzi Bey, Chief of Jeddah Hospital.
- (5) Syed Hashem-al-Dagestan, of Mecca, Chief Revenue Officer.
- (6) Abdullah Effendi (Syrian), Superintendent of Police.
- (7) Taufik Bey (Iraki), Port Officer.
- (8) Abdullah Effendi, of Mecca, Postmaster-General.
- (9) Sheikh Ali Salama, of Jeddah, Mayor of Jeddah.
- (10) Sheikh Qassim Ismail, of Jeddah, Director-General of Customs.
- (11) Mohammed Sali Jamjoun, of Jeddah, Chief of Anqaf.
- (12) Sherif Sharaf-el-Riza, of Mecca, Acting Financial Minister.
- (13) Sheikh Mohammed Marzouk, of Mecca, Kadi of Mecca.
- (14) Sheikh Bi Bhahed, of Nejd, Grand Kadi of the Hejaz.

The number of Syrians of the medical profession is noticeable. Syrians are also well represented in the various commands in the army, details of which I have been unable to secure to date.

Other than the above Dr. Abdullah Bey Damluji, originally from Mosul and whose brother is now at a military staff college in England, training for the Irak army, has been appointed as the representative of the King of the Hejaz and Director for Foreign Affairs.

10. There is a movement afoot, particularly in Mecca and Medina, that only Hejazis should be employed on the administrations, and all the foreigners, i.e., Syrians, Egyptians, &c., should be dismissed.

11. Dr. Abdullah Hadi, mentioned above as Director-General of the Quarantine Services has already submitted a budget for £60,000 for the erection of quarantines all over the place, including Tebuk and Taif. He is, so I should judge from a conversation I had the doubtful pleasure of having with him, a man of no

intellectual development whatever, and how he came to be nominated to such a post is quite beyond me.

Should his proposals be put into force it is quite possible that the pilgrims will have to do double quarantine, once at Kamaran and again at Jeddah. I have already protested to the King's representative against such an eventuality, and as an example of the régime Hadi Bey would establish, may be cited the fact that he assured me that pilgrims coming from the ships and proceeding to quarantine on the islands would endure no hardships whatever, as he was buying a fast tug capable of a speed of 25 knots to tow the dhows from the boats to the islands, and the trip of 7 miles would not take more than 10 minutes. The above proposal and the Einsteinian adaptability of his calculations are on a par with his many other suggestions.

12. On account of the fact that most of the administrations are in the process of reorganisation, and on account of the poorness of the available material for the various administrative posts, no great improvement on the Sherifian régime can be anticipated for some time to come, but the one asset over the old régime is that the level-headed manner and strength of character with which Ibn Saud is facing the situation, more particularly in regard to the pilgrimage question, will overcome many apparently insurmountable difficulties and tend to make the people cognisant of their own shortcomings.

13. On the 8th January Ibn Saud was by a "Bayat" formerly elected King of the Hejaz and assumed the title of King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd and its Dependencies. The ceremony, which took place in Mecca, came as a surprise to many of the Hejaz people themselves, and was, according to reports, forced upon Ibn Saud, not against his will, perhaps, by the Hejaz notables, as they realised that should he hand the government of the Hejaz over to the Hejazis themselves or to some Moslem delegation or council, nothing but internecine strife and contentions would be their lot for months and even years to come, as they would be open to the intrigues of the Ashraf and many other sections of the public.

Therefore, in order to guarantee the safety of the Haramain and the roads leading thereto, in order that Moslems could perform their religious duties in security, and, further, in order to secure peace and prosperity to their country, they begged Ibn Saud to accept the kingship.

This Ibn Saud did but declared that the Hejaz was for the Hejazis, and that, in accordance with their wishes, he would assume the title of King and assure the safety of the Holy Places and roads, but that the affairs of Nejd and the Hejaz would be kept strictly separate.

14. On the 22nd instant, Ibn Saud, just prior to observing a self-inflicted fast, on account of not having fasted the year previous owing to the war, invited the representatives of the various Powers, the European residents and the notables of Jeddah to a banquet.

After the dinner Abdullah Bey read a speech of welcome, after which the Sultan addressed the assembled company in the following sense:—

"It is a great pleasure to me to have the opportunity of informing my honoured guests, and particularly the foreign representatives, of my thoughts and desires for this holy territory, and which merits our best efforts to secure its peace and prosperity. I shall devote the whole of my energies to that end. I am aware of the great achievements of the western world and I do not despise them. I feel that the western world owes much to the Arabs, who have, in recent years, lost their position in the world because they strayed from the right paths set by their ancestors, but I am going to devote my energies to bring them back to those paths of righteousness and truth which alone lead to great achievements.

"We have our obligations to the honourable foreign Governments, by which we will stand, and they have their obligations towards us. Moslems are brothers throughout the world, and we stand as such, and we ask the foreign Governments to facilitate the passage of pilgrims to the Holy Places. And there are obligations greater even than this, and that is, that Arabs and Moslems should be treated with consideration and their interests protected as the foreigners are treated in this Holy Land.

"I know that the heart of an Arab and Moslem is good soil, and if it is watered with kindly consideration it will produce good crops, i.e., affection. Therefore, I beg that the honourable foreign Governments will not gainsay the legitimate rights of the Moslems in their respective countries. In conclusion, I pray God our actions may be greater than our words."

15. His Majesty has, during the course of several conversations I have had with him, raised the question of slavery, and is, in fact, manifesting a desire to find some way of abolishing this barbarous practice in the territories under his control. What the eventual results will be is not yet manifest.

16. During the period under report, orders have been secured for British firms for the supply of a condenser, two motor-cars and 5,000 tons of coal. It is hoped to secure further orders for boats, electric lighting plants, and the supply of an amount of small coinage to replace the small coins of many denominations and nationalities at present in circulation.

There is also in the course of formation a Moslem company to run a service of motor-cars between Jeddah and Mecca. This company, which will be composed purely of Moslems, are desirous of having the service running before the full pilgrimage in May-June next, but, owing to the slowness of the various administrations and the consequent delay in getting the concession, it is doubtful whether it will be possible.

17. I understand that Mr. Philby, who is still in Jeddah, is endeavouring to secure the oil concessions at Dibba, and, if so, will be returning to England to attempt to raise the necessary capital for the exploration of these fields.

18. Two Indian deputations have been present in Jeddah during the period, (1) the Khilafat delegation as partisans of Ibn Saud, and (2) the Khudam-ul-Haramain, antagonistic to the Wahabi régime and to the other delegation. The loyalty of the Khilafat delegation to Ibn Saud was badly shaken by the election of this latter as King of the Hejaz, as they, through their delegation, were anxious to assume some sort of an administrative power after the departure of King Ali on behalf of the committee they represented. Both delegations are receiving half-hearted welcomes and are very disappointed.

19. Several doctors have recently arrived from Egypt to attempt to restore the sight to the left eye of Ibn Saud, of which the vision is partly obscured by a white film. The first part of the operation has been performed successfully.

20. A wireless set, bought from Marconi in England, is being erected at Kufuda, and a spare set, captured at Jeddah, is being sent to Abha to be erected there. These are, no doubt, to supply quick and accurate information of the military situation in that direction.

21. Nine slaves have been repatriated during the period under report.

S. R. JORDAN.

No. 108.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Jordan (Jeddah).

(No. 28.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, March 5, 1926.

YOUR telegram No. 12 of 25th January: Desire of Ibn Saud to engage British pilot and engineer to operate aeroplanes in his possession.

Please inform Ibn Saud that his request has been sympathetically considered by His Majesty's Government. It is difficult on the details supplied to gauge his exact requirements. In order to assist him in forming estimate of personnel and material required for operating air service as contemplated, His Majesty's Government are prepared in the first instance to send him from Egypt an officer of Royal Air Force on a visit to inspect the aircraft, draw up estimate and advise him generally regarding future requirements.

[E 1583/155/91]

No. 109.

Acting Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain—(Received March 8.)

(No. 13.)

Sir,

Jeddah, February 15, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to confirm my telegrams Nos. 21 and 22 of the 13th and 14th February respectively, and to state that the sequence of events culminating with the above telegrams was as follows:—

The steamship "Alavi," of the Turner, Morrison line of steamships, arrived in Jeddah from Kamaran (last port, Karachi) on the 9th February with a number of

first- and second-class passengers on board, together with 360 pilgrims and 6,295 bales of merchandise destined for Jeddah.

The ship upon arrival was visited by the local quarantine doctor, by name Ramzi Bey, and placed in quarantine for twenty-four hours, irrespective of the fact that the doctor on board presented a clean bill of health from Kamaran, and no sickness had broken out after her departure from the quarantine station. The first- and second-class passengers, mostly the families of the local and Mecca notables, were allowed to disembark, but the pilgrims were detained and the discharge of the cargo held up.

As soon as these facts came to my knowledge, I sent a clerk of the agency to the quarantine offices to ascertain the details.

He was informed that the ship had been placed in quarantine for twenty-four hours as she had only done twenty-four hours' quarantine at Kamaran, but that he would release the ship if he received an order from Abdullah Bey Damluji, the King's representative and Director of Foreign Affairs.

Upon this, I conferred with my Dutch colleague, and we both visited the Minister for Foreign Affairs and pointed out that the idea of keeping the pilgrims on board ship for twenty-four hours after arrival was unnecessary and futile, as, in order to clean the ship, if infected, disinfection would have to be carried out, and the mere holding up of the ship and pilgrims for twenty-four hours in port would produce rather than prevent infection.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs promised to refer the matter to the Sultan in Mecca and inform us of the result in due course. This was about midday. At 3-30 I received a telephone message from Abdullah Bey Damluji, who stated that he regretted he was unable to do anything.

As I doubted if he had referred the matter to the Sultan, I informed him that I intended to telephone direct to Mecca, which I did.

As soon as the Sultan heard of the situation, he promised to look into it at once, and some one hour afterwards rang me up, stating that Abdullah Bey informed him that there was illness on board. This I was able to refute, and the Sultan thereupon gave orders for the ship to be released pending discussion of the whole affair.

The following morning, in order to keep the question to the fore, I sent Ihsanullah, of the agency staff, to Mecca to interview the Sultan. I provided him with explicit written instructions, and was in constant touch with him and the Sultan by telephone.

The results of these conversations are summarised in my telegrams above referred to and hardly require to be enlarged upon. I enclose herewith a more exact translation of the agreement suggested and acceptable by Ibn Saud, and I hope that, as these conditions to all intents and purposes agree with the Convention of 1912 and are a great advance on the conditions under the Shereefian régime, they will be acceptable to His Majesty's Government as a provisional arrangement until such time as the Hejaz becomes a signatory of the International Quarantine Convention.

A desire to this effect has been expressed by the Sultan, who is uncertain as to how it should be done, i.e., whether he should apply direct or through the intermediary of another Power, or await an invitation. As I understand there will be a Sanitary Conference in Paris during the month of May, I would respectfully suggest that the necessary steps be taken to assure the membership and representation of the Hejaz thereat, as, unless some definite effort at co-operation takes form soon, there is no apparent reason why, when Ibn Saud is, say, at Nejd, the thoroughly incapable and bigoted heads of the various local administrations, who have most had experience under the Shereefian régime, may not adopt their old tactics.

The situation has been rendered rather more difficult by Mr. Philby, about whom I am forwarding a separate despatch, who frequents the society of the various departmental heads and fills them with ideas of non-co-operation and full independence and the inefficiency of the International Quarantine Convention.

On this occasion I have fortunately been able to refute the puerile arguments put forward by him to the local people, but on a future occasion I may not be so successful.

Copies of this despatch and of its enclosure are being sent to India and Egypt.

I have, &c.

S. R. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 109.

Translation of Proposed Agreement.

In the name of God the Most Merciful, the Compassionate.

SPECIAL arrangements for the present pilgrimage season until official agreements are made between us and the Governments:—

1. Every ship coming from countries which are free from epidemics and is in possession of a certificate from quarantine following an international law proving that the ship is clear should not have her passengers delayed after the medical visit.
2. In case an epidemic disease breaks out after leaving the quarantine, and the same is proved by the quarantine and the ship's doctor jointly, the ship will be sent back to the nearest international quarantine if the Government to which the ship belongs request this, or she will be placed in the local quarantine.
3. If the ship does not call at an international quarantine and a suspicion arises about her at the medical visit, the ship will be put under health supervision and the passengers will be put under local quarantine.
4. After the collection of the 70 Egyptian piastres from the shipping companies, nothing else at all should be taken *re* passport or quarantine fees on entering or leaving.

No. 110.

Acting Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 12.)

(No. 32.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

YOUR telegram No. 28.

Jeddah, March 12, 1926.

Ibn Saud accepts offer with pleasure. Suggest officer should not leave Egypt before 1st April owing to my absence in Port Sudan.

[E 1908/366/91]

No. 111.

Vice-Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 16. Secret.)

Sir,

Jeddah, February 20, 1926.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 123 (22), of the 30th December last, relative to the Port Sudan-Jeddah cable, I have the honour to forward herewith a copy of a letter received from the Director of Posts and Telegraphs, Khartum, in answer to my letter No. 692 M. of the 28th December last, of which a copy was forwarded to you with my despatch under reference.

I have, &c.

S. R. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 111.

Director of Posts and Telegraphs to British Agent, Jeddah.

(Strictly Confidential.)

Sir,

General Post Office, Khartum, February 15, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter No. 692 M. of the 28th December, 1925, and copy of your despatch No. 123 (22) of the 30th December, 1925, to the Foreign Office.

1. I see no objection to, and am in favour of, the conference which you have proposed in paragraph 5 of your despatch No. 123 (22). I assume, however, that no further action can be taken pending a reply from the Foreign Office in connection with your suggestion for a conference, when I presume the Sudan Government will be asked officially to participate in the conference.

2. I am unable to express any very definite views on the subject of the use of the Hejaz wireless stations for international traffic, but the following remarks may be of interest:—

- (a.) For various reasons, not confined to this particular question, it seems desirable that the Hejaz should notify its adhesion to the International Telegraph Convention and the Radio-Telegraph Convention. I would add, however, that the Sudan, from an international telegraph point of view, is regarded as part of Egypt, and I understand that adhesion to the above conventions must be notified through diplomatic channels.
- (b.) Whether or not the Hejaz notifies its adhesion to the above conventions, it is presumed that any administration working wireless direct to one of the Hejaz stations would require that traffic and accounting procedure should be in accordance with the international regulations. This would involve the employment by the Hejaz Government of officials conversant with international telegraph procedure and practice. I would add that pending settlement of the ownership of the cable, this Administration keeps the cable account, but if the Hejaz adheres to either of the conventions referred to above, it would be necessary that it should have an accounting branch of its own to deal with claims and settlement of accounts.
- (c.) International wireless traffic will obviously compete with traffic now forwarded by cable, and as the traffic by the latter is quite small the question as to whether both methods of communication are necessary will require consideration.
- (d.) As the cable is old and the cost of repairs is heavy, it may be found desirable to abandon the cable and institute a wireless service between the Hejaz and Port Sudan or Khartum. The whole question is therefore intimately bound up with the question of the disposal of the cable.
- (e.) In view of the above remarks, it would appear advisable that no action should be taken until the proposed conference has taken place or some other arrangements have been made for settling the ownership of the cable and the various cognate questions connected therewith.

I have, &c.

Director of Posts and Telegraphs,
Sudan Government.

[E 1919/367/91]

No. 112.

Acting Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 22. Secret.)

Sir,

Jeddah, March 1, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz during the period the 1st to the 28th February, 1926.

2. Copies of this report are being sent to Egypt, Jerusalem (2), Bagdad, Aden, Delhi and Beirut (for Damascus).

I have, &c.

S. R. JORDAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 112.

Report for the Period February 1 to 28, 1926.

DURING the period under report many changes have taken place in the various administrations as laid down in my report for the month ended the 31st January. The most momentous of these changes is perhaps the dismissal of Dr. Hadi Bey, for a short time Director-General of the Quarantine, and the curtailment of a considerable part of the power of Dr. Abdullah Bey Damluji, one time King's representative, or self-styled Viceroy and Minister for Foreign Affairs, but who is now but a representative of the Foreign Ministry at Jeddah. Mouammer Bey, lately representative of the Sultan of Nejd in Egypt, has been appointed head of the Foreign Political Intelligence Department and chief adviser to the King.

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2. Several interesting personalities have arrived in Jeddah during this month, chief of whom is perhaps Major Ibrahim Depui, who now styles himself as Shereef Ibrahim, claiming in justification of this pretension illegitimate descent from his grandfather's side many years ago in the Yemen. He arrived as the representative of the High Commissioner of Syria to negotiate a commercial treaty between the Nejd and Syria. His credentials were from the High Commissioner, M. de Jouvenel, and Ibn Saud politely regretted being unable to treat with an individual, but expressed his willingness to treat with either the French or Syrian Governments. After some delay, during which no doubt Depui referred the matter to Syria, it was decided that he was negotiating on behalf of the Governments of Syria, who would soon be established on a basis similar to that of the Kingdom of Irak. Owing to these delays, small progress has been made with the negotiations, as I also understand that the Sultan and his advisers are of the opinion that this move on the part of the French represents a clumsy manoeuvre to gain Hejaz recognition of the mandate in Syria, which has, I believe, been withheld to date. Should the French secure this, it will enable them to put pressure on Ibn Saud in case it can later be established that Arabs from his territories are assisting the Druse revolt.

3. Noori Pasha Shalan, a well-known Arab of the Hauran and a prominent man during the big war, arrived about the same time as Depui, but whether this is mere coincidence or otherwise I have not been able to ascertain.

4. A certain Suleiman Pasha Shafki also arrived in Jeddah during the period under report. He was one time Turkish Governor of the Asir and after Minister for War in Constantinople under the old régime. He is an anti-Kemalist and, I understand, a refugee from Turkey.

5. Other than the above a certain Mr. Ellis, an American journalist, also turned up, and after a stay of a few days in Jeddah proceeded to Bahra, accompanied by Mr. Philby as interpreter, to meet Ibn Saud. Mr. Ellis, if I am not mistaken, is well known in Constantinople for his anti-British sentiments, and they appear not to have changed since those days, as during the trip down on the steamer he lost no opportunity of criticising His Britannic Majesty's policy in the Levant and declaring that we should clear out of Irak and leave Jerusalem and Palestine to the Americans.

6. A delegation from the Asir (Idrissi) also came to Mecca to meet Ibn Saud and put their claims before him. This deputation was from one of the rival factors in that area, Hassan to wit, and Ibn Saud's statement to them, as published in the Mecca newspaper, is given in enclosure No. 1 to this report.

7. Mr. Philby's activities continue, and he seems to lose no opportunity of creating difficulties for His Britannic Majesty's Government. Whether he does this in order to curry favour with the present authorities as a means of facilitating the obtention of certain concessions or because he happens to be a disgruntled ex-official of His Majesty's Government seeking revenge is uncertain and beside the point as the results are the same.

8. The Khudam-al-Haramain delegation, whose arrival I signalled in my last report, have become very unpopular, and eventually Ibn Saud requested them to leave the Hejaz. This will undoubtedly come as a blow to the many Indian Moslems who consider the Holy Land of Islam their own peculiar property. This delegation, upon its arrival, refused the Royal hospitality, stating that they could not recognise Ibn Saud in this country. Ibn Saud requested them first to examine the facts of the matter before condemning him, and stated that he believed that with goodwill on each side it would be possible to settle any points in dispute. Eventually the delegation accepted the Sultan's hospitality and proceeded to Mecca. During their stay in that town they appear to have lost no opportunity of creating intrigues against the present régime, and to that end appear to have expended the greater part of the 12,000 rupees they were supposed to have brought with them from India for distribution amongst the poor of the Haramain. They also categorically ordered Ibn Saud to leave the Hejaz with his army, but failed to state what precautions they were taking against revolution and for the safety of the roads.

9. One Syed Taib Hazazi, who was a clerk in the Department of Justice, has recently been appointed as Reis-el-Diwan to the Sultan. The appointment is unfortunate as Hazazi, brought up under the Turkish régime, is thoroughly corrupt.

10. It would at present appear as if the persons who were prominent in the Shereefian régime are now obtaining many of the more lucrative posts in the new Administration to the exclusion of certain Syrians and other foreigners so-called in the Hejaz. Although this can hardly be considered desirable from the point of view of the foreigners, I mean Christian Powers, it is perhaps the lesser evil, as these

people and their peculiarities are known factors, and relations can be established accordingly, whereas such past masters in the art of administrations as, say, Dr. Hadi Bey, must always remain an unknown quantity.

11. The National Assembly has recently voted a further annuity of £21,000 to the Sultan for the upkeep of the aeroplanes and the armoured cars and other technical services. This now brings the amount voted to the Sultan to £221,000, or, approximately, one-fifth of the revenue of the country.

12. The concession for the motor service between Mecca and Jeddah has been granted to Abdullah-al-Fadle in company with one Dehlavi, a prominent Mecca merchant of Indian extraction, and one Amari, together with an Egyptian. Twenty-five per cent. of the profits of this company go to the Government and the remainder is for distribution amongst the shareholders.

Abdullah-al-Fadle, the promotor of this company and one of the King's favourite advisers, has also been appointed as the buying agent for the Hejaz, and all Government purchases will in future be negotiated through him. As can readily be imagined, this most lucrative post was eagerly sought after, and El Fadle has no doubt received it in recompense for his services to the Nejd cause during the late war.

13. Recently the authorities published a list of fees chargeable to pilgrims. This is a good step, and I understand taken by the Sultan in order to prevent the extortionate exactions of the mutawwifs (pilgrim guides) and local merchants.

14. A National Committee of Relief has also been appointed in Mecca for the distribution of charities. So far their labours have been restricted to making rules and regulations, as no charities have arrived to date, consequently they have not come in for any criticism, as they are not for the moment prominent in the public eye.

15. His Highness the Sultan has finally decided to disallow the establishment of any banks in the Hejaz, as their procedure is against the Shara's law. He was materially assisted in making the above declaration by the local merchants, who petitioned him in this respect. These people make large sums yearly out of the exchange of rupees and Dutch guilders and the establishment of a banking house would mitigate against the profitable business done in this respect.

16. From a religious point of view the Wahabis are becoming more exacting as time goes on. In Mecca several regrettable incidents have occurred, one of which ended in the victim's death. It appears that the victim, an Egyptian chauffeur, was sitting at a coffee shop near the Holy Mosque when a Wahabi, dressed as all Wahabis are, came along and plucked the cigarette from his mouth and started belying him with a stick. The Egyptian resented this treatment, and a bout of fisticuffs ensued, in which the original aggressor received a black eye and other minor injuries. It was not till the parties had been separated and quietened that it was discovered that the aggressor was the grandson of Abdul Wahab, the founder of the faith. As he is a particularly holy man, the chauffeur was taken before the Grand Cadi, who ordered him to be flogged, with the result above stated. Further, four pilgrims, Afghans, went out to the "Jebel-el-Nur," where Mohammed had once hidden from his aggressors, and as they prayed they were fired upon by some Akhwan, who slightly wounded two of them. Several further incidents of a minor nature have occurred, and unless some action is taken by the Sultan to stop these persecutions it will be difficult for him to reconcile the above incidents with his assurances of full religious freedom and safety to pilgrims. In this respect he recently sent to this agency a telegram addressed to the authorities at Singapore, stating that he guaranteed the safety and religious freedom of all who came on the pilgrimage. This action was taken on receipt of a telegram from the Nemazee shipping people, who stated that pilgrims were hanging back on account of the dangers of the pilgrimage.

In Jeddah, also, their strictness is becoming manifest. It may not be generally known that here is the Tomb of Eve, "the mother of the world." The grave is some 200 yards long and some 4 yards wide and has in the middle a small mosque, where formerly, on payment of a few piastres baksheish, the keeper of the edifice would lift a flagstone from the centre of the floor to allow sceptical Christians and pious Moslems an opportunity of admiring the lady's navel. This tomb, until orders were issued to the contrary, used to be the favourite resort of childless wives and languishing maidens, but now has been closed under royal irade and anybody frequenting the place is punished.

17. Owing to the more settled conditions in the Hejaz pilgrims have already begun to arrive, and some 2,000 have come from India, Java and Singapore. On the arrival of the steamship "Alavi" with 360 pilgrims on board, the local authorities, despite the fact that the ship had passed through the quarantine at

Kamaram and had no illness on board, placed the ship and pilgrims in quarantine for twenty-four hours. This action on their part was quite unnecessary and represented but a show of authority. In company with the Dutch consul a protest was made against this action, but no satisfaction was obtained till I telephoned to the Sultan direct, who thereupon ordered the ship to be released and later issued instructions that no ships passing any recognised quarantine station and proceeding direct therefrom to Jeddah would undergo quarantine locally unless illness had manifested itself on board after the ship's departure from the quarantine station. Even then if the foreign representative of the nationality of the ship required, the ship would be sent back to the nearest quarantine station. He also requested to become a signatory of the International Sanitary Convention, and desires to send a delegate to the conference to be held in Paris about May next.

Such actions on the part of Ibn Saud show his general disposition towards better relations with foreign Powers and a desire for more modern methods in the Hejaz, and would appear to deserve seconding as far as is practicable.

18. The condenser question has finally been settled, and the firm of Messrs. Mirrlees, Watson and Co. have agreed to have it constructed and working by the 15th May, which will go far towards securing the comfort of the pilgrims on their return from Mecca about the end of June and whilst awaiting shipment to their homes.

19. The Hejaz authorities have also placed a contract with the Royal Mint for the supply of 1 million each of 1 piastre, $\frac{1}{2}$ piastre and $\frac{1}{4}$ piastre pieces of cupro-nickel, to replace the various small coins at present in circulation in the Hejaz. This will tend to restrict the thieving methods of local money-changers who, on account of the multiplicity of currencies employed, have no trouble whatever in confounding and robbing pilgrims who wish to change their rupees or guilders.

20. During the period under report three slaves have taken refuge at this agency and been sent to the Sudan.

21. Enclosure No. 2 to this report is an article published in the "Umm-al-Kura" under the heading of security, and details the instructions given to the sheikhs of the tribes of the Hejaz.

22. Zakaria Khan, the self-styled Afghan consul, left for Bombay en route to Afghanistan a few days ago.

S. R. JORDAN.

Enclosure 2 in No. 112.

Extract from the Mecca Newspaper "Umm-al-Kura," No. 60, dated 6th Sha'ban, 1344 (February 19, 1926).

DELEGATION OF IDRISSEI.

A DELEGATION from El Sayed Hassan-el-Idrissi under the presidency of Mohammed Bin Hadi-el-Naami reached Mecca to meet His Majesty the King. The delegation were guests of the King.

It reached us that the delegation have offered obedience and submission in the name of Syed Hassan to His Majesty the King and that they are prepared to receive any order he gives them. His Majesty answered them in the following summary:—

"We have no ambition in your country. I only want to make good and set the thing right. You will realise that the question of your country is rather important in my eye owing to the fact that it is near to our boundaries. There is nothing between Imam Yahya and us except friendship. I think it better that we should endeavour to make reconciliation between you and to avoid bloodshed. As to the conditions which should be between us, we will offer them to you to convey to Sayed Hassan in order that agreement will be made on them.

"You must know that our only objects in any one of the Arab countries are (1) to be Moslem brothers and to follow the 'Koran' and the traditions of the Prophet and the course of the good ancestors and the four Imams; (2) to co-operate for obeying God and to be pious, and leave the dispute which leads us to weakness; (3) to keep to our limits, dealings and the rights of our subjects. The one who is capable of doing so deserves to keep his territory, but as regards the weak, we will discuss his matter, bring about peace and prevent dispute."

Enclosure 3 in 112.

Extract from the Mecca Newspaper "Umm-al-Kura," No. 60, dated 6th Sha'ban, 1344 (February 19, 1926).

SECURITY IN THE HEJAZ.

HIS Majesty the King has summoned all the chiefs of the Hejaz tribes (Harb, Juheina, Billi and others).

They all came at the end of the month of Rajab. His Majesty the King saw them in his house and advised them. He then divided the roads in the Hejaz to different parts, making limits for each part, and caused each one of the sheikhs to guarantee the security within his region and will be held responsible for his tribe, and will have to answer for any offence or contradictory action made by him or by one of his men.

His Majesty the King gave them the following instructions:—

1. To follow and keep to the Islamic Shara'a law.
2. To pay the alms in time to the representative of His Majesty for everything for which alms are due, like camels, sheep, corn, palm-trees, &c.
3. To make the "Jihad" (holy war for the sake of God) and to hasten to join other Moslems for same as soon as they receive the order from His Majesty the King.
4. To protect the travellers, whether they are pilgrims, camelmen or passers-by, &c., and not to cause any travellers, pilgrims or others to pay them anything, other former rights being cancelled, and that they are to take only what His Majesty the King graciously gives them from "Beit-al-Mal" (treasury) of the Moslems as he gives others of his subjects, and that the enemy of the Moslems is their enemy and the friend of the Moslems their friend. They swore by God to do accordingly.

[E 2065/415/91]

No. 113.

Acting Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 23.)
Sir,

Jeddah, March 4, 1926.

WITH reference to Foreign Office telegram No. 14 of the 4th February last, concerning the visit of H.M.S. "Emerald" to Jeddah, I have the honour to state that H.M.S. "Emerald" arrived in Jeddah on the morning of the 1st instant. I proceeded on board immediately, and afterwards accompanied Captain Mackenzie to the King's residence.

2. The captain invited His Majesty, who had arrived from Mecca that morning, to visit the ship. The King accepted this invitation and proceeded on board the same afternoon accompanied by Captain Mackenzie and myself. With the King was his third son Mohammed, the Governor of Jeddah, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and many Jeddah and Mecca notables.

3. Upon His Majesty's arrival on board H.M.S. "Emerald," and as it was by then the hour of prayer, the quarter deck was cleared and His Majesty and his followers performed their religious devotions.

4. Afterwards the whole party was shown over the ship and His Majesty expressed great admiration and astonishment at such a wonderful ship, and was so interested in all that he saw that he did not hesitate to accept an invitation to see the boilers and machinery, though warned of the heat and oil.

5. After the inspection of the ship Captain Mackenzie provided tea for the King and other guests, and took the opportunity of presenting His Majesty with a clock from himself and officers of H.M.S. "Emerald" as a souvenir of His Majesty's visit to the ship. The party thereupon returned ashore having been on board some two and a half hours.

6. The following morning the King's second son Feisal and his youngest son Mansour, a child of four years, proceeded on board with a further party of notables and thoroughly examined the ship. Captain Mackenzie kindly issued invitations to my

foreign colleagues and the European community to visit the ship and take tea with himself and the officers of the ward room in the afternoon.

7. In the evening His Majesty the King invited the captain and officers of the ship to a banquet. The members of the British community were also invited. After dinner His Majesty presented swords to Captain Mackenzie, the ship's commander and the engineer commander, and a gold watch to the officer in charge of signals.

8. The following morning, Wednesday, at the request of His Majesty, the Emir Abdullah, his brother, was shown over the ship. He, too, was delighted with all he saw and could find no words to express his astonishment.

9. H.M.S. "Emerald" eventually sailed from Jeddah at 1 P.M. on Wednesday after a stay of just over forty-eight hours.

10. I would most respectfully bring to your notice the most efficient and charming manner in which Captain Mackenzie and the officers of H.M.S. "Emerald" carried out the arrangements for His Majesty's visit, who on several occasions expressed to me his pleasure and satisfaction at having had the opportunity of visiting such a wonderful ship and of meeting such a number of officers of His Majesty's navy. His Majesty reiterated his thanks many times, and I am of the opinion that the visit of this ship has served to further cement the close friendship existing between His Majesty's Government and the King and Sultan Abdul Aziz.

I have, &c.

S. R. JORDAN.

[E 2066/7/91]

No. 114.

Acting Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 25.)

Sir,

Jeddah, March 4, 1926.

WITH reference to Foreign Office telegram No. 25 of the 25th February last relative to the recognition of Ibn Saud as the King of the Hejaz, I have the honour to state that I took the opportunity of informing the Sultan of his recognition by His Majesty's Government as King of the Hejaz on the occasion of the visit of H.M.S. "Emerald."

2. I attach hereto a copy of the letter addressed to His Majesty in pursuance of your telegram above quoted, together with a translation of his reply thereto.

3. As will be seen from the translation of His Majesty's reply, this act of formal recognition by His Britannic Majesty's Government afforded His Majesty great pleasure.

I have, &c.

S. R. JORDAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 114.

Copy of Letter from the Acting British Agent and Consul, Jeddah, to His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd, No. 146 M. of March 1, 1926.

(After respects.)

I HAVE the honour to inform your Majesty that I have been instructed by His Britannic Majesty's Government to acquaint your Majesty with the fact that His Britannic Majesty's Government now recognise your Majesty as King of the Hejaz.

I am, however, to add that His Majesty's Government, while thus recognising your Majesty's authority over the Hejaz, continue to regard the régime of the Holy Places of Islam and all religious questions connected therewith as matters solely concerning Moslems, regarding which His Majesty's Government neither ought nor desire to express an opinion.

Compliments.

Enclosure 2 in No. 114.

Translation of a Letter from Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdul Rahman-al-Faisal-al-Saud, King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd, to the Acting British Agent and Consul, Jeddah, No. 78, dated 18th Sha'ban, 1344 (March 3, 1926).

(After greetings.)

I BEG to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated the 1st March, 1926, communicating the recognition of His Britannic Majesty's Government to the effect that we are King over the Hejaz, for which I thank the British Government.

There is no doubt that the old relations between myself and the British Government will be strengthened on a steadfast foundation and strong base which will guarantee to maintain the independence of such a holy country.

I, who still keep amongst my ribs (i.e., in my heart) the highest and noblest sympathy, affection and respect (for His Majesty's Government), seize this good opportunity and offer to His Britannic Majesty's Government my truly great thanks and gratefulness.

With best respects.

[E 2067/48/91]

No. 115.

Acting Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 26.)

Sir,

Jeddah, March 5, 1926.

WITH reference to Foreign Office telegram No. 24 of the 24th February last, relative to a tribal raid into Transjordan, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the letter addressed to His Majesty Abdul Aziz together with a copy of His Majesty's reply thereto.

2. A copy of this despatch and enclosures is being sent to Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

S. R. JORDAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 115.

Copy of Letter from the Acting British Agent and Consul, Jeddah, to His Highness Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdul Rahman-al-Faisal-al-Saud, Sultan of Nejd, dated February 26, 1926.

(After respects.)

I AM directed by His Britannic Majesty's Government to inform your Highness that on the 17th January last a raiding party composed of about 450 Bedouin of your Highness's subjects raided the Hajaya-Mannain Arabs encamped between Bayer and El Hisa in Transjordanian territory.

There were casualties on both sides, and a number of animals were looted.

The raiding party was distributed under four standards, Sheikhs (1) Ikreyim-bin-Saud Ateya, (2) Enad-bin-Saud Ijmain, (3) Ahmed-bin-Saud Farhan, and (4) Sayyah-bin-Saud Mutain.

The last-named belongs to the Aneiza, and the remainder to Bani Atiyeh.

The raiders' intentions were to attack the Bani Sakhr tribesmen, and it is reported that while the Wahabi Governor of Hail endeavoured to prevent the raiders carrying out their projects, the Governor of Jauf encouraged the raid.

The tribesmen in Transjordan are apprehensive of further raids, and I am to request your Highness to take steps to punish these raiders immediately, thereby discouraging this objectionable practice in the future.

(Compliments.)

Enclosure 2 in No. 115.

Translation of Letter from the Hejaz Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Acting British Agent and Consul, Jeddah, No. 90, dated 18th Sha'ban, 1344 (March 3, 1926).

(After respects.)

HIS Majesty my Lord the King has ordered me to inform you that he has received your letter No. 141 of the 26th February, 1926, regarding the raids against the Transjordanian tribes.

We do not know the names mentioned in your letter, and who were said to have made the attacks against the Transjordanian tribes. Therefore we are in doubt about the correctness of the news related about those accidents.

The Amir of Hail, Abdul Aziz-bin-Musaid, wrote to His Majesty on 25.6.44 to say that Dagah Abu Tayah and Nawaf-el-Awagi their neighbour of Eniza have raided a party of Shararat near El Hawga and captured three of their camels and killed their owners. They again attacked Karim-bin-Ateya and captured some of his camels. Then Karim-bin-Ateya followed them to take back his camels. We have received no further news about him until now. Ends.

To-day we received a telegram from the Amir of El Ula, and we enclose a copy for your perusal, and from which you will know the fact. Nothing has happened besides this.

As to the accusation against the Amir of El Jauf, it is not correct at all, because the mentioned man has no connection with those people, and their reference is the Amir of Hail.

The actions made by the Transjordanian tribes against our tribes should not be overlooked. The Government of Transjordan wished by such complaint to hide the bad actions of its tribes.

Now we cannot keep silent in respect of such actions and would rather pressing request the matter to be considered, the things looted to be returned to their owners, and the transgressors to be punished in compliance with the Hadda agreement.

(With respects.)

Enclosure 3 in No. 115.

Copy of Telegram to His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd.

(Translation.)

El Ula, 18.8.1344 (March 3, 1926).

I BEG to submit to your Majesty that to-day Nafar-el-Fuqara taken [? attacked] with party of Sukhur called El Zubbun came to us.

Ibn Gazi-bin-Abtan and Mohammed-bin-Oadah-el-Datayah took [? attacked] them. They captured from them thirteen [? sticks]; and Oadah-el-Atnah took [? attacked] El Shararat, capturing six "Azwad." They took them between Teymah and El Jauf.

Those who have done this action is [? Safhah] of Ma'an. They took them on 7.8.1344.

The slave,
IBN NOWEISER.

[E 2068/2068/91]

No. 116.

Acting Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 27.)

Sir,

Jeddah, March 9, 1926.

WITH reference to Foreign Office telegram No. 33 of the 23rd September, 1924, relative to the massacres at Taif, I have the honour to report that I have, since the surrender of Jeddah, been collecting and collating the evidence as to the guilty parties and the claims of the British subjects who suffered at the hands of the invaders.

2. Owing to the difficulty of getting into touch with these people, many of whom are in either Mecca or Taif, I have not yet finished this task.

3. The local authorities, however, hearing no doubt of the activities of this agency, have now published in the "Umm-al-Kura," the Mecca newspaper, an article under the heading of "Compensation for the Refugees of Taif," a translation of which is enclosed herewith.

4. This article, which is an open admission of guilt on the part of the Wahabis, states that His Majesty has ordered that a committee be appointed to investigate and assess the damages sustained by everybody, irrespective of nationality, in order that they may receive compensation.

5. His Majesty has no doubt been forced to take this action for two reasons: Firstly, to prevent a full investigation of the atrocities committed; and secondly, to avoid anything in the nature of foreign interference.

6. Whilst His Majesty's Government are greatly concerned for the welfare of His Majesty's subjects in foreign States, and are, at the same time, anxious to avoid interference in Hejaz affairs or anything that may be construed as such, I would most respectfully suggest that a communication couched in terms similar to the following might have the effect of both obtaining compensation for damages or loss of life suffered by His Majesty's subjects, and also show to Ibn Saud His Majesty's Government are desirous of not interfering unless such should be warranted by an injustice to His Majesty's subjects residing within his domains:—

"His Majesty's Government learn with pleasure of the action taken by your Majesty in appointing a committee to assess and compensate the victims of the Taif atrocities. His Majesty's Government will follow with the closest interest and attention the results of the work of the committee appointed by your Majesty as far as it concerns the compensation of the families of the British subjects murdered at Taif and the compensation of the British residents who lost much goods and jewellery during that most regrettable occurrence, and would urge your Majesty to expedite the work of this committee, as many of the British subjects affected thereby are at present living in great poverty.

"His Britannic Majesty's representative in Jeddah has been instructed to afford the committee appointed by your Majesty every facility to inspect the claims of the various British subjects, the majority of which has already been submitted to him.

"In conclusion, His Majesty's Government would be pleased to receive from your Majesty a list of the British subjects who have received compensation in respect of damages suffered at Taif."

7. I understand from my Dutch colleague that he is taking action on similar lines.

8. Copies of this despatch have been forwarded to India and Singapore.

I have, &c.

S. R. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 116.

Extract from the Mecca Newspaper "Umm-al-Kura."

COMPENSATION FOR THE SUFFERERS OF TAIF.

(Translation.)

WE have published more than once what impression the accident of Taif has made in His Majesty the King's soul, and that it took place in an hour of anarchy, when everything was mixed up and in a state of disorder.

Nothing has deterred His Majesty the King from advancing towards Mecca and Jeddah except his fear lest an hour like that of Taif might occur.

When His Majesty arrived the war was still going on, and it was not possible at that time to look into the matter with a view to avoid the difficulties of the calamities usually caused by war.

When everything was put in order and the war was ended, His Majesty the King kindly thought of the sufferers of Taif and gave orders for a committee to be appointed to decide the losses which have occurred in order to compensate the sufferers of whatever nationality they may be.

We pray God may cause happiness and prosperity to continually reign over this country after this day, and that it may not see any further mishap or calamity.

[E 2069/7/91]

No. 117.

Acting Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 28.)

Sir,

Jeddah, March 9, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith an extract from the Mecca paper "Umm-al-Qura," giving the text of the letter received from the Soviet representative in Jeddah communicating the Soviet Government's recognition of Sultan Abdul Aziz as King of the Hejaz, and which was notified in writing to His Majesty on the 16th February last.

2. I am informed confidentially that the Soviet representative verbally requested Ibn Saud to consider the Soviet Government's recognition as confidential until His Britannic Majesty's Government had notified him of their recognition of His Majesty.

3. This arrangement, however, no doubt caused the anxiety to Ibn Saud as reported in my telegram No. 23 of the 24th February.

4. The French consul in Jeddah also informed Ibn Saud verbally of the recognition of the French Republic on the 2nd, as did also the Italian consul, but neither of which to date have been confirmed in writing.

I have, &c.

S. R. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 117.

Extract from the Mecca Newspaper "Umm-al-Qura."

RECOGNITION FROM FOREIGN POWERS FOR ABDUL AZIZ AS KING OF THE HEJAZ
AND SULTAN OF NEJD AND ITS DEPENDENCIES.

THE King has received on 3.8.1344 the following letter from the Russian agent and consul:—

"His Majesty the King of the Hejaz
and Sultan of Nejd and its Dependencies.

"(After greetings and respects.)

"Supported by the order of my Government, I have the honour to inform your Majesty that the Government of the Soviet Republic, according to the fundamental principle regarding the independence and the freedom of nations, and in regard to the will of the Hejaz people shown in their 'bayat' to your Majesty as King over the Hejaz, recognise your Majesty as King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd and its dependencies.

"Therefore the Soviet Government consider themselves in suitable convenient political state with your Majesty's Government.

"In conclusion, please accept my best respects.

"KARIM KHAKIMOFF,

"Soviet Agent and Consul-General, Jeddah.

"3.8.44 (February 16, 1926)."

[E 2071/48/91]

No. 118.

Acting Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 30.)

Sir,

Jeddah, March 10, 1926.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 26 of the 5th instant concerning the raids into Transjordan, I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a further communication received from Ibn Saud on this question.

2. His Majesty has on several occasions recently expressed an opinion that the raids conducted from Transjordan are deliberately inspired to create trouble between Great Britain and Nejd, and he requests that immediate action may be

taken to prevent further regrettable occurrences, otherwise it will be impossible for him to restrain the tribes under his care from taking retaliatory measures.

3. A copy of this despatch is being sent to Jerusalem.

I have, &c.

S. R. JORDAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 118.

Translation of Letter from Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdul Rahman-al-Faisal-al-Saud to the Acting British Agent and Consul, Jeddah, No. 112, dated 23rd Sha'ban, 1344 (March 8, 1926).

(After respects.)

I HAVE written to you about the raids made by the tribes of Transjordan, and I have sent you the telegram received from our Amir at El Ula.

We have to-day received another telegram confirming the occurrence of the previous raids and mentioning some other incidents that occurred by those tribes. You will find the details in the attached telegram.

Such incidents have occurred in such a dreadful manner that indicates that there are some people working from behind administering these operations and pushing the mentioned tribes to make the attacks.

I am afraid that such incidents may provoke our tribes, who will then take revenge against those who attacked them, and consequently the security at the frontiers will be affected which we are afraid of.

Therefore, I most pressing request that the transgressors should be punished and the looted properties returned to their owners. Otherwise I cannot bear the responsibility of any incident that may occur, and you know the nature of the Arabs.

(With respects.)

Enclosure 2 in No. 118.

Translation of Telegram to the King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd.

(Reply.)

No. 82. I beg to submit to your Majesty that I have ascertained the matter and found it true and certain. Those who were taken [?attacked] have gone to Ibn Messaid. Those who took [?attacked] them are Hamad-bin-Jazi and Mohammed-bin-Kadah Abu Tayeh. Atna Kawin alone took six groups of camels and Daabesh took five groups alone.

Do not be worried, my Lord.

The slave,

IBN NOWEISER.

No. 119.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Jordan (Jeddah).

(No. 33.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, April 1, 1926.

MY telegram No. 22 of 19th February: Quarantine arrangements for 1926 pilgrimage, last paragraph.

Desire of Ibn Saud to be represented at Paris Sanitary Conference and to sign International Quarantine Convention was brought by His Majesty's Embassy at Paris to notice of French Government, who have telegraphed invitation to Ibn Saud through your French colleague and intimate that there will be no objection to signature.

You should inform Ibn Saud accordingly, making it clear that action of French Government was consequent on our suggestion.

It may interest Ibn Saud to know that Mr. Bullard will be a member of the British delegation.

No. 120.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Jordan (Jeddah).

(No. 35.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, April 6, 1926.

PLEASE inform Ibn Saud that His Majesty's Government have had under consideration the report of Sir G. Clayton on his mission.

They have thus learnt of His Majesty's desire for the revision of the treaty of 1916. They realise that since that date the circumstances have changed and that certain of the articles of that treaty are no longer appropriate. His Majesty's Government therefore will be prepared to discuss the question of treaty revision, and hope shortly to address a further communication of the subject to Ibn Saud.

The attention of His Majesty's Government has also been drawn to the correspondence between Ibn Saud and Sir G. Clayton regarding the protection of Nejdian interests in Damascus by His Majesty's consul. They do not desire to raise any objection to His Majesty entering into direct communication with the French authorities in Syria through the Nejdian representative there.

With regard to proposed Nejdian delegation to India (see Clayton report, p. 46), you should explain that matter has now been satisfactorily settled in accordance with Ibn Saud's wishes.

No. 121.

Acting Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 7.)

(No. 36.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jeddah, April 6, 1926.

IN long letter Ibn Saud complains of having received no replies to his various communications *re* raids carried out against his subjects by tribes of Transjordan and Irak.

States he has been informed by the Amirs of Jauf and Hail, as well as by his father and eldest son in Riyadh, that situation is extremely critical and they cannot guarantee to hold the tribes in hand any longer.

He writes to disclaim any responsibility for actions of his people, who can no longer submit to attacks and oppressions of tribes of Transjordan and Irak, and adds that he has sent messages to all his amirs and tribal chiefs ordering them to be patient for first week in next month (about ten days' time), by which time he hopes to receive a final reply.

States also that his tribes are complaining regarding camels returned to the Dhafir, whilst those raided by them have not been returned. In this respect I have pointed out that he has not yet supplied Irak with details of Akhwan claims as requested some six weeks ago.

Copy of letter and of my reply follows by bag.

(Repeated to Bagdad, Jerusalem and Cairo.)

[E 2260/180/91]

No. 122.

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 112.)

Sir,

Damascus, March 26, 1926.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 35, Secret, of the 26th February, 1925, Noori Shaalan, Chief of the Ruala, who has just returned from Mecca, whither he had gone to pay homage to Ibn Saud, is reported to be inviting his tribesmen to embrace the tenets of Wahhabism.

2. If Ibn Saud's power is not destined to suffer any early eclipse, it will be necessary to watch attentively the spread of his influence among the tribes of the Syrian desert. Frontier lines drawn on maps across desert regions will not prevail in the end against the logic of tribal relations and dependence. Without any formal infringement of the treaties he recently signed with Sir Gilbert Clayton, Ibn Saud's influence might easily spread through the Bedouin tribes north of the frontier he has accepted. We might thus gradually find that Ibn Saud was virtually astride of our

motor and air communications, as well as the future railway and pipe-line between Irak and the Mediterranean.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 97), Amman (No. 96), Bagdad (No. 91), Beirut (No. 108) and Aleppo (No. 78).)

I have, &c.

W. A. SMART.

No. 123.

Acting Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 37.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah (via Port Sudan), April 6, 1926.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Situation in Hejaz seems to have changed considerably within the last few weeks. Nejd is becoming increasingly despotic, and there are complaints on all sides of interference with religious matters and no freedom whatever as promised. Pilgrimage will apparently be very small, as Persians have forbidden same, and there are rumours of Egypt and Syria not sending Mahmals as was at first contemplated. This, coupled with frontier incidents and anti-Wahabi propaganda abroad and in the Hejaz, seems to be affecting Ibn Saud unfavourably, and complaints in my immediately preceding telegram would appear to be admission of incapability to deal with circumstances. Whole trouble is undoubtedly lack of capable administrators to assist Sultan, as he is surrounded with adventurers and persons contaminated by previous régimes.

(Sent to Bagdad, Jerusalem and Cairo.)

No. 124.

Acting Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 8.)

(No. 38.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jeddah, April 7, 1926.

YOUR telegram No. 22.

Ibn Saud has refused French invitation to attend Sanitary Conference, pretext being lack of expert doctors and exigencies of pilgrimage season.

Attitude inexplicable, except in view of my telegram No. 37.

Despatch follows.

No. 125.

Acting Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 11.)

(No. 40.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jeddah, April 10, 1926.

MY telegram No. 38 and my despatch No. 38 of 7th April.

Efforts to secure Ibn Saud's participation at Sanitary Conference in spite of previous refusal have been successful, and he appointed Mahmoud Hamdi Bey as delegate.

No. 126.

Acting Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 13.)

(No. 41.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jeddah, April 12, 1926.

YOUR telegram No. 35.

King of the Hejaz thanks His Majesty's Government for sentiments, and states that Hejaz Government is prepared to enter into friendly negotiations for discussion of an agreement to strengthen relations between His Majesty's Government and his nation.

No. 127.

Lord Lloyd to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 14.)

(No. 140.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Cairo, April 14, 1926.

PRIME Minister informs me that Ibn Saud is making difficulties about pilgrimage, that he objects to Mahmal being accompanied by usual music and that he disclaims responsibility for consequences of anyone smoking. King was angry and contemplated possibility of not sending Mahmal.

Prime Minister does not wish to interfere with movement of some 10,000 pilgrims, and asked whether His Majesty's Government would make representations to Ibn Saud. I told him that he must state in writing exactly what he wished us to do and that I would submit request to you. I added that I could not say whether we could intervene or not.

(Repeated to Jeddah.)

[E 2496/306/91]

No. 128.

The Marquess of Crewe to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 20.)

(No. 714.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Paris presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, dated the 17th April, respecting the Hejaz Railway.

Paris, April 19, 1926.

Enclosure in No. 128.

French Ministry for Foreign Affairs to British Embassy.

PAR une note en date du 10 février 1926, l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique a bien voulu faire savoir au Ministère des Affaires étrangères que, d'après les informations transmises par le représentant britannique à Djeddah, Ibn Séoud avait exprimé le désir que des arrangements soient faits pour la mise en état et l'ouverture au trafic de la totalité du Chemin de Fer du Hedjaz.

L'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique rappelait à ce propos que le statut de ce chemin de fer était conditionné par la déclaration faite le 27 janvier 1923 au nom des Gouvernements anglais et français par M. Bompard devant la Commission économique et financière de la Conférence de Lausanne—déclaration qui prévoit la constitution à Médine d'un conseil consultatif ayant le droit de transmettre aux administrations des sections du chemin de fer se trouvant respectivement en Syrie, Palestine, Transjordanie et Hedjaz des recommandations pour l'entretien de la ligne et pour l'amélioration du trafic relatif au pèlerinage.

L'Ambassade d'Angleterre ajoutait que la constitution de ce conseil nécessitait des consultations préliminaires et un accord entre le Gouvernement britannique représentant la Palestine et la Transjordanie, le Gouvernement de la République française représentant la Syrie et Ibn Séoud en qualité de Roi de Hedjaz.

L'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique exprimait, enfin, sur les instructions du principal Secrétaire d'Etat des Affaires étrangères, le désir de savoir si le Gouvernement de la République était disposé à coopérer à cet égard avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique.

Le Ministère des Affaires étrangères a l'honneur de faire savoir à l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique qu'il estime en effet hautement désirable que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique et le Gouvernement de la République française se mettent d'accord sur la portée et les modalités d'application de la déclaration faite par M. Bompard le 27 janvier 1923. Le Gouvernement de la République française est donc tout disposé à coopérer à cet égard avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique.

Paris, le 17 avril 1926.

No. 129.

[E 2546/344/91]

Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 127.)

Sir,

Damascus, April 9, 1926.

WITH reference to Mr. Smart's despatch No. 112 of the 26th ultimo, I have the honour to report that the Damascus Arabic newspaper, "Fata-el-Arab," No. 1296 of yesterday's date, published the following news item:—

"The Bedouins and the Wahhabi faith.

"We learn that Sheikh Nuri Shaalan, the chief of the Ruwala tribe, has requested from the chiefs of the Mawali and Hadeediyn tribes, as well as from the other tribes which pitch their tents within the Syrian zone, the payment of the 'Zaka' tax, i.e., one mejidieh on each camel and half a mejidieh on each head of sheep."

2. This report of the activities of Nuri Shaalan in collecting a tax normally only paid by tributaries of Ibn Saud is very significant and may be the prelude to an important extension of Wahhabi influence.

3. It is also noteworthy that the proselytising efforts attributed above to Nuri Shaalan should be directed to tribes inhabiting regions so far north as the Hadeediyn.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 106), Bagdad (No. 99), Amman (No. 106), Beirut (No. 120) and Aleppo (No. 83).

I have, &c.

J. R. VAUGHAN-RUSSELL.

[E 2431/900/91]

No. 130.

Mr. Oliphant to Acting Consul Jordan (Jeddah).

(No. 48.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 22, 1926.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 9 of the 30th January reporting your discussions with Ibn Saud on the subject of slavery in the Hejaz.

2. The Secretary of State approves the language held by you to His Majesty in the course of these interviews.

3. Ibn Saud's attitude towards both the slave trade and domestic slavery in the Hejaz appears to be more enlightened than that of his predecessors, and offers reasonable hope that progress may be made towards the eventual abolition of slavery within his dominions. In view, however, of the opposition which will certainly be offered by slave owners in the Hejaz to any measures of reform which His Majesty may attempt to introduce, it is desirable to encourage him to proceed by gradual stages. The Secretary of State shares the view of Ibn Saud that the first object to be obtained is the complete prevention of the importation of slaves into the Hejaz and Nejd. Undoubtedly His Majesty might, if properly aided by his subordinates, be able to diminish, and possibly prevent entirely, the traffic in African slaves at present carried on by slave dealers. He may, however, have considerable difficulty in preventing the occasional sale by pilgrims of members of their family who have accompanied them on a pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina. For this reason alone, His Majesty's Government would be unwilling to abandon the right now exercised by His Majesty's agency at Jeddah to manumit and repatriate slaves. Moreover, the character of the Hejaz officials is not, unfortunately, such as to warrant the presumption that they will co-operate loyally with you in stamping out the slave traffic, even though Ibn Saud himself may be genuinely anxious to do so. Sir Austen Chamberlain cannot, therefore, agree to any diminution of the right of His Majesty's agency to manumit slaves.

4. The aim of British policy in the Hejaz should be to obtain the fullest co-operation from Ibn Saud in preventing slaves from entering his territories, while maintaining intact the right of His Majesty's agent and consul at Jeddah to manumit and repatriate any slaves who may take refuge with him. The next step would be to induce His Majesty to issue a declaration, preferably backed by the authority of a fetva by the Ulema of Mecca, condemning the practice of slavery. This declaration might conveniently embody the principles of the Cyprus Involuntary Servitude

Declaration Law of 1879, of which a copy is enclosed herein. You should, on a suitable occasion, invite Ibn Saud's attention to the provisions of this statute, which has recently been adopted *mutatis mutandis* in Tanganyika.

5. The Secretary of State desires you, therefore, to inform Ibn Saud that his conversations with you on the subject of slavery have been reported to Sir Austen Chamberlain, who has read of them with much interest, and is gratified to learn of the broadminded and statesmanlike attitude which His Majesty is adopting towards this question. The Secretary of State recognises that the abolition of slavery in a country where it has a traditional foothold must be carried out by stages, the first of which should be the abolition of the slave trade and the prohibition of the importation of slaves into the Hejaz and Nejd. The Secretary of State has fully considered Ibn Saud's plea that the right of manumission by His Majesty's agent at Jeddah should be abandoned, but he regrets that he cannot agree to this. The practice of manumission is of long standing, and is in no way derogatory to the sovereign rights of the King of the Hejaz. On the contrary, it will enable His Majesty's agent at Jeddah to assist Ibn Saud in his declared intention of stamping out the slave trade. Finally, you will emphasise to Ibn Saud the great interest which is taken in the slavery question throughout the civilised world, and especially by the League of Nations, a committee of which have in the past year been considering this very question, and point out that the League was most unfavourably impressed by the conditions existing in the Hejaz under the former Hashimite régime.

I am, &c.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

[E 2368/900/91]

Enclosure in No 130.

THE STATUTE LAWS OF CYPRUS. 19 000 1212 3
(1923 Revision.)

Involuntary Servitude.

29 of 1879.

To Remove Doubts as to the Legal Abolition of Involuntary Servitude in Cyprus, and to declare the Law in respect thereto.

ROBERT BIDDULPH.]

[December 27, 1879.

WHEREAS doubts have been expressed whether involuntary servitude in this island has been abolished in due form of law, and it is expedient that these doubts should be removed:

Be it therefore enacted:—

Involuntary servitude unlawful.

No rights arising out of involuntary servitude to be enforced.

Right of property not to be affected by alleged slavery of owner.

Penal offences against alleged slaves not excused.

Short title.

1. Involuntary servitude, except for any crime or offence whereof a person shall have been duly convicted, is hereby declared to be unlawful.

2. No rights arising out of an alleged property in the person and services of another as a slave shall be enforced by any civil or criminal court, or other authority whatsoever within this island.

3. No person who may have acquired property by his own industry, or by the exercise of any art, calling, or profession, or by inheritance, assignment, gift, or bequest, shall be dispossessed of it or prevented from taking possession of it on the ground that he or the person from whom the property may have been derived was a slave.

4. No one shall be excused from the consequences of doing any act amounting to a penal offence on the ground that the person to, upon, or against whom the act was done, was, or was believed to be in a state of slavery.

5. This law may be cited as "The Involuntary Servitude Declaration Law, 1879."

[E 2594/80/91]

No. 131.

M. de Marees van Swinderen to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 24.)

*Légation des Pays-Bas, Londres,
le 23 avril 1926.*

M. le Secrétaire d'État,

JE ne suis pas resté en défaut de transmettre en son temps au Ministre des Affaires étrangères à La Haye le contenu de la lettre que vous avez bien voulu m'adresser sous la date du 25 février écoulé, concernant la station quarantenaire de l'île de Camaran.

Le Ministre susvisé vient maintenant de me faire connaître et j'ai l'honneur de porter ci-dessous à votre connaissance le point de vue du Gouvernement néerlandais en cette question.

Le Gouvernement de la Reine a hautement apprécié l'esprit dans lequel la réponse anglaise a été rédigée, attendu qu'il appert de cette communication que le Gouvernement britannique s'est efforcé à arriver à un accord qui donnerait satisfaction aux parties.

Le Gouvernement néerlandais regrette cependant de ne pas pouvoir considérer les propositions présentement faites par le Gouvernement du Roi comme de nature à aller suffisamment au-devant des desiderata exprimés du côté néerlandais et jugés équitables par le Gouvernement de la Reine. Mais d'autre part, étant donné que la réponse britannique laisse la voie ouverte à des pourparlers ultérieurs, ce Gouvernement se flatte de l'espoir qu'il sera possible d'arriver à un règlement donnant satisfaction aux parties.

Pour le Gouvernement néerlandais, cette solution satisfaisante n'apparaît possible que si l'accord se réalise sur les points suivants, qui, à ses yeux, sont essentiels. Ces points sont déjà connus du Gouvernement britannique, mais ils sont répétés et résumés ci-dessous pour plus de clarté:

1. Pour ce qui est de la station quarantenaire de l'île de Camaran, il importe que la solution à trouver comporte l'administration internationale de la station ou bien qu'elle donne cette administration conjointement à l'Angleterre et aux Pays-Bas, sur le pied d'une parfaite égalité et sous le contrôle international de la Société des Nations. S'il paraissait, au cours des pourparlers à venir, qu'il est impossible d'arriver à un accord dans ce sens, la solution devrait consister dans l'appointement à Camaran d'un médecin néerlandais et d'un médecin anglais ou anglo-indien de même rang et placés l'un et l'autre dans une position identique.
2. Dans ce dernier cas, il faudrait que le Gouvernement ait voix au chapitre en ce qui concerne la visite des navires de pèlerins par le médecin néerlandais ou indo-néerlandais placé à la tête du personnel subalterne, en tant que le médecin néerlandais à Camaran déciderait de son propre chef, pour les navires arrivant des Indes néerlandaises, des mesures à prendre à l'égard de chacun d'eux, conformément aux instructions qui lui seront données par le Gouvernement des Indes néerlandaises dans les limites de la Convention sanitaire (si ce Gouvernement est amené à y adhérer), et sinon, selon les prescriptions établies ou à établir ultérieurement par le Gouvernement des Indes néerlandaises, prescriptions où forcément il sera tenu compte des principes essentiels de ladite Convention sanitaire.
3. La participation dans le contrôle donné au Gouvernement néerlandais en ce qui regarde l'emploi des fonds dont dispose la station quarantenaire de Camaran s'exercera de cette façon, que chaque année le budget de la station et la communication des modifications à y apporter éventuellement seront établis d'un commun accord entre les Gouvernements anglo-indien et néerlandais.
4. Les stipulations sous 2 et 3 seront fixées dans un règlement à établir d'un commun accord entre les deux Gouvernements. Il y sera convenu d'un règlement commun concernant la manière dont seront solutionnés, sur le pied de l'égalité des parties, les cas de divergence d'opinion entre les parties contractantes.

Il y a lieu, en outre, de faire observer:

1. Que la troisième phrase de l'alinéa 2 de la réponse britannique pourrait prêter à malentendu, attendu qu'il n'est pas tout à fait clair si elle se rapporte à la première ou à la seconde phrase de cet alinéa;

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N

2. Que, vu que les propositions britanniques visent, dans l'alinéa 6, sous (c), l'escale faite à Camaran par les navires de pèlerins au cours de leur voyage de retour aux Indes néerlandaises, le Gouvernement néerlandais tient à faire savoir que sur ce point il désire réserver tous ses droits.

Étant donné, enfin, que le Gouvernement néerlandais a grand intérêt à ce que le point de vue du Gouvernement britannique soit connu avant le 1^{er} mai prochain, le Jonkheer de Karnebeek serait heureux si vous pouviez me faire parvenir la réponse de votre Gouvernement dans un délai aussi rapproché que possible.

Veillez, &c.

M. DE MAREES VAN SWINDEREN.

[E 2627/367/91]

No. 132.

Acting Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 35. Secret.)

Sir,

Jeddah, March 31, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz during the period the 1st to 31st March, 1926.

2. Copies of this report are being sent to Egypt, Jerusalem (two), Bagdad, Aden, Delhi, Beirut (for Damascus) and Khartum (through Port Sudan).

I have, &c.

S. R. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 132.

Report for the Period March 1 to 31, 1926.

(Secret.)

DURING the period under report Ibn Saud has been officially recognised as King of the Hejaz by His Majesty's Government, the Soviet and French Republics and the Dutch Government. On the 1st March H.M.S. "Emerald" arrived off Jeddah, and the captain, after paying an official call on the King, who was in Jeddah at the time, invited him to visit the ship. This invitation was accepted, and the same afternoon the King, accompanied by his third son, Mohammed Hafiz Wahba, Abdullah Bey Damluji, and Kaimakam of Jeddah and many notables, went on board and were shown over the ship. The King himself took great interest in all he saw, and, after taking tea with the captain, was presented with a handsome clock by the captain and wardroom officers of the ship as a souvenir of his visit.

2. The King, accepting the gift, stated his pleasure at having had the opportunity of seeing such a wonderful ship, and cordially thanked the captain and officers for their kindness.

3. The following morning the King's second son, Feisal, visited the ship, accompanied by a further batch of Jeddah and Mecca notables, and, finally, on the third day of the "Emerald's" stay in Jeddah, and at the special request of the King, his brother, the Emir Abdullah, was shown over the ship. The "Emerald" sailed at noon, after a stay of three days in Jeddah.

4. On the evening of the second day of the "Emerald's" stay the King gave a banquet to the officers of the ship and the British residents of Jeddah.

5. The political situation during the period under report shows no great changes. The Government would appear to be concentrating all its efforts on the consolidation of the country and the safety and care of the pilgrims, coupled with a great deal of propaganda, forceful and otherwise, in an attempt to gain converts to the Wahabi faith.

6. Tyeb Hazazi, who I reported in my last despatch as the newly-appointed Rais-el-Diwan, is rumoured to be in the pay of the French Government. It is suspicious that he arrived in the Hejaz on the same ship as Major Ibrahim Depui, but I have not been able to obtain evidence in confirmation of this report. In fact, the very obvious difficulties being placed in Major Depui's way would appear to give these rumours a negative value.

7. The French consul, M. Mourey, who recently proceeded on sick leave, returned to Jeddah just before the new year, but again has had a complete breakdown

and been obliged to leave the country. Major Depui has been appointed *gérant* of the French consulate pending the arrival of M. Mourey's successor.

8. Abdullah Bey Demluji, one time King's representative and Minister for Foreign Affairs, has now lost both these titles and been recalled to Mecca, where he remains as one of the King's advisers. I consider this man as thoroughly corrupt and that he hides under his smiling and most amiable exterior a fanaticism or stupidity and stubbornness like unto only the much-abused mule of fiction.

9. The rumour to the effect that there had been a clash in Medina between the Nejdīs and the Malay pilgrims, assisted by the townsfolk, is now proved to be false, and the various telegrams sent to India in this respect were despatched by the recently-deported Khudam-ul-Haramain Committee, who were proceeding from Suez to Sanaa, and so calling at several Hejaz ports *en route*, where they distributed pamphlets calculated to create division between the Hejazi, thereby causing trouble to Ibn Saud. There is little doubt but that they will endeavour to persuade the Imam of Yemen to attack Ibn Saud and gain possession of the Holy Cities for the Orthodox Moslems and drive out the Wahabis.

10. The Bolshevik agent in Jeddah recently forwarded a telegram, ostensibly from the Moslems of Russia, suggesting that the projected conference for the choice of a Caliph should not be held in Egypt, where the Moslem delegates would be subjected to British influence, but in Mecca, where such foreign influences would be absent. My Soviet colleague, who is steadily drinking himself to death, recently obtained a medical certificate from the Dutch pilgrimage doctor to the effect that his state of health requires a change to a colder climate. This he has, I understand, already despatched to Moscow, but states locally that he intends to remain in Jeddah over the pilgrimage. He also states that as many as 30,000 Russian Moslems will be making the Haj this year by ship from the Black Sea. This figure I consider is a gross exaggeration, primarily intended to curry favour with the local authorities. No doubt suitable excuses will be forthcoming if this number do not turn up.

11. The acting Egyptian consul held a reception on the occasion of King Fuad's birthday, at which the foreign representatives and notables of Jeddah assisted. The acting consul, who is a youth from the secondary schools of Egypt, delivered a most eloquent speech, recalling all the past glories of Egypt and her future aspirations, claiming that King Fuad was the greatest of Moslem Kings and a true friend of the Hejaz, as exemplified by the many charities received from Egypt. I rather suspect that this oration was prepared in Egypt and sent down to be read on this occasion.

12. Dr. Mohammed Saleh, an Egyptian doctor attached to the quarantine at Suez, arrived from Egypt recently and proceeded to Mecca to hand over to the Sultan the forms used by the quarantine authorities in Egypt.

13. The King of the Hejaz recently received an invitation from the French Government to attend the International Sanitary Conference to be held in Paris during the month of May. I have not yet heard whom His Majesty intends to send as Hejaz delegate.

14. It is rumoured locally that a caravan of 160 camels proceeding from Mecca to Medina was robbed on the way. Too much credence cannot be placed in these reports, as many of the anti-Wahabi elements in the Hejaz seem to spend their time in manufacturing and circulating rumours of this nature. The only thing that lends colour to the rumour is the known dissatisfaction of Shereef Khalid, who, after quarrelling with the Shereef Abdullah in Transjordan, ran away and joined the Wahabis, and was actually in charge of Ibn Saud's forces at the capture of Taif and Mecca, and for some time commanded the besieging army around Jeddah. It is currently stated that it was he who persuaded Ibn Saud to attack the Hejaz, and he no doubt, after his military exploits, expected to receive suitable reward. His appointment to the Governorship of Turaba hardly fulfilled his expectations, and he is now supposed, on account of his dissatisfaction, to have instigated the robbery. The distance of Turaba from the Mecca-Medina route would appear to prevent any effective organisation of robber bands along that route, and the reported robbery probably represents but another false rumour.

15. The commercial situation shows signs of improvement, but the abuses in the customs administration learned under the Turks and perfected under the Shereefian régime still continue to a certain extent. There appears to be no particularly fixed tariff for imported goods, but it is all more or less classed under a 20 per cent. *ad valorem* tax. This gives the customs authorities an opportunity of adding any sum to the invoice value, such sums representing freight and other charges, and thus leaves an open road for corruption. But, altogether, even the

merchants in the market admit that there is a distinct improvement in the Customs Administration.

16. The duty on tobacco is fixed at 40 piastres per kilo in Jeddah, but tobacco could formerly be landed at Lith or Rabigh at a flat rate of 10 piastres per kilog. Now that the Wahabis have more or less forbidden—or perhaps I should say forcibly discouraged—smoking in the Holy City, the Mecca merchants have been sending their stocks down to Jeddah for disposal. This, of course, was detrimental to the Jeddah merchants, who protested, with the result that the old stocks in Mecca are not allowed to be dumped on the Jeddah market. Considerable losses have been incurred by the Mecca merchants on account of this embargo.

17. The details of the motor-car concession for the transportation of pilgrims between Jeddah and Mecca have at last been published in the "Umm-al-Qura," the Mecca newspaper. The usual pan-Islamism asserts itself in nearly every clause, and, until the company takes on a more definite form, British manufacturers would be well advised to stand clear from all advances other than on a strictly cash-down basis. Of the eight or nine cars which the company started to use within the last two months, four, no less, were broken down on the Jeddah-Mecca road some days back, and frantic orders for spares are being despatched every other day. The fares have been fixed at £E1 each way, plus a surtax of 20 piastres Egyptian for the Koshan or Government tax. The company recently sent two cars from Rabigh to Medina to reconnoitre a possible motor road between those towns. I understand that this party took some three days to do the distance, but report optimistically, and state that fifteen hours is all that will be necessary for the journey from Mecca to Medina after regular communication has been established.

18. The situation, in so far as concerns the religious freedom of the pilgrims and residents of the Hejaz, is becoming increasingly difficult. Many petty tyrannies, not the least of which is the fact that all barbers have been instructed not to shave the faces of pilgrims or residents completely, as this is against the orders of the Prophet. At least fifteen hairs must be left on the face. A further cause of dissension is the fact that the Department of Public Health has issued orders that all bodies, male or female, are to be examined by a doctor of the administration before burial. This, I am given to understand, will be greatly resented by all Indians and Afghans and many of the stricter sects of all Orthodox Moslems. Further, now only the Wahabi Imam is allowed to lead the evening prayer in the mosque, and where formerly thousands congregated, not more than a thousand may be seen in the mosque of an evening.

19. A further cause of trouble is that the Egyptians have been requested unofficially not to send the usual brass band with the Mahmal. What effect this may have on Egyptian opinion, if the band is suppressed, or on the Wahabis, if it accompanies the Mahmal, is still to be seen, but, either way, discontent will be manifest.

20. There is no doubt, as I stated, that Ibn Saud himself is a man with a wider outlook and more modern ideas than his fanatical followers, and though he appears at the present moment to be priest-ridden, there are still possibilities of events taking a more favourable turn as regards religious freedom. One must not lose sight of the fact that these same fanatical people are his one source of strength, and to offend them by ignoring their religion, which he himself has inculcated, and of which he is the present head, would be tantamount to suicide, but he is slowly and with subtle reasoning bringing the Wahabi ulama to a more reasonable point of view as regards the other sects of Islam. To prove this, it is but necessary to compare the actions of the Wahabis when they first captured Mecca some hundred years ago and their actions to-day, when the difference is at once manifest. No appreciation of their actions can be complete until after the pilgrimage, when their behaviour at Arafat and elsewhere will be known. Though pessimists foresee clashes between the various sects about that time, I think that it is as yet too early to judge.

21. The general situation is unchanged. Pilgrims are arriving, but slowly, which is a source of great regret to Hejazi and Wahabi alike. To date, only 9,642 have been recorded officially, but this does not include many North Africans who drift across from Suakin and Massaua, but who for the most part are practically penniless and no great source of revenue to the country. My Dutch colleague informs me that the pilgrimage has received a boost in the Dutch East Indies, and more will be arriving than was at first expected. The Indians appear nervous as to their reception, and this can hardly be wondered at in view of the propaganda which has been carried out in that country for months past.

22. A certain Emir-el-Shariat, of Bihar and Orissia, accompanied by one Syed Salih Husain, arrived on the steamship "Jehangir," and the latter particularly was most bitter about the treatment they received at Kamaran, and openly stated his intention of encouraging "civil disobedience" of all pilgrims arriving at the quarantine station. Most of the other pilgrims had no complaints to make in respect of their treatment.

23. The victims of the Taif massacre are at last to receive consideration, and Ibn Saud has appointed a committee of Mecca notables to estimate the damages sustained by each family and distribute relief to those in need of it at once. This is a step in the right direction, but it is liable to be dropped when but half completed unless the authorities are kept up to it.

24. Mr. Philby left for England in the beginning of the month, but stated before his departure that he would probably be returning about the time of the pilgrimage.

S. R. JORDAN.

[E 2623/366/91]

No. 133.

Vice-Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 36.)
Sir,

Jeddah, April 7, 1926.

WITH reference to Foreign Office telegram No. 63 addressed to His Britannic Majesty's High Commissioner in Egypt and forwarded to me, relative to the Port Sudan-Jeddah cable, I have the honour to report that I proceeded to Port Sudan in company with the two Hejaz delegates, *i.e.*, Sheikh Suleiman Gabil, for many years Mayor of Jeddah, and Abdullah Effendi Kazim, Director of Hejaz Posts and Telegraphs, on the 16th March, on board the steamship "Mansourah."

2. I enclose herewith the minutes of the various meetings held during our stay in Port Sudan, which are self-explanatory, together with a copy of the draft agreements that were finally initialled by all the delegates present, under reservation in the case of the Hejaz delegates only, who throughout showed no inclination whatever to take a decision, stating that they must first refer to the King of the Hejaz. Abdullah Effendi Kazim in particular was most obstructive and throughout showed a great disinclination to come to any agreement. This, as was clearly shown by several instances, was more from a desire to keep his own position as Director of Posts and Telegraphs inviolable, rather than from a desire to assist either his Government or a solution of the cable question.

3. Suleiman Gabil was much more helpful, and on several occasions was so annoyed at the stubbornness and stupidity shown by his fellow delegate as to quarrel with him during the course of the sessions.

4. Mr. Waterfield, of the Eastern Telegraph Company, was very helpful throughout, and greatly facilitated the work of the conference, firstly by a thorough knowledge of the cable and its requirements, and secondly by his tactful manner in explaining to the Hejaz delegates the details of the proposed new régime.

5. I returned to Jeddah by the steamship "Keneh" on the 28th-29th March.

6. Upon arrival in Jeddah the Hejaz delegates at once proceeded to Mecca to lay the agreements before the Sultan, from whom I have received no intimation of acceptance or otherwise to date. This probably is on account of the fast of Ramadan during which very little work is done by the local people.

7. I would like to take this opportunity of expressing my gratefulness to the Governor, Red Sea Province, Mr. Tippetts, for placing a room of the Governorate at our disposal and also for his helpfulness and hospitality throughout the proceedings.

8. I shall not fail to inform you of His Majesty's reply as soon as I receive a reply from the Hejaz authorities.

9. A copy of this despatch and of its enclosures is being sent to the High Commissioner for Egypt, Cairo.

I have, &c.

S. R. JORDAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 133.

Port Sudan-Jeddah Cable Agreement.

(Draft Agreement.)

WHEREAS it has this day been agreed between the Sudan Government on the one part and the Hejaz Government on the other part, and His Britannic Majesty's Government as a third and assenting party, as follows:—

1. That the cable formerly known as the Jeddah-Suakin cable and now known as the Port Sudan-Jeddah cable shall become, as from the 1st day of January, 1926, the joint property of the Sudan and Hejaz Governments.
2. That the unexpended balance standing to the credit of the cable account as at the 31st December, 1925, as shown by the statements prepared and certified by the Sudan Government, shall be divided equally between the Sudan and Hejaz Governments.
3. That the parties to this agreement shall, in order to facilitate the better working of the cable, authorise the Eastern Telegraph Company (Limited) to work and maintain the cable communication between Jeddah and Port Sudan, under an agreement to be concluded between that company and the Sudan and Hejaz Governments jointly.
4. That, as from the 1st January, 1926, until such date as the cable is taken over by the Eastern Telegraph Company (Limited), the Hejaz Government undertakes to settle all sums due by that Government in respect of messages transmitted via Port Sudan during this period, or such sums shall be deducted from the half share of the unexpended balance payable to the Hejaz Government under this agreement.

Enclosure 2 in No. 133.

(Draft Agreement.)

WHEREAS it has this day been agreed between the Sudan and the Hejaz Governments, hereafter called the Joint Owners on the one part and the Eastern Telegraph Company, hereafter called the Company, on the other part, as follows:—

1. That both terminals of the Port Sudan-Jeddah cable, hereafter called the cable, shall be worked and the cable maintained by the company free of charge to the joint owners for a period of twenty-five years.
2. That this agreement shall be subject to two years' notice of termination after the first two years by either of the parties to this agreement.
3. The company undertakes not to charge more than 1 fr. 50 c. gold for each word transmitted over the cable, including both terminal charges, and of this charge 1 fr. 25 c. gold shall be retained by the company, who will deal directly with the public in Port Sudan, and the balance of 25 centimes gold shall be paid to the Hejaz Government in respect of services in dealing directly with the public in Jeddah.
4. The Company agrees to accept half the cable rate in respect of all Sudan and Hejaz Government telegrams transmitted over the cable.
5. The charges and/or apportionment as set out in article 3 shall be liable to revision after a period of two years as from the date of this agreement.
6. Should circumstances arise necessitating additional telegraphic facilities, wireless or otherwise, in the territories of the Hejaz, the Hejaz Government undertakes to give the company the first refusal for the supply and working for such additional communications.
7. The Sudan Government undertakes not to use wireless between the Sudan and the Hejaz in competition with the cable.
8. The Hejaz Government undertakes not to use wireless between the Hejaz and foreign stations in competition with the cable.
9. The Hejaz Government undertakes to accord the company suitable offices in Jeddah free of charge.
10. The Hejaz Government agrees to allow the importation into the Hejaz territories, free of duty, all material required for the maintenance of the company's offices and staff quarters.
11. The Hejaz Government agrees to exempt from sanitary, harbour or other dues any cable ship of the company entering Hejaz waters and to allow the free importation of all materials landed for the repair or extension of the cable.

12. The Hejaz Government agrees that the company shall have no direct dealing with the public in the Hejaz, this service being performed by the Hejaz Postal and Telegraph Administration.

13. The company agrees to hand back the cable to the joint owners upon the termination of this agreement in good order, having regard to the present condition of the cable.

14. Nothing in this agreement shall absolve the company from paying 25 centimes gold per word for all messages to or from the Hejaz passing over Sudan Government telegraph.

[E 2761/1244/91]

No. 134.

INTER-DEPARTMENTAL PILGRIMAGE QUARANTINE COMMITTEE.

Minutes of the 29th Meeting, held at the Foreign Office on Thursday, April 29, 1926, at 3 P.M.

Present:

Mr. J. MURRAY, C.M.G., Foreign Office (*in the chair*).

Mr. P. J. PATRICK, India Office.

Major H. W. YOUNG, C.M.G., D.S.O., Colonial Office.

Mr. J. S. HENDERSON, Ministry of Health.

Mr. V. A. L. MALLET, Foreign Office (*Secretary*).

Mr. C. L. Stocks, Treasury; Commander F. A. P. Williams-Freeman, D.S.O., R.N., Admiralty; and Flight-Lieutenant T. W. Elmhirst, Air Ministry, were also present by invitation.

Minutes of the 28th Meeting.

The minutes of the 28th meeting were confirmed.

Kamran Quarantine Station.

The Committee had before them a note from the Netherlands Minister to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, dated the 23rd April, 1926, and India Office letter to the Treasury No. E & O. 2415/26 of the 24th April, 1926.

MR. MURRAY explained that the rejection by the Netherlands Government of the proposals contained in Sir Austen Chamberlain's note of the 25th February, 1926, and the alternative proposals now put forward in M. van Swinderen's note had created a new situation. It was important that a *modus vivendi* should be reached with the Netherlands Government before the meeting of the International Sanitary Conference at Paris on the 10th May. Before considering how far His Majesty's Government might go towards meeting the Dutch proposals, it was necessary to decide to what extent any form of international or Anglo-Dutch control in Kamran would be compatible with the strategical requirements of the Admiralty and Air Ministry. It had been made clear to the Netherlands Government in Sir Austen Chamberlain's note of the 25th February that the civil administration of the island was to be treated as a thing apart from the actual management of the quarantine station. In his reply, M. van Swinderen had not alluded to this point, but his proposals appeared to refer to the quarantine station only, and not to the whole island.

MR. PATRICK stated that, apart from the staff of the quarantine station, there were roughly 1,500 native inhabitants of the island in the year 1917. No later information is available. If the administration now vested in the hands of an officer appointed from Aden were to be withdrawn, provision would have to be made for the control of these inhabitants with a view to adequate protection of the quarantine station itself. The revenues raised in the island apart from quarantine dues would not, however, suffice for the needs of the administration; some subsidy from quarantine dues or elsewhere would be necessary to keep the administration solvent.

Mr. MURRAY said that it seemed clear that His Majesty's Government could not admit the Dutch to any share in the territorial control of the island. This must be kept apart from the management of the quarantine station.

COMMANDER WILLIAMS-FREEMAN explained that Kamaran would, in certain circumstances, be of great importance to the Admiralty, and they desired, therefore, that complete British control of the anchorages and approaches should be retained. They would, therefore, be opposed to any proposal to hand over the administration of the island to an international body.

FLIGHT-LIEUTENANT ELMHIRST explained that there was already an aerodrome on the island, the use of which the Air Ministry would like to retain unless political conditions necessitated its abandonment.

Mr. MURRAY said that the important thing appeared to be to prevent any other Power from obtaining a footing in Kamaran Island.

MAJOR YOUNG enquired whether it was proposed that the administration of Kamaran should continue to be subordinate to Aden, and mentioned that the Secretary of State for the Colonies was, he believed, in communication with the Secretary of State for India on the subject of the future control of Aden.

Mr. PATRICK thought that the Government of India might be unwilling to continue to be responsible for the administration of Kamaran, through Aden if the quarantine station were placed under some other authority; such a situation was not contemplated in their letter of the 1st April. The India Office had, however, telegraphed to the Government of India to enquire whether, as a last resort, they would accept the third alternative proposal in M. van Swinderen's note, namely, the appointment to manage the quarantine station of Dutch and British medical officers of equal rank and on an entire equality of position to each other, in preference to international control of the quarantine station (probably by the Alexandria Board), and had asked for an answer before the 5th May.

Mr. STOCKS expressed sympathy with the Government of India view, that, as the administration of the island exists ostensibly for the safety of the quarantine station, it should be assisted financially by a contribution from the quarantine receipts.

THE COMMITTEE proceeded to consider various possible alternative ways of meeting the Netherlands Government, including a suggestion that the Sanitary and Maritime Board of Egypt should be invited to take over the running of the quarantine station. After discussion, the Committee expressed a unanimous opinion that the third alternative put forward in M. van Swinderen's note of the 23rd April would afford the most satisfactory solution. The Committee were of opinion that, in view of the short time available before the opening of the International Sanitary Conference, the negotiations with the Netherlands Government would be best carried on in Paris during the days preceding the meeting of the International Sanitary Conference. They suggested that the British delegation, assisted by the Indian delegation, should be authorised to endeavour to reach an agreement with the Dutch delegation on the following lines:—

- (1.) The administration of Kamaran Island to remain in its present relation to Aden, whatever might be the ultimate decision as to the control of Aden itself.
- (2.) The quarantine station to be managed on the principles suggested in the third alternative in M. van Swinderen's note of the 23rd April. This would in practice mean that Dutch and British or Dutch-Indian and British-Indian medical officers would work the quarantine station on a footing of absolute equality, that the Dutch medical officer would deal with matters affecting Dutch interests, and the British medical officer with matters affecting British interests. The budget would be decided by agreement between the Governments of India and of the Dutch East Indies.
- (3.) Provision to be made for a sinking fund to repay eventually to the British and Indian Exchequers the sum of £45,000, representing the deficit on the reconditioning and running of the quarantine station between 1919 and 1922. In the event of the Netherlands Government agreeing to the establishment of this sinking fund or alternatively advancing a sufficient

sum to meet the claims of both parties, His Majesty's Government and the Government of India would raise no obstacle to the balance at present in hand, amounting to about £47,500, being devoted as far as necessary to the programme of improvements in the quarantine and sanitary arrangements of the station, which were indicated in India Office letter E. and O. 2415/26 of the 24th April, and estimated to cost about £43,000.

- (4.) The administration of the island to receive annually from quarantine station funds the sum of 10,000 Rs. or such lower sum as might be agreed upon in return for the assurance of good order and public security afforded by it. The idea is that the Civil administration shall, as in the past, be self-supporting, out of local taxes and quarantine receipts, so as to impose no burden on India or Great Britain.

Mr. PATRICK explained that the India Office could not commit the Government of India to these proposals without consulting them by telegraph, and that it would therefore be undesirable to send a detailed reply on the above lines to M. van Swinderen before the consent of the Government of India had been obtained. He suggested that in any agreement ultimately reached between the British and Dutch Governments, there should be inserted a stipulation that the working of whatever system was adopted should be reviewed three years hence in the light of experience, and, if necessary, revised, it being understood that the principle of equality between the British and Dutch medical officers should remain unaffected.

MAJOR YOUNG was unable to state definitely whether, if the Colonial Office were to take over the administration of Aden from the Government of India, they would also agree to take over Kamaran.

THE COMMITTEE placed on record their opinion that the administration of Kamaran can only be satisfactorily worked from Aden.

Mr. PATRICK explained that a wireless installation was about to be erected on the island by the Government of India out of the balance in hand on the quarantine station.

Mr. STOCKS stated that the Treasury would not object to this expenditure. He pointed out that the existence of the present balance and of the claim of the British and Indian Exchequers to a refund of £44,000 might be used as a lever in bargaining with the Dutch delegation for the establishment of a sinking fund as suggested in (3). He thought it should be made clear to the Dutch that the wireless station, when erected, and the buoys placed at the approaches to the island by the Admiralty will be the property of the administration and not of the quarantine station.

THE COMMITTEE recommended that, pending the receipt of the observations of the Government of India, an *interim* reply should be addressed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to M. van Swinderen to the effect that His Majesty's Government were consulting the Government of India and hoped shortly to be in possession of their views, but that *prima facie* they were disposed to favour the third solution suggested in M. van Swinderen's note of the 23rd April, and would be glad if the Netherlands Government would authorise their delegation in Paris to discuss the details of a settlement on these lines with the members of the British and Indian delegations, who would be in Paris during the week beginning the 3rd May, attending the meetings of the Office international d'Hygiène publique.

Quarantine Measures on the Hejaz Railway.

The Committee had before them telegram No. 122 of the 19th April from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine, and Lord Plumer's reply, telegram No. 129 of the 26th April, commenting on the draft articles 143, 144 and 145 considered at the 28th meeting of the Committee.

MAJOR YOUNG explained that Lord Plumer had suggested that article 143 should begin "A quarantine station shall be established by the Mandatory Power at Maan." The Colonial Office thought that the words "by the Mandatory Power" should be omitted, as these words might be held to imply that the Maan quarantine station was actually to be set up by His Majesty's Government, whereas the intention

was that it should be administered by the Transjordan Government under British control. The Committee shared this view. Major Young stated that the idea was to make the station self-supporting and that Palestine would probably lend the necessary capital.

Major Young then read the new article 145 which had been drafted by Lord Plumer to run as follows:—

"Pending the establishment at Akaba Port of a quarantine station of an adequate capacity, pilgrims travelling from the Hejaz by the sea route to Akaba and thence by land to Maan shall be subject to the prescribed quarantine measures at Tor before disembarkation at Akaba."

THE COMMITTEE considered that this article was unnecessary and would impose a hardship upon pilgrims. There seemed no reason why pilgrims coming from Jeddah by sea to Akaba should be diverted to Tor, which would considerably lengthen their journey on board ship, when they would in any event be subjected to adequate quarantine measures on reaching Maan. It might be assumed that all pilgrims landing at Akaba would proceed to Maan in the first instance. Major Young was asked to move the Colonial Office to refer this article back to Lord Plumer with the Committee's criticism, and to suggest to him the desirability of dropping the proposal.

MAJOR YOUNG invited the Committee's attention to a letter from the French consul at Bagdad to the Acting High Commissioner for Irak dated the 20th March (Colonial Office letter No. C 7708/26 of the 17th April), in which suggestions were made for the co-ordination as between Syria, Palestine and Irak of measures for the transporting of pilgrims overland to the Hejaz.

THE COMMITTEE expressed itself in favour of the suggestion that representatives of Palestine, Irak and Syria should meet as soon as possible at either Beirut or Damascus, in order to arrange for such co-operation. Major Young was asked to move the Colonial Office to recommend this course to the High Commissioners for Irak and Palestine, and to enquire whether they had already taken any steps in the matter.

[E 2594/80/91]

No. 135.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to M. van Swinderen.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 30, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 23rd April, relative to the future administration of the quarantine station at Kamaran Island.

2. The proposals set forth therein are receiving the sympathetic consideration of His Majesty's Government, who have found it necessary to consult the Government of India on the subject by telegram. Until the views of that Government, which are expected in the near future, are available, I regret that I am unable to reply in detail to your note. Meanwhile it may be of assistance to your Government to learn that *prima facie* His Majesty's Government are disposed to favour the third alternative suggested in your note, namely, the appointment, to manage the quarantine station at Kamaran, of a Dutch medical officer and of a British or British-Indian medical officer of equal rank and on an entire equality of position towards one another.

3. His Majesty's Government are anxious to reach an arrangement acceptable to both Governments before the opening of the International Sanitary Conference at Paris on the 10th May. With a view to facilitate this, it appears desirable that the details of a settlement on the above lines should be discussed in Paris by the delegates of the two Governments before that date. If the Netherlands Government share this view I hope that they will authorise their delegates to the International Sanitary Conference to discuss the question with the British and Indian delegations who will be in Paris during the week beginning the 3rd May, in connection with the meeting of the Office international d'Hygiène publique.

I have, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[E 2735/344/91]

No. 136.

Consul-General Satow to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 1.)

(No. 75. Confidential.)

Sir,

Beirut, April 19, 1926.

WITH reference to Mr. Mayers's confidential despatch No. 60 of the 23rd March, in which he reported the arrival in Beirut of the Sherif Ali Haidar, I have the honour to report that it seems likely that this personage intends to leave for the Hejaz in the near future, probably with his son Mohamed Emin.

2. I have not made the acquaintance of Ali Haidar, nor, indeed, that of his son Abdul Medjid, who, as you know, has been here some considerable time. The latter has occasionally expressed to various people his wish to get to know me, but as he has taken no active steps in that direction and as he has been the object of some attention on the part of the French, I, for my part, did not think it incumbent upon me to make the first move, and in any case I did not wish to appear to be trespassing on French preserves.

3. However, in the course of the last few days I have twice come across him, and on one occasion when, having been inveigled into a photographic group, I found myself seated next to him, he murmured that for reasons which I understood he had to his regret not been able to get to know me, but that perhaps soon his father and brother would have to apply to me for visas.

4. Last Friday, at a reception given by the Governor of the Lebanon, Sir Ronald Storrs, who has been staying here as the private guest of M. de Jouvenel, found his acquaintance sought by Abdul Medjid, who invited him to call upon the Sherif Ali Haidar. Sir Ronald, after bringing the matter to M. de Jouvenel's knowledge and ascertaining that he had no objection and also informing me of his plans, called upon the Sherif the next morning. As Sir Ronald had no official status here, a fact which he was careful to impress upon the Sherif and his sons, he later gave me details of his interview with the family. The gist of what happened is that the Sherif expressed his intention of proceeding at an early date to Mecca, without, however, consulting Ibn Saud, in the hope that, once there, he would succeed in persuading the latter to confer upon him some official position such as he desires. He further stated that it was his earnest wish on his way to call upon His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine, which explains why my visa will be required, and also to be received by His Majesty's High Commissioner in Egypt. Sir Ronald Storrs gave non-committal replies and merely said that he would bring the matter to the notice of the proper authorities, meaning me.

5. It is therefore probable that I may shortly receive a request for a visa for Palestine from Ali Haidar and his son. I trust that His Majesty's High Commissioner, to whom I am sending a copy of this despatch, will furnish me with an expression of his wishes as to the attitude I should adopt towards such a request. As regards the Sherif's visit to Egypt, my visa is, of course, not required, but if it is desired either to facilitate or to hinder the Sherif's visit to Cairo with the avowed intention of seeking an interview with His Majesty's High Commissioner, the latter will presumably see fit to have the proper instructions sent to the Egyptian consul, who, without such instructions, might be in doubts as to how he should deal with the case.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Constantinople, Jeddah, Jerusalem and Cairo.)

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW

No. 137.

Acting Agent, Jeddah, (No. 35 M.) to High Commissioner, Bagdad.—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received May 1.)

(No. 46.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Jeddah, May 1, 1926.

YOUR telegram No. 65 S.

Ibn Saud requests that, owing to the fact that most of his dependable men are assisting him in the Hejaz, constitution of special tribunal may be delayed till the end of August. In the meantime he agrees to instruct Amir of Hail to collaborate

[15026]

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with Irak and Transjordan officials for return of loot and prevention of raids. He informs me that Amir of Hail is responsible for whole of Transjordan and Irak frontiers and all communications should be direct with him, as all other Amirs, as of Jauf and Tebuk, are subsidiary. Question of Persian Gulf may be settled with Amir of Hassa direct.

Instructions to this effect are being sent at once.
(Repeated to Jerusalem.)

No. 138.

Acting Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 51.)
(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, May 4, 1926.

YOUR telegram No. 35.

Ibn Saud urgently requests that revision of treaty to strengthen friendship between His Majesty's Government and himself may be completed before 1st June owing to approaching Moslem conference and pilgrimage and "other cogent reasons." These latter undoubtedly refer to situation between Hejaz and the Yemen.

No. 139.

Acting Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 52.)
(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, May 4, 1926.

MY telegram No. 32.

Air Force Officer and I yesterday visited Ibn Saud, who showed great anxiety to have personnel and spares required to make machines serviceable with least possible delay and requested me to order same from United Kingdom.

I informed him that officer had been sent to examine and report on aeroplanes and probable requirements for organising air service His Majesty wished to operate and that consequently I would refer matter to you.

I gather that he is apprehensive of an attack from Arabs, whom Italians are said to be arming and Ibn Saud's enemies encouraging to attack.

In view of these possibilities it might be to His Majesty's Government's advantage to second Ibn Saud and place a reliable airman such as Noakes at his disposal to organise Hejaz aircraft with aid of civilian British personnel.

My telegram [? No. 49] would appear to imply extensive purchases in near future, including war material no doubt.

Foreign countries have been making efforts to secure orders from Hejaz, and if materials required by local authorities are not supplied by His Majesty's Government he will have no difficulty in getting them elsewhere. Such an air service would also be advantageous for suppression of raiders and more fanatical tribes who are impatient of Ibn Saud's moderate policy in Hejaz.

See telegraphic report sent to Air Ministry.

[E 2918/180/91]

No. 140.

Vice-Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 43.)
Sir,

Jeddah, April 12, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to confirm my telegram No. 41 of to-day's date, and to forward herewith a copy of my letter to Ibn Saud in pursuance of your telegram No. 35 of the 6th instant, together with a copy of his reply thereto.

I have, &c.

S. R. JORDAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 140.

Copy of Letter from the Acting British Agent and Consul, Jeddah, to His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, and Sultan of Nejd, Mecca, dated April 8, 1926.

(After respects)

I AM directed to inform your Majesty that His Britannic Majesty's Government have had under consideration Sir Gilbert Clayton's report on his mission to your Majesty for the settlement of outstanding questions between His Majesty's Government and Nejd.

His Majesty's Government learned of your Majesty's desire for the revision of the treaty of 1916, and, realising that certain articles of the treaty are no longer appropriate owing to the change of circumstances since that date His Majesty's Government will be prepared to discuss the question of the revision of the treaty and hope to address a further communication to your Majesty on this subject in the near future.

The attention of His Majesty's Government has also been drawn to the correspondence between your Majesty and Sir Gilbert Clayton regarding the protection of Nejdian interests in Damascus by His Britannic Majesty's consul in that place and they do not desire to raise any objection to your Majesty entering into direct communication with the French authorities in Syria through your Majesty's representative in that country.

With reference to the Nejd delegation which your Majesty proposed to send to India, I have already informed your Majesty that this matter has been settled in accordance with your Majesty's wishes, and that there is no objection to the delegation proceeding if and when desired.

Compliments.

Enclosure 2 in No. 140.

Translation of Letter from Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdul Rahman-al-Faisal-al-Saud, Mecca, to the Acting British Agent and Consul, Jeddah, dated 27th Ramadan, 1344 (April 10, 1926).

(After respects.)

I HAVE received your letter of the 8th April, 1926, regarding the readiness of His Britannic Majesty's Government to alter the treaty of 1916, and that the present circumstances necessitate considering it. This has given me great pleasure, and it will undoubtedly make the friendly relations in future more firm and stronger.

In this connection I have to thank General Sir Gilbert Clayton for his kind efforts and for the attention given by His Britannic Majesty's Government to his opinions, which are based on experience and foresight. I do not doubt that such person is the capable one who can make the Arab and the British interests common and closely join the two nations.

The request I previously made for a special representative having no connection with the Persian Gulf to be sent in order that I may discuss with him all matters that concern the interests of the Arab and the British nations was for such purpose.

My Government is ready at any time to enter into friendly negotiations with whoever the British Government may depute for discussing an agreement to strengthen the relations between my nation and the British nation.

With best greetings.

[E 2919/48/91]

No. 141.

Vice-Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 44.)

THE acting British agent and consul, Jeddah, presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of despatch No. 247 to His Majesty's High Commissioner, Bagdad, dated the 15th April, 1926, respecting the special tribunal described in the Bahra Agreement.

Jeddah, April 15, 1926.

Enclosure 1 in No. 141.

Vice-Consul Jordan to High Commissioner for Irak.

(No. 247.)

Sir,

Jeddah, April 15, 1926.

WITH reference to your telegram of the 7th April, 1926, relative to the early constitution of the special tribunal prescribed in the Bahra Agreement, I have the honour to forward herewith a copy of my letter addressed to Ibn Saud in pursuance thereof together with a copy of his reply thereto.

2. Copies of these communications are being sent to the Foreign Office.

I have, &c.

S. R. JORDAN.

Enclosure 2 in No. 141.

Copy of Letter from the Acting British Agent and Consul, Jeddah, to His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd, Mecca, dated April 9, 1926.

(After respects.)

I HAVE been requested by His Britannic Majesty's High Commissioner in Irak to inform your Majesty that the Irak Government are anxious that the special tribunal referred to in article 2 of the Bahra Agreement should be constituted as soon as possible.

They further suggest that the tribunal should sit in Koweit, which is the neutral country most accessible for both parties, and that the presidency of the tribunal should be entrusted to a British officer.

I shall be glad if your Majesty will inform me if these suggestions are acceptable to your Majesty or if not I shall be glad to be furnished with your Majesty's views in order that I may transmit same to His Britannic Majesty's High Commissioner in Irak for communication to the Irak Government.

Compliments.

Enclosure 3 in No. 141.

Translation of Letter from Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdul Rahman-al-Faisal-al-Saud, Mecca, to the Acting British Agent and Consul, Jeddah, dated 28th Ramadan, 1344 (11.4.1926).

(After greetings.)

WE have received your letter of the 9th April, 1926, and we have no objection to agree to the request of the British High Commissioner for Irak *re* the forming of the court referred to in article 2 of the Bahra Agreement, and there is no objection for holding it in Koweit. But owing to the fact that our men are now busy in the pilgrim season, and as it is not possible now to get and collect the documents and supporting papers here and in Nejd concerning the losses and the loot we referred to in our previous letters to your Excellency. Therefore we hope that his Excellency the High Commissioner will agree to have that meeting postponed until after the pilgrim season and until careful investigations are made by our representatives deputed to the attacked places in order that correct information and accurate details may be had about the kinds and quantities of such losses which have to be enquired about in order to facilitate the required end, and to limit the cases which will be brought to the said court, and in order to be able to get to the way of solving the entangled difficulties.

Our reply to the presidency of the court being given to a British officer is to refer the application of same to what is mentioned in article 2 of the said Bahra Agreement.

With best greetings and respects.

[E 2980/155/91]

No. 142.

Vice-Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 46.)

Sir,

Jeddah, April 17, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to confirm my telegram No. 40 of the 10th instant, relative to the representation of the Hejaz Government at the Sanitary Conference to be held in Paris on the 10th May, and in continuation of my despatch No. 38 of the 7th instant, on the same subject, transmit herewith a précis of the report submitted by Munshi Ihsanullah upon his return from Mecca which covers the general situation in Mecca at the present moment.

2. Copies of this despatch and of its enclosure are being sent to India, Egypt, Bagdad, Palestine and Singapore.

I have, &c.

S. R. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 142.

Précis of Munshi Ihsanullah's Report.

I REACHED Mecca on the evening of the 5th instant and immediately visited Sheikh Hafiz Wahba and Abdullah-el-Dahlavi, two of His Majesty's chief advisers. Sheikh Hafiz was good enough to arrange for me to see His Majesty the following morning.

I saw His Majesty the King on the morning of the 6th instant, and acting upon instructions pointed out to His Majesty the false position raised by the refusal of the Hejaz to participate in the Paris Conference after having signified the desire to be represented thereat and which His Britannic Majesty's Government had been able to arrange, thereby showing a further proof of the friendly relations existing between the two countries. I also pointed out that His Britannic Majesty's Government had no axe to grind in this respect, but were desirous only of seeing the Hejaz represented in this conference as some of the questions there to be discussed concerned them closely in relation to the comfort and well-being of the pilgrims, as well as the health of the Hejaz generally.

His Majesty pointed out that there was a shortage of doctors in the Hejaz, and that in view of the approaching pilgrimage he did not feel justified in sending away one of his best men.

Eventually His Majesty agreed to reconsider his decision, and on the morning of the 7th instant sent a telegram to the French consulate cancelling his previous refusal and accepting the French Government's invitation to the conference.

After my interview with His Majesty I made as many enquiries as possible into the local state of affairs, which are taking on a new form, and I regret to have to report that His Majesty the King is coming totally under the influence of the religious fanatics and advisers brought up under the old régime.

Not only the Wahabis of Nejd but also a number of Indians who have embraced the Wahabi faith are persuading Ibn Saud to forcibly convert all who visit Mecca and to destroy tombs and all religious edifices, which they claim amount to idolatry. I learned that it is intended to demolish the four Makams of the four Imams, as well as the Makam Ibrahim, and also to demolish the minaret of the holy mosque. Also that the custom of making Umra should be abolished and the mosque of the Umra destroyed.

Needless to say, these rumours and the actions of the Wahabis of only allowing their own ulama to conduct the prayers in the holy mosque, coupled with the forcible manner in which smoking is forbidden, is breeding discontent amongst the people, and many of the pilgrims go to the holy mosque but seldom, remaining in their houses and conducting their own prayers therein for the most part.

Orders have been issued for the destruction of the Tomb of Eve at Jeddah and also for the demolition of the Dar-el-Khazran (the place where Omar the Great was converted). The birthplace of the prophet "Moulid-el-Nabi" has been destroyed, and the place is overrun with pie-dogs. Such things as this are causing much heart-burning amongst the pilgrims and all orthodox Moslems, and are not in accordance with the assurances given by His Majesty prior to his advent to the

Throne of the Hejaz. One party of Indians were actually about to leave Mecca and return to India before the pilgrimage, stating that a pilgrimage under such circumstances could not be regarded as a lawful pilgrimage.

The Dutch and Malayan pilgrims, even though the mutawwifs have been ordered to bring them to the holy mosque, refuse to go as there is no Sheikh of the Shaffi, and they consequently remain in their houses and make their devotions there. This was confirmed to me by the Dutch vice-consul.

As clearly shown by the above it is manifest that Ibn Saud has changed greatly and gone back on his many promises, as during the last year's Haj he gave orders for the rebuilding of the destroyed shrines and actually placed the contracts for this purpose.

Apparently also Ibn Saud is losing, temporarily perhaps, the firmness of character which he originally possessed, and now acts in a very undecisive manner, issuing and rescinding orders in almost the same breath.

The situation at Mecca is most unsatisfactory, and even the most fanatical Indians and non-co-operationists are now stating that it is necessary for the British Government to have a representative at Mecca to look after the pilgrims. A certain famous Indian Nationalist, one Maulvi Mohammed Said, the superintendent of the Madrassa Southiali, expressed these sentiments to me personally.

The economical situation in Mecca is also very bad, and the people have no confidence, and although there are perhaps 10,000 pilgrims in the city business is very dull and many of the larger houses which in an average season formerly sold as much as £70 or £80 per day now do not sell goods to a tenth of that value.

Hejaz for the Hejazi as was at one time the local slogan is now devoid of meaning from a religious point of view and mere empty words.

On the evening of the 8th I again went to the palace, and there I found the Nakib-el-Ishraf of Damascus alone with the King, who was delivering the following speech in my presence:—

"Everyone who comes to me warns me to be careful of the British Government, as it is said that they are working for disunity amongst the Arabs in particular and the world's Moslems in general, and that I am, in accordance with the treaty between that Government and myself, a slave in their hands. To-night is a Friday night, and the month the month of Ramadan, and I swear this night in the name of the Almighty (four time repeated) that I have never received anything from the British Government either in writing or verbally which indicates their desire for disunity amongst the Arabs, and I can prove by the letters that I have in my possession that the British Government have always tried to bring peace and prosperity to the Arabs. They also did their best to settle the dispute between Hussein and myself, but Hussein would never come to any decision, and upon this I wrote to the British Government saying that I was obliged to take the matter into my own hands, and it was the sword that settled the matter. In reply to my letter the British Government said that they would be neutral and they kept their neutrality up to the very end, and I cannot blame them. They kept their neutrality and they respect my religion, honour and independence, and I am bound by my religion to respect the treaty which exists between us by God" (repeated thrice).

During the course of the speech he also referred to the visit of the Persian consul-general, Ain-ul-Mulk, from Damascus, who came to accord recognition to His Majesty, and in this respect Ibn Saud said: "Only the other day the Persian consul-general said to me that the British were like oil on water, and no matter how much you stirred the oil and water the oil would always come to the top." Meaning that British and Arab ideals were very dissimilar and the British always wanted to be on top.

Speaking of the forces he could command, Ibn Saud said: "I am a stranger even in Nejd, and I come from a place near Aleppo, and my present tribe does not number even 5,000 fighting men, and we are the weakest of the Nejd tribes, but we are bound to Nejd by my religion and our religion has strengthened us, and I can easily put 200,000 men into the field in a short period if the necessity arises, and I can sacrifice myself and my whole nation for the cause of our religion."

[E 2981/48/91]

No. 143.

Vice-Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 48.)

THE Acting British agent and consul, Jeddah, presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of despatch No. 265, to the High Commissioner, Bagdad, dated the 20th April, respecting Irak-Nejd relations.

Jeddah, April 20, 1926.

Enclosure 1 in No. 143.

Vice-Consul Jordan to High Commissioner, Bagdad.

(No. 265.)

Jeddah, April 20, 1926.

Sir,

WITH reference to your telegrams of the 13th instant, I have the honour to confirm my telegram No. 32 of to-day's date and to forward herewith copies of my communications addressed to His Majesty the King of the Hejaz in pursuance of your telegrams above quoted, together with a copy of his reply thereto.

2. Copies of this despatch and of its enclosures are being sent to the Foreign Office.

I have, &c.

S. R. JORDAN.

Enclosure 2 in No. 143.

Vice-Consul Jordan to the King of the Hejaz.

(After respects.)

Jeddah, April 16, 1926.

WITH further reference to your Majesty's letter of the 20/9/1344 (the 3rd April, 1926), and in continuation of my letter of the 6th April, 1926, I have the honour to state that I have been requested by His Britannic Majesty's High Commissioner in Irak to inform your Majesty that the Government of Irak have issued very strict orders against raiding and is determined to stamp out this evil.

Only one instance of raiding has occurred recently and that when camels were taken from the Nakhusha. These camels have all been recovered and handed over to the messenger of Mussad.

Owing to the lack of details of the raids given in your Majesty's complaints conveyed in your Majesty's letters of the 10th Moharrem, 1344, and of the 27th Safar, 1344, it has not been possible to trace the assailants. With reference to the raids of the 25th March last against the Ibn Ashwan, every effort has been made by the Irak Government to trace Ibn Lochai, the culprit, but without success. He was for some time in Koweit, but has since disappeared.

Your Majesty will, I am sure, realise that in order to trace persons guilty of raiding fairly precise details are necessary, and His Britannic Majesty's High Commissioner in Irak is of the opinion that the best course of combating this evil would be the immediate constitution of the special tribunal as envisaged in the second article of the Bahra Agreement and the submission of all claims to that tribunal for decision.

His Britannic Majesty's High Commissioner has already suggested to your Majesty the immediate constitution of this tribunal, as conveyed in my letter of the 9th instant and now wishes to urge upon your Majesty that Irak is loyally carrying out their treaty obligations and looks to your Majesty to restrain your Majesty's subjects from acts of aggression on the excuse of the very indefinite details supplied to date.

(Compliments.)

S. R. JORDAN.

Enclosure 3 in No. 143.

Vice-Consul Jordan to the King of the Hejaz.

(After respects.)

Jeddah, April 16, 1926.

WITH reference to your Majesty's telegram of the 24th March last, sent direct to me in Port Sudan, relative to the violation of your Majesty's territories by certain tribesmen of Irak, I am now requested by His Britannic Majesty's High Commissioner in Irak to inform your Majesty that the charges set out in your Majesty's telegram under reply have been fully investigated and found to be devoid of fact.

The British officer known as Abu Hunaik has never been beyond the neutral zone, in which area he has on two occasions visited mixed Dhafir and Shammar camps.

Further, His Britannic Majesty's High Commissioner states that no encouragement whatever is given to Nejd tribesmen to migrate to Irak as the policy of Irak is just the contrary.

Ibn Suwait, mentioned in your Majesty's telegram under reply, did not accompany the British officer known as Abu Hunaik on the occasion of his last visit to the neutral zone.

Barjis-bin-Khairallah, who has for two years past, been in the Irak police, in February last visited the neutral zone accompanied by a party of police to recover stolen property and not for recruiting purposes. On this occasion also they did not cross the Nejd frontier.

His Britannic Majesty's High Commissioner for Irak considers that probably the rumour regarding recruiting may be due to the fact that several men of Shammar origin, three to be exact, who have been living in Zubair for some years past, have recently joined the Irak police.

As pointed out in my letter of to-day's date, His Britannic Majesty's High Commissioner for Irak assures your Majesty that Irak is loyally carrying out her treaty obligations, and I sincerely hope that the above explanation will serve further to convince your Majesty of the good intentions of the Irak Government to loyally abide by the Bahra Agreement.

(Compliments.)

S. R. JORDAN.

Enclosure 4 in No. 143.

Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdul Rahman-al-Feisul-al-Saud, Mecca, to the Acting British Agent and Consul, Jeddah, dated 5th Shawal, 1344 (April 18, 1926).

(Translation.)

(After respects.)

In reply to your two letters regarding the raids against our frontiers by the Irak tribesmen, I inform your Excellency that, on reading the communication from his Excellency the High Commissioner in Irak about this matter, I became quite surprised as he did not mention but a single incident or the like which he says that its doer has run away to Koweit and then disappeared.

I have to say that in making my previous complaints I was not speaking at conjecture without ascertaining the fact that our subjects have been attacked on different occasions and the exact information.

I only presume that the enquiries made by the British authorities in Irak were through people who wish to obliterate the facts or they may have another object for concealing same.

The raiding incidents referred to in my previous letters are actual and I do not doubt its being correct and by people from El Dhafir and others on a large scale.

But I am sorry that the details I asked for from our Amir at Hail and others concerned at Nejd regarding the explanation of such raids, the dates and places at which they occurred, the names of the assailants and the attacked, the quantity of loot, and all such details, have not reached me to date from our said Amir of Hail.

I have at once instructed him to collect such details from the concerned authorities and to forward same in a list direct to the High Commissioner in Irak, together with a letter which I will send to the said High Commissioner through

the mentioned Amir in order to secure the advantage of making the details reach the British authorities at Bagdad by the quickest means.

As to the matter of the British officer named Abu Hunaik and his entering the Nejd frontiers, and the one named Khairallah and his encouraging the tribesmen to emigrate, and recruiting, I beg to refer to my telegram sent to you at Port Sudan in which I only mentioned such news as received from the Amir of Hail as they are I will, however, ascertain the matter from him and will send you the most adequate details about it exactly.

In this connection I refer to my previous letter from which you might have noted that it is difficult before the pilgrim season to have a tribunal constituted in Koweit as mentioned in article 2 of the Bahra Agreement.

I am, in the meantime, glad to say that it is my earnest desire to see that peace and order are prevailing on both sides of the frontier of the two neighbouring countries and that their subjects should live a pleasant and happy life, and that the two Governments would apply the terms of the agreement quite loyally and carefully. (With respects.)

[E 2961/366/91]

No. 144.

Foreign Office to Eastern Telegraph Company, Limited.

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 14, 1926.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain to communicate to you the following information, which he has received by telegraph from the acting British agent and consul at Jeddah relative to the Jeddah-Port Sudan cable.

2. Ibn Saud has accepted the draft agreement between the Sudan and Hejaz Government and His Majesty's Government in the form agreed upon at the recent conference at Port Sudan. As regards the draft agreement between the Governments and the Eastern Telegraph Company, he suggests that articles 6 and 8 should be combined in the following manner:—

"The Hejaz Government agree not to use their own or other companies' wireless or cables for foreign communications unless the cable is out of order and pending the completion of repairs."

3. You will observe that the effect of this suggested amendment is entirely favourable to your company.

4. As regards articles 9, 10 and 12, Ibn Saud reserves his consent pending the arrival of a representative of your company with whom he can discuss the details of working arrangements and assure himself that those arrangements are not detrimental to the sovereign rights of the Hejaz. Mr. Jordan suggests that a representative of your company should be sent to Jeddah for this purpose as soon as possible, and the Secretary of State will be glad to learn whether your directors can make arrangements accordingly.

I am, &c.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

[E 3032/2068/91]

No. 145.

Vice-Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain. — (Received May 17.)

(No. 50.)

Sir,

Jeddah, April 24, 1926.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 27 (49) of the 9th March last, relative to the Taif massacres, I have the honour to state that on the 9th instant the local authorities published a notice in the Mecca newspaper to the effect that all claims in respect of losses sustained in Taif during the massacres must be in the hands of the committee before the 10th Shawal, 1344, i.e., the 23rd April, 1926.

2. As many of the British subjects who suffered during this period have since left the country and returned to their homes, I addressed a letter (copy attached) to His Majesty the King of the Hejaz to this effect, and requested a further delay of two

[15026]

P 2

months for the reception of claims from abroad. I have had no reply to date, but will not fail to communicate same to you when received.

3. I attach also a list of the claims for compensation* which have been filed at this agency to date, together with a full list of British subjects who suffered at Taif,* as far as can at present be ascertained.

4. I also attach such evidence of the guilt of the Wahabi forces as has been collected to date,* and which includes reports from the Indian pilgrimage officer, Mr. Yasin Khan, the Indian surgeon lately attached to the agency, Dr. Munir-ud-Din, and a report prepared by Munshi Ihsanullah,* employed at this agency and recently appointed permanent Indian pilgrimage officer, together with an extract from a letter received by him from one Sheikh Mohammed Sadiq Mujaddidi,* who was in Taif during the massacres.

5. The persons resident in the Hejaz, and who had previously placed their claims with this agency, were instructed to put their claims before the committee appointed by Ibn Saud, and this has in fact been done.

6. Copies of this despatch and of its enclosures have been forwarded to India and Singapore.

I have, &c.
S. R. JORDAN.

Enclosure in No. 145.

Copy of Letter from the Acting British Agent and Consul, Jeddah, to His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd, Mecca, No. 268 M. (49), dated April 22, 1926.

(After respects.)

I HAVE the honour to inform your Majesty that the article printed in the "Umm-al-Qura," of the 9th April, 1926, relative to the compensation for the losses of the victims of Taif, has been brought to my notice, and I have noted that all claims for compensation must be in the hands of the committee not later than the 10th Shawal, 1344.

I feel it my duty to inform your Majesty that many of the victims who suffered during that most regrettable incident have now left the Hejaz for India and elsewhere, and the period granted under the above-mentioned notice in the "Umm-al-Qura" is not sufficient to enable them to comply with the instructions contained therein.

Consequently, I have the honour to request that your Majesty will grant a further delay of two months for the reception of the claims of persons who suffered at Taif and who have since left the Hejaz, in order that these claims also may receive the just consideration which I know is your Majesty's desire.

(Compliments.)

[E 3034/2068/91]

No. 146.

Vice-Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 52.)

Sir,

Jeddah, April 26, 1926.

IN confirmation of my telegram No. 45 of to-day's date and in continuation of my despatch No. 50 of the 24th April, relative to the atrocities committed at Taif, I have the honour to report that Ibn Saud has agreed to allow a delay of two months for the reception of claims for compensation from abroad.

2. I enclose herewith a copy of his reply to my communication No. 268 M. of the 22nd April, a copy of which was forwarded with my despatch under reference.

3. Copies of this despatch and of its enclosure are being sent to India and Singapore.

I have, &c.
S. R. JORDAN.

* Not printed.

Enclosure in No. 146.

Translation of Letter from Abdul Aziz-bin-Abdul Rahman-al-Faisal-al-Saud, Mecca, to the Acting British Agent and Consul, Jeddah, dated 12th Shawal, 1344 (April 25, 1926).

(After respects.)

I HAVE read your letter No. 268 (49) of the 22nd April, 1926, and I found that it expresses your high feelings towards us regarding the decision we made to lighten the need of those who suffered the misfortunes in the incident of Taif when the ex-Government was withdrawing, and regarding your Excellency's wish to have the period extended and to accept the applications of the absent persons in India and elsewhere for two months.

To comply with your wishes we have no objection to accept your request in order to act according to justice and equity which we are determined to follow.

I am glad to take this opportunity and present to you my best greetings and respects.

[E 3039/146/89]

No. 147.

Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 155.)

Sir,

Damascus, May 3, 1926.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 148 of the 27th ultimo, I have the honour to report that His Highness Damad Ahmed Nami Bey, the newly appointed President of the State of Syria, arrived here from Beirut to take over his duties on the evening of the 29th ultimo. He was accompanied by the French High Commissioner.

2. The proclamation appointing Nami Bey as President having been read by M. de Jouvenel at the Syrian Government offices on arrival here, the next day, the 30th April, Ahmed Nami Bey held a reception there, to which all officials and notables in Damascus were invited. Following upon this function, the new President delivered a speech outlining briefly the aims which he had in view, and which he hoped his Government and Ministers would assist him to achieve.

3. The speech was not altogether encouraging from the point of view of that section of the Syrian people which is now in rebellion. It was an utterance full of vague promises of future blessings which only could be obtained by close collaboration with France, and such hopes which it did hold out of French concessions to the Syrian people in the cause of a general pacification were, I fear, somewhat disappointing to Damascus in general. It is, of course, obvious that any Syrian Government must collaborate with the French Mandatory Government, but I gather that he emphasised this necessity in his speech, and thereby gave an impression to Syrian Nationalists that his inclinations were more pro-mandatory than pro-Syrian. It was, of course, impossible for any speech made on such an occasion to avoid referring to the paramount necessity of Syrian collaboration with the French mandatory authorities.

4. Particularly disappointing was the omission of any reference to the question of a general amnesty. Syrians are stated to be still firm in their determination to struggle on until an amnesty has been promised. I am informed from a fairly reliable source that the French authorities are not altogether unprepared to grant an amnesty eventually under certain conditions, and that Nami Bey is aware of this. No doubt he is keeping this trump card up his sleeve and will produce it later when he can make use of it with the greatest effect.

5. However, great hopes were held out by Nami Bey of obtaining a satisfactory solution for the Syrian claims for territorial unity. He foreshadowed territorial adjustments in Syria and the Lebanon which would give Syria an outlet on the sea at Tripoli.

6. He promised that his Government would draw up a treaty with the French Government closely resembling that already existing between Great Britain and Iraq, to remain in force for a certain number of years. Syrian national sovereignty would thus be respected.

7. New elections would be carried out as soon as possible, and the newly elected Parliament would vote upon the new Syrian Constitution.

8. M. de Jouvenel having previously publicly declared his agreement upon the foregoing points, there is every reason to anticipate that the new President will find no

great difficulty in forming a Cabinet to assist him in putting his programme into execution. Up to the present no announcement has yet been made here regarding the composition of the new Syrian Cabinet. The disappointment felt by Damascenes at the absence of any reference to an amnesty in the new President's speech is somewhat counterbalanced by a feeling of optimism in the air, which is the result of a hope strongly felt in Damascus that the new Syrian Government may find a means of putting an end to the intolerable situation which the revolution has created during the past nine months.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 124), Amman (No. 131), Bagdad (No. 118), Beirut (No. 147), and Aleppo (No. 99).)

I have, &c.

J. R. VAUGHAN-RUSSELL.

[E 2946/306/91]

No. 148.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris).

(No. 1472.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, May 18, 1926.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 714 of the 19th April, relative to the Hejaz Railway, I transmit to you the accompanying copy of correspondence with the Colonial Office.

2. In view of the acceptance by the French Government of the principle of co-operation with His Majesty's Government in this matter, I consider it desirable to agree with the French Government on a definite course of procedure before approaching Ibn Saud.

3. I am also of opinion that the question of the repair of the line and re-establishment of a train service throughout its length should be kept separate from that of the institution of the Moslem Advisory Council at Medina, which was foreshadowed in M. Bompard's declaration at Lausanne on the 27th January, 1923.

4. I shall, therefore, be glad if you will inform the French Government that I welcome their promise of collaboration and hope that mutual agreement may be reached on the following points, regarding which a settlement is necessary, as a preliminary to the opening of negotiations with Ibn Saud.

5. The problem of reconditioning the sections of the railway which lie in Syrian, Palestinian and Transjordanian territory falls into two parts: (1) Repair of the permanent way; (2) redistribution of locomotives and rolling-stock. As regards (1), I understand that the only section of the line in British mandated territory which is not at present fit for traffic is that between Maan and Mudawarra, on the frontier of the Hejaz. The Administration of Transjordan are prepared to put in hand the necessary repairs as soon as there is a reasonable prospect of the whole railway resuming operations. As regards (2), the present position is set forth in my note of the 3rd December last to M. de Fleuriau, a copy of which was enclosed in my despatch No. 4007 of the 4th December last. This note contained certain proposals for the redistribution of locomotives and rolling-stock, on which I still await the observations of the French Government. I shall be glad if you will urge upon them the early acceptance of these proposals.

6. If agreement can be reached on these points between the two Governments, it will be possible to approach Ibn Saud jointly with a request that he will repair that portion of the railway which lies within the Hejaz and is at present unfit for traffic, viz., the section between El Ala and Mudawarra. In return, Ibn Saud could be informed that the French and British Governments will guarantee an adequate train service as far as the frontier of the Hejaz to link up with whatever service His Majesty may establish on the section under his control. It might further be suggested to Ibn Saud that, if agreement is reached in principle, a meeting should be held either at Maan or at Amman between the local railway experts from Syria, Palestine, Transjordan and the Hejaz to arrange for co-operation in the maintenance of a train service throughout the whole length of the Hejaz Railway.

7. You should lay these proposals before the French Government, and also make clear to them the views of His Majesty's Government on the question of the Moslem Advisory Council, as set forth in paragraph 7 of Foreign Office letter of the 30th April to the Colonial Office.

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 148.

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 30, 1926.

WITH reference to Foreign Office letter of the 9th February, enclosing a copy of a despatch instructing His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris to invite the co-operation of the French Government in the matter of the Hejaz Railway, I am directed by Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain to transmit to you the accompanying copy* of a despatch from Lord Crewe, conveying the acceptance of that proposal by the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

2. Mr. Secretary Amery will recollect that the question of reopening the Hejaz Railway for through traffic to Medina was raised by Ibn Saud in December last (see Foreign Office letter of the 31st December, 1925), and that an interim reply was sent to that ruler through the acting British agent and consul at Jeddah in February (see Sir Austen Chamberlain's telegram No. 15 to Mr. Jordan, a copy of which was enclosed in Foreign Office letter of the 9th February, referred to in paragraph 1 above). Now that the French Government have agreed to co-operate with His Majesty's Government in applying to the Hejaz Railway the principles of the Anglo-French Declaration of Lausanne, it appears to Sir Austen Chamberlain to be desirable to formulate certain definite proposals to the French Government.

3. The question of the effective re-establishment of the Hejaz Railway on a normal basis can be divided into two parts: (1) Joint action by Syria, Palestine, Transjordan and the Hejaz to repair the various sections of railway lying within their respective territories, and to run trains through the whole length of the railway as far as Medina; (2) the establishment of the Moslem Advisory Council at Medina, which is foreshadowed in the Anglo-French declaration made at Lausanne by M. Bompard on the 27th January, 1923. These two subjects will be dealt with separately in the following paragraphs.

4. For the establishment of a through connection between Haifa, Damascus and Medina by the Governments of the various territories through which the railway passes, i.e., Syria, Palestine, Transjordan and the Hejaz, it will be necessary, in the first place, that certain sections of the permanent way which are now closed to traffic shall be repaired. From your letter of the 16th April, it appears that the only sections of the Hejaz Railway which are at present completely out of action are (a) the portion of line within Hejaz territory between El-Ala, or (if the line is already repaired as far as Tebuk) Tebuk and Mudawarra; (b) the section lying within Transjordan from Mudawarra to Maan. When these sections shall have been repaired, there will remain the problem of the adequate provision of engines and rolling-stock, the majority of which is still retained by the French authorities on the Syrian section of the line. From the sub-enclosure in your letter of the 17th April, it seems possible that these authorities intend at least to lend engines and rolling-stock in order to run a through train service to Medina during the pilgrimage season. The actual phrase used by the French consul at Bagdad in writing to M. Bourdillon is, however, somewhat obscure: "Les mesures prises sur la section syrienne du [? chemin de fer] Hedjaz permettent . . . de fournir le matériel nécessaire aux trains de pèlerins jusqu'au Médine, si les conditions de la voie le permettent au delà des frontières syriennes." Meanwhile, the Secretary of State awaits a reply from the French Government to the note which he addressed to M. de Fleuriau on the 3rd December, 1925 (see Foreign Office letter of the 1th December), in which definite proposals were made for the redistribution between Syria, Palestine and Transjordan of the Hejaz Railway engines and rolling-stock in proportion to the volume of traffic passing over the several sections of the railway on the 1st August, 1914. Acceptance of these proposals by the French Government would materially increase the number of engines and trucks available for use on the Palestine and Transjordan sections of the railway.

5. The Secretary of State, therefore, proposes, if Mr. Amery concurs, to suggest to the French Government that the co-operation, on which they have now agreed in principle, should assume the following form: That the British and French Governments should agree to approach Ibn Saud jointly with the proposal that, if he will put into a thorough state of repair the section of railway from Medina to Mudawarra, and agree to run a regular train service thereon, the Transjordan Administration will repair the section of line from Mudawarra to Maan, and

the Syrian Administration will redistribute the engines and rolling-stock on the lines suggested in Sir Austen Chamberlain's note of the 3rd December to M. de Fleuriau. As a result, it would be possible for the French and British Governments to guarantee to Ibn Saud an adequate train service as far south as the Hejaz frontier. If the British, French and Hejaz Governments reach an agreement on the above point, a meeting of the local railway experts from Syria, Palestine, Transjordan and the Hejaz should be held as soon as possible either at Maan or Amman to arrange for co-operation in maintaining a train service throughout the whole length of the Hejaz Railway.

6. The Secretary of State is of opinion that, before approaching Ibn Saud, it is essential that some such plan of co-operation should be concerted with the French Government. At the same time he is anxious that the Hejaz Railway should be reopened for the convenience of pilgrims with as little delay as possible, although he realises that it is unlikely that the necessary repairs can be completed before the 1926 pilgrimage.

7. As regards the second point referred to in paragraph 3 above, namely, the establishment of the Moslem Advisory Council foreshadowed in the Lausanne Declaration, it is clear that this council will be of little use from the technical point of view. Its object will be rather to provide a Moslem façade for the operations of the Hejaz Railway, and to make suggestions to the various Governments through whose territory the railway runs, regarding arrangements for the comfort and assistance of pilgrims. In view of the fact that this council is to sit at Medina, the initiative in establishing it should, in Sir Austen Chamberlain's opinion, lie with Ibn Saud himself. It therefore seems desirable that, as soon as agreement shall have been reached between the British, French and Hejaz Governments regarding the actual working of the railway on the lines suggested in paragraph 5 above, the British and French consuls at Jeddah should jointly urge Ibn Saud to set up this council. There would, however, be no advantage in its inauguration until such time as the railway is in working order.

8. I am to invite the observations of Mr. Amery on the above suggestions, and to express the hope that he will concur in the proposed communication to the French Government.

9. A copy of this letter is being sent to the India Office.

I am, &c.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

Enclosure 2 in No. 148.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.

Sir,

Downing Street, May 11, 1926.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Amery to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 30th April and to request you to inform Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain that he concurs in the proposed communication to the French Government with regard to the application to the Hejaz Railway of the principles of the Anglo-French Declaration at Lausanne.

A copy of this letter is being sent to the India Office.

I am, &c.

J. E. SHUCKBURGH.

[E 3081/366/91]

No. 149.

The Eastern Telegraph Company (Limited) to Foreign Office.—(Received May 19.)

Electra House, Moorgate,

London, May 18, 1926.

Sir,

WE have to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 14th instant in reference to the previous correspondence exchanged on the subject of the Jeddah-Port Sudan cable, and I am desired to express my company's thanks to Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain for communicating to us the information which he has received from the Acting British Agent and Consul at Jeddah.

As suggested by Mr. Jordan, we have instructed our representative at Port Sudan to proceed to Jeddah in due course, after putting himself in touch with the former gentleman, and for the information of the Secretary of State, I beg to attach a copy of the telegram to our superintendent.

I am, &c.

Secretary.

Enclosure in No. 149.

Telegram from the Eastern Telegraph Company (Limited), London, to Representative at Port Sudan.

Port Sudan, May 17, 1926.

FOREIGN Office, 14th May, advises Ibn Saud accepts draft agreement between Sudan and Hejaz Governments in form agreed recent conference Port Sudan. Ibn Saud suggests articles 6 and 8 should be combined in following manner: "The Hejaz Government agree not to use their own or other companies' wireless or cables for foreign communications unless the cable is out of order and pending the completion of repairs." We agree to this, but would like article 6 to stand as well, if you can arrange it, giving us first refusal of any additional wireless station, but do not let this jeopardise or hinder final agreement. Re articles 9, 10 and 12, Ibn Saud reserves consent pending arrival our representative for discussion details working arrangements. Arrange put yourself in touch with Jordan and proceed Jeddah when he has made necessary arrangements. In your dealings with Hejaz authorities be careful to act in conciliatory tone and meet wishes; in any doubt refer to me.

No. 150.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Jordan (Jeddah).

(No. 42.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 20, 1926.

YOUR telegram No. 51 of 4th May: Revision of treaty with Ibn Saud.

You should explain to Ibn Saud that, while every endeavour will be made to expedite matters, it is unfortunately most improbable that the revision of the treaty can be completed by 1st June.

No. 151.

Acting Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 57.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, May 25, 1926.

FROM reliable information it is now certain that tombs of Prophet's family in Medina have been destroyed, including tomb of Hamza.

There are also rumours that dome of Prophet's tomb may be removed. Indian and other pilgrims are very uneasy and incensed against Ali brothers, who they state have again deceived them. Possibility of fanatical outbreaks always present, but unlikely for the moment.

Ibn Saud justifies action by long article in local paper signed by seventeen ulamas of Medina.

(Sent to Bagdad, India, Egypt, Jerusalem and Singapore.)

[E 3158/3158/91]

No. 152.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 242.)

Sir,

Angora, May 18, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that according to an announcement in to-day's paper the Turkish Government has appointed a certain Suleiman Shevket Bey to be political representative at Mecca. Suleiman Shevket Bey, who is unknown to me, is stated to be proceeding shortly to his post via Alexandria.

2. The Turkish Government is also sending a delegate to the forthcoming Islamic Congress at Mecca in the person of Edib Bey, a retired colonel, who is now a Deputy for Constantinople. Edib Bey is something of a man of the world, speaks good French, plays bridge, and is associated with Europeans in mining and other business. He is also a personal friend of the Ghazi, and that he should be chosen to go against his personal inclination—he is not thin enough or religious enough to relish a summer at Mecca—is another indication that the Turkish Government is far from losing interest in the Hejaz.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner in Egypt and to the acting British agent and consul at Jeddah.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 3198/367/91]

No. 153.

Vice-Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 55. Secret.)

Sir,

Jeddah, May 1, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz during the period the 1st to 30th April, 1926.

2. Copies of this report are being sent to Egypt, Jerusalem (2), Bagdad, Aden, Delhi, Beirut (for Damascus), Khartum (through Port Sudan) and Singapore.

I have, &c.

S. R. JORDAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 153.

Jeddah Report for the Period April 1-30, 1926.

DURING the period under report no political events of importance seems to have taken place in the Hejaz, and the King would appear to have been concentrating his energies on consolidating his Empire and as far as possible pacifying the more unruly Akhwan elements amongst his people. A source of discontent during this period has been the reported outbreak of a number of tribal raids along the frontiers of Nejd territories, and Ibn Saud appears to have been afraid that a general recrudescence of this troublesome practice was about to take place. Owing to the prompt assurances of the Irak and Palestine Governments, the danger seems to have passed and it now appears that a certain amount of the difficulty arose through the violation of Nejd territorial rights. As the treaty as to the frontiers has recently been concluded and the Nejd is not expert in the matter of degrees and minutes of longitude and latitude, certain errors as to which was the actual boundary appears to have arisen. It is hoped by the early establishment of the special tribunals under the Bahra and Hadda Agreements, before which these and other questions can be placed, will go far to stop the present voluminous and sometimes acrimonious correspondence between Ibn Saud and the neighbouring Powers.

2. The Mecca newspaper publishes a statement supposedly made by the Amir Abdullah of Transjordan, who declares that an agreement has recently been concluded between the Nejd and Transjordan, and he is going to keep to the articles of that agreement. The "Umm-al-Kura" adds: "Arabs will succeed only if they state the truth."

3. The supposed commercial treaty concluded between Syria and the Nejd was taken back to Beirut by Major Ibrahim Depui recently, who expressed himself well satisfied with the progress made and the accord arrived at between these neighbouring States. On the other hand, local rumour confidently states that no agreement was signed, but that Ibrahim returned to Beirut with a counter-agreement from Ibn Saud roughly approximating to the original agreement submitted by Ibrahim. I have been unable to verify this.

4. A certain Dr. Emin Rihani, a Christian, well known as an Arab historian and writer, recently arrived in Jeddah from Syria, and yesterday morning, upon Ibn Saud's arrival from Mecca, read to him, before a motley assembly of Hejazis and Nejdies, an address of welcome and praising Ibn Saud for his great exploits. Rihani concluded by saying that he had had the honour of visiting the Sultan by two doors, first by the door of the Persian Gulf, secondly by the door of the Red Sea, and he sincerely hoped that soon he would have the honour of visiting His Majesty by the third and more glorious door, that of the Mediterranean Sea and Syria and Palestine. This from Rihani came rather as a surprise, as I had previously considered his efforts, though decidedly pan-Arab, to be concentrated on the success of Ibn Saud in the Hejaz. It may be that recent events in Syria has brought about a change of attitude on his part.

5. Ibn Saud in reply was very moderate in his tone and stated that it was not from foreign Powers that they had to fear, as their country was not a land of gold mines, but from the Arabs themselves, who were in the paths of intrigue and falsehood and thereby kept their nation backward.

6. The Persian consul-general from Damascus, Eyn-el-Mulk, has also visited the Sultan in Mecca during the period under report, but he stayed but two or three days in the Hejaz and I had but small opportunity of seeing him. He apparently came to convey the Shah of Persia's formal recognition of Ibn Saud as King of the Hejaz. The Persian Government, about the time of his arrival in the Hejaz, officially forbade the Persian pilgrimage.

7. The situation from the Yemen side appears quiet, and the Mecca newspaper recently published an article to the effect that Sir G. Clayton had been to Sanaa and concluded a treaty between the Imam Yahya and Great Britain, and that he was now about to endeavour to conclude a treaty between the Hejaz and Nejd and the Yemen. As against this the paper publishes an article flatly contradicting the rumour that there has been a clash between the forces of the Nejd and Yemen, and states that the two countries are in most friendly relations.

8. I hear that three aeroplanes and 116 cases of "instruments" were landed at Hodeidah by the Italian steamship "Lomedano." My information on this point appears reliable.

9. A Javanese delegation headed by Raden Omar Said Tjoktoaminoto and Kiyai Haji Mansour has been very active in Mecca lately, holding public meetings and preaching the Malay Archipelago for the Malayans and Moslems and the expulsion of the white races and Christian influence. These two were originally proceeding to Cairo, but have now left for Medina and will, I understand, return to Mecca direct in time to attend the conference convened by Ibn Saud on the 20th Zil Kedah, 1344 (the 7th June, 1926).

10. I attach hereto a translation* of an article from the Mecca newspaper reporting an interview with this delegation, together with a translation of the telegram sent by Ibn Saud inviting the various nations and committees named therein to send delegates to Mecca. It was hoped, I believe, that the delegates who attended the Khilafa Conference in Egypt would then have time to reach Mecca and attend this further conference.

11. Two representatives from the Sind Provincial Khilafa Committee arrived by the steamship "Alavi" recently, and after expressing their pleasure for the kind treatment received in Kamaran, stated that they had brought some 2,000 rupees for distribution among the poor of the Haramain.

12. After receiving an invitation from the French Government to send a delegate to the International Sanitary Conference to be held in Paris, Ibn Saud regretfully refused same. This in view of his previous expressed wish to be represented was a complete *volte-face*, and although he was later persuaded to cancel his refusal and send a delegate, I have not been able to ascertain why he in the first place refused, but I expect the Director for Foreign Affairs, lately reinstated to this rank, was not unconnected with the attitude adopted by His Majesty. Abdullah

* Not printed.

[15026]

Q 2

Bey Damluji is apparently still nursing his rebuff in the case of the "Alavi" some months ago and took this opportunity of getting his own back. Dr. Mahmoud Hamdi, the Director-General of Health and the King's private physician, left in the company of the Dutch consul, M. Vander Plas, who was also proceeding to Paris as one of the Dutch delegates.

13. The situation as regards religious freedom is becoming increasingly difficult and the Wahabi slogan of "Back to the time of the Prophet" is becoming more and more noticeable. I attach herewith a copy of a proclamation published in the Mecca newspaper forbidding drinking and smoking, and the Governor of Jeddah has received instructions to enforce these regulations in Jeddah.

14. The editor of the "Umm-al-Kura," who is in very close touch with Ibn Saud, yesterday evening informed a member of the staff of this agency that after long and mature consideration, the Sultan and King had decided to play a "lone hand." He had appealed to the Moslem world for unity and co-operation in the question of the control of the holy places, and the only answers he had received was as a confused babble of sound, everybody wanting something different. Seeing, therefore, that nothing could be gained in this way, the King decided to devote his energies to the protection and cleansing of the holy cities being answerable only to his conscience and his people, and that he would enforce his religion in the holy land, thereby satisfying his people and rendering the Hejaz and Nejd safe from internecine strife, and it was only with the help of the Nejd soldiers that security could be maintained.

15. No doubt Ibn Saud has been forced to take this step by the more fanatical of his Akhwan followers and is now pleading in justification the results obtained in Turkey, who in order to advance in the world has done many deeds that would formerly have been considered reprehensible, but that the only result was a few days' outcry in the world's Moslem press and now their actions are accepted all the world over, and it would be similar with his actions in the Hejaz.

16. It is strongly rumoured that one of the chief of Ibn Saud's Wahabi ulamas has gone to Medina with instructions to destroy the tombs of the Prophet's family. This lacks confirmation to date, but certainly the "Tomb of Eve," in Jeddah, has had the dome destroyed and people are no longer allowed to worship thereat. But there is, as will at once be realised, a big difference between the tomb of a very elongated mythical lady and the tombs of the family of the Prophet.

17. The arrangements for the pilgrimage to Medina has been completed and are as follows: Pilgrims proceeding from Mecca travel the whole way by camel, touching at Rabigh on the coast *en route*. Pilgrims from Jeddah proceed by dhow from Jeddah to Rabigh and there join the various caravans from Mecca. Camel hire has been fixed at £8 instead of £16 under the late régime.

18. Another example of the Wahabi "Get back to the Prophet" principles occurred in Jeddah a few days ago. A thief who had been caught in the act had his hand cut off and the stump dipped in boiling oil, and was then paraded through the local market place as a warning to others.

19. The one great source of satisfaction in the Hejaz at the present is the absolute safety of the roads. Everywhere isolated groups of two or three pilgrims may be met with, who go about quite unprotected and in perfect safety.

20. Owing to the scarcity of pilgrims, the financial situation is not brilliant and the Government is rather pressed for money. In order to prevent the corruption that exists in the financial departments, Ibn Saud has recently appointed a certain Mohammed Bey Nihaz as Inspector of Finance and he has entered upon his duties, which might be likened to Hercules labour of cleansing the Ægean stables, with commendable zeal. A number of officials have been replaced by others not a whit more honest than their predecessors and so the vicious circle goes on.

21. Commendable progress is being made by Messrs. Mirlees Watson and Co., with the condenser, and it is hoped to be completed by about the 20th May.

22. During the feast of Bairam the usual courtesies were made and returned, and two deputations, one of the Takrunis and the other of the Hausa residents of Jeddah took the opportunity of calling at the agency to express their sentiments of loyalty to the British Empire.

23. The number of pilgrims who have arrived in the Hejaz to date may be roughly estimated at 11,500, and over and above there are about 5,000 on their way from India.

24. One slave has been repatriated during the period under report.

S. R. JORDAN.

Enclosure 2 in No. 153.

Extract from the Mecca Newspaper "Umm-al-Kura."

INVITATION TO THE MOSLEM CONFERENCE.

WE heard from the Royal office that the following telegram was sent by His Majesty the King (on 12.9.1344) to His Majesty the King of Egypt, His Majesty the King of Afghanistan, the Turkish Republic, His Highness the Shah of Persia, His Majesty the King of Irak, Amir Abd-el-Krim of Rif, Imam Yahya, the Chief of the High Moslem Council at Jerusalem, the Chief of the Caliphate Society at Bombay, the Hadith Society at Amritsar, the learned men society at Delhi, his Excellency the Bai of Tunis, the Governor of Tripoli, Sheikh Badr-ed-Din-el-Husseini, Sheikh Baghat-el-Bitar at Damascus, the Central Religious Ministry at Orfa, Russia, the Kadi Mustafa Shershali at Tibziozo, Algeria, the Chief of "Sherkit Islam" at Jokjakarta, Java and the Mahometan Society, Java:—

"For the service of the two holy sanctuaries and their inhabitants, to secure their future, to increase the means of comfort for pilgrims and visitors, to improve the holy lands in all respects which all the Moslems in general care for, to fulfil our promises we made and with a view to our wish to see the Moslems co-operating in serving these holy lands, we thought that the suitable time for holding a general conference in which the Moslem countries and nations will be represented is on the 20th Zil Kedah, 1344.

"We have sent invitations to all those whom it may concern of the Moslems and their Kings.

"Hoping that your representatives will be present at the fixed time. May God guide us all.—ABDUL AZIZ, King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd and its Dependencies."

Enclosure 3 in No. 153.

Extract from the Mecca Newspaper "Umm-al-Kura."

OFFICIAL PROCLAMATION.

IT reached us from the office of His Majesty's representative that the Royal Order was issued approving the following:—

We as the general suzerain and being entitled to impose punishments on evil doers and in order to keep the commands of God carried out and not disobeyed, have issued the following orders to purify the holy place of God from sinners:—

1. Anybody who intentionally does not pray "jamaah" (with the party) will be imprisoned from twenty-four hours to ten days and will be fined a certain amount of money.
2. Anybody who drinks liquors will be punished according to the Shariah law in this respect, and will be imprisoned from one month to six months and fined a certain amount of money, and in case he continues doing so he will be exiled from the city of God for two years.
3. Anybody who makes liquors, sells them or prepares a place for drinking, will be imprisoned from six months to two years and his place will be confiscated. If he commits this again he will be exiled from the holy city of God from two to three years.
4. As tobacco is a bad thing and is harmful for the body, money and mind, and as certain ulamas (learned men) said that it is forbidden, it is necessary to purify the holy places from such evil, and, therefore, anyone smoking openly will be imprisoned from twenty-four hours to three days and will be fined a certain amount of money.
5. Any meeting held for the purpose of circulating false rumours or conspiring against the policy of the Government, its members will be imprisoned from two years to five years or will be exiled from all the Hejaz.
6. Anybody who helps to hide such criminals as mentioned in article 5 will be considered as partner and will be punished in the same way.

7. Any meeting against the Shariah, its members will be imprisoned from three months to six months and fined a certain amount of money.
8. Any meeting for a good thing should be reported to the Government and the objects of the meeting and its place should be pointed out for a permission to be obtained from the Government.
9. Concerned officials should carefully apply such rules and anybody neglecting will be severely punished.

P.S.—Our representative is the one in charge of seeing such rules carried out. These orders are to be put in force from the date of publication.

No. 154.

Acting Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 58.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, May 25, 1926.

YOUR telegram No. 42 of 20th May.

As treaty revision cannot take place before 1st June, Ibn Saud states that, owing to conference and pilgrimage, it is now impossible for him to enter into negotiations before 11th July.

No. 155.

Acting Agent, Jeddah (No. 48M.), to Government of India.—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received May 30.)

(No. 60.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, May 29, 1926.

YOUR telegram No. 953S.

Sheikh Abdallah-bin-Bilahid-a-Nejdi and Grand Kadi of Hejaz proceeded to Medina and put question to ulama of that place asking if erection of building over the tomb and using the same as a mosque was not forbidden and prohibited. Also if practice of Moslems rubbing themselves against tomb, lighting lamps, making votive offerings and calling upon dead corpses which are mere earth as if they were gods, and such things, were in accordance with religion.

The ulama replied that building of tomb is forbidden according to best traditions, and is supported by Ali, who said to Ali-el-Hayag: "I send you to do as God's Prophet—do not leave a statue undestroyed or a high tomb standing."

Using tomb as mosque and praying in same and lighting lamps is strictly forbidden according to tradition of Ibn Saud Abbas, who said Prophet cursed people who used tomb as mosque. Also turning toward's Prophet's tomb instead of Kibla is forbidden. And to go around Prophet's tomb kissing and rubbing against it is strictly forbidden. The Tazkir, Tarheem and Tasleen are new things.

Above is followed by long article stating that these facts may annoy some people, but that they are in accordance with the Koran, and one should fear God, not men, and that "we care not for what men may say, as we are guided by truth alone. We wish to satisfy all people, but must first satisfy God."

Full article follows with monthly report.

No. 156.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Acting Agent, Jeddah.

(No. 43 and No. 44.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 31, 1926.

(R.) YOUR telegram No. 52 of 4th May: Hejaz aerial services.

It is undesirable on political grounds that officer on active list of Royal Air Force should be seconded for such service. British civilian personnel, however, might possibly be available if engaged on personal contracts. Air Ministry are making tentative enquiries regarding suitable volunteers, pending receipt of full report from

Squadron-Leader Noakes regarding numbers required and routes and stations proposed.

His Majesty's Government are prepared to give Ibn Saud such assistance as they can in procuring necessary spare parts and refitting aeroplanes. In order to save time Air Ministry offer to supply spares from Egypt and to arrange for repair of two or three of remaining aircraft at Jeddah. Department of Overseas Trade can also be asked to take up matter with British manufacturers concerned through purchasing agents whom Ibn Saud is appointing. (End of R.)

(Confidential.)

While anxious to assist Ibn Saud to obtain necessary material for civilian services from British sources, it is not yet certain whether His Majesty's Government will be able to depart from their policy of refusing to grant export licences for war material consigned from United Kingdom to any independent ruler in Arabian peninsula. You should, therefore, not broach this question with Ibn Saud at present stage, more especially as no definite request for war material appears yet to have been put forward by him.

[E 3421/306/91]

No. 157.

The Marquess of Crewe to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 1045.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Paris presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs respecting the reopening of the Hejaz Railway.

Paris, June 4, 1926.

Enclosure in No. 157.

Note from French Ministry for Foreign Affairs, June 3, 1926.

PAR une note en date du 22 mai dernier,* l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique a bien voulu, en accusant réception au Ministère des Affaires étrangères de sa communication du 17 avril 1926, lui faire part des vues du Gouvernement britannique concernant la réorganisation du Chemin de Fer du Hedjaz et l'ouverture éventuelle de pourparlers avec la Sultan Ibn Séoud au sujet de la reprise du trafic sur l'ensemble de ce réseau.

Le Ministère des Affaires étrangères a l'honneur de faire connaître à l'Ambassade d'Angleterre qu'il partage entièrement l'avis exposé dans la note dont il s'agit quant à la nécessité d'une entente préalable entre le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté et le Gouvernement de la République. Cette entente paraît particulièrement désirable à l'égard de la remise en service des sections de la ligne actuellement inutilisables, ainsi que des conditions auxquelles les deux Puissances mandataires pourraient négocier avec Ibn Séoud la reprise du service du pèlerinage de La Mecque. Il importe que cette dernière question ne soit abordée que lorsque toutes les dispositions auront été prises, d'accord entre les deux Gouvernements, en vue d'assurer dans de bonnes conditions l'exploitation régulière des sections situées dans les États sous mandat.

Le Gouvernement de la République est également d'accord avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté en ce qui concerne l'étendue de la compétence reconnue au Comité musulman de Médine par la déclaration du 27 janvier 1923; ce comité doit être essentiellement consultatif et ne posséder aucun droit de contrôle sur la gestion technique du réseau. Son rôle essentiel sera de veiller à la répartition sur l'ensemble de la ligne, dans l'intérêt des pèlerins musulmans, des bénéfices réalisés dans les diverses sections, et qui n'auront pas été absorbés par les dépens d'exploitation, la majeure partie de ces bénéfices devant provenir, selon toutes prévisions, de la section syrienne, dont le bon fonctionnement est la base de tout projet de réorganisation du trafic à destination de l'Arabie. Il semble, d'ailleurs, qu'il n'y ait, pour le moment, aucun intérêt à hâter l'entrée en fonctions d'un organisme qui n'aura sa raison d'être que lorsque la ligne entière sera remise en service.

* See No. 148.

Quant à la répartition équitable du matériel roulant entre la section palestinienne et la section syrienne du Chemin de Fer du Hedjaz, cette question retient toute l'attention du Gouvernement de la République, et des instructions ont été adressées au Haut-Commissaire à Beyrouth en vue de faciliter un accord amiable entre les représentants qualifiés des réseaux intéressés.

Le Ministère des Affaires étrangères ne manquera pas de tenir l'Ambassade d'Angleterre informée des mesures qui auront été prises à ce sujet.

Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Paris,
le 3 juin 1926.

No. 158.

Lord Lloyd to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 275.)
(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, June 4, 1926.

PERSIAN Minister, under instructions, so I gather, from his Government, has approached me with urgent request that His Majesty's Government should bring pressure on the King of the Hejaz to prevent further destruction of sacred tombs at Medina. He referred to profound irritation which had been aroused in Persia by these acts of vandalism and to general belief in Moslem countries that Ibn Saud was ally of Great Britain, whose responsibility, apart from consideration for the feelings of her own Moslem subjects, was thus the more engaged.

I referred to His Majesty's Government's traditional policy of non-interference in Moslem religious affairs, and to the propriety of such a request being made to His Majesty's representative at Tehran rather than through me.

Persian Minister was, however, very insistent in view, as he affirmed, of imminent danger of destruction even of the tomb of the Prophet himself, which was now the only one still left intact.

No. 159.

Sir P. Loraine to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 5.)

(No. 137.)
(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, June 5, 1926.

REPORTED destruction of tombs at Medina by Wahabis and likelihood of similar acts has aroused considerable indignation here, especially as tombs are object of special veneration to Shiah, and religious pressure is being brought to bear on the Persian Government to take action. As you are aware, no Shah or Persian Government can ultimately ignore such pressure.

Circumstances here are now so altered that Shiah and religious hierarchy is practically without exception anti-Bolshevik and pro-British. If, therefore, His Majesty's Government felt themselves able to use influence possessed with Ibn Saud in a restraining sense as regards these acts of vandalism and without prejudicing their well-known policy of non-intervention in Moslem religious affairs, and if I were enabled to let it be known that they are so doing, I believe the effect here would be profound and beneficial.

(Sent to India.)

[E 3489/366/91]

No. 160.

Acting Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 8.)

(No. 62.)
Sir,

Jeddah, May 12, 1926.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 36 of the 7th April and in confirmation of my telegram No. 54 of to-day's date, relative to the Port Sudan-Jeddah cable, I have the honour to report that on the occasion of the visit of His Majesty the King of the Hejaz to Jeddah, I took the opportunity of discussing with His Majesty the initialled agreement concluded at Port Sudan relative to the disposal of the cable known as the Port Sudan-Jeddah cable.

2. His Majesty accepted the first agreement *in toto*, with the addition of the amount to be divided between the Hejaz and Sudan Governments in the second article of the agreement, which would now read as follows, the addition in no way altering the sense or scope of the article:—

"That the unexpended balance of £E. 33,501-149 m/ms. standing to the credit," &c.

3. With reference to the second agreement to be concluded between the joint owners and the Eastern Telegraph Company, I have to report that His Majesty agreed to articles 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 after lengthy discussions, but would not agree to article 6, as he seemed incapable of understanding the words "first refusal," and was unwilling to bind himself to buy such new telegraphic facilities as he may require in the future from the Eastern Telegraph Company.

4. His Majesty, after lengthy discussion, suggested that articles 6 and 8 should be deleted and the new article 6 should read:—

"The Hejaz Government undertake not to use for foreign communications her own wireless or cables or the wireless or cables of any other company, and the Eastern Telegraph Company, on its part, undertakes to secure the communications by wireless in case the cable is out of order. Should the company refuse to do so, the Hejaz Government will be free to operate its own communications in any way it may find suitable for its interests during the period the cable is not working."

The above article assures the Eastern Telegraph Company of an absolute monopoly of the Hejaz foreign communications for the period of the agreement, and will, I think, be acceptable to that company.

5. Article 7 was accepted.

6. While not objecting to articles 9, 10 and 12, His Majesty expressed a desire that any future working arrangements between the Eastern Telegraph Company and the Hejaz Government should be such as to guarantee the full sovereign rights of the Hejaz Government, and considered that, before accepting these three articles, it would be advisable for a representative of the Eastern Telegraph Company to come to Jeddah and, in collusion with the local authorities, agree to some form of a *modus operandi* agreeable and to the advantage of both parties.

7. I agreed with His Majesty's point of view, and would suggest that, if the Eastern Telegraph Company are agreeable to the article 6 as now submitted, they should send a representative to Jeddah as soon as possible.

8. His Majesty agreed to the remaining articles 11, 13 and 14.

9. Copies of this despatch are being sent to Cairo and Khartum.

I have, &c.

S. R. JORDAN.

[E 3473/900/91]

No. 161.

Vice-Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 65.)
Sir,

Jeddah, May 17, 1926.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 48 of the 22nd April last, relative to the slave trade in the Hejaz, I have the honour to forward herewith a copy of a letter addressed to His Majesty the King of the Hejaz by me in pursuance of the instructions contained in your despatch under reference.

2. I enclose also a translation of his reply wherein he again insists that His Majesty's Government should abandon the right to manumit and repatriate slaves through the intermediary of this agency.

I have, &c.

S. R. JORDAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 161.

Copy of Letter from the Acting British Agent and Consul, Jeddah, to His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd, Mecca, dated May 10, 1926.

(After respects.)

I HAVE been directed by His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to inform your Majesty that your Majesty's conversations with myself on the subject of slavery in the Hejaz have been reported to Sir Austen Chamberlain, who has read of them with much interest. His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State is gratified to learn of the broad-minded and statesmanlike attitude which your Majesty is adopting towards this question.

The Secretary of State recognises that the abolition of slavery in a country where it has a traditional foothold must be carried out by stages, the first of which should be the abolition of the slave trade and the prohibition of the importation of slaves into the Hejaz and Nejd.

His Britannic Majesty's Secretary of State has fully considered your Majesty's plea that the right of manumission exercised by His Britannic Majesty's agent at Jeddah should be abandoned, but he regrets that he cannot agree to this.

The practice of manumission is of long standing and is in no way derogatory to the sovereign rights of the King of the Hejaz, but on the contrary enables His Majesty's agent at Jeddah to assist your Majesty in your Majesty's declared intention of stamping out the slave trade.

It is quite impossible to exaggerate to your Majesty the great interest taken in the slavery question throughout the whole of the civilised world, and especially by the League of Nations, a committee of which has in the last year been considering this very question. I should also point out to your Majesty that the League was most unfavourably impressed by the conditions existing in the Hejaz under the former Hashimite régime.

Compliments.

Enclosure 2 in No. 161.

Translation of Letter from Abdul Aziz-ibn-Abdul Rahman-al-Faisal-al-Saud, Mecca, to the Acting British Agent and Consul, Jeddah, dated Zil Qedah 1, 1344 (May 13, 1926).

(After respects.)

WITH reference to your letter of the 10th May, 1926, I inform your Excellency that the slave question has some religious and social traditions prevalent amongst people and it is not an easy thing to cause such things to vanish for small reasons, and as I informed your Excellency during our previous conversation that the extermination of such traditional and habitual thing as the slave trade which is practised by people for thousands of years cannot be carried out unless I am supported by certain fixed conditions, the first of which is that the British agency at Jeddah should promise not to accept any of those slaves in order that we will have a reason when we begin to force the people to stop such trade under the understanding that finishing such thing requires a long time while effective measures are taken gradually.

It is regretted that no more sacrifices can be done in this respect.

With best greetings.

No. 162.

Acting Agent, Jeddah, (No. 52 M.) to Government of India (Foreign Department).—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received June 9.)

(No. 63.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah (via Port Sudan), June 8, 1926.

YOUR telegram No. 1021 S.

Situation in Mecca is quiet. Practically the whole of the Indian pilgrims are against the present Wahabi practices, and even pilgrims of Wahabi persuasion from India and Egypt have split with local Wahabis on religious question. Ibn Saud,

in opening speech at the conference yesterday, forbade all discussion other than [? omitted: of a] religious nature.

Sanaullah of Amri[? tsar] is endeavouring to bring about co-operation of Ali's brothers with [? B.....]s.

I understand that a last-minute private conference of Egyptian and Indian Caliphatis decided to combine forces at conference.

Unity-of-the-East movement and pan-Arabism is receiving a great deal of attention in private discussions outside.

Ibn Saud appears to be endeavouring to utilise conference to consolidate his position in the Hejaz and to raise funds for such public works as Ain Zobeida water scheme, railway from Jeddah to Mecca and erection of accommodation at [? Me]na and Arafat. Full report follows as soon as possible.

No. 163.

Sir W. Tyrrell (for the Secretary of State) to Sir P. Loraine (Tehran).

(No. 88.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, June 9, 1926.

YOUR telegram No. 137 of the 5th June: Destruction of tombs at Medina.

Policy of non-intervention hitherto pursued by His Majesty's Government in Moslem religious affairs is unquestionably wise course to maintain. Moreover, our influence with Ibn Saud is not a consideration on which we can rely. In these circumstances it would be both unwise and unsafe to abandon policy of neutrality, especially as we could not ensure success for our interference.

No. 164.

Acting Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 10.)

(No. 64.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, June 9, 1926.

MECCA Conference opened under presidency of Shereef Adnan of Mecca. Suleiman Nadvi, president of Indian Caliphatis, and Ziaeddin, head of Soviet Moslem delegation, were elected vice-presidents.

Governor of Jeddah yesterday called to inform me that Soviet Moslem delegation has no connection whatever with Bolshevik Government, and was concerned with religious questions only. I have no doubt but that he was acting under instructions from Ibn Saud, who for the moment is endeavouring to propitiate all parties.

Pan-Islamism is receiving much attention, but Suleiman Nadvi stated confidentially to a friend that, owing to fanaticism of Wahabis, Indians could not co-operate with them at present.

The more fanatical Wahabis are endeavouring to force Ibn Saud to destroy the dome of the Prophet's tomb before the arrival of the pilgrims at Medina after Mecca pilgrimage.

(Sent to India.)

[E 3638/3472/91]

No. 165.

Acting Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 14.)

(No. 72.)

Sir,

Jeddah, May 28, 1926.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 68 of the 17th instant relative to capitulatory rights in the Hejaz, I have the honour to state that my Italian colleague recently requested that a meeting of the foreign representatives, with the exception of the Soviet agent, should be called to discuss the question of foreign capitulatory rights, in view of certain difficulties which had arisen between an Egyptian and Italian subject.

[15026]

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2. It appears that an Italian at present residing in Jeddah in connection with the motor service between Jeddah and Mecca had struck an Egyptian chauffeur employed by the concessionaries.

3. The Egyptian thereupon complained to his consul, who put the matter before the Sharia courts, and the Italian was arrested and placed in prison.

4. The Italian consul, as soon as he became aware of this, complained to the kaimakam in writing and requested the release of the man on his guarantee. The man was released and the kaimakam forwarded the Italian consul's letter to His Majesty the King of the Hejaz, who wrote a letter to my Italian colleague in which the following passage occurs:—

"You will realise that these places are holy places and the Sharia (religious) laws should prevail in such places, and that Islam does not allow anyone to be oppressed by another in general dealings, and that the Government do not recognise Capitulations for foreigners in such places. There is no difference between one person and another in the eyes of justice."

5. At the meeting it was decided that, pending instructions from our respective Governments, we would continue to consider capitulatory rights as in existence.

6. Prior to the meeting my Italian colleague had called on the *gérant* of the Egyptian consulate and requested that the matter should be settled between the consulates and withdrawn from the religious courts in order to avoid difficulties. This the *gérant* of the Egyptian consulate refused to do, and the Italian consul then requested me to act as intermediary between them and endeavour to settle the matter.

7. I thereupon requested the *gérant* of the Egyptian consulate to see me in my office and, after sundry explanations, he agreed to withdraw the case from the courts. This, in fact, was done and, following a series of reciprocal apologies, the matter was dropped.

8. I shall be glad to be informed what attitude I should adopt towards the Hejaz Government as regards the question of capitulatory rights.

9. A copy of this despatch is being sent to India.

I have, &c.

S. R. JORDAN.

[E 3657/48/91]

No. 166.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received June 15.)

Sir,

Downing Street, June 14, 1926.

I AM directed by Mr. Secretary Amery to refer to the letter from this Department of the 30th April, forwarding a copy of a telegram addressed to the High Commissioner for Palestine regarding the establishment of the tribunal provided for in article 6 of the Hadda Agreement, and to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before Secretary Sir Austen Chamberlain, the accompanying copy of a despatch which has been received from Lord Plumer on the subject.

2. I am to request that, if Sir Austen Chamberlain sees no objection, His Majesty's consul and agent at Jeddah may be instructed to endeavour to ascertain the attitude of Ibn Saud towards the proposal to nominate a British officer as president of the tribunal, since it is not clear from Ibn Saud's letter of the 15th April, a copy of which accompanied your letter of the 17th May, what are his real views on this point.

I am, &c.

J. E. SHUCKBURGH.

Enclosure in No. 166.

Lord Plumer to Mr. Amery.

(Confidential. C.)

Sir,

May 28, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to refer to your telegram No. 126 of the 24th April, 1926, on the subject of the establishment of the tribunal provided for in article 6 of the Hadda Agreement, and to inform you that no difficulty will arise in securing suitable persons to represent the Government of Transjordan.

2. The selection of a president acceptable to both parties is not, however, so simple a matter if the choice is confined to Arabs. The chief British representative has advocated as a solution the appointment of a British officer in that capacity.

3. In view of the difficulty of finding an Arab president of sufficient eminence who is not likely to be interested in litigation brought before the court, and who will be unobjectionable to both Governments, I suggest for your consideration that His Britannic Majesty's consul and agent, Jeddah, should approach the Sultan of Nejd in order to ascertain his attitude towards the proposal to nominate a British president.

4. A copy of this despatch is being forwarded to His Majesty's consul and agent, Jeddah, for his information.

I have, &c.

PLUMER, F.M.,

High Commissioner.

No. 167.

Mr. Phipps to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 17.)

(No. 218.)

[By Bag.]

Paris, June 16, 1926.

(Telegraphic.)

FOLLOWING from British delegation:—

"At plenary sitting of conference this morning, Persian delegate, in spite of decision of Second Committee reported in Mr. Bullard's letter to Mr. Oliphant of 9th June, read declaration claiming that article 82 (which becomes No. 90 in final text of convention), should be omitted, as it consecrated a system which was humiliating for Persia and was unjustifiable on technical grounds.

"The President pointed out that this was really a political and not a sanitary issue, and called upon British and Persian delegations to agree together upon text which could be adopted on Friday, when last sitting of conference will take place.

"Subsequent discussion with Persian delegate made it clear that his instructions, or what he pretended to be his instructions, precluded him from agreeing to anything in the nature of article 82 in a form which would be of any use to us in justifying maintenance of present system.

"In these circumstances it was felt that it would be idle to attempt further negotiations with Persian delegate, who had sprung his mine so late as to make it practically impossible to obtain fresh instructions or start negotiations at Tehran before conference breaks up. After consultation with Mr. Malkin and Indian delegation, we reached conclusion that in last resort we could agree to following article instead of article 82 if conference, including Persian delegate, agreed:—

"'En ce qui concerne les modalités de l'application, dans les ports persans du golfe Persique, du régime sanitaire résultant du titre 1^{er} de la présente Convention, les modifications à apporter au régime actuel feront l'objet d'un accord à intervenir entre les Gouvernements persan et britannique.'

"M. Barrère, to whom situation has been explained, is going to endeavour to persuade Persian delegate to accept above formula. If he refuses, M. Barrère will suggest that he should sign convention containing article 82 with reservation that his Government will withhold ratification pending adjustment of question by diplomatic negotiations with His Majesty's Government. This would leave Persia bound by 1912 Convention until such time as she had reached an agreement with Great Britain.

"We will report further developments."

No. 168.

Acting Consul, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 20.)

(No. 68.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jeddah, June 19, 1926.

MY telegrams Nos. 63 and 64.

Mecca Conference has officially adjourned until three days after completion of Haj, but as Hejaz Government have secured their two main objectives it is considered probable that no further meetings will take place.

Main objectives were:—

1. Secure possession of all Aukaf-ul-Haramain moneys for improvement of Hejaz.
2. Claim Hejaz Railway from French and British authorities, and in case of refusal refer the matter to League of Nations (your telegram No. 15 refers). Resolutions were passed in favour of both motions.

Situation in Mecca is critical, and pilgrims are [group undecypherable] excited, more particularly Indians and Egyptians. As an indication of the gravity of the situation may be cited the fact that practically three-quarters of camelmen have returned to their homes, as they are afraid of trouble during Haj, and not more than 6,000 remain in Mecca to transport pilgrims to and from Arafat. Water is scarce at Mecca, and sickness very prevalent, but no epidemics of a serious nature to date.

(Sent to India.)

[E 3790/367/91]

No. 169.

Vice-Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 21.)

(No. 75. Secret.)

Sir,

Jeddah, June 1, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith my report on the situation in the Hejaz during the period the 1st to the 31st May, 1926.

2. Copies of this report are being sent to Egypt, Jerusalem (2), Bagdad, Aden, Simla, Beirut (for Damascus), Khartoum (through Port Sudan), and Singapore.

I have, &c.

S. R. JORDAN.

Enclosure 1 in No. 169.

Jeddah Report for the Period May 1-31, 1926.

(Secret.)

OWING to the arrival of many pilgrims in the Hejaz for the approaching pilgrimage and also of a number of delegates to attend the conference called by Ibn Saud to discuss ways and means of ensuring peace in the Hejaz and the comfort and safety of pilgrims to the Holy Land, the political situation both internal and external during the period under report has been interesting.

2. Internally the situation presents certain difficulties the chief of which is no doubt the dissatisfaction of many of the more fanatical tribes of the Hejaz at the moderate policy adopted by Ibn Saud towards the questions of tomb worship, smoking and other such things which are rigorously excluded from the Wahabi faith, as such were not practised by the Prophet.

3. Ibn Saud's brother Mohammed, who is a fanatical Wahabi and married to the daughter of Ibn Bajaid the Sheikh of the Ghut-Ghut, the most fanatical tribe in the Arabian peninsula, recently left Mecca in great anger and joined his father-in-law.

4. In order to appease these unruly elements which are actually his main power and support, Ibn Saud was obliged to adopt a more drastic policy, and so sent the Grand Kadi of the Hejaz, a certain Sheikh Abdullah Bileihed, to Medina to attend to the destruction of the tombs of the Prophet's family.

5. The Grand Kadi eventually persuaded seventeen of the ulama of Medina to issue a fetva in which they set out that tomb worship is forbidden, and thereupon the tombs were destroyed. I attach hereto a copy of the fetva with the names of the signatories, as published in the Mecca newspaper "Umm-al-Kura," together with a long article on the same subject by the editor,* but inspired, if not actually written, by Ibn Saud himself.

6. Information from Medina would indicate that a certain amount of dissatisfaction is manifesting itself amongst the population of that town, and many people have left for Yambo and other centres. The ulama who refused to sign the fetva are naturally in disgrace, and it is considered possible that they may be prevented from continuing their religious functions.

7. Smoking has also been forbidden, in public, as has also the playing of music and other such pastimes, as they are considered injurious to the body and a waste of time when devout Moslems should be calling upon Allah instead of amusing themselves.

8. The Wahabi contentions in this respect has recently received a great set forward on account of a fetva issued by the religious heads in Cairo in respect of the Mahmal.

Ibn Saud again forced by his fanatics was not prepared to allow the Mahmal to come to the Hejaz from Egypt unless certain formalities entailed by his beliefs were complied with. They were as follows:—

- (1.) No music to accompany the Mahmal after Jeddah.
- (2.) No smoking in public.
- (3.) No circumambulating or worship of tombs.

The Egyptian Government referred these matters to their religious heads and a fetva was issued in consequence stating that these conditions were in accordance with the Koran or traditions, and the Mahmal and pilgrims should proceed. I attach hereto a copy of the fetva, together with the comments thereon by the "Umm-al-Kura."*

This action on the part of the Egyptian authorities has undoubtedly given Wahabism a great boost, and the far-reaching effects of the fetva cannot at present be estimated. But certainly it will mean a consolidation of the Wahabi régime in the Hejaz, and will be the prelude to further fanatical exigencies on their part.

9. The conference which is being held in Mecca under the auspices of Ibn Saud is to meet on the 1st June, and as far as I have been able to ascertain, and from the tone of the article regarding the Egyptian fetva in the "Umm-al-Kura," the work of the conference will be chiefly the dissemination of Wahabi propaganda and a religious discussion on these points.

The question of the comfort and safety of the pilgrims has already been attended to by the present Government, and I gather that they are not prepared to enter into any discussion as to any sort of divided control of the Holy Places, though a committee composed of representatives of the various elements of the Moslem world may be elected to advise the Hejaz Government on certain points relating to the pilgrimage.

10. The Ghut-Ghut tribe referred to above muster perhaps 5,000 fighting men, and are commonly recognised throughout the Hejaz as the most fanatical and savage tribe in the Arabian peninsula. They are closely allied with the Dukhana, another fanatical tribe, and with assistance from the Arabs around Khurma and Taraba are forcing Ibn Saud to put into effect all the Wahabi tenets. Should he fail to do so these tribes are capable of associating with the Imam of Yemen, or anybody else for that matter, and conniving at the overthrow of Ibn Saud, whom they openly called an infidel. Ibn Saud's recent actions in Medina and Jeddah will undoubtedly appease them somewhat, and the effects of the Egyptian fetva cannot be lost upon them, but they are nevertheless clamouring for Ibn Saud to return to Riyadh and attend to the internal matters of Nejd, which apparently have not been so flourishing since his departure two years ago.

Just before Ibn Saud took steps to satisfy their incessant demands for a more strict enforcement of their religious principles this tribe looted a camel train of

* Not printed.

300 bags of rice being transported from Hassa to Riyadh as, so they said, Ibn Saud had not sent them any food for months.

11. The trouble would now appear to have blown over, and unless some fanatical Indians or Bokharis become annoyed at the destruction of the various tombs the pilgrimage should pass off without any incidents. In order to lessen the possibility of trouble Ibn Saud has as far as possible refused permission for his own people to make the pilgrimage this year.

12. A further incident of some importance recently was the arrest of Sherif Mohsen-el-Mansur, uncle of the late King of the Hejaz, and one of the intriguers who nearly delivered the Hejaz garrison and town into the hands of the Wahabis some months back. Sherif Mohsen is practically the head of the Harb and Billi tribes in the Hejaz, and as such had a certain amount of influence. Three days after his arrest and departure for Riyadh thirty-four other Hejazis were arrested and sent to Taif, where they are to be tried for treason. Prominent amongst these latter is Said Ahmed Saggof once the private secretary and Lord Chamberlain of King Ali. This party had apparently been holding secret conclaves and conspiring for the overthrow of the Wahabi régime. Certain incriminating correspondence addressed to persons in Egypt and the Yemen is supposed to have been intercepted and the plot discovered in this manner. I have not been able to ascertain the details of this matter to date but hope to do so later. A list of the arrested persons is attached.*

13. It appears from information received from Mecca that certain Indian and Javanese pilgrims are availing themselves of the opportunity of openly expressing to the mass of Moslems gathered in Mecca their ideas of external politics, and it is feared that some of them are offending even their own people by their frankness.

Probably the worst in this respect is an Indian, by name Maulvi Sana Ullah, of Amritsar, who loses no opportunity of addressing meetings and expressing his views to the gathered assemblies. He is apparently extremely anti-British and continually exhorting the world's Moslems to throw off the Christian oppressors and be free. His expressions of religion and Indian politics have apparently given offence to a number of the Indian pilgrims, and a certain amount of discontent at his utterances is becoming manifest.

14. Sheikh Rashid Raza of Egypt has also, it appears, trodden rather heavily on the toes of various sects of Islam, as have several other persons of minor importance.

15. A Javanese by the name of Tjokorominato, President of the Haramat-ul-Ikhwan of Netherlands East Indies, has also been very prominent and is most active in his propaganda against the white races who are victimising the poor Moslems of Java and Malaya. Prominent amongst his followers are the following:—

Haji Rasul, editor of the "Al Manar," Padang.

Pakeh Jenan-bin-Taib, or Jenan Taib, editor of the "Seman Azhar," and others.

It is confidently stated that these persons are about to make a determined attempt to promote and further their cause in the Federated Malay States.

16. The Ali brothers, Mohammed Ali and Shaukat Ali, recently arrived from India and were met by the Governor and Mayor of Jeddah under instructions from the King. They were treated as royal guests, and left the same day for Mecca. They had no complaints to make regarding the administration of Kamaran, where they told local people they were treated courteously. This is rather different to Sana Ullah, mentioned above, who, upon his arrival in Jeddah, told the Indian pilgrimage officer that such a disgrace could no longer be allowed to exist, and that he would leave no stone unturned to put an end to this inhuman and indelicate state of affairs as existed at Kamaran quarantine station.

17. As far as I have been able to ascertain to date, there appears to be little or no communistic activity in Mecca amongst the pilgrims at present. Of Communists there are plenty, but they are chiefly Communists by interest rather than from conviction.

18. Most of the pan-Islam and anti-Christian fanatics who are always cursing the white man's domination are classed as Communists by the local people, but this appellation is entirely erroneous. That they would avail themselves of genuine communistic ideas, teachings or money, is undoubtedly a fact, but only as a furtherance to their own ideas and ambitions.

* Not printed.

19. A communistic Moslem delegation from Russia has accepted Ibn Saud's invitation to the Mecca Conference, and is headed by one Dhiaeddin-bin-Farideddin, chief of the Central Religious Ministry.

20. I now learn that the Mecca Conference has been postponed for five days to allow this Soviet Moslem delegation sufficient time to reach Mecca. It will be after their arrival that the real propaganda may be expected.

21. The local attitude regarding the Yemen is one of constant watchfulness, but I am inclined to consider that the big pilgrimage from Egypt and the fetva issued therewith will, besides the effects already mentioned above, react adversely to the Imam in this respect also, and may possibly be the deathblow to the intriguers of the old régime and the orthodox Moslems, who, being dissatisfied with the Wahabis, were endeavouring to persuade the Imam to attack.

22. During the period under report the existence of the Capitulations in the Hejaz were on two occasions called in question, and, although the request of the foreign representatives were acceded to, Ibn Saud claims that there are no Capitulations in the Hejaz and cannot be, as this land is a holy land and none but the holy law of the Koran, i.e., Sharia Law, can be maintained in the Hejaz.

23. A further advance in the way of administration has been made by Ibn Saud who has caused to be appointed in all the principal towns of the Hejaz an advisory council composed of the leading men of the town. Their duties are chiefly as their name implies, but, further, certain of them are to be elected as representatives to proceed to Mecca to discuss questions of policy when the necessity arises.

24. The pilgrims continue to arrive daily, and with the advent of the Mahmal at least 15,000 pilgrims are expected from Egypt. It would appear as if not less than 50,000 to 60,000 persons will be making the pilgrimage this season, which, on account of the short notice, is exceptionally good and will give the Hejaz finances an opportunity to recover from the effects of the war. Approximately 36,500 pilgrims have arrived to date.

25. The Egyptian Government have recently appointed a new Egyptian consul at Jeddah, by name Emin Bey Tewfik, lately at Lyons in France.

26. The motor concession is now in full swing and recently acquired twenty-five Ford cars from Egypt which ply between Mecca and Jeddah. Forty chauffeurs and mechanics were brought from Egypt to work the service, but many of these have found the conditions and climate of Jeddah too severe, and have broken their contracts and returned. Local drivers have been engaged to replace them.

27. The condenser is nearing completion and it is hoped to start supplying water at an early date.

28. Eight slaves have been repatriated during the period under report.

S. R. JORDAN.

Enclosure 2 in No. 169.

Extract from the Mecca Newspaper "Umm-al-Kura," No. 69, dated April 30, 1926.

THE FRANK STATEMENT.

IT reached us from our correspondent at Medina that the Grand Kadi of the Hejaz, Sheikh Abdullah-bin-Bilehid, after his arrival at Medina, made an interview with the learned men of the city, discussed with them many matters and asked them some questions, to which they answered very distinctly.

The following is the text of the questions and the answers:—

In the name of God, the Most Merciful, the Compassionate!

What have the learned men of Medina, may God enlighten them and increase their knowledge, got to say about the building over the tombs and using same as mosques? Is it allowable or not? If it is not allowable, but prohibited and strictly forbidden, should it be demolished and praying there prevented or not? And if the building is in a place like "El Bakea," where the building prevents using the space built over, is it an unlawful thing and should it be removed because of the

oppression it brings on the deservers or not? And are the actions which the ignorant people do at such tombs, like rubbing themselves against them, asking them as they do to God for help, drawing themselves near to them by making sacrifices and votive offerings, and lighting lamps on same, allowable or not? Is it also allowable to turn towards the tomb of the Prophet, prayer and peace of God may be upon him, calling for help, &c., or to go round about it, to kiss it and to rub one's body against it? And is "Tarheem" and "Tazkeer" between the time of calling for prayer and praying and before dawn and on Fridays, as is done in the holy mosque, lawful or not?

Please give us a ruling in these respects and mention the proofs supporting same.

Answer.

We say, and pray God may grant us success, that building on tombs is forbidden as agreed upon owing to the correct traditions related prohibiting same; and thus many learned men gave a ruling to the effect that it should be pulled down. This is supported by the tradition of Ali, may God be pleased with him, who said to Ali-el-Hayag: "May I send you to do as God's Prophet, may prayer and peace of God be upon him, did send me to do, that is, not to leave a statue unless you destroy it, and not to leave a high tomb unless you level it down."

As to the using of the tombs as mosques and praying in them, it is absolutely forbidden, and lighting lamps on them is also forbidden, as is mentioned in the tradition of Ibn Abbas, who said that the Prophet of God has cursed the female visitors of tombs and the people who use the tombs as mosques and place lamps over them (related by people of religious laws).

The things which the ignorant people do at tombs, like rubbing themselves against them, drawing themselves near them by sacrifices and votive offerings and asking them as is done with God are unlawful and religiously forbidden, and should not be done at all.

As to turning towards the tomb of the Prophet, may prayers and peace of God be upon him, it is better to stop it as is known from the important religious books and because the best direction is that which is towards the "Kibla." To go round about it or to rub the body against it and to kiss it is absolutely forbidden.

The "Tazkir, tarheem and tasleem" are something new.

This is what we know as far as we can understand. And every learned man has got a superior to him.

Signatures:

MOHAMMED-BIN-SADIK.
MOHAMMED-BIN-MAHMOUD-EL-AZHARI.
MOHAMMED ZAKI.
MAHMOUD SHAABAN.
MOHAMMED-BIN-ALI-EL-TURKI.
MOHAMMED-EL-TAYEB.
SADDIK SAID.
MOHAMMED-EL-HASHEMI.
HAFAZ IBRAHIM BAZI.
OMAR-EL-KURDI.
BISHIR-BIN-AHMED-EL-GHOTHI.
KHALIL-BIN-MOHAMMED.
HAMID-BIN-EL-TAYEB.
AHMED-BIN-AHMED.
ASSAD KAMAKHI.
HAMAD-BIN-TAYY.
MOHAMMED-BIN-SAKR.

Dated 25th Ramadan, 1344.

Enclosure 3 in No. 169.

Extract from the Mecca Newspaper "Umm-al-Kura," No. 73, dated May 28, 1926.

RULING OF THE LEARNED MEN OF EGYPT. VISITING THE TOMBS,
TOBACCO AND MUSIC.

His Excellency the Sub-Minister of Interior,

THE contents of your Excellency's letter of the 10th May, 1926, No. 91 (Administration), are noted as well as the enclosed copy of telegram received from His Majesty the King of the Hejaz and Sultan of Nejd to His Excellency the Minister of the Interior of Egypt, requesting information as to the religious rules regarding the points of the telegram and as to what should be followed this year about the pilgrimage with a view to what His Majesty King Ibn Saud indicated.

On consideration we found that the points about which a decision can be given are those of paragraphs 6 and 7 regarding visiting tombs, music and tobacco.

As regards visiting tombs, we say that it is religiously approved as the Prophet, may peace and prayer of God be upon him, said "I had prevented you from visiting the tombs, but now I say visit them."

The Prophet used to visit the tombs of the Moslems at Bakea-el-Gharkad and say: "Peace be upon you as you have kept patient and blessed is the consequence of that dwelling."

A certain Mahshi Imdad-el-Fattah has copied out from the "Kahstani" the following: (at El Ehia): The preferred course of visiting tombs is that one should stand towards the "Kibla" to say salaams and should not rub the grave, neither should he kiss it or touch it.

The learned men explained many things which are disliked when tombs are being visited. They summarised the same by their saying: "And also everything that is not known of the Sunna," which is a general rule by which any action not known of the Sunna can be compared. They gave as examples, the touching and kissing. It is known that going round about other than the "Kaaba" is not of the Sunna.

As regards smoking or tobacco, we say that it was not existing in the time of the Prophet, may peace and prayer of God be upon him, neither was it existing in the time of the Caliphs, the friends and the Imams, but it came into existence in the late centuries.

The learned men differed very much about it. Some of them said that it is prohibited relying on a tradition of Ahmed related by Om Salma to the effect that the Prophet prohibited using anything which makes one drunk or weak, and said that if it is not intoxicating it causes weakness. They further stated that, according to the religious rules, if the Master prohibited a permitted thing for a religious interest it should be prohibited.

Some of them stated that it is a disliked thing owing to the apparent danger it causes to bodies and loss of money.

Some others did not think that it caused weakness, so they allowed it according to the general rule which is "things are either permitted or forbidden." They replied to those who said that it is prohibited or disliked by saying that such are two religious rulings which cannot be proved without evidence and it did not exist.

It appears that the most reasonable of such sayings is the one which says that it is disliked. So it ought to be left out and not used, as small things turn out great.

As regards playing and hearing of music, it is a play, pleasure and waste of time, the thing which is prohibited. For our learned men said that it is a disliked thing to play, dance, clap or to play on musical instruments which are all prohibited. The only thing exempted is beating the "duff" (drum) on marriages and religious ceremonies.

We think it better that our Government should facilitate pilgrimage for the Moslems.

Salaams and respects.

MOHAMMED ABU-EL-FADHL,
Sheikh of El Azhar Mosque.
ABDUL RAHMAN KURRA-A,
Mufti of Egypt.

Dated May 12, 1926 (29.10.1344).

No. 39, fetvas, p. 10, book 28.

[E 3811/80/91]

No. 170.

British Delegation, International Sanitary Conference, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 22.)

(No. 11.)
Sir,

*British Delegation, International Sanitary Conference,
Paris, June 21, 1926.*

WE have the honour to transmit to you herewith the signed and sealed duplicate (British precedence) of the Anglo-Dutch Agreement in regard to Kamaran, and the signed duplicate of the protocol accompanying it. The signature of these instruments took place in His Majesty's Embassy on the 19th instant. We were advised that it was unnecessary to seal the protocol, and, as M. van Troostwyk concurred in this view, the seals were omitted.

Spare copies of the instruments have been given to the Netherlands and Indian delegations.

The Netherlands signatories were furnished with special full powers, which, as they were not required in connection with the conference, they gave to us and which we now transmit for retention in the Foreign Office.*

We have, &c.

G. S. BUCHANAN.
JOHN MURRAY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 170.

Anglo-Dutch Agreement regarding Kamaran.

THE Governments of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of India of the one part and the Government of the Netherlands for the Netherlands and for the Netherlands East Indies of the other part recognising that the treatment of pilgrims travelling to the Hejaz from the South at Kamaran Quarantine Station is their common concern, and being desirous to establish by agreement provisions for its efficacious administration,

Have agreed upon the following provisions:—

Measures to be applied on Pilgrim Ships and at the Quarantine Station.

1. The British and Indian Governments of the one part and the Netherlands Government for the Netherlands and for the Netherlands East Indies of the other part agree that the measures prescribed in the Schedule to this Agreement shall be applied with effect from the date on which this Agreement enters into force, pending the ratification of the revised International Sanitary Convention on behalf of India and the Netherlands East Indies.

Internal Organisation.

2. The Civil Administrator of the Island of Kamaran appointed by the Government of India shall be the Director of the Quarantine Station, and in that capacity shall exercise general supervision and control over the whole staff of the station. He shall be assisted by two medical officers, one of whom shall be appointed by the Government of India, and the other by the Government of the Netherlands East Indies. It is agreed in principle that these two medical officers shall be on a footing of complete equality. In order, however, to ensure necessary co-ordination in matters of common concern in regard to the internal administration of the

* Not printed.

Quarantine Station it is agreed that the relative seniority of the two officers shall be determined as follows:—

Each medical officer shall be appointed in the first instance for a period of two years, during the first of which he shall be described as Deputy Medical Superintendent and during the second as Medical Superintendent. For the first year from the date on which this Agreement enters into force the medical officer appointed by the Government of India shall be Medical Superintendent. If at the end of the period of two years from first appointment the Medical Superintendent continue to be employed on the staff of the Quarantine Station, he shall revert to the position of Deputy Medical Superintendent for the first year of his second term of office or of any further term. Should the Medical Superintendent for any cause vacate his appointment before the end of his term of office, he will be succeeded by the Deputy Medical Superintendent, who will act as Medical Superintendent for the remainder of the term without losing his right to be Medical Superintendent for the next year.

3. The Medical Superintendent shall be the chief technical officer of the Quarantine Station.

4. The nature of the measures to be applied in the case of ships containing only pilgrims from the Netherlands East Indies shall be determined by the medical officer appointed by the Government of the Netherlands East Indies irrespective of his position as Medical Superintendent or Deputy Medical Superintendent. Similarly, the measures to be applied in the case of ships not containing pilgrims from the Netherlands East Indies shall be determined by the medical officer appointed by the Government of India. In the case of ships containing pilgrims both from the Netherlands East Indies and from elsewhere the decision of the Director of the Quarantine Station as to the measures to be applied shall be final.

5. It shall be open to the Governments of India and of the Netherlands East Indies to appoint medical and sanitary assistants to be attached to the medical officers appointed by their respective Governments.

Epidemiological Intelligence.

6. The Government of India undertake to communicate to the Far Eastern Epidemiological Bureau at Singapore information regarding cases of plague or cholera which have manifested themselves on board pilgrim ships calling at Kamaran or at the Quarantine Station.

Financial Administration.

Pilgrim Dues.

7. The amount of the dues to be paid to the Quarantine Station in respect of each pilgrim carried on all ships required to call at Kamaran shall remain fixed at Rs. 10 until the Governments of India and of the Netherlands East Indies determine otherwise by agreement.

Financial Responsibility of the various Governments concerned in the administration of the Quarantine Station and Repayment of Advances made by them.

8. The British and Indian Governments of the one part and the Government of the Netherlands for the Netherlands and for the Netherlands East Indies of the other part agree in principle—

- (1) that the sums advanced by the British and Indian Governments to meet deficits which were incurred in the administration of the Quarantine Station up to the 31st March, 1922, shall be repaid to these Governments out of the revenue of the Quarantine Station;
- (2) that responsibility for any further deficit incurred after the date on which this agreement enters into force shall be shared in proportion to the number of pilgrims by whom dues are paid to the Quarantine Station; this proportion to be calculated in accordance with the number of pilgrims embarking from British or Netherlands territory from the date on which the agreement enters into force.

9. For the purpose of repayment of the advances already made by the British and Indian Governments and of creating a reserve to meet future contingencies, provision shall be made for the maintenance in India of a fund to be called "the Kamaran Quarantine Station Fund" with effect from the date on which the agreement enters into force. To this fund shall be paid—

- (a) 5 per cent. of the amount collected annually from pilgrim dues, which shall forthwith be paid in equal moieties to the British and Indian Governments, as an instalment of the amount due to those Governments in respect of the advances referred to in article 8 (1) until the whole of that amount is liquidated;
- (b) any surplus available in respect of the previous financial year after provision has been made for the expenditure required during the forthcoming year, which surplus shall bear compound interest at 5 per cent.

Annual Report and Budget.

10. The annual budget estimates of the Quarantine Station shall be prepared by the director, together with an annual report. These shall be submitted, with the observations of the Medical Superintendent and Deputy Medical Superintendent, to the Government of India six months before the commencement of the forthcoming financial year. Copies of the annual report, the actual figures for the preceding year and the budget estimates for the forthcoming year, together with the balance sheet of the Kamaran Quarantine Station Fund, and the observations of the Medical Superintendent and the Deputy Medical Superintendent thereon, shall be communicated forthwith by the Government of India to the Government of the Netherlands East Indies. The observations of the Government of India shall be communicated to the Government of the Netherlands East Indies not later than three months before the commencement of the ensuing financial year. The budget of the Quarantine Station shall not be approved until the Government of the Netherlands East Indies have signified their acceptance of it, or such amendments have been made as are accepted by the Governments of India and of the Netherlands East Indies.

Capital Expenditure.

11. The Governments of India and of the Netherlands East Indies shall jointly determine the improvements and alterations of the Quarantine Station involving capital expenditure, the order in which such improvements shall be executed, and the provision for their execution to be made in the successive annual Budgets of the Quarantine Station.

Subsidy to Civil Administration of Island of Kamaran.

12. A sum of Rs. 10,000 shall be paid annually from the revenues of the Quarantine Station to the Government of India towards the maintenance of the civil administration of the Island of Kamaran.

Adjustment of Disputes arising out of the Interpretation of the Agreement.

13. Disputes between the British or Indian Governments of the one part and the Governments of the Netherlands or the Netherlands East Indies of the other part arising out of the interpretation of this Agreement shall be adjusted as follows:—

If the Director of the Quarantine Station is unable to agree with the medical officer appointed by the Government of the Netherlands East Indies, when the latter is acting either as Medical Superintendent or as Deputy Medical Superintendent, as to the interpretation of any article of this Agreement, he shall report the circumstances to the Government of India, who shall forthwith communicate his report to the Government of the Netherlands East Indies. The respective Governments shall thereupon endeavour to reach a settlement of the dispute by agreement. If, after full consideration, the Government of India and the Government of the Netherlands East Indies are unable to reach a

settlement of the dispute by agreement, or if as between themselves a dispute arises in regard to the Budget or any matter referred to in this Agreement or in regard to the interpretation of this Agreement, they shall severally communicate statements of the facts to the British and Netherlands Governments, who shall endeavour to reach a settlement through the diplomatic channel. If a settlement is still not reached by this procedure, the British and Netherlands Governments shall each appoint a representative in order that these representatives may endeavour in conference to reach a settlement of the dispute by agreement. If the two representatives fail to reach an agreement they shall jointly appoint a third member. If on this point there is disagreement between the two representatives, the British and Netherlands Governments shall request the President of the Permanent Court of International Justice to appoint a third member and the Commission thus constituted shall determine the dispute.

14. This agreement, which is subject to confirmation by an exchange of notes to be effected through the diplomatic channel, shall enter into force on the 1st January, 1927, from which date the agreement shall be in force for a period of eight years. It shall, however, be subject to revision after the 1st January, 1933.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorised for that purpose, have signed the present agreement and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate at Paris, the 19th June, 1926.

(L.S.)	G. S. BUCHANAN.
(L.S.)	JOHN MURRAY.
(L.S.)	D. T. CHADWICK.
(L.S.)	W. DOUDE VAN TROOSTWYK.
(L.S.)	DE VOGEL.
(L.S.)	VAN DER PLAS.

SCHEDULE.

General Provisions.

I.—When there are cases of plague, cholera, or yellow fever in the port of departure of a pilgrim ship, embarkation shall not take place unless the Government of the country to which the port belongs has taken measures by immunisation, segregation, or observation after the persons have been collected in groups, with or without bacteriological examination, intended to ensure that none of the persons embarked shall be attacked by one of these diseases.

II.—A ship which, in addition to ordinary passengers, among whom pilgrims of the upper classes may be included, carries pilgrims in less proportion than one pilgrim per 100 tons gross, shall not be considered a pilgrim ship.

III.—As far as it is practicable, pilgrims who disembark, and pilgrims who embark at sanitary stations must have no contact with one another at the landing places. Pilgrims who have been disembarked must be distributed in camp in as small groups as possible.

It is necessary that they be supplied with wholesome drinking water, obtained either from local sources, or by distillation.

Provisions Applicable to Pilgrim Ships.

IV.—Pilgrim ships must be capable of accommodating pilgrims in the between-decks.

Over and above the space required for the crew, the ship must provide for each person, irrespective of age, an area of 1.50 square metres, equivalent to 16 English square feet, and a height between decks of at least 1.80 metres, equivalent to about 6 English feet.

No pilgrim shall be accommodated below the first between-deck below the waterline. Satisfactory ventilation must be ensured, and, in the case of any deck below the upper between-deck, it shall be mechanical.

In addition to the spaces reserved as above for pilgrims, the ship must provide on the upper deck for each person, irrespective of age, a free space of at least 0.56 square metre, equivalent to

about 6 English square feet, not reckoning the space which is reserved on the upper deck for temporary hospitals, crew, shower baths, latrines and for the working of the ship.

V.—Adequately screened washing places must be provided on deck, a sufficient number of them being reserved exclusively for women. The washing places must be supplied with pipes fitted with taps or nozzles able to yield a continuous supply of sea water under pressure even when the ship is at anchor; these taps or nozzles to be in the proportion of 1 per 100 pilgrims or fraction of 100.

V.—The ship must be provided, in addition to closets for the crew, with latrines fitted with a flushing apparatus, or with a water tap. Some of these latrines shall be reserved exclusively for women.

Latrines must be in the proportion of 2 per 100 pilgrims or fraction of 100.

There must be no latrines in the hold.

VII.—The ship must have two places for cooking set apart for the use of the pilgrims.

VIII.—Properly fitted hospital quarters, constructed with due attention to safety and health, must be reserved for the accommodation of the sick. These quarters must be situated on the upper deck unless, in the opinion of the competent sanitary authority, arrangements fully as hygienic can be made elsewhere. They must be constructed so as to allow persons suffering from infectious diseases, and persons who have been in contact with them, to be isolated according to the nature of their illnesses.

The hospital, including any temporary hospital, must be capable of accommodating at the rate of 8 sq. metres per patient (equivalent to 82 English sq. ft.), 4 per 100 or fraction of 100 of the pilgrims taken on board. The hospitals must be provided with separate latrines.

IX.—Every pilgrim ship must carry such medical remedies, disinfectants, and appliances as are necessary for the treatment of the sick; it must be provided with anti-smallpox and anti-cholera vaccines. It is desirable that it should also be provided with other specific immunising agents (vaccines and sera), in the necessary quantities. The regulations framed for this class of ship by each Government must specify the nature and the quantity of these agents. Medicine and attendance shall be provided for the pilgrims free of charge.

X.—Every pilgrim ship must carry a medical officer, duly qualified in accordance with the regulations in force in the country from which the pilgrims were shipped to the Hejaz, or to which they return therefrom. A second medical officer, with similar qualifications, must be carried when the number of pilgrims on board exceeds 1,000.

XI.—The heavy baggage of pilgrims shall be registered and numbered. Pilgrims may keep with them only such articles as are absolutely necessary; the nature, amount, and dimensions of these articles, shall be decided by regulations framed by each Government for its own ships.

XII.—The competent authority shall not permit the departure of a pilgrim ship until satisfied—

- (a) that the ship has been thoroughly cleansed, and, if necessary, disinfected;
- (b) that the ship is in a condition to undertake the voyage without danger; that she is provided with the necessary gear and apparatus for use in case of shipwreck, accident, or fire; with wireless equipment for sending and receiving which can function independently of the engine room; and with sufficient life-saving apparatus; that she is properly manned, equipped, and ventilated, with awnings of sufficient size to cover the decks; and that there is nothing on board that is, or may become, injurious to the health and safety of passengers;
- (c) that there is on board, over and above the rations for the crew, sufficient food and fuel of good quality for all the pilgrims during the whole voyage, and that there are places suitable for the storage of such food and fuel;
- (d) that the drinking water is of good quality and from a source free from risk of contamination; that it is in sufficient quantity; that the tanks for drinking water are safe from

all contamination and so closed that the water can be supplied only by means of taps or pumps. The water supply fittings known as "sucoirs" are absolutely prohibited;

- (e) that the ship carries a condenser capable of distilling a minimum quantity of 3 litres of water per diem for every person on board, including the crew;
- (f) that the ship possesses a disinfecting chamber, ascertained by the sanitary authority of the port where the pilgrims embark to be safe and efficacious;
- (g) that the provisions of Clause X have been complied with;
- (h) that the deck is free from all merchandise and from encumbrances.

XIII.—The captain may not start without having in his possession—

- (1) a list countersigned by the competent authority showing the name and sex of each of the pilgrims embarked, and the total number of pilgrims he is authorised to carry;
- (2) a bill of health, giving the name, nationality and tonnage of the ship, the name of the captain and of the doctor, the exact number of persons embarked—crew, pilgrims and other passengers—the nature of the cargo, and the place of departure.

The competent authority shall note on the bill of health whether the number of pilgrims permissible under the regulations has been embarked or not, and, in the latter case, the additional number of passengers the ship is authorised to embark at subsequent ports of call.

XIV.—During the voyage the deck intended for the use of pilgrims must be kept free from encumbrances; it must be reserved night and day for the passengers and placed at their disposal without charge.

XV.—The between-decks must be carefully cleansed and rubbed with sand every day while the pilgrims are on deck.

XVI.—The latrines allotted to the passengers, as well as those of the crew, must be kept clean and must be cleansed and disinfected at least three times daily and more often if necessary.

XVII.—The excreta and dejecta of persons showing symptoms of plague, cholera, dysentery or other diseases preventing them from using hospital latrines must be received in vessels containing a disinfecting solution. These vessels shall be emptied into the hospital latrines, which must be thoroughly disinfected every time this is done.

XVIII.—All bedding, carpets and clothing that have been in contact with the sick persons referred to in the preceding clause must be immediately disinfected. The observance of this rule is specially enjoined in respect of the clothes of persons who have been "contacts."

Such of the above-mentioned articles as are of no value must be either thrown overboard, if the ship is not in harbour or in a canal, or else burnt. Other articles must be disinfected.

XIX.—The quarters occupied by the sick, referred to in Clause VIII, must be thoroughly and regularly cleansed and disinfected.

XX.—Not less than 5 litres of drinking water must each day be put at the disposal of every pilgrim, irrespective of age, free of charge.

XXI.—If there be any doubt as to the quality of the drinking water, or any reason to suspect that it may possibly have become contaminated, either at its source or during the voyage, it must be boiled or otherwise sterilised, and the captain shall be responsible for seeing that it is thrown overboard at the first port of call at which he can procure a purer supply.

XXII.—The medical officer shall visit pilgrims, attend sick, and see that the principles of hygiene are observed on board. He must in particular—

- (1) satisfy himself that the rations issued to the pilgrims are of good quality, that their quantity is in accordance with contract, and that they are properly prepared;

- (2) satisfy himself that the provisions of Clauses XVI, XVIII, XX and XXI of this Schedule have been carried out;
- (3) keep a diary of all occurrences relating to health during the voyage, and submit this diary, on request, to the competent authority of the ports of call or the port of final destination.

XXIII.—In the event of a death occurring during the voyage, the captain must enter the fact opposite the name of the deceased on the list countersigned by the authority of the port of departure, and must also enter in the log the name of the deceased, his age, the place from which he came, the certified cause of death, and the date of death.

In the event of a death from infectious disease, the corpse, wrapped in a shroud impregnated with a disinfecting solution, must be committed to the deep.

XXIV.—The captain must see that all preventive measures taken during the voyage are entered in the log. The log shall be submitted by him on request to the competent authority of the port of call or the port of final destination.

At each port of call the captain must cause the list drawn up in accordance with Clause XIII to be countersigned by the competent authority.

In the event of a pilgrim disembarking during the voyage, the captain must note the fact on the list opposite to the pilgrim's name.

In the event of persons embarking, their names must be entered on the list in accordance with the aforesaid Clause XIII. This must be done before the competent authority, as in duty bound, again countersigns the list.

Measures at Kamaran.

XXV.—Pilgrim ships from the South, bound for the Hejaz, must put in at the Kamaran Quarantine Station, and shall be dealt with as provided in the following clauses.

XXVI.—Ships found on medical inspection to be "healthy" shall be given free pratique on completion of the following procedure:—

The pilgrims shall be disembarked; they shall take a shower bath or bathe in the sea; their soiled linen and any portion of their personal effects or their baggage considered by the officer indicated in article 4 of the Agreement to be suspect, shall be disinfected. The duration of these operations, including disembarkation and embarkation, must not exceed forty-eight hours. Provided this period is not exceeded, such bacteriological examination as may be considered necessary by the above-mentioned officer may be made.

If no recognised or suspected case of plague or of cholera be discovered during these operations, the pilgrims shall immediately be re-embarked and the ship shall proceed to the Hejaz.

Notwithstanding the above, the officer indicated in article 4 of the Agreement may authorise ships recognised after medical inspection to be "healthy" to proceed to the Hejaz without being submitted to the measures prescribed, provided that all the pilgrims on board have been immunised against cholera and smallpox, exception being made in the case of smallpox for those pilgrims who show marks of having had the disease, and that the provisions of this Schedule have been strictly adhered to.

XXVII.—Suspected ships, that is to say ships which have had cases of plague or of cholera on board but no fresh case of plague within seven days or of cholera within five days of the date of arrival, or on board of which an unusual mortality among rats has been discovered shall be dealt with as follows:—

The pilgrims shall be disembarked; they shall take a shower bath or bathe in the sea; their soiled linen or any portion of their baggage or personal effects considered by the officer indicated in article 4 of the Agreement to be suspect shall be disinfected.

The parts of the ship occupied by the sick shall be disinfected. The duration of these operations, including disembarkation and embarkation, must not exceed forty-eight hours; provided this

period is not exceeded such bacteriological examination may be made as the officer indicated in article 4 of the Agreement may consider necessary, and at his option measures may be taken to effect the destruction of all rats on board. These measures shall be carried out in such a manner as to avoid, as far as possible, damage to the ship's plating, engines and cargo, and must not last more than twenty-four hours.

If no case or suspected case of plague or of cholera be discovered during these operations, the pilgrims shall immediately be re-embarked and the ship shall proceed to the Hejaz.

XXVIII.—Infested ships, that is to say ships which have cases of plague, rat plague, or cholera on board, or which have had on board cases of plague within seven days, or of cholera within five days, of the date of their arrival, shall be dealt with as follows:—

Persons found suffering from plague or from cholera shall be disembarked and isolated in hospital. The other passengers shall be disembarked and isolated in as many small groups as possible, in order that if plague or cholera break out in one group the whole party may not be affected by the outbreak.

The soiled linen, clothing, and personal effects of the crew and the passengers shall be disinfected thoroughly, as well as the whole or such parts of the ship, and of the baggage, as the officer indicated in article 4 of the Agreement shall decide.

The passengers shall remain at the Quarantine Station five days in the case of cholera, or seven days in the case of plague. If a new case occurs after disembarkation, the period of observation shall be extended by five days for cholera and seven days for plague, to date from the isolation of the last case.

In the case of plague, or of the discovery of rats infected with plague, adequate measures shall be taken by the sanitary authority to effect the destruction of all rats on board, subject to the provisions in Clause XXVII. Pilgrims shall not be re-embarked, and the ship shall not be permitted to proceed to the Hejaz until after the completion of these measures.

XXIX.—If it is established on the arrival of a ship from Kamaran at a Hejaz port that cases of plague or cholera have occurred on board during the voyage, or at the time of arrival, and the ship returns to Kamaran, the measures specified in Clause XXVIII shall be applied.

XXX.—If the pilgrimage is infected a pilgrim ship may be ordered to put in at Kamaran on its return voyage to the south by the consular authority of the country for which any of its pilgrims are bound. In this event the officer indicated in article 4 of the Agreement shall decide what quarantine measures, if any, shall be taken at the station. These measures may include observation, vaccination and bacteriological examination. If no case of plague or cholera has manifested itself during the voyage nor at Kamaran, the duration of these measures shall not exceed five days from the date of departure from the Hejaz. If a case of plague or cholera has manifested itself on board or at the Quarantine Station the measures prescribed in Clause XXVIII shall be applied. However, deratisation of the ship shall be effected only if deemed necessary by the above-mentioned officer.

Enclosure 2 in No. 170.

Protocol.

On the occasion of the signature of the Agreement between the Governments of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of India of the one part and the Government of the Netherlands for the Netherlands and the Netherlands East Indies of the other part concerning the administration of the Quarantine Station at Kamaran, the undersigned plenipotentiaries have considered it appropriate with a view to the removal of doubt and to the smooth working of the

Agreement to place on record the manner in which they interpret the Agreement in regard to the following matters arising out of articles 7 to 12 :—

(1.) For the purpose of this protocol it has been assumed that the financial year for the Quarantine Station at Kamaran will coincide with the calendar year.

(2.) It is understood that the Government of India will credit to the Kamaran Quarantine Station Fund on the 1st January, 1927, the balance derived from pilgrimage dues estimated to be available on the 31st March, 1927. Thereafter the sums to be credited to the fund will be those specified in article 9 of the agreement. These sums may be distinguished as follows :—

- (a) sums dependent on the gross receipts from pilgrim dues in the immediately preceding year;
- (b) sums dependent on the results of the working of the immediately preceding year and on the prospects of the forthcoming year.

On the 1st January, 1928, 5 per cent. of the gross receipts from pilgrim dues realised in 1927 will be credited to the fund, and will immediately be paid out for disposal in the manner prescribed under article 9 (a) of the Agreement. This sum will merely pass through the accounts of the fund and will continue to do so each year until the advances referred to in article 8 (1) of the Agreement have been fully repaid. The surplus, if any, available for credit to the fund in respect of the financial year 1927 will not be ascertainable until the accounts of the financial year 1928 are closed, since any balance which may exist on the 31st December, 1927, as the result of the working of the year 1927, is reserved in the first instance under article 9 (b) of the Agreement to make good any deficit which may occur in the following year 1928. The same procedure will apply to each subsequent year with appropriate change of dates.

(3.) It is understood that the order of priority of payments from the fund will be as follows :—

- (a.) The first charge on the fund is the annual payment provided for in article 9 (a) of the Agreement. This payment will continue until the whole of the advances referred to in article 8 (1) of the Agreement has been repaid. The first payment will be due on the 1st January, 1928, in respect of the receipts from pilgrim dues in 1927.
- (b.) The next charge on the fund is to meet the deficit, if any, incurred in the financial year, and to ensure that a sufficient sum is provided to meet, together with the revenue anticipated from dues in the forthcoming year, the total estimated expenditure of that year under all heads, namely, the running expenses of the station, including the annual payment referred to in article 12 of the Agreement and the cost of execution of the improvements and alterations referred to in article 11. This deficit, if any, will in the first instance be ascertainable when the accounts of 1927 are closed.
- (c.) The next charge on the fund is the repayment in such further instalments as may be agreed upon between the Governments of India and of the Netherlands East Indies of the balance of the advances referred to in article 8 (1) of the Agreement, the object being to secure the repayment of these advances as early as is consistent with the prompt execution of the improvements and alterations referred to in article 11.
- (d.) The next charge upon the fund is the payment of any advances arising out of the application of article 8 (2) of the Agreement.
- (e.) Thereafter the fund will be available as a reserve to meet further unanticipated expenditure.

(4.) It is understood that, as the British and Indian Governments are not charging interest on the advances referred to in

article 8 (1) of the Agreement, interest is only due on the difference between the amount at the credit of the fund and the outstanding amount of those advances.

Signed in duplicate at Paris, the 19th June, 1926.

G. S. BUCHANAN.
JOHN MURRAY.
D. T. CHADWICK.
W. DOUDE VAN TROOSTWYK.
DE VOGEL.
VAN DER PLAS.

[E 3743/710/91]

No. 171.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Phipps (Paris).

(No. 1852.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, June 25, 1926.

HIS Majesty's Government have recently had under consideration the question of the prevention of the export of arms and ammunition to the rulers of the Arabian peninsula, to which reference was made in my despatch No. 1446 of the 27th April, 1925.

2. Political conditions in Arabia no longer warrant the continuation of this policy, which has in practice proved susceptible of evasion. I shall therefore be glad if you will address to the Government to which you are accredited a note in the following sense.

3. In view of the re-establishment of peace in the Hejaz and of the friendly relations existing between Ibn Saud and the Governments of Irak and Transjordan, His Majesty's Government have come to the conclusion that there is no longer any objection to the admission of arms and ammunition to Arabia, provided that the trade is conducted within the limitations laid down in the Arms Traffic Convention of 1925. In these circumstances I propose to inform Ibn Saud that there is no objection to his placing orders for war material in the United Kingdom subject to the above limitations, and that His Majesty's Government will no longer refuse to grant export licences from this country in respect of such consignments. His Majesty's Government further propose to take similar action in the case of other established rulers in Arabia if they make similar requests, except in the case of the Imam of the Yemen, to whom facilities will not be allowed in this country so long as he remains in occupation of part of the Aden Protectorate.

4. A similar despatch is being addressed to His Majesty's representatives at Rome and Brussels.*

I am, &c.
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

No. 172.

Acting Agent, Jeddah, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 26.)

(No. 70.)
(Telegraphic.) R.

Jeddah, June 24, 1926.

CLASH occurred between Egyptian Mahmal escort and Akhwan between Mecca and Arafat on evening of 19th June. There were losses on both sides, and only arrival of Ibn Saud saved general disaster.

Details follow by despatch when available.
(Sent to India and Egypt.)

* Rome, No. 897, and Brussels, No. 496, *mutatis mutandis*.

[E 3978/710/91]

No. 173.

The Marquess of Crewe to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 30.)

(No. 1201.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Paris presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note sent to M. Briand, dated the 29th June, 1926, respecting the export of arms and ammunition to the rulers of the Arabian peninsula.

Paris, June 29, 1926.

Enclosure in No. 173.

The Marquess of Crewe to M. Briand.

M. le Président du Conseil,

Paris, June 29, 1926.

I HAVE the honour, under instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government has recently had under consideration the question of the export of arms and ammunition to the rulers of the Arabian peninsula, to which reference was made in Lord Crewe's note No. 322 of the 28th April, 1925.

2. In view of the re-establishment of peace in the Hejaz and of the friendly relations existing between Ibn Saud and the Governments of Iraq and Transjordan, His Majesty's Government have come to the conclusion that there is no longer any objection to the admission of arms and ammunition to Arabia, provided that the trade is conducted within the limitations laid down in the Arms Traffic Convention of 1925. In the circumstances, Sir Austen Chamberlain proposes to inform Ibn Saud that there is no objection to his placing orders for war material in the United Kingdom subject to the above limitations, and that His Majesty's Government will no longer refuse to grant export licences from Great Britain in respect of such consignments. His Majesty's Government further propose to take similar action in the case of other established rulers in Arabia if they make similar requests, except in the case of the Imam of the Yemen, to whom facilities will not be allowed in Great Britain so long as he remains in occupation of part of the Aden protectorate.

3. I have the honour to add that His Majesty's representatives at Rome and Brussels have been instructed to address a similar communication to the Governments to which they are accredited.

I have, &c.
CREWE.

CHAPTER III.—SYRIA.

No. 174.

Consul, Damascus, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 5.)

(No. 1.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Damascus, January 4, 1926.

CONSTANTINOPLE despatch No. 296 of 13th April.

Abdul Majid has arrived here and is reported to have declared publicly that he is charged by the French High Commissioner with mission of pacification. Natives think that he is French candidate for throne of Syria.

[E 147/146/89]

No. 175.

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 6, 1926.)

(No. 284.)

Sir,

Damascus, December 27, 1925.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 42 of the 23rd instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the letter of Soubhi Bey Berakat tendering his resignation from the post of President of the State of Syria, and the text of M. de Jouvenel's letter accepting this resignation.*

2. The comments below the second letter are from the newspaper, the "Syrie," of the 23rd instant, and are much to the point. Apparently Soubhi Bey, when at last he was forced to resign and realised that he could hope for no further effective support from the French, determined to safeguard his electoral future by adopting the Nationalist programme.

3. This resignation was inevitable and has been unduly delayed. It was humorously remarked that the French perhaps hesitated so long to bring about his departure because they feared that, when out of office, he might return to his old occupation of a leader of bands in the neighbourhood of Antioch.

4. Soubhi Bey was obviously not the man for the Presidency of the State of Syria. He is deficient in intelligence and speaks Arabic with difficulty. As President of an Arabic-speaking State he had to have his public speeches read by a secretary. He surrounded himself with collaborators having the same linguistic disqualifications. The very general complaint was that the Syrian Government was Turkish, not Arab.

5. Hassan Izzet Pasha, the Minister of Public Works, and the most Turkish member of the Cabinet, has also tendered his resignation.

6. Sheikh Taj-ud-Din, Director of Aukaf (Religious Endowments), and son of the most respected of the ulema, Sheikh Badr-ud-Din, has been asked to act as head of the Syrian State. It seems doubtful whether he will finally accept such an ungrateful task. Colonel Andréa, who has just been promoted to the rank of general, is the effective ruler of Southern Syria, and the native Civilian Government at Damascus has no power whatever.

I have, &c.
W. A. SMART.

[E 148/12/89]

No. 176.

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 6, 1926.)

(No. 285.)

Sir,

Damascus, December 28, 1925.

WITH reference to paragraph 21 of my despatch No. 278 of the 18th instant, I have the honour to report that the Damascus delegation, after an interview with M. de Jouvenel, has returned here, leaving three of its members at Beirut to continue the discussions with the French High Commission.

* Not printed.

2. The following were the demands presented by the delegation as essential for the restoration of peace:—

- (1.) A general amnesty.
- (2.) Unification of the country so as to include the whole of the present State of Syria, the territory of the Alawites and the districts added to the pre-war Lebanon to form the "Grand Liban," including Beirut and the other coastal towns. The pre-war Lebanon would be excluded from this unification. The capital of Unified Syria would, of course, be Damascus.
- (3.) National supremacy, by which is meant that the native Government should have real authority and no longer be a figure-head; that the French advisers should be confined to an advisory rôle, and should not, as now, constitute virtually the Executive.
- (4.) The election of a Constituent Assembly to frame the Constitution of the new Syrian State.
- (5.) A limitation of the period of the French mandate, on the analogy of Irak.

3. Considerable vagueness characterised the formal reply of the French High Commissioner, the text of which was enclosed in despatch No. 174 of the 24th instant from the British acting consul-general at Beirut. M. de Jouvenel evaded the constitutional demands by referring them to the future representative councils of the present State of Syria and of the Alawites—councils which are to issue from elections decreed in conditions objectionable to the Nationalists (see my despatch No. 283 of the 27th instant). He was only specific on the question of the amnesty, subsequently embodied in the *arrêté* enclosed in Mr. Mayers's despatch No. 175 of the 25th instant and regarded as inadequate by the delegation.

4. The delegates returned to Damascus dissatisfied with the results of their visit. They seem to think that M. de Jouvenel is too much of a politician, and is trying to get the best of them by political manoeuvres. In his conversations with them he apparently refused to include in the Syrian State the districts added to the old Lebanon, but, according to one delegate, he contemplated forming these districts into a separate State. He was, it would appear, not at all encouraging as to the possibility of including the Alawites in the Syrian Unity.

5. The amnesty is only complete for the rank and file of the rebels laying down their arms before the 8th January, 1926. It would be a physical impossibility for all the rebels to get the news of the amnesty and make submission within so brief a period. This French precipitation is reminiscent of General Gamelin's action in giving Damascus, after the bombardment, less than four days to pay £T. 100,000 gold and surrender 3,000 rifles, a task also physically impossible, and, of course, not accomplished.

6. Moreover, as the delegates pointed out, the inhabitants of the Jebel Druse, who form the bulk of the rebels, have always been allowed to carry arms, by the Turks as well as by the French, who, indeed, confirmed this right in article 7 of the famous Druse Charta of Independence (see my despatch No. 107 of the 23rd June last). It is argued that this right is based on the peculiar necessities of the Jebel Druse, exposed on all sides to armed Bedouin, against whom it can only defend itself by arms. It would therefore, it is maintained, be unfair to disarm the Jebel Druse before disarming its predatory Bedouin neighbours.

7. Incidentally, I would observe that only European officials, quite ignorant of realities, could imagine that there is any chance of the Druses even considering the possibility of giving up their arms in present conditions.

8. But an even graver defect of the amnesty is its limited application to the rebel chiefs, who, if they surrender before the 8th January, 1926, are only promised their lives. The delegates argued that they can only bring about peace by negotiating with the rebel chiefs, who will certainly refuse to negotiate on such a basis. The feudal loyalty of the Druses to their chiefs precludes any likelihood that the rank and file would, to secure their own lives, be prepared to sacrifice their leaders.

9. Apparently, verbal assurances were given to the delegates by the High Commission that the rebel chiefs surrendering would be treated without severity and with due regard to their social position.

10. The delegation also objected to the electoral *arrêté* enclosed in my despatch No. 283 of the 27th instant, which, they argued, would give opportunity to all sorts of intrigue for further division of Syria. Apparently, the delegates received a verbal assurance from the High Commission to the effect that steps would be taken to obviate this danger.

11. Objection was also raised by the delegates to the grant of semi-constituent powers to a Syrian Representative Assembly elected according to the old electoral law, devised, they think, to reduce Nationalist representation to a minimum.

12. M. de Jouvenel apparently evaded expressing any opinion regarding the demands for "national supremacy" and for a limitation of the period of the mandate.

13. The French High Commission, residing in the Christian atmosphere of Beirut, remote from the realities of the situation now requiring a settlement, seems to be handling the problem without adequate knowledge. There does not also appear to be consistency in the different French agencies at work. While M. de Jouvenel at Beirut is decreeing the release of the Nationalist prisoners at Ruad Island, General Andréa at Damascus is multiplying the arrests of Damascene notables. Moreover, while proclaiming a desire to meet the wishes of the Nationalists, M. de Jouvenel's manifest attempts to accentuate divisions in Syria have unfortunately inspired the people here with a distrust of his sincerity. The Oriental is very quick to form an opinion of the personal character and sincerity of the man he is dealing with, and this first impression is often definitive. It is, anyhow, unfortunate that the French should have embarrassed the progress of negotiations by such definite and precipitate measures as the above-mentioned electoral and amnesty *arrêts*, as well as by manifestations tending to promote separatism in Northern Syria.

14. I fear that M. de Jouvenel is inclined to examine the Syrian problem much as a French politician examines the possibilities of combinations to constitute a parliamentary majority among numerous and unstable French political parties. The lack of union in the Syrian peoples no doubt makes such methods tempting. It is idle to suppose, as the Nationalists assert, that the whole country is united in its purpose. The notorious particularist tendencies of the Alawites and of Aleppo can hardly inspire them with enthusiasm for any administrative centralisation at Damascus. If it is a question of gaining time, of bringing more troops from France, of crushing the rebellion later and of maintaining France's old strategy in Syria, there is no doubt much to be said for a French policy of political expedients, provided that France is ready eventually to pay the price in blood and treasure.

15. Hitherto, under Generals Gouraud and Weygand, France has had a definite policy in Syria, based on strategical interests of France. By this policy the "Grand Liban" and the Alawites, isolated from the rest of Syria, constituted a rampart from which France could dominate the hostile interior and behind which she could retire with a good chance of safety in the hour of need. This policy, however advantageous to France, is administratively and economically harmful to the whole country, which cannot prosper amidst such unnatural divisions. The Nationalists are persistent in their desire to reunite the country, and they are getting unexpected support in this matter from the Jebel Druse. The Druse leaders are evincing a strong interest in the detachment from the "Grand Liban" of its recent additions. These annexed districts contain a considerable Druse population, which has suffered greatly during and after the hostilities in Hasbeya and Rasheya. The imprudent vociferations of the Lebanese Christians have aroused much bitterness among the Druses, whose irritation is increased by the knowledge that the hostile eloquence of the Lebanese is only equalled by their physical timidity. The Druse leaders seem to feel that their brethren in the Greater Lebanon should not be abandoned to their Christian enemies backed by the French. This Druse support of one of the main planks of the Nationalist programme is, of course, invaluable to the Nationalists. The movement for unity to-day is far more difficult to oppose than before the rebellion, and the maintenance of France's old policy will require a more considerable army than that now in Syria.

16. If France is unwilling to make the necessary military effort to suppress the rebellion by force and maintain her old administrative strategy, she would be well advised to abandon the method of political expedients and endeavour to frame a new policy which would encourage the rebels to make peace and would give the whole country a tolerable system of economic and administrative unity, without imperilling the existence of the mandate. Statesmanship, not political adroitness, is required for such an innovation. Such a policy would require that France, instead of encouraging separatist tendencies, should endeavour to break down all these paralyzing particularisms and gradually weld the country into an organic unity which alone can offer some prospect of progress for its component parts. There is no sign of any clear perception by the French of the alternative policies before them. They seem only intent on getting the best of a serious rebellion by vague promises of

future ameliorations, by half-measures of clemency and through the general lassitude. This attitude is full of danger. The rebels consider themselves as still victorious. They are very hopeful of trouble in the north, where they say that Yusuf Bey Hayati (see the last paragraph of my despatch No. 278 of the 19th instant) is hard at work preparing rebellion. The Jebel Druse is intact. Large tracts of Southern Syria are still overrun by the rebels. The French have not yet been able to clear the immediate neighbourhood of the town of Damascus, on which attacks still take place. The whole country, including the rebels, is, of course, suffering grievously and anxious for peace. But if it is not to be imposed by French troops more numerous than now available, peace must be offered which holds out some prospect of a permanent alleviation.

17. No doubt the French have not said their last word, and perhaps they are acting on the principle that too much must not be offered at once. The rebels, too, would doubtless accept less than they are now asking for. Perhaps Amir Amin Arslan and his fellow-delegates to the Jebel Druse (see paragraph 20 of my despatch No. 278 of the 18th instant) will, now that they have returned to Beirut, be able to bring home to the French some of the realities of the situation. Other deputations, Druse, Moslem and Christian, are at work. Altogether, there is ground for hope that the negotiations will not be abruptly interrupted on the fatal 8th January.

I have, &c.
W. A. SMART.

[E 234/12/89]

No. 177.

Acting Consul-General Mayers to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 11, 1926.)

(No. 177.)

Sir,

Beirut, December 30, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the official declarations reported in my despatches Nos. 174 and 175 of the 24th and 25th December have not produced so far any definite improvement in the situation as viewed from Beirut. The Damascus delegation does not appear to have met with much success, and the mission of the Emir Amin Arslan to the Jebel Druse is said to have been fruitless. There is therefore no immediate prospect of peace here, but it would perhaps be wise to defer judgment on the developing situation until the 8th January—date mentioned in M. de Jouvenel's offer of a limited amnesty. It will then be known whether, on the one hand, the attempt to separate the insurgent leaders from their followers has had any effect, or, on the other, M. de Jouvenel is prepared to go further in his move towards conciliation. The general impression is that the rebels will be loyal to their chiefs.

2. In Beirut the Constitution makers have little progress yet to record. The procedure is not exactly as stated in paragraph 5 of my despatch No. 171 of the 14th December, 1925. The function of the Committee of Twelve is to elaborate the constitutional law only. They will consult representatives of the different creeds, leading professional men and heads of departments and nominees from the districts of the Lebanon. However, although the opinion of these witnesses will be taken into account, they will have no voice in voting the Constitution in its final shape. That privilege is reserved to the Representative Council, who will proceed to the vote after they have debated the draft presented to them by the sub-committee.

3. There is a movement of opposition on foot against this programme, led by some prominent lawyers and journalists. They claim that, if their opinion is sought in preparing the statute, they ought also to have a share in voting it. Personal rivalries and jealousies perhaps account for this attitude, but the present Representative Council is probably as efficient as can be expected under local conditions (see Mr. Satow's despatch No. 95 of the 20th July last), and it ought to serve its purpose in this transitional stage. It is as capable of working out constitutional laws for the country as any other quorum of Lebanese politicians would be.

4. Elections in the State of the Alouites have been ordered for early in January 1926. Thereafter that territory will also proceed to elaborate its constitutional desiderata.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to Bagdad, Jerusalem, Damascus and Aleppo.

I have, &c.
NORMAN MAYERS.

[E 235/12/89]

No. 178.

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 11, 1926.)

(No. 288.)

Sir,

Damascus, December 30, 1925.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 278 of the 18th instant, I have the honour to report that the French military operations in the Damascus oasis have been continuing without any striking incidents. The bands continue to avoid any direct conflict with the columns, which periodically sweep the gardens. Latterly the French troops have been sweeping a new area, in the south-east, and have established posts at several additional points. The French posts now appear to be established in a rough semi-circle from Douma in the north to the neighbourhood of Nejha in the south, with its extreme eastern projection in the vicinity of the lakes. Unfortunately, bands appear to be able to slip between these posts without much difficulty.

2. Band activity diminished in the immediate neighbourhood of the town after the powerful concentration of French forces at Damascus, but during the last few days there has been a recrudescence of this activity. The bands have begun again to fire on the French military posts at the edge of the city, and the French, on several occasions, have resumed their cannonading across the town. Bands have again been active in the Shaghour (eastern) and Meydan (southern) quarters of the town, but these bands are composed almost exclusively of Damascenes, who, when hard pressed, have no difficulty in concealing themselves in friendly houses and leaving the town at a more favourable moment.

3. Bands have also been attacking Mezzeh, the north-western suburb of Damascus.

4. Nassib Bey Bakri and Hassan-al-Kharrat, with not inconsiderable bands, have reappeared in the neighbourhood of the town, but they cannot now make any prolonged sojourn in one place.

5. In the night of the 27th-28th instant a band delivered a more regular attack on the French troops at Kadem, the southern suburban station of Damascus, and cut the railway just south of that station. Train circulation was interrupted for two days, but has been re-established to-day.

6. Yesterday at 4 p.m. a mounted band, about 30 strong, rode into the town up to the main northern entrances of the bazaars, almost within a stone's throw of the French barricades at the beginning of the northern suburbs. Considerable firing took place, but apparently only two Syrian gendarmes were killed by the rebels, who rode out unmolested by the way they had come.

7. Last night a band attacked and plundered the police station in the Muhajjerin suburb, just north of the Salhiyyeh quarter, while another band attacked the police station at Kiwan on the Beirut road just outside the town.

8. Two more attacks have been made by bands on the station of 'Ain Fijeh, on the Beirut Railway, 21 kilom. from Damascus, where is the source of the town's pure water supply, but the rebels were driven off before they could cut the line.

9. Bands are still signalled in the neighbourhood of Homs, and one of them attacked and plundered the station of Kattina, 13 kilom. south of Homs. The gendarmes, who fled at the approach of this band, are to be tried by the "Conseil de Guerre."

10. The bands still appear to be in undisputed possession of the region of Nebk.

11. For the moment the French appear to be making no serious attempt to deal with Wadi-al-Ajam, still overrun by Druses. Its turn was to come after the clearance of the Damascus oasis.

12. In short, the military operations in the neighbourhood of Damascus, although they have made the town tolerably secure for the moment against any serious attack, have not yet been able to suppress the band movement. Indeed, it is difficult to see how such a result can be secured until the Jebel Druse, which is the base of the movement, has been reduced to submission.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 271); Amman (No. 206); Bagdad (No. 287); Beirut (No. 284), and Aleppo (No. 177).)

I have, &c.
W. A. SMART.

[E 236/236/89]

No. 179.

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 11, 1926.)

(No. 290. Confidential.)

Sir,

Damascus, December 30, 1925.

WITH reference to paragraph 19 of my despatch No. 237 of the 10th ultimo, and to my despatch No. 272 of the 12th instant, I regret to have to report that Moslem feeling against the Armenians is growing in intensity.

2. During the recent expeditions into the eastern oasis (see my despatches No. 278 of the 18th instant and No. 288 of to-day's date) much plundering of villages and killing of villagers, not always guilty, have taken place. Natives state that the purely French soldiers have not participated in these acts of violence. The culprits are stated to be the North African soldiers and more especially the irregulars under French command, who consist mainly of Circassians, with Armenian and Kurdish elements. These irregulars have become a byword for every kind of rapine and cruelty. The presence, in these irregular formations, of Christians who, to add to native resentment, are Armenians, refugees dependent on Arab hospitality, has aroused dangerous passions among the Moslems. During the last fortnight the town has been filled with refugees from the eastern oasis, bringing with them such of their household chattels and even live-stock as they could take away with them in their flight. These poor people are in a sorry plight, and many of them will have to return to destroyed or plundered homes. My own quarter has been full of them, and I have had occasion to hear their patient lamentations. All of them tell the same story of the irregulars' misdeeds. The director of the Victoria Hospital told me that he met a peasant acquaintance coming into town with the usual pitiful accompaniment of a mule piled up with the greatest variety of household goods. The doctor asked his acquaintance why he had left his village. The man replied that he had been compelled to depart because the Armenians were plundering his house.

3. No doubt the Moslems exaggerate both the numbers of the Armenians enrolled in these irregular formations and the extent of their misdeeds. Yet the fact remains that some Armenians are in these formations. These Armenians came here as pitiful refugees from Turkey. By their better craftsmanship and by the lower wages they accepted, they caused economic prejudice to the natives. Yet these foreign Christian intruders had not been subjected to any bad treatment by the Moslems. A revolt breaks out which quickly assumes a nationalist character and is only directed against the French. The most elementary prudence and recognition of hospitality should have enjoined on the Armenians complete abstention from any participation in the hostilities. Instead of adopting this attitude of abstention, a number of them joined these irregular formations and fought against their Moslem hosts, who regard themselves as fighting for their native land. The result was inevitable. In the incursion into Damascus on the 18th October last, the first people whom the rebels attacked were the Armenians in the refugee camp at Kadem, the southern suburb. These same rebels abstained from any attack on the native or European Christians, who were equally at their mercy.

4. So strong is the feeling now that a Moslem in close touch with the bands warned Mr. Teen, my dragoman, of the danger he was running by allowing some poor Armenians to take refuge in his house, as he has been in the habit of doing during the periodical alarms caused by incursions of bands. This Moslem told him that the rebels were determined to kill any Armenians they could find. I told Mr. Teen to advise discreetly his Armenian guests to leave for the Lebanon.

5. Moslem resentment is mainly directed against the Armenians, but it is also now felt against other Christians. For this change of Moslem feeling the Christians themselves are mainly responsible. I have already drawn attention to the danger to Christians in the interior from the foolish vociferations of the Lebanese Christians against the rebels. Unfortunately, some of the Damascene Christians have been equally imprudent. After the recent concentration of strong French forces at Damascus and their appearance, for the first time, in some number around and in the Christian quarter, many Damascene Christians began to adopt an arrogant attitude, which has greatly incensed the Moslems, suffering from military operations conducted by a foreign Christian Power. The Moslems, who protected these native Christians when they had been abandoned by the troops of their foreign co-religionists, have perhaps some excuse for their exasperation.

6. I fear, too, that local Moslem feeling is not so friendly as it was towards Great Britain. There can be no doubt that Christians generally at Damascus have hitherto

largely owed their immunity to the desire of the Moslems not to alienate England's sympathy, on which they counted. The visit of M. de Jouvenel to London, garbled versions of his negotiations with you and Mr. Amery, the persistent refusal of this consulate to allow itself to be drawn into any anti-French attitudes, seem to have convinced the Nationalists that they have nothing to hope for from us. It is even murmured in Nationalist circles that the English have struck an unholy bargain with France to help in the repression of Syrian nationalism as a price for French support against Turkey in the Mosul question. I have noticed lately attempts to exploit this reversal of feeling as regards us. For instance, the surrender of the Nationalist Damascene notable, Jemil Mardam Bey, several months ago to the French authorities after he had taken refuge in Palestine, is being actively represented as a shameful British violation of the internationally recognised right of asylum for political refugees. He has just been released from Ruad Island, and, as he is reported to be full of indignation against us, I anticipate little good from his return to Damascus.

7. At present, the French troops at Damascus are so numerous that Christians, native or foreign, run little danger from this Moslem feeling, except from accidental encounters with bands hastily raiding and escaping from the city. If, however, troubles elsewhere should cause any serious reduction of the present French garrison, I doubt whether Christians would be so comfortable at Damascus and whether the desire to humour us would constitute so powerful a restraint on the rebels as in the past.

8. I would mention that the Nationalists, having lost hope of help from us, seem to be turning to Turkey and Russia. Much mystery surrounds the movements of Yusuf Bey Hayati (see paragraph 16 of my despatch No. 285 of the 28th instant). I have been told that he has paid a visit to Angora and has had interviews with Mustafa Kemal and the Russian Ambassador there. I do not know what degree of truth there is in these stories. But I am sure that the Nationalists, little as they like and much as they fear both Turkey and Bolshevism, would not, in their desperation, hesitate to accept help from either of those Powers, if it were available.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (271), Amman (207), Bagdad (288), Beirut (285) and Aleppo (178).

I have, &c.

W. A. SMART.

No. 180.

Consul Hough to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 11.)

(No. 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Aleppo, January 11, 1926.

YESTERDAY mob made a demonstration against arrest of certain Nationalists and tried to rush the prison. Dispersed by machine-gun fire; six killed, a score wounded. The town now quiet, but panic-stricken.

(Sent by post to Beirut, Damascus and Bagdad.)

[E 297/12/89]

No. 181.

Acting Consul-General Mayers to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 14.)

(No. 2.)

Sir,

Beirut, January 3, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a manifesto to the Druses which has appeared in the press to-day. An official communiqué published simultaneously, and with which the above should perhaps be read in conjunction, states that the Druse chiefs met at Shabaa on the 27th December last to examine the question of submission. Sultan-el-Attrash is said to have declared for a continuation of the struggle, while others expressed a wish to submit. According to the same communiqué, the Jebel Druse is uneasy over its losses and dissensions.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Bagdad, Jerusalem, Damascus and Aleppo.)

I have, &c.

NORMAN MAYERS.

Enclosure in No. 181

*Manifesto to the Druses.**Pourquoi vous battez-vous ?*

JE suis venu vous apporter le droit de faire vous-mêmes votre Constitution, de choisir vous-mêmes votre Gouvernement et ses chefs.

En continuant la lutte, c'est donc contre vos espérances et contre votre liberté que vous combattez !

Pourquoi?... Pour qui?...

Il y a quelques jours, des notables druses désespérés de vous voir souffrir, sont allés trouver vos chefs, pour leur démontrer que les combats n'avaient plus de raison d'être, et ne pouvaient conduire les Druses qu'à la défaite, à la mort et à la famine, dont vos femmes et vos enfants seront les premières victimes.

L'armée française avait laissé passer ces notables, car je n'ai pas voulu que la France porte la responsabilité des malheurs qui vous menacent.

Cette responsabilité, Sultan Atrache l'a prise, car c'est lui qui a repoussé les démarches de vos frères. Qu'elle retombe sur lui !...

Seule la France peut vous donner le blé, les fontaines, les routes, les écoles et cette liberté nationale qui vous manquent, dont le bienfait commence aujourd'hui à s'étendre sur toutes les parties de la Syrie qui sont en paix.

Avant l'heure décisive qui sera celle de vos derniers combats, j'ai voulu faire mon devoir en vous avertissant que, si votre sang continue à couler, si vos femmes et vos enfants ont faim, si votre ruine et votre défaite deviennent sans remède, ce ne sera pas ma faute mais celle de Sultan Atrache et des étrangers qui le paient, vous considérant déjà comme leurs sujets, et vous obligeant à des combats où vous perdez tout, sans qu'ils y risquent un cheveu de leur tête.

Entre eux et moi, vos enfants jugeront.

Druses, votre seul moyen de vaincre est de déposer les armes !

La paix, la liberté, le pain que je vous apporte valent mieux que vos fusils !

Rappelez-vous que vous ne pouvez rien contre la France et qu'elle peut tout pour vous !

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République française,
JOUVENEL.

[E 426/12/89]

No. 182.

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 19.)

(No. 2.)

Sir,

Damascus, January 4, 1926.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 285 of the 28th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a proclamation of the French High Commissioner to the Druses,* inviting them to submit and to repudiate their chief, Sultan Pasha Attrash, who, it is asserted, is being paid by foreigners and has rejected the advice of the Druse delegation, allowed by the French authorities to proceed to the mountain.

2. I hope that the reference to "foreigners" is only to the Syro-Palestinian Committee in Egypt, which, however, is mainly composed of Syrians.

3. Presumably this proclamation is not intended merely as bluff. It contains no definite offer of peace conditions and only a vague statement at the beginning to the effect that M. de Jouvenel has come bringing to the Druses the right to make their own Constitution and choose their own Government and chiefs. Unless the French are again being misled by their "bureaux de renseignements," they can hardly hope that this proclamation, which has been distributed by aeroplanes in the mountain, can be followed by any considerable Druse desertions of their chiefs. On the face of it, this

* See No. 181.

proclamation would seem to mean that the French are now resolved to suppress the rebellion by force of arms, and that these vague peace suggestions are only made with a view to conveying the impression to the world that France has done all she can to make peace and that the ultimate repression has been forced on her by the rebels' uncompromising attitude.

4. Captain Georges Picot, General Andréa's chief of the staff, mentioned to me that he was not troubling about a house at Damascus because he expected to have to go to the Jebel Druse in April next with the French column.

5. Reinforcements would, of course, be required for such a policy, which would necessitate considerable sacrifices of French blood and treasure. Syria, after it had thus been reconquered, would be completely ruined.

6. Nevertheless, French incoherence precludes any confidence in logical deductions from their own actions. There are indications of compromises being evolved from the negotiations now proceeding between the French High Commissioner on the one hand and Sheikh Taj-ud-Dine (see paragraph 6 of my despatch No. 284 of the 27th ultimo) and the candidates for the new Syrian Government on the other. I have been informed confidentially that the nationalist leaders are not at all easy about the rebel powers of resistance. My nationalist informant, who was thoroughly qualified to be informed on the subject, told me that the Druses were much exhausted and anxious for peace. Sultan Pasha Attrash, he said, had so far refused to dissociate himself from the nationalists and was sure of the fidelity of the Druses, but, however desperately the latter might fight, they could hardly resist a strong French offensive in the spring unless help, entirely problematic, were forthcoming from other elements in Syria. The nationalists were, therefore, anxious to make peace as soon as possible, especially as they had reason to believe that the French were working actively to detach the Druses and conclude a separate peace with them. Unfortunately, he said, the nationalists had no confidence in the French, who seemed to be trying merely to gain time by illusory offers.

7. If the French were prepared to include all the rebel chiefs in a general amnesty there would be a good chance of peace now. I gathered from my informant that M. de Jouvenel is anxious to do so, if the step can be taken in such a way as to soften the blow to French prestige. The idea has been mooted that the new Syrian Government should receive assurances from the French High Commissioner that it would be authorised, if the rank and file submit, to extend subsequently the pardon to the chiefs. The difficulty in the way of this solution is the general lack of confidence in French assurances. However, the fact that M. Pierre Aloye, the new delegate elect who is replacing M. Aubouard, came to Damascus the day before yesterday, gives hope that things are not so hopeless as they would appear from French proclamations and *arrêts*, for it was given out some time ago that he would not take up his post until the basis of a settlement with the new Syrian Government had been devised.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem, Amman, Bagdad, Beirut and Aleppo.)

I have, &c.

W. A. SMART.

[E 460/12/89]

No. 183.

Acting Consul-General Mayers to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 7.)

Sir,

Beirut, January 9, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that Sheikh Taj-ud-Din, accompanied by a small party of Damascus notables, has, as reported by Mr. Smart in paragraph 6 of his despatch No. 2 of the 4th instant, been in Beirut for some days now negotiating with the French High Commissioner over the new Syrian Government to be formed after the resignation of Soubhi Bey Barakat.

2. The local press treats the sheikh with respect, but points out that while, on the one hand, the groups which he represents are not theoretically supposed to have any connection with the rebellion, on the other, he could hardly make more extreme

demands if he were the duly accredited spokesman of the rebel forces. He is said to have asked:—

- (a.) The proclamation of Syrian unity, the districts added to the Lebanon in 1920 being returned to Syria proper; the admission of the Lebanon into a Syrian federation.
- (b.) The convocation of citizens to elect a Constituent Assembly.
- (c.) A general amnesty.
- (d.) Adjournment of elections to the Legislative Assemblies until peace is re-established.
- (e.) Indemnities for sufferers from the war.
- (f.) Duration of the mandate to be fixed by charter.

3. Demands of this tenor cannot naturally be accepted by the French, and the conversations of M. de Jouvenel with Sheikh Taj-ud-Din have definitely ended in failure. As far as I have known French officials in Beirut, no thought of a limitation to the duration of the mandate has ever occurred to them. It has certainly never occurred, except as an exceedingly vague and distant prospect, to the Christian sects who form a majority in the Great Lebanon, who rely on the permanent presence of the mandatory Power to retain their position of predominance, and who have not explored so far into the future as to envisage the Lebanon as other than it is at present, an unremunerative but politically important part of the French colonial empire.

4. The adherence of the Lebanese Christians to the mandate is only rivalled by their abhorrence of any conception of the unification of their country with Syria. Unity means for them the danger of submergence in pan-Islamism, another triumph for the Arab nations; for the People's party in Damascus is clearly seen from Beirut as another wave in the rising tide of Arab nationalism. The unification of Syria is a Moslem idea. The campaign to reduce the Lebanon to its former limits is equally a Moslem idea. It is little wonder that the sacristies of the Lebanon and all the sons of the hybrid semi-civilisation which has grown up along the Syrian littoral should be firm in their belief in a French mandate and in independence from a radically alien interior.

5. The fact appears to be that the Christian Syrian of the Lebanon has generally no strong conception of his nationality. If he travels in Europe, he most likely tries to pass himself off as French or Italian, or at least tells the people in the lounge of his hotel that he is a French protégé. The Moslem of Beirut would say quite plainly that he was a Syrian. The Christian Lebanese has everything to lose and nothing to gain, except a political ideal, by Syrian unity. He is definitely European in his aspirations rather than Asiatic.

6. Nevertheless, there are important Moslem enclaves in the Great Lebanon. The Moslem community in Beirut is large and influential. Tripoli is nearly all, Sidon predominantly, Moslem. These bodies are restive in their present political surroundings. They refuse to be satisfied with the Great Lebanon, which they regard as separating them from the predominantly Moslem State of Syria and as a contrivance to rob them of any voice in the direction of their country. Fanaticism, as much as dispassionate conviction, is at the base of this idea. Still, Beirut, Sidon and Tripoli were all outside the former small Lebanon.

7. The Lebanon Moslems are therefore solid with the Nationalists in Damascus in their demand for a return to a smaller State. Little has been heard of them recently, but their activity has been considerable. A deputation of eight of them waited a few days ago on M. de Jouvenel and laid before him their views. The question of what France will do with the Moslems, whose sense of unity and of racial distinction the events of the last few months have all gone to inflame, remains to be solved. General Sarrail may have stumbled on the solution when he came to Syria imbued with the determination to keep himself politically above the sects and creeds. His failure was due to personal insufficiency to carry out his extremely difficult ideal.

8. M. de Jouvenel has obtained the favour of the Christians, but his success with the Moslems has yet to be made. They can be counted on for the present as taking their stand with their Nationalist co-religionaries in the Syrian State, but, when the time comes for them to show their strength, I do not think they will be found so obdurate as their friends in Damascus, for they have not so much to gain materially by a political triumph. A larger share in political and administrative offices might do something to alleviate their sense of grievance. In any case, the French will in all probability be able to obtain sufficient petitions from other non-Christian communities, such as the Alaouites, the Metwalis and even the Lebanon Druses, to lend support to

their resistance of the orthodox Moslem demand for unity, as expressed in paragraph (a) of Sheikh Taj-ud-Din's proposals.

9. Although yesterday was the 8th January, date which was to terminate the offer of a limited amnesty, there is no news of the insurgents coming in in any numbers, and no general hope of pacification.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Bagdad, Jerusalem, Damascus and Aleppo.)

I have, &c.

NORMAN MAYERS.

[E 459/12/89]

No. 184.

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 16.)

Sir,

Damascus, January 11, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to invite a reference to despatch No. 7 of the 9th instant from the British acting consul-general at Beirut regarding the negotiations of Sheikh Taj-ud-Din and his Nationalist collaborators with the French High Commissioner at Beirut.

2. As this account is given from the Lebanese angle, it would seem only fair to present the Syrian version of the failure of these negotiations.

3. When M. de Jouvenel arrived at Beirut he let it be known to various Syrian notables that he was anxious for peace. It was represented to him that the only possible way of placating the rebels was to get rid of Subhi Bey, with his Turkish colleagues, and to form a popular Government with a programme which would command sufficient Nationalist support. At Damascus it was understood that M. de Jouvenel was prepared to follow this course, and deputations proceeded to Beirut. In the meanwhile M. de Jouvenel went to Aleppo and gave to this journey the appearance of a separatist demonstration against Damascus, i.e., against the Nationalists, with whom he was negotiating. At the same moment, his electoral decree (see my despatch No. 283 of the 27th ultimo) was issued, manifestly against the people with whom he was supposed to be seeking peace. A partial amnesty, obviously impracticable, was hastily proclaimed by him in such a way as to prejudice the negotiations. Syrian alarm was still further increased by the extraordinary statements made in the French Chamber of Deputies by Ministers during the Syrian debates in the Chamber of Deputies just before Christmas. The Nationalist negotiators therefore had some ground for being uneasy.

4. The demands they submitted were the five enumerated in paragraph 2 of my despatch No. 285 of the 28th ultimo. Three of these—Syrian Unity, a Constituent Assembly, national supremacy—have figured in every Nationalist programme since I have been in Syria. The general amnesty was obviously necessary if the rebels were to submit peacefully. The only new feature was the limitation of the mandate. This hardly seemed to the Syrians a revolutionary suggestion, in view of England's readiness to accept such a limitation in the far more backward country of Iraq.

5. Subsequently a demand was made for an adjournment of the elections until the return of peace—a perfectly reasonable demand.

6. Obviously, the Nationalists were prepared to accept less than they were asking for. As a matter of fact, they were prepared not to press for the immediate inclusion of the Alawites in the Syrian Unity. They were even prepared to accept the return to Syria of only the Kazas of Hasbeya, Rasheya, Baalbec and Tripoli, leaving for the present Beirut and the Kazas of Tyre and Sidon in the Greater Lebanon. In reply to the Nationalist demands, M. de Jouvenel has, as far as my information goes, made no offer whatever. A search through all his pronouncements and decrees will reveal no concrete and practical concession to the cause of peace, excepting, perhaps, the mission to the Jebel Druse. These direct overtures to the Druses, which might easily have been successful a couple of months ago, came too late, for the Druses now refuse to dissociate themselves from their Nationalist allies. As regards the negotiations with the Nationalists, it is difficult to avoid the impression that there was no real intention of compromise on the French side. It looks as though an impracticable amnesty and vague peace professions were intended to justify, before

the League of Nations next month, French repressive action rather than to bring about peace by negotiation.

7. The failure of the negotiations has provoked in the French-inspired press and among French officials statements forecasting a definitely anti-Moslem and repressive policy. It is suggested that Southern Syria should be deprived of even the very limited constitutional privileges of Aleppo, the Alawites and the Grand Liban. It is declared that, in view of the unreasonable attitude of the Damascenes, Southern Syria must be directly administered by the French themselves, while the rest of the country, as a reward for having kept quiet, will be organised separately into something more like a mandated territory. It is understood that M. Pierre Aylpe is to be appointed Governor of Southern Syria. I incorrectly reported his arrival at Damascus in the last paragraph of my despatch No. 2 of the 4th instant. He is, however, expected here almost immediately. Originally he was to have come as an "Envoyé extraordinaire" with the powers of a delegate.

8. Some French reinforcements have been arriving during the last month, and, with a few more, the French should be able to suppress the rebellion in the spring by force of arms. The French here talk as if an expedition to the Jebel Druse in April had been decided upon. Unless the Druses were to obtain fresh succour from Syrian elements, they could hardly, in their present state of exhaustion, withstand a regular offensive by a French striking column of, say, 15,000 men. Some 25,000 men would probably be required to hold the lines of communication, to defend Damascus and the approaches to the Lebanon, and to occupy the rest of the country.

9. To return to Mr. Mayers's despatch, I hardly think that "fanaticism" is the word to apply to Moslems in this country. If there has been any fanaticism in French mandated territories, it has certainly been more evident among the Christians than among the Moslems. But I would prefer not to use this term at all, for it may convey a mistaken idea of the Syrian problem. There are no races in Syria, but they are replaced by religious communities whose animosities have racial rather than religious characteristics. The Moslems of the territories added to the Lebanon could reasonably, and without any fanaticism in the religious sense of the word, object to being transferred from the jurisdiction of a Syrian Moslem Government to that of a hostile Lebanese Christian Government. The territories they inhabited were not enclaves in the old Lebanon, but external districts joined on to it.

10. I doubt whether a Moslem of this country would usually say that he was a Syrian. He would probably say more often that he was a Moslem or an Arab. Syria of to-day is a creation of Europe, not an organic reality. Anyhow, in French mandated territories the Sunni Moslems, who form an absolute majority of the total population, want to be under a Moslem Government, whether they be in the Greater Lebanon, in the Alawite territory or in Aleppo. The Druses, thanks to French blundering, can now be regarded as on the side of this Sunni majority. The Metaoulis (Shias) of Baalbec have vigorously declared their solidarity with their Sunni brethren of Damascus. Many of the Christians of Damascus are with the Moslems. For instance, the most active Nationalist negotiator at Beirut and spokesman of the deputations has been a Damascene Christian, Faris Bey Al Khouri. He and other Christians were, indeed, imprisoned by the French for their Nationalist sympathies.

11. It will thus be seen that France has against her a formidable coalition, while she is leaning mainly on a few hundred thousand Lebanese Christians, quite unwarlike and useless except for rhetorical tournaments, and on the Nusairi heretics of the Alawite territory, who are warlike, but exceedingly backward and of doubtful allegiance.

12. I do not think that the French would be well-advised to surrender to the Nationalists. On the contrary, I have repeatedly pointed out that Nationalist supremacy in Syria is incompatible with a continuance of the French occupation and contrary to the interests of our neighbouring mandated territories. But if France is to stay in Syria without a large army of occupation, she must, even after suppressing the rebellion by military means, frame a policy based mainly on the material interests of the Moslem majority, and not on those of a small Maronite minority. She must devise an administrative and economic policy which will give some material prosperity to these unhappy Moslems, whose lot under the French mandate has been far from enviable. Such a policy must involve some sort of unification of the country, which cannot prosper amidst multiple and unnatural divisions. If France is able to initiate such a policy, she will find supporters among the Moslems, all of whom are not Nationalists. At present she has practically all Moslems against her, for deep down

into their hearts has sunk the belief that all their misery and their poverty is due to France.

13. Unfortunately, the French High Commission at Beirut seems to contain politicians and journalists rather than administrators. It is therefore possible that we shall witness a continuance of the present crusading policy directed by French freethinkers.

14. This unfortunate situation merits our attention. England is a great Moslem Power, and Moslems in Syria and our neighbouring mandated territories are still friendly to us. It would be most inconvenient for us to appear as the supporters of a modern crusade. Yet it is obviously to our interest that somehow or other France should remain in Syria.

15. The situation is even more inconvenient for the League of Nations. What has happened, and is happening, in Syria is no longer a secret. Clouds of journalists from various parts of the world have descended on the country. The Syrians are making a determined effort to get a hearing at Geneva next month. No doubt they will fail, but their failure will not strengthen the authority of the League. If the Mandates Commission has to hear and accept French explanations of a kind such as given, according to the Arabic press, by Ministers to the Chamber of Deputies, then it is not difficult to imagine what murmurs will pass through the watching Moslem world. If it is desired that the League of Nations should gradually acquire a universal character, and not appear as an association of the West against the East, then the prolongation of situations such as that of Syria to-day under French mandate can only be regarded as morally damaging to the League's cause.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 11), Amman, (No. 10), Bagdad (No. 10), Aleppo (No. 8) and Beirut (No. 9).)

I have, &c.

W. A. SMART.

[E 480/146/89]

No. 185.

Consul Hough to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 4.)
Sir,

Aleppo, January 11, 1926.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 3 of the 7th January, I have the honour to report that the Nationalists distributed as widely as possible copies of a leaflet calling on all patriotic Aleppines to boycott the elections. I enclose a translation of this proclamation.* Not content with this, they interfered actively during the elections by mild rioting and demonstrations, including the upsetting of voting urns. In consequence, all the signatories of the manifesto, except one or two who are said to have escaped, were arrested on Saturday, the 9th, and several others, bringing up the total of arrests to thirty-five.

2. Yesterday afternoon a demonstration was made in the Serai to demand the release of these leaders, and a mob collected. The prison is next door to the Serai, and the town prisoners, getting wind of the affair, seemed inclined to join forces with the mob outside and break open the prison. Armoured cars were sent to the spot and machine guns turned on to the prison gates. The temper of the mob got worse, and a policeman was killed. Promptly the machine guns from the citadel, after (it is said) firing a salvo in the air, fired on the crowd, killing six and wounding about a score. This incident was reported in my telegram No. 1 of to-day. Panic promptly seized the whole town, which resounded with the running of feet and the clanging of bolts. The town was policed all night by armoured cars and cavalry. The panic lasted till this morning, when practically all shops and banks in the town were shut.

3. I saw M. Reclus, the French delegate, this morning, and asked him what he had to tell me about the safety of foreigners. He said that for the moment he did not anticipate any continuation of disturbance, but promised to advise me at once in case of need, adding that, as I was now his next-door neighbour, this would be an easy matter. For the time being I remain content with what he said. It may very well be an isolated incident. There are no tribes from outside in the town, who would be really dangerous. The average Aleppo crowd is not as a rule difficult to control.

* Not printed.

[15026]

x 2

4. The Moslem leaders whose arrest caused the trouble have, as I predicted, come more boldly into the open and suffered the penalty of their boldness. It is not yet known what it is intended to do with them. Some accounts say they will be banished. Their increased activity is apparently due to instigation from Damascus. I still think that, generally speaking, the seed of nationalistic propaganda will fall on stony soil at Aleppo, where the desire for a quiet life and dislike of politics will continue to be the leading considerations, even amongst Moslems.

5. I have not yet had a full report of the progress of the elections, and will advert to this in a separate despatch.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Bagdad (No. 4), Beirut (No. 5), and Damascus (No. 4).)

I have, &c.
W. HOUGH.

[E 605/12/89]

No. 186.

Acting Consul-General Mayers to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 27.)

(No 5. Confidential.)
Sir,

Beirut, January 7, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the Emir Amin Arslan, the Druse notable who went on a semi-official mission to Sueida as reported by His Majesty's consul at Damascus in paragraph 20 of his despatch to you No. 278 of the 18th December, 1925, and his despatch No. 285 of the 28th December, 1925, paragraph 17, three days ago gave the following confidential account of the result of his journey to a friend of mine:—

2. He was well received by the Druse chiefs, whom he found anxious for peace and haunted by the fear of famine. There had been little sowing, and stocks were almost exhausted. Women and children would soon be dying, in the Hauran and in the Jebel Druse, for want of food. The leaders were not easy in their minds. They had heard of "Swiss" Red Cross officials being in Beirut, but they knew that the French would never allow food or medicaments to reach them. Menaced by this situation, they were willing to make peace.

3. But how could they trust the French? The French were out to exterminate them as a definitely hostile and even pro-British element in their territory. In 1860 the Powers had combined to keep France in check. Now there was no one to restrain her. The Druses neither trusted French individuals nor the French nation, misled by their officials in Damascus and Beirut. If the British would guarantee the terms offered by the French, the Druse leaders would be willing to treat; or they would be satisfied with a League of Nations guarantee, which would include Great Britain. They dared not treat with the French alone, because they feared that the latter would hang some of them after they had disarmed them. It is true that the High Commissioner has promised the leaders their lives if they capitulate before the 8th January, but Emir Amin knows that the rebel leaders do not trust this promise. Therefore, faced with no alternative, they are united and determined to fight to the last man.

4. There was no hope of their accepting the offer of the amnesty for the 8th January. A Druse representative was now in Geneva. They hoped, famine or no famine, to hang on until February, when the question of the French mandate for Syria came up for report before the League. The Emir repeated that the intervention as an intermediary of either Great Britain or the League would bring peace at once. They would not trust France alone.

5. I have repeated the Emir's statements much as they were given to me. They are open, of course, to many objections, but they record pretty accurately, I should imagine, the opinions of the distant insurgents as seen through the eyes of a sympathiser in the Lebanon. Emir Amin Arslan spoke to my informant for an hour and a half, giving him all the history of the Druses and the French since 1860. The latter have been in Syria only for a short five years' period, in which it would be unreasonable to expect them to have lived down the memories and rancours of half a century. The Emir's assertions indicate that the Druses at least have not forgotten, and that old antagonisms are still renewing their will to carry on a struggle of which they are perhaps weary. It is not impossible that they will resist the French attempts

to divide them and, in spite of their want and misery, continue to resist until some intervention on which they found their hopes saves them from the reckoning which the French have demanded. Time, from all appearances, is the only power likely to act as their intermediary, and even he is abandoning their side. The Druses must realise that they are nearing the point when, whether they like it or not, they will have to come to parley with the French.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Bagdad, Jerusalem, Damascus and Aleppo.)

I have, &c.
NORMAN MAYERS.

[E 576/12/89]

No. 187.

Acting Consul-General Norman Mayers to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 26.)

(No. 12.)

Beirut, January 15, 1926.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of a decree, No. 53, published to-day, regarding the confiscation of the estates and properties of rebel leaders.

2. The exalted tone of the preamble gives to the "arrêté" the air of an edict of the early days of the French revolution. It is obviously intended to warn off wealthy political intriguers, and to weaken further the resistance of the rebels by setting class against class, peasant against landlord, and tiller of the soil against feudal proprietor.

3. The proceeds of the confiscations are to go to general war reparations; to a distribution of land among the peasants; to a subvention of the agricultural banks; and to the construction of cheap dwellings for the proletariat. Here idealism and political strategy go hand in hand. It is legitimate to wonder how much the nationalist and anti-French movement, which almost appears to be gaining rather than losing momentum, will be affected by the recent cannonade of proclamations and "arrêtés."

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Bagdad, Jerusalem, Damascus and Aleppo.)

I have, &c.
NORMAN MAYERS.

Enclosure in No. 187.

Arrêté No. 53.

M. HENRY DE JOUVENEL, Sénateur, Haut-Commissaire de la République française auprès des États de Syrie, du Grand-Liban, des Alaouites et du Djebel Druse, Considérant que la responsabilité des événements qui ont troublé et troublent la sécurité des pays sous mandat, incombe principalement, sinon exclusivement, à un certain nombre de notables;

Que ceux-ci, abusant du pouvoir considérable que leur donne sur la masse de la population une organisation encore insuffisante du crédit mobilier et agricole, et de l'assistance sociale, ont fait et font pression sur leurs fermiers, métayers, locataires ou ouvriers pour les entraîner dans des agitations politiques ou dans des séditions souvent concertées avec l'étranger, et des conspirations contre la sûreté intérieure et extérieure de l'État;

Que la loi doit permettre de retirer au coupable les moyens par lesquels il attente à l'ordre et à la paix, et de donner à ses biens confisqués une destination conforme à l'intérêt social;

Vu l'article 1^{er} de la déclaration du mandat;
Sur la proposition du secrétaire général;

Arrête:

Article 1^{er}. Les biens, tant mobiliers qu'immobiliers, des individus qui seront condamnés contradictoirement ou par contumace pour un des crimes ou délits prévus aux chapitres 1 ou 2 du livre 1^{er} du Code pénal, seront confisqués par l'État, quelle que soit la peine prononcée.

Toutefois, la confiscation des biens ne deviendra définitive à l'égard des individus contumaces que si ceux-ci ne se présentent pas pour faire opposition à l'arrêt dans un délai de trente jours.

La condamnation et la confiscation seront prononcées par le même arrêt.

Art. 2. Dans chaque État, le Ministre ou le Directeur des Finances gèrera les biens confisqués dont le produit figurera à un compte spécial hors budget.

Art. 3. Une Commission de Répartition, dont la composition sera réglée par un arrêté ultérieur, procédera à l'affectation des biens confisqués ou de leur produit à l'un des objets suivants :

1. Réparation des dommages de brigandage.
2. Cession de terres aux paysans.
3. Subventions à la Banque agricole et Institution de Crédit mobilier.
4. Construction ou aménagements de logements à bon marché.

Art. 4. Le secrétaire général est chargé de l'exécution du présent arrêté, qui entrera en vigueur dans chaque État dès qu'il aura été affiché à la porte du Palais du Gouvernement de cet État.

Le Haut-Commissaire,
DE JOUVENEL.

Beyrouth, le 12 janvier 1926.

[E 602/12/89]

No. 188.

Consul Hough to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 5.)

Sir,

Aleppo, January 13, 1926.

IN continuation of my immediately preceding despatch, I have the honour to report the following additional details which have come to my knowledge regarding the demonstration of the 9th instant:—

2. It is said that the demonstration was formed at the Great Mosque, or Mosque of Zakaria, at noon on Sunday. Only about 500 volunteers presented themselves, so the leaders adjourned the proceedings until 3 P.M., telling the crowd to add to their number and return then. At 3 P.M. about 1,500 turned up at the mosque. The procession, attracting many idlers on the way, may have swelled to 3,000 or 4,000 strong by the time it reached the Serai. Up to the present I am totally unable to say by whom the demonstration was organised, and no one can even give unsupported conjectures. If I may give one, entirely my own, I may hint that the mufti is a member of the Kayali family, five of whom were among the arrested Nationalists. This, however, is pure surmise.

3. It seems certain that the mob were not all unarmed. It is said that the policeman whose death was reported in my former despatch was killed by a revolver shot. A somewhat comic touch was given to the proceedings when Saadallah Jabri, an arrested Nationalist, succeeded in haranguing the mob from a window of the prison. It seems clear that the use of force was amply justified in the circumstances.

4. The aged and feeble Vali, Muri Pasha Mellah, found the situation totally beyond him. The crowd were very hostile, as the order for the arrest had passed through him. He finally escaped in his motor, not without injury. It must be said that the injury was not directly due to the mob. A spahi, clearing the path for his car, accidentally smashed its window with his sabre, and the Vali was badly cut about the face by broken glass. His own son, Nasih-el-Mellah, was among those arrested, and, finding his position quite untenable, he resigned the same evening. The president of the Court of Appeal, Mahmoud Bey El Hakim, was named Vali in his stead. A namesake of his signed the boycott manifesto, but is not of the same family. The new Vali had been offered the presidency of the Extraordinary Tribunal at Damascus, but declined it, so his sympathies may be said to be mildly Nationalist. He is not, however, anti-mandate. His general reputation is good.

5. This is written in the evening of the 12th. Up to the time of writing the shops have only made a feeble and partial attempt at reopening. I hear, from what I believe to be an absolutely sure source, that the shops were given private hints to remain shut by the rank and file of the police, many of whom are in covert sympathy

with the rebels. This, if true, is the most disturbing factor in the situation. The chief of police is, however, thought to be loyal.

6. The total of arrests is now forty-three. This includes one or two secret emissaries from Damascus, who were caught with seditious propaganda matter on them. Of local families, the Jabris head the "roll of honour" with eight members arrested. The activities of Ihshan of that ilk in Geneva and elsewhere are doubtless known to you. The other great Moslem family of landowners, the Mudaress, are taking no part in the proceedings. It is understood they regard them as part of a pan-Arab movement, while their own secret sympathies are said to be pro-Turk. The Kayali family have five members behind bars, including the notorious Dr. Abdul Rahman Kayali, an incorrigible malcontent, but an intelligent and rather likeable man. The recital of the rest of the names would perhaps hardly interest you. The prisoners have been removed to the military barracks for safer custody, and it is now thought likely that they will be deported to France for a spell.

7. In the person of Ibrahim Hanano, who escaped in time to avoid arrest, the French let a big fish slip through their net. He was the first signatory of the boycott manifesto and was in former times a celebrated "cheteh" leader. Reports on his previous exploits by my predecessors will be found in your archives. It is by some thought that he will not be able to do so much mischief now, as the Turks have decided not to co-operate in band movements (see my despatch No. 1 of the 5th January). I personally am not so sure. He may yet prove a considerable source of trouble.

8. I had information this morning that a pacific demonstration was intended to the British consulate, with the aim of expressing a general desire for a change of mandate and of invoking the intervention of Great Britain for the release of the prisoners. I telephoned M. Reclus and said that such a demonstration would be as embarrassing to me as to him. It has not so far materialised.

(Copies to Bagdad (No. 5), Beirut (No. 6) and Damascus (No. 5).)

I have, &c.

W. HOUGH.

[E 631/12/89]

No. 189.

Acting Consul-General Mayers to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 13.)

Sir,

Beirut, January 17, 1926.

WITH reference to despatch No. 16 of the 11th instant from His Majesty's consul at Damascus, and in continuation of my despatch No. 7 of the 9th instant, I have the honour to inform you that the manifold difficulties in which the French have involved themselves since the distant prelude in the Jebel Druse to the present rebellion are now beginning to be realised to the full by responsible persons here. Officials who in the days of the Damascus bombardment used to say that it would all be over in a few days now express quite freely their discouragement, and frankly discuss the difficulties they encounter.

2. These difficulties, now that there are reinforcements in the country (although even they, to all appearances, are not sufficient), are for the present more political than military. The forces grouped against the French give from Beirut, as from Damascus, an impression of solidarity which a month or two ago was not so obvious. The mainstay of the resistance is now clearly seen to be the hostility of the Orthodox Moslems, which, centred in Damascus, active and intelligent, focusing on the French mandate animosities garnered from every corner of the Moslem world, including perhaps Nejd and the Riff, has now lifted the quarrel from the sphere of the revolt of a small and peculiar community against a faulty Administration to the rank of a reiteration of the old antagonism of East and West.

3. The question whether the Lebanon is to be great or small is, to my mind, only a symptom of more menacing difficulties. The Lebanese newspapers say that the resuscitation of this old dispute is a manoeuvre on the part of the Nationalists to extend the struggle. If so, the manoeuvre has succeeded. The agitation about its boundaries has brought the Lebanon at last into the general mêlée. The Municipal Council of Baalbek has just been dissolved for taking part in it, and all officials have simultaneously been warned by the Governor of the State that if they take the latter's bread and salt,

they must at least abstain from scheming against its destruction. Sunni Moslems here have not had the chance of taking up arms nor of countenancing resistance to the French. Their present outcry for attachment to a Moslem State of Syria is their contribution to the common war chest.

4. Realisation of this concentration of hitherto disparate opinion has naturally impressed the French, and caused the fanatic outcry in the Lebanese press to which Mr. Smart makes allusion in his despatches Nos. 15, 16 and 18. The hostility and exaggerated derision of the French press against the former Arab régime in Damascus will be remembered. The Emir Feisal, in another guise, is in Damascus again.

5. The same crystallisation of purpose doubtless accounts for the inactivity of the heretic Alawite and Metwali communities, who would view a Sunni Moslem Power as an unpleasant neighbour, though they would not dread such a Power with the emotion that has been awakened in the breasts of the Christian Lebanese. The Alawite elections at Latakia have therefore gone off quietly, and very little has been heard recently of the Metwalis, whose homes are scattered beyond Tyre and Sidon. The Nationalists do not count with certainty on these populations, as Mr. Smart's statements in paragraph 6 of his despatch No. 16 confirm. Little has been said, too, of the Druses of the Shouf, though it is rumoured that many of their young men have gone over the anti-Lebanon to join their co-religionaries.

6. The situation inspires hesitation and doubt. Bands are still operating on the western and southern slopes of Hermon. The railway and telephone between Beirut and Damascus have been cut for some days. Letters posted in Damascus on the 12th, which should regularly have arrived in Beirut on the 13th, have only reached the coast to-day, the 17th. I have just given a visa for Palestine to a French officer and his wife who are travelling from Aleppo to Damascus. They waited at Rayak for four days hoping to get through to their destination, but now have been forced to come on to Beirut, whence they will reach Damascus, if the railway south of that city is not cut in the meantime, via Haifa and Deraa.

7. An opinion commonly expressed here is that the offer of a partial amnesty, proclaimed by M. de Jouvenel, which came to a fruitless end on the 8th January, was not a genuine move towards reconciliation. A French official himself described it to me as a gesture destined to justify the mandatory Power in the eyes of the world and to put the insurgents in the wrong. Proof of this is perhaps to be found in the fact that rumours of an indefinite extension of the amnesty brought down an official declaration that the offer closed once and for all on the 8th January.

8. All these difficulties are very embarrassing. The French High Commission contains at present more charm and intelligence than ever in the last thirty months. But it is not at all certain that the shower of proclamations and decrees which, with abundant rains, 1926 has so far produced, will avail to facilitate the reassertion of French authority. If General Sarrail's circle reminded one of a sergeants' mess, M. de Jouvenel's entourage is reminiscent of a pre-revolution salon, and the methods of the Encyclopédistes applied to the Syrian tangle are not a guarantee of success. Mr. Smart speaks of a crusading policy directed by free-thinkers. This spirit is apparent in the Decree No. 53 transmitted in my despatch No. 12 of the 15th instant. An official of the French High Commission recently told me that an opportunity was being sought to deal with latifundia and feudal rights over land in the interests of the peasant classes. M. de Jouvenel appears to be thinking of that issue when he threatens the landlords with confiscation as the penalty of rebellion. In doing so he is dangerously near inventing diversions which in the end may enable his main object to evade him. The crusading spirit is present, a crusade undertaken with the polite zeal of the eighteenth century rather than with the fervour of the thirteenth.

9. I append a communiqué from the talented pen of the High Commissioner which has appeared to-day. The controversy over the "Grand-" and the "Petit-Liban" is avoided, and the pronouncement is simply a trumpet call to the ballot-box.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Bagdad, Jerusalem, Damascus and Aleppo.)

I have, &c.

NORMAN MAYERS.

Enclosure in No. 189.

Extract from the Beirut Press of January 17, 1926.

LE HAUT-COMMISSAIRE CONTRE LES SÉPARATISTES.

NOUS demandions à M. de Jouvenel de faire paraître un communiqué qui mît fin à la campagne des Séparatistes. Voici "la déclaration nécessaire":

"Le Haut-Commissaire reçoit depuis quelque temps un certain nombre de mazbatas contradictoires, les unes tendant à détacher telle ou telle partie du Grand-Liban, les autres réclamant le maintien des frontières actuelles.

"Ces mazbatas sont inutiles.

"Le régime des élections qui permet aux populations de faire entendre leur voix à des intervalles réguliers est infiniment préférable à celui des pétitions. Le premier est un appel au peuple, le second n'est qu'un appel au maître.

"C'est pourquoi le Haut-Commissaire a décidé que partout les élections suivraient la paix.

"Ceux qui prolongent les hostilités ou s'abstiennent de participer, soit aux élections, soit aux Constitutions, renoncent d'eux-mêmes à l'exercice de leurs droits.

"Le Haut-Commissaire considère comme un devoir de les en avertir.

"Quant à ceux qui attaquent les frontières, ils exaspèrent les inimitiés de races et de religions, et rendent impossible l'entente entre les États. Ainsi s'opposent-ils à la véritable unité, qui consiste à resserrer les rapports d'amitié et d'intérêt qui doivent unir le Liban et la Syrie.

"Venant du dehors, les attaques contre les frontières existantes apparaissent comme des menaces de guerre. Venant du dedans, elles attentent à la sûreté de l'État.

"A l'heure où la guerre n'est pas encore terminée, et où l'armée française vient à peine de sauver le Liban de l'invasion, chacun doit éviter scrupuleusement toute attitude qui pourrait le faire suspecter de connivence avec les bandes qui s'efforcent de mettre en péril la sécurité de l'armée et de l'État."

[E 641/146/89]

No. 190.

Consul Hough to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 8.)

Sir,

Aleppo, January 15, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to submit a report on the progress of the elections in this district.

2. The possibility that the extremists might make trouble in Aleppo was foreseen when the heads of the Christian communities could not be induced to call their communities to the poll *en masse*. The spiritual chiefs are generally very well informed about political feeling, and the inference made by the French was that they were "ca'ing canny" so as to avoid setting themselves too openly in opposition to the Moslem extremists, keeping on terms with whom is a constant factor in their policy. The deduction drawn was that the extremists were out for trouble, which proved to be correct, as you know. In consequence of these manoeuvres, the percentage of voters in Aleppo itself was low. The French do not assert it to be higher than 15 per cent. of the electorate, and this may be exaggerated.

3. On the other hand, in the outlying districts the proportion was extremely high, in some places up to 90 per cent. of the electorate. It is thought that this unusual interest is due to the conviction in the minds of all electors that a separation from Damascus would be good for them economically. This is possibly true, but it would be interesting to know what methods were used to propagate this conviction. The autonomy of Aleppo would considerably handicap the pan-Arabs and Nationalists, and the convenience of this can hardly have escaped the attention of the mandatory authorities.

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4. The preliminary elections have been declared valid, and the elections of the second degree are fixed for the 22nd instant. It will then be possible to estimate their ultimate significance better than at present.

5. As regards the elections in other sanjaks of this district, all I have learnt of Dair-es-Zor is from a brief paragraph in the press saying that it has been impossible to conduct them among the tribes, as they are all inaccessible in their winter quarters. It is true that a good many of them are in Irak, but there may be more in this paragraph than meets the eye.

6. Reports from Alexandretta show that a very high percentage of voters took part. I gather from M. Catoni that the Alawite candidates are at present making the running. This may lead to interesting developments in the political complexion of that district, to which I will revert in due course.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Bagdad, No. 7; Beirut, No. 9; and Damascus, No. 8.)

I have, &c.
W. HOUGH.

[E 628/12/89]

No. 191.

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 25.)

Sir,

Damascus, January 19, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to report that railway communication between Damascus and Rayak has been interrupted for a week.

2. On the night of the 12th-13th instant the band of Akkasheh, swollen by Kurdish recruits, under Abu Diab, a recent addition to the band leaders, pulled up, at different spots, some 5 kilom. of rails between the stations of Elhameh (10 kilom. north of Damascus) and At Takiyyeh (30 kilom. north of Damascus) and threw a considerable quantity of the rails into the River Barada below the embankment. A goods train coming from Rayak was derailed between Judeidah (14 kilom. north of Damascus) and Elhameh and plundered by the band. A relief train coming from Rayak with workmen to repair the damage was derailed at Kafar, between Sook Wadi Barada (29 kilom. north of Damascus) and Fijeh (21 miles north of Damascus), the rails there having been pulled up after the passage of the goods train. An armoured train which came out to the relief from Damascus was derailed just north of Elhameh and about a kilometre south of the spot at which the goods train had been derailed.

3. From a conversation with Commandant de Vaux, of the Services de Renseignements, and from other sources, I gather that the military authorities displayed their usual negligence. They apparently knew on the morning of the 12th instant that this band was moving towards the railway line, but they took no steps to obviate the danger. After the derailment of the goods train they were informed that the line had suffered widespread damage, yet the relief train from Rayak and the armoured train from Damascus were allowed to proceed incautiously into the damaged areas, with the result that they were both derailed.

4. On the following morning, the 12th instant, workmen, without any military protection, were sent out from Damascus to repair the line. They found the band across the line near Judeidah and naturally returned to Damascus. On the next day, the 13th, another armoured train set out from Damascus, but was heavily attacked by the band between Judeidah and Elhameh and had to retreat to Damascus.

5. On the next day, the 14th instant, the French did at last what they should have done on the 12th instant, when they got the news of the rebel movement and before the damage had been done, that is to say, they sent out a strong column, under Colonel Vergne, who has been in command of all the sweeping operations in the neighbourhood of Damascus. This column drove the band away and burnt the villages of Judeidah and Ashrafiyyeh, which is a little north-east of Judeidah. The inhabitants fled to the mountains, and the males among them will doubtless become recruits for the bands. The column is apparently threatening Fijeh and Bassimeh, a neighbouring village, with a similar fate.

6. A British Indian subject, named Haj Mohamed Kamal-el-Hindi, who was a worker in a flour mill at Judeidah and did not fly with the villagers, appears to have had a narrow escape. According to his own story, the soldiers pushed him into the mill, to which, after closing the door, they set fire with the intention of burning him

alive. He says that he jumped out of a remote window and managed to reach the station, where the station master, who knew him well, interceded for him and saved his life.

7. Incidentally it seems rather extraordinary that the mandatory authorities should, at a moment when the fear of scarcity has not yet been removed, burn a large mill which provides the town of Damascus with some of its flour.

8. The interruption of railway communication with Beirut has sent up the prices of bread, tea and sugar. Communication by road has, of course, long been interrupted. As Damascus is now depending largely on flour imported through Beirut, any frequent and prolonged interruptions of communications with the coast must have serious effects on the town. Suffering is already widespread among the population, which is so poverty-stricken by the events of the last six months that any considerable and lasting increases in the prices of the necessities of life might have unpleasant reactions.

9. However, General Andréa announced yesterday that the line had now been repaired. A trial train left Damascus for Beirut this morning.

10. Hitherto the bands had been singularly feeble in their attempts at railway destruction, and this is the first time that they have shown some real enterprise. It is said that this band was helped in its destructive work by the advice of ex-Turkish officers. If this destructive skill were to make further progress and the rebels, for instance, were to learn how to blow up one of the numerous tunnels, the interruption of railway communication would be still more prolonged and more serious. If we are to judge by their past record, the military authorities cannot be counted on to do anything to protect the tunnels until one of them has been blown up.

11. In view of this new development, the railway company has announced that it is suspending its night services for the present. There will thus be only one train to Beirut each day, and passengers for Aleppo, who used to leave Damascus by the night train to catch the connection at Rayak, will presumably have to spend the night at Rayak or Baalbec and get their connection for Aleppo next day. Travellers from Aleppo to Damascus will likewise have to spend the night at Baalbec or Rayak.

I have, &c.
W. A. SMART.

[E 866/12/89]

No. 192.

Acting Consul-General Mayers to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 8.)

(No. 20.)

Sir,

Beirut, January 25, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to report that there is still no improvement in the general Syrian situation as seen from Beirut. The Maronite Patriarch has written to the Governor of the Great Lebanon asking that a medal should be struck in honour of those who have defended from outside aggression the sacred soil of the Lebanon. Nevertheless, there are no trains running to Aleppo, the rail having again been cut south of Homs. The whole of the country lying between the Lebanon and the Anti-Lebanon lives in a state of perpetual apprehension. A band of 600 insurgents was in the Bekaa last week, holding up to ransom half a dozen Lebanese villages within an hour's journey of Zahle. At Sofar, 15 miles from Beirut on the Damascus road, a scuffle took place a few nights ago between gendarmes and armed Druses, which resulted in five deaths.

2. In conversation with the French one gets away from this silly talk of sacred soil and the peace-loving apostle of civilisation. There is mention of war and mention of peace. It is even rumoured that the High Commissioner and General Gamelin do not see eye to eye on the situation and its needs. What can, however, be vouched for is the fact that conversations are still going on with the Moslems. A representative of M. de Jouvenel has met several times in the last few days with local Moslem spokesmen who have several schemes to offer, one of them being that Beirut should become a free port. This French representative is M. Jean Méliat, a rather enigmatic person of middle age, who has been "chef de cabinet" to the Governor-General of Algeria. His official task in Syria is to help prepare the Organic Law, but he is supposed to be something of an expert on Eastern affairs, although he says he does not speak Arabic. He works personally with the High Commissioner, and is rather proud of being, like the latter, a man of letters, having published a number of books.

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3. At the same time Sheikh Taj-ud-Din, whose former visit to Beirut occasioned my despatches Nos. 7 and 13, is back again for further consultations with the authorities. His proposals are now said to be:—

- (a.) Admission of Syria into the League of Nations.
- (b.) A Constitution based on "national supremacy."
- (c.) A treaty between France and Syria.
- (d.) A general amnesty.
- (e.) Rectification of the Syria-Lebanon frontier by a mixed commission of Syrians and Lebanese, with a delegate of the High Commissioner as arbitrator between them.

4. If these proposals are really what the sheikh has put forward, they are much more likely to form the basis of negotiation than the last, for an understanding between France and the State of Syria on the lines of that which has recently been renewed between Great Britain and Irak would perhaps not be altogether an impossible solution, in view of the personal character and political creed of M. de Jouvenel, not to mention the new appreciation of the relations between France and her mandated territory, or at least the more unruly regions of it, which recent events have brought home to some Frenchmen. The question of the Great Lebanon and its boundaries is still there in a modified form; but I am inclined to think—speaking, of course, from the Beirut point of view—that there is an element of unreality in that agitation. Some of the leading Moslems of Sidon, for example, have signified their disagreement with the idea that they should be attached to Syria. It is true that Tripoli has been sulking behind closed shop doors for several days; but the Lebanese Moslem agitation is fed from Damascus, and if the Moslems of Damascus were offered and accepted a treaty with France which would give them considerably more voice in the direction of their affairs than they have at present, their co-religionists of the Lebanon would find their position very much weakened. It is, however, rather anticipating matters to speak of such a treaty.

5. Two companies of Chasseurs libanais are being formed of volunteers recruited locally. As these are said to be mostly Armenians who have adopted Lebanese nationality, the question is again raised of the advisability of arming Christians, and especially alien Christians, against men who consider themselves struggling for a patriotic end.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to Bagdad, Jerusalem, Damascus and Aleppo.

I have, &c.

NORMAN MAYERS.

[E 927/12/89]

No. 193.

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 9.)

(No. 44.)

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to invite a reference to the French High Commissioner's decree No. 53 of the 12th instant, enclosed in despatch No. 12 of the 15th instant from the British acting consul-general at Beirut, regarding the confiscation of the properties of rebel notables.

2. The preamble would convey the impression that the rebellion is the work of a few notables, who are dragging the unwilling people into the struggle. Such a presentation of the case is very misleading. At Damascus, at any rate, the strength of the movement is in the middle and lower classes, who, indeed, reproach the notables for their lack of co-operation. The failure of the notables to co-operate more actively is due to pusillanimity rather than to any lack of anti-French sentiment. Many of them have fled to Beirut or Egypt to keep out of danger and complications.

3. If the French are misled and are not merely trying to mislead public opinion outside of Syria, it is to be feared that they will be at a considerable disadvantage in handling the situation. What constitutes the difficulties at Damascus is the universal popular support of the rebels. The Druses are exhausted and not without internal divisions. A strong military expedition against the Jebel Druse in April should be able to crush the resistance in the mountain. But the problem of this general guerilla

in the country and in the town of Damascus itself, which is full of bands, hardly seem one for a military solution. This guerilla in the city is only rendered possible by the universal complicity of the humbler inhabitants, who are not far from regarding the rebels as heroes. My barber, for instance, did not hesitate to compare them to "Antar," the hero of popular Arab legend, much to the disadvantage of the latter, who, he pointed out, never had to fight against artillery, tanks and aeroplanes. The French rarely come into the Moslem city. Indeed, some of my French acquaintances have told me that I live in a quarter in which, to their regret, they cannot visit me. It is possible, therefore, that they cannot see so clearly what is evident to one who, like myself, lives in an entirely Moslem quarter. I could quote numerous instances of this extraordinary popular complicity with the bands. One amusing example will perhaps suffice. I was returning one evening after dark from the British Syrian Mission. As I entered the modest popular bazaar at the beginning of my quarter a Ford car passed me rapidly and pulled up sharply. Two men, their faces muffled in their "kefiyehs," got out of the car. Some of the small shopkeepers, whose booths were just closing, approached and asked the men who they were. The reply came loudly and without any attempt at discretion: "Warriors in the way of God from Douma" ("mujahidin fi sabil Allah min Douma"). And they repeated this remark in even louder tones, so that the police hard by, who are always obligingly inattentive on such occasions, should have no excuse for not hearing. The shopkeepers gathered round the two heroes, and there ensued a friendly conversation which I thought I had better not wait to hear. The two men who were members of some band who had probably come into the town to get supplies. They were quite certain of being made welcome.

4. Of course this popular complicity may diminish gradually owing to the exactions of the bands, which are naturally composed largely of loose characters and cannot be adequately controlled by the more responsible leaders. But at the present moment it is the gravest factor of the problem. There is a certain similarity between the situation here and that in Ireland during the rebellion. In order to settle such a situation, the French, even after reasserting their military prestige by defeat of the more organised rebel forces, must, it would seem, devise some policy which would give a minimum of satisfaction to the popular elements, whose animosity is even more serious than that of the notables.

(Copies of this despatch have been addressed to Jerusalem (No. 37), Amman (No. 34), Bagdad (No. 32), Beirut (No. 34) and Aleppo (No. 24)).

I have, &c.

W. A. SMART.

[E 973/12/89]

No. 194.

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 11)

(No. 52.)

Sir,

Damascus, January 31, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to submit a summary review of the general situation in Southern Syria during the first month of the New Year.

2. The concentration of nearly 10,000 French troops at Damascus in the middle of last month has prevented any further attacks on the town by considerable bodies of rebels such as occurred, for instance, at the beginning of December on the Meydan (southern quarter) and near the British hospital. It has also prevented bands from establishing themselves in the eastern oasis as in the past. It has, however, not prevented attacks on the town by smaller bands or their passage through the oasis. The semi-circle of French posts encompassing the eastern oasis has been pushed as far south as Burak, where, according to native reports, the French troops got the worst of an encounter with the Druses. The official communiqués on the subject were so vague and disconnected as to suggest a set-back in that region. The mobile column under Colonel Vergne has had during the latter part of the month to be used along the northern railway, but it has just begun again its periodical sweeping movements in the eastern oasis.

3. In Damascus itself governmental authority is even more circumscribed than it was. The town is full of bands composed of Damascenes, who emerge from their houses and return to them without any difficulty after operating in one or another part of the city. When their activity becomes too aggressive, French troops move against them,

and use is sometimes made of tanks, which shell right and left the streets through which they pass. Casualties among non-combatants, Circassian or Armenian irregulars and Syrian gendarmes are not infrequent. The Meydan and Shaghour (eastern) quarters are almost permanently in the possession of bands, which even affect to have a police organisation of their own. Considering the lawlessness of their component elements, the amount of pillaging by the bands has hitherto been remarkably small. They still distinguish between the French and other Europeans in favour of the latter. The rebels, for instance, recently attacked a tram coming up from the Meydan, and caught a Polish passenger. They asked him his nationality. He said first that he was a Pole, and then, as they did not understand this term, that he was a German. They at once let him go with demonstrations of friendliness.

4. Recently the bands in the city have begun to carry off persons for ransom. The rebels appear to have selected preferably persons connected with the French, such as the son-in-law of the Francophile president of the municipality and the notary public of Damascus, who, two nights ago, was carried off from his house in the consulate quarter. But this is not always the case. The bands are evidently getting out of hand, and robbery pure and simple without any direct anti-French intention is tending to become the motive of their activities. This relaxation of organisation in the action of the bands was inevitable, and is a disquieting development.

5. Firing night and day continues to be customary in the city. Indeed, so accustomed has everyone grown to these fusillades, mostly in the air, that little attention is paid to them. The French still indulge occasionally in artillery fire across the town.

6. The bands, on finding their movements circumscribed in the eastern oasis, moved northwards and devoted considerable attention to destruction of the railway and telegraph lines in the immediate neighbourhood of Damascus and as far north as Homs. Railway and telegraphic communication with the north has been much interrupted during this month. I fear that the Damascus garrison has again been reduced to provide the forces which appear to have operated with some success against the rebels in Central Syria. Homs, where there has been considerable unrest, is now more heavily garrisoned.

7. The French are only holding the important urban centres and the railways. The rebels have been left in undisturbed possession of Wad-al-Ajam, and thus the country both east and west of the southern railway is at rebel discretion. The road to Kuneitra is closed, and the Kuneitra garrison has to be kept supplied by convoys. The southern railway has been occasionally cut. The rebels have been in possession of the Nebk region for three months, but a French force recently moved out in that direction from Homs. I do not yet know what has been the result of this movement. Generally the rainy season makes any extensive military operations impracticable for the present.

8. The Druses appear to be very exhausted, and there is now some opposition among them to Sultan Atrash. A reliable informant tells me that Sultan Atrash can count on about 70 per cent. of the Druses of the Southern Mountain, but on very few in the northern parts, where the rival families of the Halabiyyeh and 'Awamereh have considerable influence. It would, however, be unwise to exaggerate the importance of these divisions, which are often simulated by the Druses for purposes of political tactics. Nevertheless, my information goes to show that the Druses are not at present in a position materially or morally to resist successfully a strong offensive in the spring, unless diversions in their favour occur elsewhere and encourage their resistance.

9. A French officer recently remarked to me that the rebellion would be ended by terrorisation and exhaustion. Burning and plundering of villages no doubt form part of the terrorisation, which, however, has, to a certain extent, an effect contrary to that sought, for it creates the desperation which swells the numbers of the insurgents. But exhaustion is already operating to weaken the organised forces of the rebellion. If there are no developments in the north favourable to the rebel cause, the French troops, slightly reinforced, should in the spring be able to overcome organised rebel resistance, provided they are prepared to attack vigorously and suffer considerable casualties.

10. But guerrilla and banditism cannot be overcome by purely military methods. It is essential that some Syrian administrative authority should be created to co-operate with the French troops in the work of pacification. At present there is virtually no native Government, and it is almost impossible for a foreign army to handle such a situation by direct and unaided action. The negotiations of M. Pierre Alype, the new Envoyé extraordinaire, with various Damascene personalities have not yet resulted in the formation of a Syrian Government. He has recently proceeded to Beirut to discuss matters with M. de Jouvenel, and perhaps on his return he may make some announcement of French policy. Without considerable concessions to Nationalist opinion, it

would be impossible to form any Government having the necessary authority to assist the French materially in the work of pacification. If such concessions were made, I believe that it would still be possible to obtain the co-operation of an influential native Government, for all law-abiding citizens are seriously alarmed by the growth of the anarchical forces let loose in the country and by the economic ruination of Syria.

11. Morally the position of France has deteriorated still further during the present month. Her inability to maintain order in the town in spite of the presence of a large military force, her failure to secure any native co-operation, the growing misery of the people attributed to France, the destructions, avoidable and unavoidable, of military operations, have all combined to increase popular discontent and to widen the gulf between mandatory and mandated.

I have, &c.

W. A. SMART.

[E 1159/12/89]

No. 195.

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 56. Confidential.)

Damascus, February 5, 1926.

Sir,

WITH reference to paragraphs 8 and 9 of my despatch No. 52 of the 31st ultimo, I have received information from well-informed nationalist sources to the effect that the rebels are too exhausted to continue the struggle much longer. They are, according to my informants, only continuing the rebellion actively in anticipation of some relief from the League of Nations when France's mandate for Syria comes under examination in the middle of this month. As soon as all hope is lost of succour from Geneva, my informants believe that the rebel resistance will collapse.

2. There is little doubt that Southern Syria, including the Druses, is exhausted. The rebels, Druses and others, are already making advances to the mandatory authorities. If France only had in Syria men inspiring general confidence, I believe that the rebellion could now be terminated without military expeditions. The difficulty in the way of a prompt settlement is the universal native distrust of French officials in this country. However, even if this lack of confidence should retard a settlement, the general opinion among well-informed Nationalists seems to be that the rebels must submit before long, unless serious diversions in their favour occur in the north.

3. The submission of the rebels without their obtaining any fundamental concessions would leave behind rancours and bitternesses which would render precarious any political settlement of the country. It is to be hoped that France, once the rebellion is at an end, will seize the opportunity to adopt a liberal Moslem policy and grant in peace all the people's moderate demands to which she has felt unable to yield under threat of war. It is only by such a method that the bitter memories of the rebellion can gradually be effaced and its future renewal be obviated. There is, unfortunately, little hope that the men France sends to Syria would be able to give effect to such a statesmanlike policy.

I have, &c.

W. A. SMART.

No. 196.

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 4.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Damascus, February 16, 1926.

YOUR telegram No. 33 and my despatch No. 57 of 6th February.

Situation is again very bad at Damascus, but reinforcements are arriving to-morrow and immediate French military reaction against sudden strengthening of rebel offensive is promised.

From experience of the past, it seems likely that new military reaction will have momentarily calming effect. I propose, therefore, in the absence of contrary instructions from you, to leave for Jerusalem and Amman 22nd February, and get visit over before situation again becomes perhaps worse with the approach of warmer weather, which will facilitate band circulation, and of tribes migrating past the town.

[E 1209/146/89]

No. 197.

Acting Consul-General Mayers to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 20.)

(No. 30.)

Sir,

Beirut, February 7, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that no very clear decision has yet been evolved from the general public debate on the future Constitution of the Great Lebanon reported in my despatch No. 14 of the 18th January last. The time limit set for answers to the *questionnaires* was at first the 15th January. It was then extended to the 31st January. Even now, with the Moslems refusing to co-operate and the learned professions still resentful of their exclusion from the Representative Council charged with the elaboration of the Constitution, there has not yet been a complete expression of opinion on the subject.

2. Apart from the general utility of such a discussion as a healthy occupation for the controversially inclined in times of political excitement, and from the desirability of rewarding the Lebanon for its docility, one is inclined to think that M. de Jouvenel himself is honestly animated by the democratic ideals to which he holds political allegiance. His main mission is, of course, to save French prestige in Syria. It would, however, be unfair to call the High Commissioner a mere opportunist; he gives the impression of a man who is a sincere believer in his remedy for the country's ills, not of one who has adopted a liberal solution because he has been forced to it. His constant theme is to exhort not only the friends of France, but also those who are indifferent or hostile to the mandatory Power, to get together and decide on democratic lines for themselves. From other high officials, past and present, in Syria the appeal would be suspect; from M. de Jouvenel it carries at least the conviction of sincerity.

3. The general impression is that it will be very difficult for France ever again to enjoy the prestige which, through years of patient work since the middle of the 19th century especially, she has built up in the Lebanon. Even now there are constant complaints that nothing is being done to protect or save the Christian communities on the fringe of the Lebanon who are exposed to the devastating visits of the insurgent bands, so that it is hard to see how the present generation can ever again place its full confidence in the protection and the wisdom of the mandatory Power. However, something has been saved. M. de Jouvenel has made many friends; he keeps open table for all who wish to dine and discuss with him. The somewhat equivocal M. Mélia (see paragraph 2 of my despatch No. 20 of the 25th ultimo) works to and fro like a shuttle, gathering opinions and picking up hints. Indeed, the latter sups in such oddly assorted company that the High Commission have been forced to state that his activities are purely informal and personal. Thus, the future rather than the present is wholesomely engaging the attention of many of the Lebanese.

4. The vehemence with which the question whether the Representative Council or a Constituent Assembly should prepare the Constitution is fought indicates the degree of interest successfully aroused. Further, the hostility of the Moslems to a State against which they have political rather than material grievances might perhaps weaken if conditions changed in Damascus.

5. In a word, the Lebanon ought not to be now a cause of any grave anxiety to the French, despite the Moslem movement, in view of the fact that the majority of its inhabitants ask nothing better than the presence in the country of a foreign Power. The discussion of the Constitution is therefore developing, although slowly. The Greek Orthodox community have now decided what line they will take in the debate. They consider that there ought to be two Chambers, the Senate to serve as a court of appeal and to check the activities of the Chamber of Deputies. The head of the State should only be responsible to the Constitution and to the law. Cabinet responsibility should be collective or individual according to the authorship of the measures which have occasioned censure. Representation of the people should be by direct, universal and single vote, and on a confessional basis. Every voter should be allowed to vote for any candidate, but no candidate should be successful who polls less than 75 votes. Government appointments and portfolios in the Cabinet should be distributed on a confessional basis, thus ensuring that no one confession—the Maronites, for example—should monopolise the Government.

6. The Greek Orthodox community, in harmony with most other bodies who have expressed an opinion, are for a republican régime. The idea of a constitutional monarchy has, however, its supporters, generally on the sound principle that in a

country such as this a monarchical system would make for discipline and public service. The preponderance of opinion in favour of a republic is to be accounted for by the influence and example of France, and by the absence of any suitable candidate for the throne. No doubt, if the French wished to mould this issue they could secure a demand for a principality. The notion was mentioned to M. de Jouvenel, it is said, that perhaps a Prince of the House of Bourbon might accept. M. de Jouvenel laughed and asked what figure he would cut if he wrote to his Radical friends in France to report that he had not made much material progress beyond securing an offer of a minor crown for a Prince de Bourbon.

7. The Greek Orthodox community as a matter of fact want the head of the State to be French, and so acute are local jealousies, even among the Christians, that this opinion is shared by many Lebanese. It will be interesting to see how French diplomacy will be able to combine whatever self-governing constitutional apparatus is produced at Beirut with the ordinary and natural desire of the French Administration, who will remain when M. de Jouvenel has departed, to keep for itself all the actual reins of government.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Bagdad, Jerusalem, Damascus and Aleppo.)

I have, &c.

NORMAN MAYERS.

[E 1240/1199/89]

No. 198.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 72.)

Sir,

Constantinople, February 17, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to report that M. de Jouvenel reached Angora overland on the 12th instant. He is still there with M. Albert Sarraut negotiating the main lines of an agreement which, it is said, M. Sarraut hopes to conclude in detail after his departure. M. de Jouvenel has stated that his object in getting into personal touch with the Turkish Government is to settle all questions connected with the Turco-Syrian frontier which have been outstanding so long. He has made a point of adding that such a settlement could but be of advantage to Anglo-Turkish relations.

2. I know little of what has passed at Angora beyond such reports as appear in the press. From these it is clear that M. de Jouvenel has paid the usual visits to Ismet Pasha and Tewfik Rushdi Bey, exchanged the usual dinners with the latter and then engaged in frequent discussions. Three commissions are said to have been set up at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to deal with the negotiations. The Turkish press suggests that Turkey desires, firstly, such a rectification south of Kiliis as would restore to the people of that place valuable lands which they are alleged to own south of the present frontier, and, secondly—though this is mentioned less confidently—Alexandretta and Antioch. I suspect that the Turks' chief objective is yet another, viz., the railway junction at Muslimieh, the return to Turkey of which would give her rail communication in her own territory as far east as Nusseibin. The Turkish minority at Antioch and Alexandretta is not much more important than at Mosul. It seems quite likely that the press agitation for the return of these two places has been kept going fitfully in the hope of enforcing the restoration of the railway line. To obtain it Angora might make some concession over the coupons, since recovery of Muslimieh would obviate the enormous difficulty and expense of building the alternative line now contemplated further north. In any case, the Turkish Government can be trusted to take the fullest advantage of the weakness of the French position, and it is to be hoped that Angora will open its mouth so wide that M. de Jouvenel will not be seriously inclined to give Muslimieh away.

3. What the French want more than a mere delimitation or a frontier customs convention is doubtless an understanding with the Turks of such a nature as to preclude for the future all possibility of disorder in Syria receiving support from Turkish territory. Whether M. de Jouvenel has set about things in the right way remains to be seen. For him to go to Angora at all seemed a doubtful step. As soon as he entered Turkey he was overcome by the inclination so often fatal to French representatives here, and delivered himself, in an interview, of a fawning tribute to the genius of

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Mustafa Kemal. He certainly had some reward, for the President of the Republic received him yesterday. One imagines that each party hopes to obtain more by his personal charm than he could by ordinary discussion and that the result will perhaps be a drawn match.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

No. 199.

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 6.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Damascus, February 18, 1926.

MY telegram No. 4.

Situation has been rendered more serious by French sending Circassian and Armenian irregulars to clear up Meidan (southern) quarter of town. In such house-to-house fighting some pillaging and killing of innocent persons are inevitable, but irregulars appears to have indulged in excesses.

Feeling of Moslems is intense and being fanned by stories of their brothers killed and despoiled by Armenians. There is much loose talk of reprisals against Christians generally.

I have urged leading Moslems to exercise restraining influence, and they have promised to do so.

I venture to suggest desirability of pointing out to French Government the danger of the use of Christian irregulars within a metropolis of Islam and even in Moslem interior generally. French do not protect us, and we are dependent upon Moslem protection. Moreover, continued use of Christian irregulars against Moslems in a country under the mandate of League of Nations may create great future difficulties for all Europeans in these parts.

I will postpone visit to Jerusalem unless situation improves.

[E 1256/146/89]

No. 200.

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 23.)

(No. 59.)

Sir,

Damascus, February 10, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to report that the French High Commissioner arrived at Damascus by special train in the afternoon of the 5th instant. As in view of the danger of rebel attacks his coming could not be announced beforehand, there was hardly any crowd along the well-guarded road from the station to the house of M. Alype, his envoyé extraordinaire, where M. de Jouvenel stayed during the three nights he was here.

2. On the 6th instant, after the usual official reception at the Grand Serai, M. de Jouvenel, in the hall of the Representative Council, made a speech, the text of which I have the honour to enclose herewith.*

3. This declaration, like its predecessors, repeats general offers of constitutional blessings after unconditional submission of the rebels. Hopes are held out of "the United States of Syria and the Lebanon," and of the consecration by treaty of the constitutional arrangements peacefully agreed upon. M. de Jouvenel intimates that his report to the League of Nations contains suggestions on these lines.

4. Native opinion generally seems to be that such speeches have no effect one way or the other.

5. Extraordinary military precautions were taken to protect the High Commissioner during his sojourn at Damascus.

6. M. de Jouvenel, on his arrival at Beirut, stated that he would not come to Damascus until Damascus was ready to receive him. It is not, therefore, clear why he came at this moment, unless it was considered advisable that he should put

* Not printed.

in an appearance at the Syrian capital before proceeding to Angora. No political innovations seem to have resulted from his visit. Apparently the French policy continues to be mainly military, and to count on the reduction of the rebels by exhaustion and by an expedition, if necessary, against the Druses in April.

7. Damascus showed itself ready to receive the High Commissioner in at least one undesirable manner. For several days the rebels had been unusually quiet, but as soon as the news of M. de Jouvenel's arrival had spread, rebel demonstrations began to take place in the form of attacks on various parts of the town. On the night of the 6th-7th instant, the rebels attacked the northern suburbs just above the old Residence, which is to be reoccupied by M. Alype. They broke into the house of Reza Pasha Said, the Minister of Education, who fortunately was not there. They shattered his mirrors with rifle shots and carried off some property. They then entered the house of Dr. Melikian, honorary dragoman of the United States consulate, and carried him off with a large sum of money he had in his safe. The police, who for once seemed to have shown some fight, had two of their number killed. Although a French post was quite close, no soldiers intervened.

8. With reference to M. de Jouvenel's statement in his speech to the effect that he could not leave Syria any longer without a Government, the French have apparently decided to make official the régime of direct government which has been practically in force since M. Alype's arrival (see the last paragraph of my despatch No. 32 of the 25th ultimo). The efforts to form a native Government have failed largely owing to the inability of the French to assure the protection of natives co-operating with them. The bands are carrying off persons from the town rather indiscriminately, but they make a special set at notables in any way connected with the French. Until the mandatory Power can regain control of the town, it is hardly to be expected that its citizens will expose themselves and their houses to hostile band action by too emphatic identification with the French.

9. M. de Jouvenel left Damascus for Angora via Beirut on the morning of the 8th instant.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 47), Amman (No. 44), Bagdad (No. 42), Beirut (No. 50), and Aleppo (No. 33).)

I have, &c.

W. A. SMART.

[E 1257/77/89]

No. 201.

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 23.)

(No. 60.)

Sir,

Damascus, February 10, 1926.

WITH reference to paragraphs 3 and 4 of my despatch No. 52 of the 31st ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a collective note addressed by the Consular Corps here to the Envoy Extraordinary of the French High Commissioner regarding the situation created by recent developments of band activities in the town of Damascus.

2. The meeting of the Consular Corps was called at the instance of my United States colleague, whose honorary dragoman, Dr. Melikian, was carried off by a band for ransom on the night of the 7th-8th instant.

3. The situation at Damascus must be almost unique. In spite of a French garrison of about 10,000 men, the rebels are able to circulate freely in the town and carry off for ransom persons living in diverse quarters. On the night of the 8th-9th instant a band occupied the whole of a central quarter of the town and carried off two notables for ransom. One of them was another relative of the unfortunate president of the municipality (see paragraph 4 of my despatch above referred to). It was the night of the Mi'raj (the Prophet's aerial journey), and the rebels, in the midst of their expedition, entered the Omayyad Mosque and prayed before the alleged tomb of St. John the Baptist. No one interfered with either their devotions or their less peaceful operations.

4. Apparently the French are reluctant to risk the lives of their soldiers by occupying the interior of the town. The Christian quarter is now occupied by a few French posts, adequate to prevent successful attacks on the parts thus held, if the bands remain as inconsiderable as at present. About half the northern suburbs are occupied

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by French troops. Barrages, held by Syrian gendarmerie, strengthened by a few French gendarmes, bar certain entries to the town, but the rebels have no difficulty in entering and leaving the city by unguarded stretches. The French gendarmes or soldiers never leave their posts to pursue the rebels through the town. These immobile guards do not therefore interfere with rebel circulation except within sight of their posts. The police, even if they were whole-hearted in their work, cannot be expected to deal with rebels organised on a military basis. Damascus is part of a military front and must be held by soldiers. Indeed, much indignation prevails among the police, especially since the death of their comrades in the attack reported in the seventh paragraph of my despatch No. 59 of to-day's date. The police not unreasonably murmur that, if they are to be left unsupported to fight against invaders in spite of the presence of a large French army here, they do not propose to expose themselves unnecessarily in the future.

5. I am unable to venture on any prophecies as to whether the rebels, who have hitherto respected non-French Europeans, will maintain this attitude. On the 1st instant the French, in the dark hours of the morning, hanged Fakhri-al-Kharrat and his two rebel companions in the main square of the town (see my despatch No. 49 of the 29th ultimo), and the corpses were left hanging until 10 A.M. These executions considerably incensed the rebels. An extremist Nationalist sent me a message the same day to the effect that, though the rebels had hitherto carefully respected foreigners, the European Powers remained indifferent spectators of the French treatment of the Syrians. He said that, if this indifference continued, the consulates might be attacked. He added that a similar intimation was being made to the United States consul. I remarked that it was quite unnecessary to attack the British consulate at any rate, for it was already at rebel discretion. This consulate is in the midst of an entirely Moslem and pro-rebel quarter, in which I am the only Christian. The rebels nightly encompass it and amuse themselves frequently by aimless firing. But they have scrupulously respected the consulate, and I am confident that they will continue to do so. To illustrate how completely is recognised authority absent from my quarter after dark, I would mention that a few nights ago, as I was returning from dinner with M. de Jouvenel, I encountered not a single soldier, gendarme, policeman, or even night-watchman after I had passed the last French post at the beginning of the city proper. And that night the rebels, to salute the High Commissioner, were showing some general activity, which should have provoked vigilance on the part of the Government forces.

6. I have no doubt that the above-mentioned Nationalist was only indulging in empty threats. My United States colleague told me that the message conveyed to him was different. He was warned that the rebels would not be responsible for any attacks on the consulates, as they had information to the effect that such attacks might be instigated by the French to discredit the Nationalists. I need hardly insist on the absurdity of such a message.

7. Hitherto the only apparent vengeance taken by the rebels for the execution of Fakhri and his companions has been the murder of a French soldier on the next day in Strait Street in broad daylight.

8. It is thought by some natives that the rebels, to arouse European interest in Syria's misfortunes, may direct their attention to Europeans other than French. I doubt whether British subjects are likely to be victims of such primitive political action. The danger, if any, to our people would be rather from motives of robbery pure and simple. The rebels might think that a British subject carried off would produce a larger ransom than a native victim.

9. British subjects outside the limited zone covered by the French troops depend, as I have often indicated, on rebel forbearance for their safety. I have little hope that the enclosed note will move the French to take any effective action in the interior of the city. We can therefore only trust that the rebels will continue to leave us alone. I am optimistic on this point.

(Copies have been addressed to Jerusalem (No. 48), Amman (No. 45), Bagdad (No. 43), Beirut (No. 51) and Aleppo (No. 34).)

I have, &c.

W. A. SMART.

Enclosure in No. 201.

Consular Corps to French Representative at Damascus.

*Décanat du Corps consulaire, Damas,
le 9 février 1926.*

M. l'Envoyé extraordinaire,

JE suis chargé par le Corps consulaire de vous faire part de ses inquiétudes au sujet de la situation actuelle dans la ville de Damas. Tout en tenant pleinement compte des difficultés momentanées des autorités, le Corps consulaire croit devoir vous signaler la possibilité de dangers pour les colonies étrangères.

Les étrangers sont très éparpillés dans la ville et, pour la plupart, ne se trouvent pas dans la zone restreinte qui est couverte par la troupe. Dans ces derniers temps, des bandes ont circulé assez souvent dans plusieurs quartiers de la ville, où elles ont fait des enlèvements de personnes diverses et de leurs biens. Il semble que rien n'empêche ces bandes de faire de même à l'égard des étrangers.

M. le Général Soulé, dans sa lettre du 30 novembre passé à l'adresse de M. le délégué, qui me l'a communiquée comme doyen sous le pli de sa lettre de la même date, a exprimé l'avis que la situation n'indiquait pas de conseiller aux étrangers de quitter la ville. Le Corps consulaire vous saurait gré de bien vouloir lui faire savoir si cet avis doit être modifié en vue de la situation actuelle.

En attendant, le Corps consulaire espère que les autorités mandataires prendront les mesures nécessaires pour assurer les étrangers contre les dangers préindiqués.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

W. A. SMART,

Doyen du Corps consulaire.

No. 202.

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 23.)

(No. 8.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

MY telegram No. 6.

French authorities have publicly expressed regret at excesses of irregulars and announced dismissal of a number of them. French are recovering from irregulars some of the loot and handing it to a native commission for redistribution to owners.

Bazaars closed to-day in sign of protest.

Moslems have hitherto been behaving with great self-control, but use of these savage irregulars in Syrian capital by mandatory Power is a perilous adventure. Some of our Asiatic nationals have reported molestation by irregulars.

No. 203.

[E 1297/146/89]

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 65.)

Sir,

Damascus, February 12, 1926.

WITH reference to paragraph 8 of my despatch No. 59 of the 10th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of an *arrêté** of the French High Commissioner, rendering official the system of direct administration by the French which has been practically in force since M. Alype's arrival.

2. M. Alype is charged with the civil administration, and General Andréa, who has, since the declaration of the state of siege, exercised the powers of a Military Governor at Damascus, is now given the title of that function.

3. This *arrêté* had become inevitable owing to the refusal of natives to co-operate in the government of the country. The French have steadily refused to make any concessions which would enable the moderate Nationalists to take office and reimpose the authority of the Government on a people in open rebellion. At the same time, the French have failed to provide protection for the entirely subservient

* Not printed.

natives, who were prepared to co-operate on whatever conditions desired by France. The bands continue to invade the town and carry off notables. On the night of the 10th-11th, attacks were made on the northern suburbs and on the consulate quarter. From the northern suburbs a Kurdish notable, among other victims, was carried off, presumably on the charge of co-operating to procure Kurdish irregulars for the French. In my quarter the rebels occupied the main police station and carried off five policemen. Some of the rebels passed the front door of the consulate in their advance on the police station.

4. Last night the rebels indulged in a general fusillade along the whole north-eastern and most of the eastern sides of the town. The firing in my quarter was heavier than any I can remember since the days of the bombardment last October. The French responded with even heavier firing, both rifle and machine-gun. As the French and the rebels kept at a safe distance from each other, apparently all this noise did not result in even a single combatant casualty.

5. The rebels sent back yesterday afternoon the policemen seized in the previous night, after having stripped them. M. Béjean, the Director-General of Police, put them into prison, on the ground that they should have resisted the rebels. There is no doubt that the police are as anti-French as the rebels, but, even if their heart were in their work, it is absurd to expect them to fight rebel military formations while 10,000 French soldiers sit outside the city without stirring to support the police. This extraordinary French abstention is, unfortunately for European prestige, attributed by the natives to pusillanimity. Whatever may be its real motive, it is obviously impossible for France to expect any effective native co-operation until she is able to occupy Damascus and protect her own creatures against the rebels.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 53), Amman (No. 49), Bagdad (No. 48), Beirut (No. 56) and Aleppo (No. 36).)

I have, &c.

W. A. SMART.

[E 1298/12/89]

No. 204.

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 66.)

Sir,

Damascus, February 15, 1926.

WITH reference to correspondence ending with my despatch No. 65 of the 12th instant, I have the honour to report that the situation at Damascus continues to be very bad.

2. The bands continue to attack various quarters of the town, including the northern suburbs, and to carry off persons for ransom. For four successive nights a band has passed by the consulate and carried off various persons, including my next-door neighbour. One of my cavasses, whose house is opposite that of this victim, witnessed his rapt. About twenty armed men arrived with a ladder, by which they climbed into the house. They came out by the front door with their prisoner. The procedure on each occasion is identical. The band enters the town and goes out by the same route. A part of the rebels keeps the neighbouring police posts occupied by heavy firing, while their companions get hold of the victim selected. Rebel sentinels are placed at points of vantage, and signals are even passed along by means of a musical instrument which sounds like a rather asthmatic bugle. The French authorities have been warned by the police of the exact route followed by this band, and, as it crosses two main arteries of the town, it would be perfectly easy to hinder its progress with a couple of armoured cars. But all military means of defence were concentrated in the northern suburbs and the interior of the town left to its fate. The fighting in the northern suburbs last night was comparatively heavy, and there were actually some combatant casualties—one French soldier badly wounded and a couple of Circassian or Armenian irregulars killed.

3. The rebels have been cutting and even carrying away the barbed-wire entanglement which the military authorities have been patiently erecting along the circular boulevard which is to surround and protect the town. Recourse has been had, not very successfully, to electric currents, mines and other devices to prevent the passage of rebels through this circular entanglement, large stretches of which are undefended by French posts.

4. The fire of the French troops is again causing me some anxiety. Some time ago a French bullet during the night went into the bedroom of an English lady living at the edge of the northern suburbs. During the heavy firing reported in the fourth paragraph of my despatch above referred to, the wall round the window of the matron's bedroom in the British hospital was struck by a number of bullets, which, from their angle, can, it would seem, only have come from neighbouring French posts. The rebels on that night were all round the British hospital, which they respected, while they were firing heavily at the French posts and at the neighbouring French hospital, which, since it is used by the French as a military post, cannot expect immunity. It was a great comfort to us all that we had last December managed to get General Andréa to move the extreme French post some way off from the British hospital, which, had the post been still under its walls, would have been riddled with bullets.

5. I asked Captain Georges Picot, General Andréa's chief of staff, to warn the French posts to be more careful where they were firing. He promised to do so and remarked, by way of consolation, that on the night in question three French bullets had entered his own house.

6. The town is largely defended now by French metropolitan soldiers, who, for fear of casualties, are not sent out with the columns. These soldiers are very young and hardly trained. They have no doubt been told ghastly stories of Druse frightfulness, and they are naturally very nervous. When a nocturnal fusillade begins, they seem to respond without any very definite aim and in all directions.

7. Some 1,200 Druses have now arrived in the eastern oasis. The Druse plan is obviously to forestall the French offensive on the mountain and make Damascus the battlefield instead of their own country.

8. On the evening of the 12th instant the railway was cut a few kilometres south of Damascus, and the Haifa train, which was derailed, was attacked by the rebels from both sides of the line. Fortunately there were some fifty French soldiers on the train, mostly coming on short leave to Damascus. They managed to keep the rebels at bay. The passengers, after spending an uncomfortable night on the line under precarious shelters, were brought into Damascus by an armoured train on the morrow. The line has been repaired.

9. On the night of the 13th-14th instant the line was cut a few kilometres north of Damascus, and the train for Aleppo was derailed and attacked by the rebels. There were only ten French soldiers on the train, and they retired to the neighbouring hills. The rebels plundered the train, even stripping the women passengers.

10. After the long interruption of northern railway communication last month, I officially enquired whether British travellers could safely use the northern line. General Andréa, in an official letter, replied that not only was the northern line now quite safe, but that travellers could use the Beirut road under a system of escorts three times a week. Apparently these convoys by road have provoked no enthusiasm among the travelling public. I am of opinion that British travellers should be warned not to come to Damascus by road or rail for the present, except on essential business.

11. The northern line has been repaired, but night services have again been temporarily suspended.

12. The French are making arrangements to cut a way through the northern end of the Meydan (southern) quarter and isolate that troublesome quarter from the rest of the town by barbed-wire defences. Barbed wire appears to be the only French remedy for our troubles. House-to-house searches have been conducted in the Meydan quarters by Circassian and Armenian irregulars. The French state that a number of rebels and some arms and ammunition have been thus seized.

13. I hope the military authorities have some idea of what they want to do, but to the profane mind the system of immobile posts behind barbed wire seems to promise little general relief.

14. The posts in the eastern oasis appear to have become quite useless. They are also immobile and have to be kept supplied by occasional columns. A landed proprietor told me that he had pointed out to M. de Jouvenel during the latter's visit here that if patrols could not be established between these posts, they had much better be withdrawn. At present the unfortunate peasants cannot make arrangements for their immunity with the rebels, who, while now passing with ease through the French posts and establishing themselves at certain points, have no longer over the oasis the general control which formerly rendered feasible working arrangements between them and the cultivators.

15. All telegraphic and telephonic communication with Damascus is again interrupted.

16. It is believed by the French and by many natives that this sudden recrudescence of rebel activity at Damascus is due to the hope of influencing the League of Nations in its present examination of the French mandate, and that there will be a general weakening of this offensive when hope is lost of succour from Geneva.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 54), Amman (No. 50), Bagdad (No. 49), Beirut (No. 57) and Aleppo (No. 37).)

I have, &c.

W. A. SMART.

[E 1301/77/89]

No. 205.

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 69.)

Sir,

Damascus, February 16, 1926.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 66 of yesterday's date and my telegram No. 4 of to-day, I have the honour to report that I have just had very friendly interviews with M. Pierre Alype, the French High Commissioner's Envoyé extraordinaire at Damascus, and with General Andréa, the general commanding the troops in Damascus and the Hauran. I have endeavoured to impress on them both the extreme seriousness of the situation at Damascus, regarding which they are obviously very badly informed. I was, however, unable to diminish their invincible optimism.

2. I told them frankly that British subjects and the consulate at Damascus were at the mercy of the rebels, who were masters of the city. Hitherto, I said, the rebels had respected the British colony generally, but it was impossible to say how long this forbearance could be counted upon.

3. General Andréa, with his usual charm, endeavoured to allay my apprehensions by talking of barbed wire entanglements and other defensive measures. M. Alype was of the opinion that the revolution proper was at an end.

4. General Andréa also told me that he was withdrawing the French battalion from Kuneitra to Damascus, and that, altogether, he expected four battalions of reinforcement to-morrow.

5. French complacency now strangely resembles that displayed in October last. On the 14th October last, when I had acquired the conviction that the bands were going to enter the town, I addressed a strong note to M. Aubouard, then French delegate, giving him exact geographical details of my colony and asking for military protection on various points (see my despatch No. 211 of the 15th October last). M. Aubouard's answer suggested that Damascus was as safe as any similar urban conglomeration in France or England (see enclosure in my despatch No. 214 of the 17th October last). The result was that, when on the 18th October last the attack took place on the points I had indicated, the French had taken no measures whatever to protect our people. To-day I have indicated, with similar geographical precision, to General Andréa the points on which the bands can strike our colony without the slightest difficulty. I feel sure that again nothing will be done to protect our people.

5. The danger now is of course different from that of last October, when the French garrison was numerically inadequate. To-day the French have a large garrison here and should be able to protect the town if they are prepared to run some risks with their soldiers' lives. But to-day the bands are less controlled by responsible leaders, the passions of the rebels more inflamed, the general misery and despair greater, than last October. We cannot be so sure to-day that these bands, operating with such ease in the city, will always respect foreigners. The use of Armenian irregulars in house-to-house searches in the Meydan (see paragraph 12 of my despatch No. 66 of yesterday's date), the killing of Moslems and some plundering by the irregulars in the course of these operations, has greatly stirred the Moslems, already highly incensed by Lebanese provocations. The Christians in Damascus are perhaps now more frightened than they have ever been before. To-day religious passion, thanks to Christian imprudences and the French military and political use of Christian elements, has become a serious factor in the situation.

6. The French must, in justice to us, either occupy the city effectively or allow foreigners to follow the example of the natives and make arrangements for their safety with the rebel masters of the city. If neither of these courses is practicable, we must

seriously consider whether we can, especially in view of the diverse menaces of the spring, continue to leave our countrymen in a position so unassured at Damascus.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 57), Amman (No. 52), Bagdad (No. 52), Beirut (No. 60) and Aleppo (No. 39).)

I have, &c.

W. A. SMART.

No. 206.

Acting Consul-General, Beirut, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 10.)

(Telegraphic.)

Beirut, February 24, 1926.

FRENCH High Commissioner has now returned from Angora and proposes similar visit to Jerusalem in a fortnight. Purpose: (1) to establish personal contact; (2) to deal with any outstanding questions you may wish to discuss. Despatch asking for your instructions follows immediately.

(Sent to Jerusalem, No. 2.)

[E 1310/1199/89]

No. 207.

The Marquess of Crewe to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 25.)

(No. 369.)

Sir,

Paris, February 24, 1926.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 579 on the Turco-Syrian frontier, I have the honour to state that I saw M. Berthelot on this subject to-day, leaving with him an *aide-mémoire* containing the request for information contained in your despatch, and also a reminder of the note addressed to me on the subject by M. Briand on the 11th July, 1925. M. Berthelot promised to send a written reply in due course, but he would at once give me such information as he had. Two telegrams had arrived from M. Sarraut with a general outline of the agreement, but the actual text would not reach Paris for some days, probably early next week. It was important to remember that nothing is actually concluded, everything being *ad referendum*.

2. As to the frontier, it had been divided into three sections for purposes of discussion. Starting from west to east, the first section ended at the point at which the railway is coterminous with the frontier, and in this section some minor modifications are suggested, and will probably be agreed to. On the second section, where the railway runs along the frontier, no question arises.

3. On the third section, that in which we are interested, from Nisibin to Djezireh-ibn-Omar, the new agreement provided for the retention of the line laid down by article 8 of the Agreement of Angora, whereby the frontier follows "the old road between the two places," but unfortunately this did not take the French Foreign Office any nearer a settlement, for, as I was aware, the Turks had continued to maintain that the "old road" meant a line drawn some way further south, which lost itself in the sands of the desert. The Turks had spoken of arbitration about this line, but the French considered there was nothing to arbitrate on, the old Roman road being visible and generally recognised.

4. The Turks, as I knew, had created several military posts on the wrong side of their proper frontier. To expel these by force would open up a large question, but it was astonishing that their retirement had not been made a condition of the agreement. A treaty engineered in such fashion could not be called a treaty at all, whatever the newspapers might say about it, observed M. Berthelot rather bitterly, adding that M. Briand had said that he was coming round to the secretary-general's favourite thesis that Senators and people of that sort ought not to be sent on diplomatic missions. After the text of the proposed agreement arrived he would keep you fully informed, quite understanding your anxiety about this section of the frontier, which the French Foreign Office also regards as of capital importance.

5. M. Berthelot gave me the distinct impression of thinking that the business had been muddled, but I was not clear whether he thought that M. de Jouvenel or M. Sarraut ought to have managed it better.

I have, &c.

CREWE.

[E 1476/1199/89]

No. 208.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris).

(No. 619.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, February 25, 1926.

M. DE FLEURIAU called upon me this afternoon.

He referred in the first instance to the conversation which Sir William Tyrrell had had with him a few days ago at my request. He told me that he was leaving for Paris to-morrow, and that in the meantime he had communicated to his Government my offer to place the vacant British judgeship at Tangier at the disposal of Italy, if in that way and by such concessions as France might be ready to make Italy's adhesion to the statute could be obtained. He went on to repeat the broad outline of the statement which Sir William Tyrrell had made to him, and enquired whether he himself had rightly understood my position. I replied in the affirmative. I said that my principal desire was to maintain the very cordial and friendly relations now established between the French and British Governments, to cultivate similar friendship and cordiality with the Italian Government, and to see the triangle completed by a like cordial relationship between Paris and Rome. I could not help feeling that at present the Cabinets of Paris and Rome were not altogether at one. He would remember that he had spoken to me about a proposal made by M. Briand to Rome for a defensive treaty embracing France, Italy and Yugoslavia, and I had gathered from what M. de Fleuriau had said that the French Government thought that their proposal was likely to prove acceptable to M. Mussolini. M. de Fleuriau would remember that I had enquired whether this treaty really followed the Locarno Treaty in being a treaty of mutual guarantee among the States between whom quarrels might arise, or whether it followed the older type of defensive alliance directed against aggression by some external Power. He had not been able to answer my question, but from such information as had reached me from Rome, I gathered that it was rather of the latter kind, and I was led to doubt whether M. Briand had rightly gauged the probable attitude of the Italian Government towards it. Then again there was the question of the notes exchanged between the British and Italian Governments in regard to Abyssinia. I had just been reading the telegram from your Lordship in which you give an account of your conversation with M. Ponsot. I told M. de Fleuriau that it seemed to me that the French and Italian Governments were each waiting for the other, and that for want of a frank explanation they were drifting apart rather than coming together. All this caused me a certain anxiety, and it was this which had led me to ask Sir William Tyrrell to make his communication.

M. de Fleuriau then read to me a communication from M. Briand in reference to the agreement just made by M. de Jouvenel at Angora. M. Briand had desired him to tell me that the French Government had not yet received the full text and that in any case the treaty had been initialled *ad referendum* only. The French Government would not sign any treaty which jeopardised the present *Entente* with this country or caused our policies to diverge. I thanked M. de Fleuriau for the communication. I told him that I should be very grateful for details if and when the French Government were willing to supply me with them, not because I for a moment suspected that there would be anything injurious to us in their policy, but because whatever agreement they might have made might perhaps suggest to us ways in which we too might successfully approach the Turkish Government in the negotiations which we were about to undertake.

M. de Fleuriau referred to the controversy about the composition of the Council. He told me that he had reported to M. Briand what I had previously said to him on the subject, but had received no further instructions, though he knew that conversations had been taking place in Berlin between the French Ambassador and the German Government. He added that, after my speech to the Foreign Press Association, he had written to M. Briand that my object appeared to be to reserve the largest liberty possible for the representatives of the different countries when they met at Geneva, and he added that I should have observed that M. Briand had taken a similar line before the Senate's Foreign Affairs Committee.

Before the Ambassador left, I referred to his note of the 18th February, enquiring what answer His Majesty's Government intended to return to the communication of the Sultan of Nejd, and read to him the substance of our instructions to Mr. Jordan (telegram No. 25 of 25th February).

I am, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[E 1350/18/65]

No. 209.

The Marquess of Crewe to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 26.)

(No. 370.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Paris presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of an *aide-mémoire* which has been addressed to the French Government regarding the Turco-Syrian frontier.

Paris, February 24, 1926.

Enclosure in No. 209.

Aide-mémoire.

IN his note (Direction politique) of the 11th July dealing with the question of the frontier between Syria and Turkey, M. Briand was good enough to state that, while, on the one hand, certain small rectifications might be made in that section of the frontier between the sea and Nisibin, this was not the case as regards the section between Nisibin and Djéziréh-ibn-Omar, which would follow the old road.

His Majesty's Government are apprised of recent announcements to the effect that an agreement has now been signed between the French High Commissioner in Syria and the Turkish Government at Angora which affects the question of this boundary. As the Government of the Republic are aware, His Majesty's Government inevitably feel close interest in the settlement of this question in view of its direct bearing upon Irak. It has been for this reason that in the past they have on more than one occasion felt it their duty to express to the Government of the Republic their anxiety as regards the presence of Turkish posts in the north-eastern corner of Syria, between Turkey and Irak. His Majesty's Ambassador has been instructed to approach the Government of the Republic in the hope that the latter may now be in a position to inform him whether they have succeeded in securing from the Turkish Government a formal recognition of the line in question, namely, the old road from Nisibin to Djéziréh-ibn-Omar, which has always been regarded as constituting in this district the true Turco-Syrian frontier, as laid down in the Franco-Turkish Agreement of the 20th October, 1921, and confirmed by the Treaty of Lausanne.

*British Embassy, Paris,
February 24, 1926.*

[E 1359/18/65]

No. 210.

The Marquess of Crewe to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 27.)

(No. 385.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Paris presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of an *aide-mémoire* from the French Government regarding the Turco-Syrian frontier.

Paris, February 26, 1926.

Enclosure in No. 210.

Aide-mémoire.

L'AMBASSADE d'Angleterre a bien voulu, par un aide-mémoire du 24 février courant, marquer l'importance que le Gouvernement britannique attache à ce que la partie de la frontière entre la Turquie et la Syrie, qui avait été fixée par le Traité d'Angora à la vieille route entre Nisibin et Djéziréh-ibn-Omar, ne soit pas modifiée, comme l'assurance lui en avait été donnée par le Gouvernement de la République.

[15026]

2 A 2

Le Ministre des Affaires étrangères a l'honneur d'informer Lord Crewe qu'aucune modification à cet égard n'a été faite par l'accord que M. Sarraut et M. de Jouvenel ont récemment paraphé à Angora *ad referendum*. La ligne frontière entre les deux villes précitées est restée fixée dans les mêmes termes que précédemment.

Paris, le 25 février 1926.

[E 1395/146/89]

No. 211.

Sir R. Graham to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 1.)

(No. 179.)

Sir,

Rome, February 26, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to report that an extraordinary session of the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations opened at Rome on the 16th instant, under the presidency of Marchese Alberto Theodoli, to consider the French report on the administration of the mandate over Syria and Lebanon, with a view to enabling the commission to furnish the Council of the League with their views on all the questions relating thereto.

2. In addition to the president, the commission was composed of M. H. van Rees (Holland), who acted as vice-president, M. Freire d'Andrade (Portugal), M. Leopoldo Palacios (Spain), M. Roume (France), Sir Frederick Lugard (Great Britain), M. Pierre Orts (Belgium), Mme. Bugge Wicksell (Sweden), Mr. Chiyuki Yamanaka (Japan), M. Rappard (Switzerland), and Mr. Grimshaw (representative of the International Labour Bureau). M. Robert de Caix, ex-secretary-general of the French High Commissionership in Syria and Lebanon, assisted by Comte Clauzel, Minister Plenipotentiary, attended the meeting as representatives of the mandatory Power.

3. On the following day the commission began their examination of the French reports on the administration of the mandates in Syria-Lebanon during the year 1924. At their request, M. de Caix furnished them with additional explanations in regard to (1) the nationality of the inhabitants of the mandated territories; (2) the number of French officials employed in the administration; (3) the administration of justice; (4) extradition conventions; (5) the preparation of the new organic statute at present being submitted for approval to the native authorities; (6) liberty of conscience and economic equality. The examination of the 1924 reports was continued on the morning of the 18th instant, when additional information was given by M. de Caix to the commission, especially with regard to the question of education and the position of Armenian refugees.

4. During the afternoon of the 18th instant, the commission proceeded to consider the French report for 1925. M. de Caix pointed out that it was only provisional and that the mandatory Power would be ready to present its final report at the next session of the commission. In the course of the following sittings, which were given up to the examination of the situation in Syria in 1925, M. de Caix furnished the commission with various details respecting the maintenance of order in the country, frontier questions, and the feelings of the population. He emphasised the fact that the French had made great sacrifices on behalf of Syrian independence, but that the population had contributed little to the liberation of their territory or to the defence of their frontiers. The French Government had arranged for representatives of the population to be present at the negotiations for the distribution of the Ottoman debt, and had appointed, in countries such as Egypt, United States of America, and Brazil, assistant consular officials to deal especially with Syrian emigration.

5. After the discussion of various questions connected with the appointment of French officials in Syria, the press, the administration of justice and the jurisdiction of civil, military and administrative tribunals, the commission, at their meeting of the 25th instant, appointed a committee composed of M. van Rees, M. Orts and M. Rappard to draw up a report for presentation to the Council of the League of Nations.

I have, &c.

R. GRAHAM.

[E 1477/12/89]

No. 212.

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 3.)

(No. 72.)

Sir,

Damascus, February 18, 1926.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 6 of to-day's date, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note which I have addressed to the Envoy Extraordinary of the French High Commissioner regarding the present serious situation at Damascus.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (61), Amman (57), Bagdad (56), Beirut (65) and Aleppo (43).)

I have, &c.

W. A. SMART.

Enclosure in No. 212.

Consul Smart to French Representative.

M. l'Envoyé extraordinaire,

Damas, le 17 février 1926.

J'AI l'honneur de vous faire savoir que des rapports inquiétants me parviennent de la surexcitation parmi la population musulmane à Damas. Des racontars de tout genre se répandent parmi elle au sujet de musulmans tués et pillés par les partisans arméniens au quartier Meidan. Dans les milieux populaires on parlerait couramment de représailles contre les chrétiens. Il est à craindre que cette surexcitation à l'intérieur de la ville ne trouve un appui de la part des bandes à l'extérieur.

J'ose espérer que M. le Général Andréa et vous, à qui j'ai déjà fait part oralement de mes inquiétudes, veilleront avec une sollicitude particulière aux développements actuels de la situation, dont la menace est, d'une autre façon, aussi réelle que celle que je me suis permis de signaler à M. Aubouard dans ma lettre du 14 octobre passé. Je n'ai pas alors réussi à lui faire partager mes craintes d'incursions, ainsi que témoigne sa lettre du 16 du même mois, c'est-à-dire deux jours avant l'entrée des rebelles à Damas. Aujourd'hui, je suis persuadé que les dangers peuvent être écartés, à condition que toutes les précautions soient prises de suite.

Je vous prie de croire que cette lettre n'est inspirée que par mes très réelles inquiétudes pour mes ressortissants et par les lourdes responsabilités que leur position m'impose aujourd'hui.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

W. A. SMART.

[E 1569/146/89]

No. 213.

Acting Consul-General Mayers to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 8.)

(No. 40.)

Sir,

Beirut, February 21, 1926.

HIS Majesty's consul at Damascus, in paragraph 3 of his despatch to you No. 59 of the 10th instant reporting the visit of M. de Jouvenel to Damascus, refers to the High Commissioner's hope for the "United States of Syria and the Lebanon" in a peaceful and prosperous future.

2. This phrase, which is not an isolated presentation of the same idea, has aroused astonishment and dismay in the hearts of the Christian Lebanese. Apprehension was first awakened by the activities of M. Méla, to whom I have alluded in paragraph 3 of my despatch No. 30 of the 7th February last. He called on the Maronite Patriarch in his palace of Bkerké and sounded his views on the feasibility of accommodating some at least of the Moslem demands with regard to the frontiers and territorial organisation of the Great Lebanon. The aged prelate is said to have answered with heat that, if there was any talk of destroying the Great Lebanon, he would himself go to Europe, in spite of infirmity, and wait on the Powers who had acquiesced in its formation.

3. The suggestion that the territory of the Great Lebanon is not intangible reappears in M. de Jouvenel's phrase of the "Etats-Unis de la Syrie et du Liban." Before it had been given publicity here, M. de Jouvenel had, fortunately or unfortunately, already left for Angora. However, there was an immediate demand for explanations, made with an insistency which was almost unknown before the present

troubles. A number of local Deputies put a direct question as to the purport of the phrase to the High Commissioner's delegate in the Lebanon. This junior official, who in Beirut does no more than effect liaison between the High Commission and the local representative council, would have been in an uncomfortable quandary if his questioners had not obligingly put an explanation straight into his mouth. They asked if M. de Jouvenel had not meant the phrase in the sense in which M. Briand used it when he spoke of the United States of Europe after Locarno. After a few days' cogitation, the delegate replied formally that such an interpretation of the High Commissioner's phrase was quite correct. M. de Jouvenel had only meant that his mission was to develop between Syria and the Lebanon, under the guardianship of France, the pacific principles of friendship which had triumphed at Locarno.

4. But lately there came to Beirut a forecast from Paris of new phrases in M. de Jouvenel's report to the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations. The High Commissioner is said to speak of a federal system for the territory under French mandate which would introduce into inter-State affairs the harmonious relations which exist between the Swiss cantons.

5. This announcement, whether correctly reported or not, has brought matters to a head. When M. de Jouvenel returns to Beirut to-morrow he will find that, for the first time since he came to Syria, the Lebanese Christians have taken the offensive against him. Many of them are saying that the honour of France was engaged in 1920 when General Gouraud proclaimed the Great Lebanon, and that if France now goes back on her word, then the Christians of Syria are at liberty to reconsider their traditional fidelity to the mandatory Power, on which, they remind the High Commissioner, French influence here is fundamentally based.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Bagdad, Jerusalem, Damascus and Aleppo.)

I have, &c.
NORMAN MAYERS.

[E 1595/1199/89]

No. 214.

Acting Consul-General Mayers to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 9.)

(No. 42.)

Sir,

Beirut, February 23, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to report that in a conversation to-day M. de Jouvenel described to me the results of his journey to Angora.

2. He had been pleased with his reception by the Turks. He had gone there at the urgent request of the French Ambassador and had expected to sign a general and, perhaps, rather vague understanding about friendly relations. He had been surprised to find a number of sub-commissions promptly formed to debate accurately and energetically with him the questions under consideration.

3. The convention finally arrived at was based on two principles: That of friendliness, which was the keynote of the preamble, and that of arbitration, note on which the agreement closed. In harmony with these two principles, the two parties had been in accordance on a number of questions added as protocols, of which the most important were—

- (a.) Delimitation of the frontier, on which agreement had been reached.
- (b.) An arrangement whereby, within 50 kilom. on either side of the frontier, special police measures would effectively deal with bands troubling the peace of territory across the neighbouring border.
- (c.) Facilities for Syrians now in Turkey to opt for Syrian nationality, should they so desire.
- (d.) Customs: The agreement signed in September last to be submitted at once for ratification to the Angora Parliament.
- (e.) Regularisation of procedure between the two countries regarding the ordinary use of the Bagdad Railway.

(Official information given to the newspapers adds that the other points settled interested extradition, protection, contraband, frontier formalities for travellers, sanitary measures and the distribution of the waters of the Euphrates.)

4. M. de Jouvenel emphasised that there were no private or secret corollaries to add to the above.

5. With regard to the delimitation of the frontier, I gained the impression that the agreement mentioned refers to the common frontier in the Aleppo district, where there has been give and take on both sides, but no considerable modification, and not to the frontier between Nisibin and Jeziret-ibn-Omar, where, as is known, there is disagreement as to the exact position of the road which marks the frontier. My impression is that this matter is not settled, and that consequently the difficulties raised by the presence of Turkish bands in the area have not been satisfactorily solved. M. de Jouvenel seemed to be satisfied that his arrangements for arbitration would be able to settle that question when the moment came.

6. I asked the High Commissioner if the matter of troop movements on the Bagdad Railway, so important for Irak, had been discussed. He replied that in that matter he was confronted with a *fait accompli* in the shape of the Accord of Angora, to which, whether he liked it or not, he had to conform. It had been in some degree with a view to the question of troops and munitions on the Bagdad Railway that he had added to the word "amitié" in the preamble the word "neutralité." If the Turks ever tried to bully Syria with regard to the passage of troops, he could always fall back on that word. He had a second line of defence in the same matter—the recourse to arbitration.

7. This arbitration is to cover all the ordinary ground of possible dispute between the two States, apart from disputes involving the question of sovereignty. For example, if the Turks laid claim to Alexandretta, that difference would have to be settled by more serious means; but he hoped that ordinary affairs would be settled by private arbitration, which would be effected by commissioners appointed by both sides, who could call in neutral opinion if necessary.

8. This convention is to be submitted to the examination of the respective Governments. M. de Jouvenel supposed that "Paris would communicate it to London." The press announces that the final signatures will be exchanged in Beirut.

9. M. de Jouvenel made a number of observations on the new Turkish Republic as he had found it. He pictured the Turks as aspiring to be the Europeans of Asia. They were not fundamentally hostile to either Great Britain or to France. These two countries, he thought, had interest in befriending and strengthening the Turkish people, who, stretching up from Smyrna to Chinese Turkestan, might be considered the spinal column of continental Asia. They showed no great enthusiasm about their convention with Russia, although they hoped that some possible good might come of it in the future. As for their feelings with regard to Mosul, he had not found them very excited. In his opinion, the idea of making war over Mosul had not entered into their calculations. If Great Britain could find some means of satisfying their injured dignity on this matter, nothing more would be heard about it.

10. M. de Jouvenel added that Angora was an uncomfortable spot where men drink heavily. Mustafa Kemal's chief interest in life appeared to be his new farm.

11. An official who accompanied the High Commissioner and with whom spoke before I saw M. de Jouvenel gave as his opinion of the Turks that they had really effected their revolution not in their legislation about monogamy and hats, but in their recent adoption of the Swiss Penal Code.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Bagdad, Jerusalem, Constantinople, Damascus and Aleppo.)

I have, &c.
NORMAN MAYERS.

[E 1587/77/89]

No. 215.

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 9.)

(No. 74.)

Sir,

Damascus, February 22, 1926.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 60 of the 10th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a reply from the Envoyé extraordinaire of the French High Commissioner to the note of the consular corps of the 9th instant regarding the situation at Damascus.

2. Reinforcements have arrived, and at last the French have sent some soldiers into the town for patrol purposes.

3. However, the situation, which showed possibilities of improvement, has been complicated by the unpleasant affair of the Meidan quarter, reported in my telegrams Nos. 6 and 8 of the 18th and 20th instant respectively. I am reporting the details of this affair in a separate despatch.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 65), Amman (No. 62), Bagdad (No. 62), Beirut (No. 72) and Aleppo (No. 48).)

I have, &c.
W. A. SMART.

Enclosure 1 in No. 215.

M. Alype to Consul Smart.

M. le Doyen,

Damas, le 19 février 1926.

LE 9 février dernier, vous avez bien voulu appeler mon attention sur les inquiétudes inspirées au corps consulaire par la situation actuelle de Damas.

Je me suis empressé de signaler cette démarche au Général Andréa, et j'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre ci-joint copie de sa réponse.

J'ajoute que le sort des colonies étrangères fait l'objet de toute la sollicitude de la Puissance mandataire en Syrie, et je vous prie, &c.

PIERRE ALYPE.

Enclosure 2 in No. 215.

General Andréa to M. Alype.

Damas, le 13 février 1926.

LES enlèvements de personnes auxquelles fait allusion M. le Doyen du Corps consulaire n'ont pas manqué d'attirer toute l'attention du commandement.

Les travaux de défense en cours permettront d'interdire aux bandes d'ici quinze jours l'accès des quartiers intérieurs qui représentent d'ailleurs la partie la plus importante de la ville. Une épuration des éléments de trouble suivra.

Seuls les quartiers Meidan-Akrad et Mohajrin resteront à l'extérieur des réseaux de fil de fer. Leur défense sera confiée à trois groupes de cinquante partisans chacun.

J'estime que, dans ces conditions, la sécurité des ressortissants étrangers sera assurée dans de bonnes conditions et je ne saurais en conséquence revenir sur l'avis précédemment émis par le Général Soule.

Le Général Commandant les Troupes de la
Région de Damas et du Djebel-Druse,
ANDRÉA.

[E 1589/12/89]

No. 216.

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 9.)

(No. 77.)

Sir,

Damascus, February 23, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to report that the French have recruited about 200 Ismailis from Selimieh, north-west of Homs, where there is an important Ismaili colony. These men have been brought to Damascus under the command of one of their chiefs and are apparently to be used in the eastern oasis. They are physically distinguishable from the Arabs, being generally of fairer complexion.

2. The romantic mind will no doubt find delight in this reassociation of the Franks with the "assassins" of crusading days against Islam. But those who are more particularly concerned with the fate of Syria of to-day can only regard this development with apprehension.

3. Armenians, Lebanese, Circassians, Kurds, Ismailis, all small minorities, have been drawn by the French into the struggle against Arabian Islam. It is certain that the Arabs will not forget this episode. It is to Europe's interest that France should remain in this country, but few close observers of France's unpopularity and inadequacies in Syria would like to stake their all on the permanency of the French occupation. If she leaves, the minorities will pay the penalty for having attacked the majority, which, until provoked, had generally respected them.

4. The Ismailis of to-day have the reputation for courage enjoyed by their dreaded forefathers of the Middle Ages. It is to be hoped that they have lost some of their ancestral ferocity. It will be interesting to watch their exploits at Damascus.

5. I need hardly say that these irregulars, of whatever sect, are not enlisting out of hostility to Islam, but on account of their poverty. I entirely share the opinion of Mr. Hough, as expressed in section 2 of his despatch No. 21 of the 26th ultimo, as to the heavy responsibility of the Power which has, with the Cilician experience fresh in its memory, utilised these minorities in hostility against the majority for a national cause.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 68), Amman (No. 65), Bagdad (No. 65), Beirut (No. 75) and Aleppo (No. 50).)

I have, &c.
W. A. SMART.

[E 1593/12/89]

No. 217.

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 9.)

(No. 81.)

Sir,

Damascus, February 24, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to report that the French have recently begun again aerial operations against the Jebel Druse, and that Sueida has been heavily bombarded. No warning is ever given by the French on such occasions to afford the women and children a chance of withdrawing. The Druses have vainly protested against these methods of French "frightfulness."

2. It would appear that the new heavy bombing machines brought into action by the French have been very destructive, and produced a considerable moral and material effect in the mountain.

3. I gather from officers here that the French columns in April do not intend to penetrate into the interior of the mountain. The idea apparently is to reoccupy and hold Sueida. Some anxiety has been expressed by Frenchmen as to whether the supplying of the post at Sueida will be easy. It is thought, however, that once the French are permanently installed at Sueida, the Druses, exhausted and daily harassed by aerial bombardments, will abandon Sultan Atrash and make their submission in masses. This calculation is not unreasonable, provided the accompanying political action is less amateurish than is usual with the French in Syria. The Druses have suffered so much that it is difficult to see how even this heroic little people can go on fighting indefinitely.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 71), Amman (No. 68), Bagdad (No. 68), Beirut (No. 81) and Aleppo (No. 54).)

I have, &c.
W. A. SMART.

[E 1638/12/89]

No. 218.

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 10.)

(No. 84.)

Sir,

Damascus, February 25, 1926.

WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 6 and 8 of the 18th and 20th instant respectively, I have the honour to submit a brief report on the regrettable incident of the Meidan quarter of Damascus.

2. The Meidan quarter is the long, narrow southern arm of the city, and is flanked by the oasis gardens on either side. This peculiar configuration greatly facilitates the infiltration of bands into this quarter.

3. The Meidan is the quarter occupied by grain merchants and contains important granaries. Many of its inhabitants are in business relations with the Hauran and the Jebel Druse. It has also a camel-market, and consequently contains many Bedouin and Nejdian elements. It has also a not inconsiderable Christian colony.

4. The Meidan from the beginning was not accommodating to the rebels. It was as anti-French as any other Moslem quarter of Damascus, but its granaries and its commercial interests inspired the inhabitants with a keen desire to avoid making

the Meidan a battlefield. During the attack on Damascus of the 18th-20th October the Meidan had refused to co-operate with the invaders, and a fortnight later it co-operated with the French to discourage Zaid Atrash from entering the town on his way to Hasbeya (see paragraph 8 of my despatch No. 228 of the 2nd November last and the first paragraph of my despatch No. 237 of the 10th November last). Captain Bourgeois, at the time of this second incident, told me that the French authorities, who had always been apprehensive of the Meidan, had been agreeably surprised to find that this quarter was quite willing to co-operate to keep the rebels out of it.

5. It will be seen, therefore, that the Meidan, had it been militarily supported by the French, would have kept out of the fray. But the French troops continued to sit in the northern suburbs and to make fruitless expeditions into the eastern oasis, while this great southern quarter of the town fell into rebel possession. The extraordinary feature of this gradual development is that it only became really accentuated after the concentration of 10,000 French troops at Damascus in the middle of December last. During November and the early part of December I passed through the Meidan several times, in a car and on foot, and met with no hindrance. However, by the end of last month the Meidan had fallen completely into rebel hands (see paragraph 3 of my despatch No. 52 of the 31st ultimo). The inhabitants, finding themselves without military support, could only acquiesce in this rebel occupation.

6. Another remarkable feature of this situation is that the French have a relatively strong military post at Kadem, the southern suburban station of the Hejaz line just outside the Meidan. Between this military post at Kadem and the French positions at the inner end of this long arm of the city the whole quarter had become rebel territory.

7. In the early days of February the French began to make tentative movements to recover this quarter. These attempts consisted mainly in sending tanks and armoured cars into the broad tramway artery, which runs fairly straight the whole length of the Meidan, and in shelling the houses on each side of this street. A way was cut through the beginning of the quarter and barbed-wire entanglements erected, leaving the greater part of the Meidan outside these defences. A number of houses were destroyed to make this boulevard.

8. On the 15th, 16th and 17th instant a more definite offensive was begun. Circassian and Armenian irregulars, supported by tanks and armoured cars, advanced from the above-mentioned defences and marched the whole length of this main street and returned by the same route. Both coming and going the tanks shelled the houses on each side. The rebels fired fairly continuously from the side streets, down which no one apparently dared to follow them, though the irregulars penetrated into the houses on each side of the main road and are said to have set fire to several. This sort of street fighting is, of course, very trying even for regular troops, and in such combats it is almost inevitable that the harassed attackers should not always confine their attention to enemy combatants. Moreover, the rebels no doubt fired from the roofs of some houses, which thus, perhaps, appeared a lawful prey to the irregulars. While, however, taking all these difficulties into account, it seems undeniable that the irregulars indulged in excesses greater than the circumstances could condone. The accusations made by the people are no doubt exaggerated, but the statement of General Andréa himself, a report of which, taken from the French subsidised paper "Alif Ba," is enclosed, provides evidence that something unpleasant must have happened in the Meidan. Otherwise the French general in command would hardly have expressed such public regret and announced the dismissal of thirty-seven irregulars found guilty of excesses. Moreover, the central police station is full of loot recovered and stored there for gradual return to its owners. Some of the looting, however, was done by bad characters of the quarter when numerous houses were vacated by their terrified inhabitants.

9. It is with pleasure that I am able to lay stress on one bright episode of this unpleasant affair. The French regulars intervened on the side of the people and violently forced the irregulars to disgorge some of their loot. The Spahis and other Algerian soldiers even received almost an ovation from the crowd which witnessed their merciful intervention.

10. As regards the number of non-combatant killed, I am quite unable to make any estimate based on irrefutable information. According to less immoderate nationalist estimates, about eighty were killed. Personally, I doubt whether even a score were killed. No French estimates have appeared. The killing in the Meidan was not the principal feature of the incident. It was the pillaging on a large scale which excited popular indignation.

11. The rebels were able to keep out of reach of the attackers, and their casualties must have been insignificant. The irregulars' losses were also trivial, and this fact renders their conduct less excusable.

12. On the afternoon of the 17th instant Captain Bourgeois and Amir Said went down to the Meidan and forced the irregulars to allow the funeral processions to pass to the neighbouring Moslem cemetery. The irregulars maintained that they had held up these processions because they were being fired at. Captain Bourgeois, as he himself told me, pointed out to the irregulars that no shots were being fired at that moment, and that there was no reason for preventing the people from burying their dead.

13. There was, of course, no lack of the exaggerated stories usual on such occasions—stories of old men, women and children slaughtered or mutilated, of women violated, &c. It may be safely said that 99 per cent. of such stories are inventions. Unfortunately, there is no doubt that the irregulars, including the Armenians, had, in the course of the operation, to force their way into mosques and into Moslem women's apartments.

14. It was alleged by Moslems that the Armenian irregulars were asking the fugitive inhabitants whether they were Moslems or Christians. If they replied that they were Christians, they were allowed to pass. If they said they were Moslems they were shot.

15. I think that the origin of this story may be that the French authorities, before the attack began, perhaps recommended to the care of the irregulars the Christian colony in the Meidan. Possibly some Christians owed their lives to the fact that they proclaimed their religion when surrounded by the irregulars, who, remembering the French injunction, spared them. I do not believe that any general discrimination was exercised with the special intention of marking out Moslems for destruction.

16. With regard to the Armenian irregulars, they are perhaps inclined to regard all Moslems as the same as their Turkish oppressors, and do not realise that the Arabs had nothing to do with the Armenian massacres. Possibly, in the heat of battle, they were carried away by misplaced vengeance of ancient wrongs. They were certainly not guiltless of pillaging and killing of non-combatants. But Moslems themselves have admitted to me that the Circassians, who are Moslem, were worse than the Armenians.

17. Unfortunately, the popular outcry was mainly directed against the Armenians as Christians, who were represented as murdering, violating, plundering defenceless Moslems. I have frequently drawn attention to the growing Moslem resentment against the offensive attitude of the Christians in the Lebanon and against the use of Christian irregulars to suppress a nationalist movement. This resentment found dangerous fuel in this Meidan incident. Threats of reprisals against the Syrian Christians became general, and the bazaars were closed for three days in sign of protest. Some of this agitation was in the nature of a manoeuvre to induce the French to remove the hated irregulars. But beyond a doubt the most dangerous religious passion was aroused by this affair.

18. Fortunately, Sheikh Badr-ud-Din, the great Moslem Divine, and other leading Moslems, vigorously discouraged the anti-Christian agitation. A sudden spell of cold, rain and sleet opportunely intervened to cool all this popular fieriness. The action of the French troops and of General Andréa mentioned above has also contributed towards appeasement. The immediate danger seems to have passed.

19. But it is to be feared that the effects of this incident will be more lasting. The story will be fully exploited by nationalist agitators, and will spread far from Damascus, into the heart even of Arabia, for the Nejdian colony in the Meidan suffered at the hands of the irregulars. An evil genius seems to preside over French counsels. Just when rebel exhaustion is offering hopes of peace, this incident occurs to fan the flame of revolt.

20. In this case the evil genius seems to have been M. Béjean, the French "Directeur-général de la Sureté." Operations in the town are largely conducted with his advice. One of his chief native counsellors is unfortunately an Armenian, and the Arabs naturally attribute the disaster to his influence. M. Béjean must have known the danger of letting loose these undisciplined irregulars in the town. General Andréa's local knowledge is slighter, and he can be acquitted of foresight of what was going to happen. Many Arabs assert that M. Béjean had his share in the spoil collected by the irregulars.

21. Perhaps the most unfortunate aspect of this expedition is its futility. The irregulars have retired behind the defences at the beginning of the Meidan, nearly

the whole of which remains in rebel possession. All this bloodshed and pillaging and stirring up of religious passion have served no practical purpose whatever.

22. It is hardly an edifying coincidence that these irregulars should have been let loose in the Syrian capital at a moment when France's mandate is under examination by the League of Nations.

23. If the French do not wish to risk the lives of their soldiers, and therefore find it necessary to use irregulars, they ought, in justice to Europe, to keep these irregulars under control, whether they be Moslem or Christian. After all, they are under French command, and their French officers should be made responsible for at least a minimum of discipline. If the irregulars cannot be kept under control, they should be disbanded as unfit instruments of a Power selected by the League of Nations to inspire Syria with European ideas of civilisation.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 74), Amman (No. 70), Bagdad (No. 70), Beirut (No. 83) and Aleppo (No. 56).)

I have, &c.

W. A. SMART.

Enclosure in No. 218.

Translation of Article from "Alif Ba" of February 20, 1926.

The Deputation and the Delegate.

WE mentioned in yesterday's issue of this paper that the meeting which took place in the Municipal Hall resulted in the election of two deputations, one of which was entrusted with the task of enquiring into everything connected with the looted property.

In the afternoon of the day before yesterday, Wednesday, this deputation called at the office of his Excellency the Delegate Extraordinary to the High Commissioner, M. Pierre Alype, and discussed with him, in the presence of his Excellency General Andréa, the recent events that occurred in the Meidan and their subsequent developments.

After the deputation had submitted their evidence and their demands, General Andréa, commander of the armies of Damascus, proceeded to explain the actual position, passing on to the recent events which were the cause of the deputation's visit. The following is a summary of what he said:—

I am extremely sorry for what has happened—matters that I cannot in any way approve. At the same time I must point out the causes which led to such happenings. While the troops were marching through the town in pursuit of their avocations, a constant rain of bullets were poured on them, not from the streets and thoroughfares, but from the windows of houses. Such illegal acts as these led to regrettable consequences. It is incumbent on law-abiding citizens not to open the doors of their houses to rebels, in order that the latter may use them as breastworks from which to fire upon the soldiers.

Nevertheless, when I learned what had happened, I issued the strictest orders against any sort of aggression and for the arrest of any person whatever who had been prompted to commit acts of robbery or personal violence. I have dismissed already thirty-seven volunteers against whom it has been proved, on enquiry, that they committed these acts which I condemn, by whomsoever committed, spontaneously or under orders. As to the looted property, we have begun by demanding its restoration, and I am quite confident that, after a short lapse of time, I shall get it back in its entirety. Then we shall hand it over to the special committee which, after completing its investigations as to its owners, will make a full and complete restoration to them.

This is the gist of what happened at this meeting, after which the members of the deputation withdrew, thanking General Andréa and M. Pierre Alype for their consideration and for the sympathy they had shown to the unfortunate sufferers. We hope that the rights of the victims will not be lost sight of.

[E 1642/12/89]

No. 219.

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 10.)

(No. 89.)

Damascus, March 1, 1926.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that for some time past the notables of Damascus have been discussing the question of sending another deputation to the Jebel Druse to endeavour to arrange a negotiated peace. They requested Amir Amin Arslan, the Druse notable of the Lebanon who headed the unsuccessful deputation of last December, to come to Damascus to talk matters over. He excused himself, but he is still being urged to come here.

2. The idea of the notables was that they should first ask the French authorities to state the maximum terms they were prepared to grant and then go to the Jebel Druse and ascertain the minimum terms of the rebels. An attempt would then be made to reconcile any difference between the attitudes of the two parties.

3. On the 27th ultimo the notables visited the Envoy Extraordinary of the High Commissioner. The interview was unsatisfactory. M. Alype apparently refrained from stating concrete and practicable terms. He raised no objection to the despatch of the deputation to the mountain, but he expressed himself as sceptical of its having any practical results.

4. Yesterday a deputation went out to the band leaders south of the town and pointed out to them the suffering inflicted on the people by military operations in the city, especially in the Meidan and Shaghour quarters. The leaders were asked to refrain from attacks until the deputation to the Jebel Druse had returned. It is not known yet exactly what answer the rebel leaders made, but apparently their attitude was not unfavourable to the idea of a truce.

5. A negotiated peace is impossible as long as the French will not offer any concrete concessions, and the French attitude all along seems to show that there was no intention of coming to terms with the rebels. Unless some change occurs in French policy it is difficult to see what any peace deputations can achieve. It is to be hoped that the French have carefully calculated the means and cost of settlement by war.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 77), Amman (No. 74), Bagdad (No. 73), Beirut (No. 88) and Aleppo (No. 60).)

I have, &c.

W. A. SMART.

[E 1779/146/89]

No. 220.

Acting Consul-General Mayers to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 16.)

(No. 51.)

Beirut, March 4, 1926.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 40 of the 21st February last, I have the honour to report that on his return from Angora M. de Jouvenel repeated, with some signs of annoyance, the explanations previously given of his phrase "États-Unis de la Syrie et du Liban." No outcry had been raised against M. Briand when he had spoken of the United States of Europe, he said. Why should he not use the same phrase in connection with States such as Syria and the Lebanon with frontiers and many interests in common? In any case it was far from him to interfere. The Lebanon was organised on parliamentary lines; let the Lebanese majority speak as to whether federation was wanted or not.

2. The impression created by the phrase still lingers. The present position is therefore in a sense contradictory. The French authorities are credited by some with a desire to consolidate the bonds between the different territories under French mandate, whereas two years ago they were obviously aiming at government by division, and even now are supposed to view the possible separation of Aleppo from Damascus with a sympathetic eye. As far as the Lebanon goes, unity is the Moslem thesis and separation the Christian thesis, and the French are being ground between the two.

3. A frightened brood of prelates gathered at the Maronite Patriarch's palace in the Lebanon a week ago. In the last sentence of paragraph 2 of my despatch above mentioned it would have been more correct to say that the Patriarch spoke of appealing to the six Powers who in 1860 guaranteed the Lebanon as it remained from that date until 1918, should there be any question of lessening its present confines. To the local Christian chiefs the integrity of the Lebanon had really appeared menaced. They reaffirmed their confidence in France, but stated that they required reassurances from the High Commissioner and, failing him, from Paris. The conclave was still sitting when M. de Reffye, the secretary-general, arrived hot-foot with a copy of M. de Jouvenel's report to the Mandates Commission. He was able in some degree to dissipate their apprehensions. The question for them of course is one of political predominance or, as others would say, political freedom. If the Great Lebanon were divided into two cantons—one consisting of the old Lebanon, the other of the districts added to form the new Lebanon in 1920—the non-Christians would predominate in the second and more important canton.

4. During the early days of the rebellion there was a certain amount of facile satisfaction in the Lebanon that the main trouble was outside the gates. To-day less Lebanese are happy over their own security, less indifferent to the course of events. The censorship has been re-established and two newspapers suppressed. Moslem "Baalbec," expressing an antagonism which would now seem to be general throughout Syria, is said to resent the presence of two newly recruited companies of volunteers, mostly Armenians. Operations against the bands in the district between Hermon and the Beirut-Damascus road have recently taken the form of three columns, backed by aeroplanes, converging on the village of Yanta, and there is not much left of Yanta. The Moslem agitation for unity with Syria continues. The debate over the organic law, which until quite recently was a great comfort to many, seems to have been forgotten. A stale uneasiness characterises the general situation. We look eastward and wait for the first rays of peace from Damascus.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Bagdad, Jerusalem, Damascus and Aleppo.)

I have, &c.

NORMAN MAYERS.

[E 1839/12/89]

No. 221.

Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 18.)

(No. 95.)

Sir,

Damascus, March 6, 1926.

WITH reference to Mr. Smart's despatch No. 72 of the 18th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter which I have received from the French Envoy Extraordinary, enclosing a letter from General Andréa regarding the present critical situation in Damascus.

2. The French authorities undoubtedly have taken measures to render the city of Damascus more difficult of attack from without by placing outside it, at intervals, strong posts armed with machine guns and connected up with barbed-wire entanglements. Such defences would very probably make bands unwilling to risk attacking the town, but the danger of insurrection within the city, though remote, exists, as indicated in the sixth paragraph of General Andréa's letter.

3. Military patrols have, it is true, begun recently to scour the town, and the French thereby will come closer into contact with the main elements of the population. The French authorities will thus soon realise, if they have hitherto been really unaware of, the depth and bitterness of Moslem feeling against them. These patrols will no doubt keep order in the city, but it is to be hoped that they will bear themselves with restraint and not provoke any dangerous incidents such as that which occurred in the Meidan quarter of Damascus on the 15th to 17th ultimo (see Damascus despatch No. 84 of the 25th ultimo).

4. Should the French authorities persist in their use of irregular troops for the maintenance of order and not keep them under strict disciplinary control, serious incidents may well result. The Meidan incident was only with comparative difficulty smoothed over, but repetitions of the irregulars' savage misbehaviour in Damascus might lead to an outburst of feeling among the Moslem population in the city which

would be stronger than the French authorities are prepared to reckon with. This point is being unofficially represented to the French authorities.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 82), Bagdad (No. 77), Amman (No. 79), Beirut (No. 93) and Aleppo (No. 65).)

I have, &c.

J. R. VAUGHAN-RUSSELL.

Enclosure in No. 221.

M. Alype to Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell.

Damas, le 5 mars 1926.

M. le Consul,

VOUS avez bien voulu, par lettre en date du 17 février, me manifester vos inquiétudes au sujet de la sécurité de la ville de Damas, qui vous semblait à nouveau menacée par une recrudescence d'activité des bandits.

M. le Général Andréa, auquel j'ai fait part, verbalement d'abord, puis par écrit, de votre communication, m'a, en réponse, communiqué la lettre dont vous voudrez bien trouver ci-joint copie.

Vous pouvez, M. le Consul, constater que les autorités françaises, qui ont la charge du maintien de l'ordre à Damas, apportent l'attention la plus grande, je puis vous en donner l'assurance, à donner aide et protection, en toutes circonstances, aux ressortissants étrangers.

Veillez, &c.

PIERRE ALYPE.

General Andréa to M. Alype.

Damas, le 25 février 1926.

En réponse à votre lettre du 22 février, j'ai l'honneur de vous faire savoir que les craintes émises par M. le Consul de Grande-Bretagne dans sa lettre du 17 février ne correspondent nullement à la situation actuelle.

À la suite des opérations de nettoyage de Meidan, une certaine surexcitation s'était en effet manifestée chez les musulmans contre les Arméniens et les chrétiens en général. Les souks furent fermés pendant trois jours en signe de protestation.

Mais, après les conseils de calme que vous avez bien voulu faire entendre aux membres de la délégation de notables, les esprits se sont manifestement détendus.

Le sérieux de la situation actuelle ne m'a pourtant pas échappé. Je fais pousser très activement les travaux de défense de la périphérie de la ville et je compte que le réseau de fil de fer sera entièrement terminé à la fin de la semaine.

Ce réseau, parfaitement battu, en tous points par les feux des mitrailleuses des postes de barrage, est déjà une garantie très sérieuse contre les incursions de bandes à l'intérieur de la ville.

Pour prévenir tout mouvement insurrectionnel dans la ville même, de fortes patrouilles armées composées de gendarmes, de policiers et de partisans parcourent de nuit et de jour les différents quartiers.

Je suis donc exactement tenu au courant de l'état d'esprit de la population et, en cas de nécessité, des mesures énergiques et immédiates me permettraient de rétablir l'ordre et la paix.

Je ne perds pas de vue la sécurité des ressortissants britanniques, qui trouveront toujours aide et protection auprès de l'autorité militaire.

E. ANDRÉA.

[E 1840/12/89]

No. 222.

Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 18.)

(No. 96.)

Sir,

Damascus, March 6, 1926.

WITH reference to Mr. Smart's despatch No. 89 of the 1st instant, I have the honour to report that the project of sending a further deputation to the Jebel Druse has so far failed to materialise.

2. Amir Amin Arslan has not yet arrived here from Beirut, and the other members of the proposed deputation in Damascus do not appear willing to embark on their mission without him. It would seem that the results of Amir Amin Arslan's conversations with the French High Commission in Beirut have up to the present held out insufficient hopes of arranging a basis for peace negotiations. The Amir is loath to come and join the deputation here unless he has the authority of the French authorities to offer concrete and practicable terms to the Druse leaders.

3. A negotiated peace, therefore, seems as far off as ever, though there are few signs here that the French are preparing for the alternative—a settlement of the rebellion by military operations.

4. The present strength of the French army here is hardly sufficient to maintain order and keep the rebels and their bandit associates out of Damascus and to do more than hold the various small posts outside and around the city. The whole of Southern Syria still remains practically at rebel discretion, and rail and telegraph communications are cut more often than not, so it is difficult to see how any punitive expedition could successfully do much more than reach, let alone subdue and hold the Jebel Druse.

5. The suspension of hostilities which Mr. Smart mentioned in paragraph 4 of his despatch No. 89 of the 1st instant has not materialised. On the contrary, daily and nightly exchanges of rifle fire between the rebels and the French on the outskirts of the city have continued with unabated intensity. A column of between 2,000 and 3,000 troops which went out to effect the routine relief and revictualling of the French post of Douma (about 7 miles north-east of Damascus) was heavily attacked by rebels and quite a battle ensued. The French claim to have killed 156 rebels, and state that their own losses were very slight, but even though this be true, the above incident is another clear indication of the state of insecurity on the very threshold of the city and of the lack of French control outside the range of their artillery.

6. The general situation remains, then, in a state of deadlock, as peace is seriously being sought by the French neither by peaceful nor by military means. Mr. Smart has in numerous reports dealt fully with the foregoing considerations, so further comment on my part is superfluous.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 82), Bagdad (No. 77), Amman (No. 79), Beirut (No. 93) and Aleppo (No. 65).)

I have, &c.

J. R. VAUGHAN-RUSSELL.

[E 1910/344/91]

No. 223.

Acting Consul Jordan to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 20.)

Sir,

Jeddah, February 27, 1926.

WITH reference to the second paragraph of Mr. Acting Consul-General Mayers' despatch No. 24 of the 31st January last, relative to the mission of M. Ibrahim Depui to the Hejaz to conclude a commercial treaty between Syria and the Nejd, I have the honour to state that I have been informed by the Minister for Foreign Affairs that M. Depui is making but small progress in Mecca, and that what few discussions have taken place on the proposed treaty to date have resulted in practically the whole thing being revised.

2. The first fence M. Depui had to face on his arrival in the Hejaz was the fact that his only credentials were from M. de Jouvenel, the French High Commissioner in Syria, consequently his position as an envoy of a High Commissioner and not of a *de facto* Government was unenviable.

3. The French consul in Jeddah was informed neither by his Government nor by the High Commissioner in Syria of Depui's mission, and consequently the Minister for Foreign Affairs, acting on instructions from His Highness the Sultan, requested my advice in the matter of recognition of the validity of M. Depui's credentials. I informed him that the attitude adopted seemed somewhat irregular, and that they would appear to be justified in asking for further credentials as to his standing as they had not been officially informed of his mission by the representative of the French Republic accredited to the Hejaz.

4. Depui after remaining in Jeddah for some three days left for Mecca and presented his draft agreement to Ibn Saud, who requested to be informed as to with which Government the proposed agreement was to be concluded. Depui informed

the Sultan that he was sent by M. de Jouvenel, to which Ibn Saud replied courteously that he regretted very much indeed, but he was not in a position to make an agreement with M. de Jouvenel, but that if M. Depui represented either the French or Syrian Governments he would only be too pleased to discuss the proposed treaty.

5. I conclude that Depui thereupon communicated the above to the French High Commissioner in Syria, as it has now been decided that the treaty shall be between the Government of Syria and the Government of Nejd.

6. I believe that the French mandate of Syria has never been recognised by the Hejaz and Ibn Saud, and his advisers now consider that the treaty thus presented from the High Commissioner and not from an established Government was a clumsy attempt to secure Ibn Saud's recognition of the French mandate, as thus they would be able to put pressure upon him were it later established that he had been sending reinforcements to the insurgents in Syria.

7. Consequently the local Government are treating the whole matter in a very distrustful manner, and are now asking for some proof of the existence of the "Syrian Government" with whom the treaty is to be concluded.

8. Depui has informed the Sultan that the French High Commissioner has submitted for the approval of the French Government certain proposals which will put Syria in a position similar to that of Irak, and that it is with this Government the treaty will be in force.

9. Discussions are still in progress, and I shall not fail to notify you of any further details that may come to my notice.

I have, &c.

S. R. JORDAN.

[E 1924/12/89]

No. 224.

Acting Consul-General Mayers to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 52.)

Sir,

Beirut, March 8, 1926.

WITH reference to Damascus despatch to you No. 89 of the 1st March last, I have the honour to report that optimistic rumours of exchange of views between the French and the Druses have for some days been current in Beirut.

2. A communiqué has now, however, been published in the press which appears to put an end to these hopes. This communiqué consists of a letter, dated the 28th February, written from Dama, and signed "The Druse People." It demands:—

- (a.) Recognition of the complete independence of the Syrian territory, with foreign representation. Admission of Syria into the League of Nations.
- (b.) Proclamation of the unity of all Syria, the Lebanon to be reduced to its pre-war frontiers.
- (c.) Conclusion of a treaty with France guaranteeing French interests without prejudicing Syrian independence. This treaty to be deposited with the League of Nations, who would be responsible for its execution.
- (d.) Election of a free Constituent Assembly; on the formation of this body French troops to retire to the coast.
- (e.) General amnesty.

3. These conditions are similar to those put forward on several previous occasions by the rebels. The reply of the High Commissioner, dated the 6th March, is a short one:—

"Le Haut-Commissaire fait savoir que la lettre du 28 février signée 'Le Peuple druse' rend impossible toute conversation directe ou indirecte avec les rebelles. Il n'acceptera désormais que leur soumission pure et simple."

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Bagdad, Jerusalem, Damascus and Aleppo.)

I have, &c.

NORMAN MAYERS.

[E 1958/12/89]

No. 225.

Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 24.)

(No. 99.)

Sir,

Damascus, March 11, 1926.

WITH reference to despatch No. 52 of the 8th instant from the British acting consul-general at Beirut, I have the honour to point out an error of detail in the Druse peace conditions as given by Mr. Mayers under the heading (d).

2. The Druses, in their letter to the French High Commissioner, posed the condition that the French troops should be withdrawn to the coast, and that a free Constituent Assembly representing all regions of Syria should subsequently be elected to form a free national Government. The following condition was that the definitive withdrawal of French troops from Syria should be completed after the meeting of the Constituent Assembly.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 86), Bagdad (No. 80), Beirut (No. 96) and Aleppo (No. 68).

I have, &c.

W. A. SMART.

[E 2214/52/89]

No. 226.

Acting Consul-General Mayers to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 7.)

(No. 57.)

Sir,

Beirut, March 18, 1926.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 53 of the 8th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of my despatch No. 20 to His Majesty's Acting High Commissioner for Irak. As the matter is one of general interest to the territories under British mandate, I have forwarded copies of the despatch to His Majesty's representatives in Palestine and Transjordan.

I have, &c.

NORMAN MAYERS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 226.

Acting Consul-General Mayers to Acting High Commissioner for Irak.

(No. 20. Secret.)

Sir,

Beirut, March 18, 1926.

WITH reference to correspondence ending with my telegram No. 11 of to-day's date regarding the visit of Colonel Vincent, the French High Commissioner's "chef du cabinet militaire," to Bagdad, I have the honour to inform you that I called on M. de Jouvenel this morning and had a short conversation with him on the subject of Colonel Vincent's errand.

2. The High Commissioner informed me that he had prepared with the help of his staff a "projet de convention," which he handed to me and copy of which is enclosed. These proposals have been mentioned to me on one or two recent occasions by Colonel Vincent, and have now taken definite form. They are at present merely suggestions for a friendly understanding between the different territories under British and French mandate. I do not gather that the project has been formulated by other than local initiative, i.e., the scheme appears to me to be the personal policy of M. de Jouvenel, who, however, is confident that it would be acceptable to the French Government.

3. Speaking in general terms, the High Commissioner repeated his belief in Anglo-French co-operation. He ridiculed the newspaper reports that he had given away Alexandretta or the Syrian section of the Bagdad Railway to the Turks, and insisted that, as he had represented to Sir Austen Chamberlain and to Mr. Amery, he intended to work in harmony with the British in this part of the world. Both France and Great Britain, he added, would be in his opinion wise to draw Turkey out of the Russian orbit into their own.

4. Here, he went on, was a scheme which would be a public demonstration of Anglo-French solidarity in the Near East. He was personally ready to put his signature to some such scheme to-morrow. Why should points in dispute not be settled quickly and amicably here on the spot by the three-monthly conference he proposed? There was of course the International Court at The Hague, as the mandates provided, but why go so far as that and risk giving the impression that it was necessary for England and France to go to law to settle their disputes? He had been very much surprised to find that there were still differences outstanding and unsettled since 1921 between Syria and Irak (see your despatch No. 2180 of the 24th February, 1926, to him). Indeed, your Excellency's letter pointing out these outstanding differences and suggesting Bedouin control on the lines of the Nejd-Irak Agreement might be considered as the point of departure of the present proposals.

5. In reply, I said that I hardly thought that the two or three days Colonel Vincent would have at Bagdad would give him the time to do much more than to lay these proposals before you, and that, in any case, they would evidently be only the basis of important negotiations to come. M. de Jouvenel agreed.

6. I did not attempt to comment on these proposals, which the High Commissioner read out aloud to me, beyond giving a general assent to the utility of his suggestions. Some of the clauses will undoubtedly appear one-sided, but it will be remembered that they are only a beginning.

7. The suggested Protocole No. 1 mentioned in article 6 might very suitably, according to M. de Jouvenel, follow the lines of the present arrangement between Nejd and Irak.

I have, &c.

NORMAN MAYERS.

Enclosure 2 in No. 226.

Draft Convention.

LE Gouvernement britannique et le Gouvernement français, dans le but de garantir la sécurité et de développer le bien-être des pays qu'ils ont reçu mandat de guider jusqu'à leur complète indépendance, ont décidé de conclure une convention étendant aux pays sous mandat britannique et sous mandat français le bénéfice de l'amitié qui les lie, et facilitant la mission commune qu'ils ont reçue de la Société des Nations.

A cet effet, ils ont désigné pour leurs plénipotentiaires :

qui se sont mis d'accord sur les stipulations suivantes :

ARTICLE 1^{er}.

Les Hauts-Commissaires britannique et français délègueront deux fonctionnaires pour les pays sous mandat britannique et deux fonctionnaires pour les pays sous mandat français, qui se communiqueront les documents sur les mesures destinées de part et d'autre à améliorer l'administration et à augmenter le bien-être des pays sous mandat. Ces fonctionnaires tiendront une conférence régulière tous les trois mois.

ARTICLE 2.

Toute contestation existant à l'heure actuelle ou susceptible de s'élever entre les Hauts-Commissariats britannique et français sera portée devant cette conférence.

ARTICLE 3.

Au cas où l'entente ne se serait pas établie au sein de la conférence, les Hauts-Commissaires britannique et français lui adjoindront un tiers arbitre choisi d'un commun accord.

S'ils ne parviennent pas à se mettre d'accord sur l'arbitre, ou ne croient pas pouvoir accepter sa sentence, le différend sera porté devant la Cour permanente de Justice internationale.

ARTICLE 4.

Les Hauts-Commissaires britannique et français remettront à cette conférence le soin de la détermination exacte et de l'abornement des frontières, en prenant pour base l'accord déjà intervenu le 23 décembre 1920.

[15026]

ARTICLE 5.

Les frontières communes étant déterminées, les Hauts-Commissaires britannique et français contractent l'engagement réciproque de les garantir contre toute agression ou toute incursion.

ARTICLE 6.

Les Hauts-Commissaires britannique et français prendront sur leurs territoires respectifs les dispositions nécessaires pour prévenir et régler, dans les conditions prévues au Protocole No. 1* annexé à la présente convention, les différends qui pourraient s'élever, d'une part, entre les tribus nomades, d'autre part, entre les nomades et les sédentaires.

ARTICLE 7.

Les Hauts-Commissaires britannique et français appliqueront en commun la convention internationale de Genève du 17 juin 1925, pour la surveillance du commerce des armes, des munitions, des poudres et explosifs et la répression de la contrebande de ces mêmes articles.

Ils communiqueront dans le plus bref délai les mesures prises sur leurs territoires respectifs à la conférence, qui aura, par ailleurs, charge de veiller à l'application du Protocole No. 2* annexé à la présente convention et à l'observation des accords douaniers intervenus entre les hautes parties contractantes.

ARTICLE 8.

Les ressortissants syro-libanais en territoires sous mandat britannique et les ressortissants irakiens, palestiniens ou transjordaniens en territoires sous mandat français jouiront, en ce qui concerne les droits et les conditions d'établissement, du traitement de la nation la plus favorisée.

ARTICLE 9.

La protection des ressortissants syro-libanais sera assurée dans les pays sous mandat britannique par les représentants diplomatiques et consulaires français régulièrement accrédités auprès du Gouvernement ou des autorités locales irakiennes, palestiniennes ou transjordaniennes.

Réciproquement, la protection des ressortissants irakiens, palestiniens ou transjordaniens dans les États sous mandat français sera assurée par les représentants diplomatiques ou consulaires britanniques régulièrement accrédités auprès du Gouvernement français.

ARTICLE 10.

Les hautes parties contractantes sont d'accord, en ce qui concerne l'extradition, sur la procédure établie dans la convention passée entre la Palestine et les États sous mandat français.

ARTICLE 11.

En vue de faciliter les relations commerciales entre les pays sous mandats britannique et français et d'appliquer, dans les conditions les meilleures, la Convention de Transit du 31 janvier 1925, les Hauts-Commissaires britannique et français remettront à la conférence le soin d'organiser la circulation automobile suivant les principes contenus dans la convention relative à la circulation automobile prévue entre les États sous mandat français et la Palestine.

ARTICLE 12.

Le régime sanitaire entre les États sous mandat britannique et les États sous mandat français sera soumis aux dispositions des conventions sanitaires internationales en vigueur, auxquelles les parties ont adhéré, et, en particulier, à celles de la Convention de Paris du 17 janvier 1912.

Les deux parties contractantes s'engagent à prendre les mesures nécessaires pour enrayer l'extension et la contagion de toutes les maladies épizootiques et épiphytiques. Elles se communiqueront à cet effet tous les renseignements utiles, particulièrement en ce qui concerne l'invasion du souf et des sauterelles.

En dehors des mesures générales ci-dessus indiquées, les autorités des localités situées à proximité de la frontière se signaleront les unes aux autres les cas de maladie contagieuse, d'épizooties et d'épiphytie qui viendraient à se déclarer dans leurs régions

* Not printed.

respectives. Les mêmes autorités se tiendront réciproquement au courant de l'état sanitaire des tribus nomades. Elles proposeront à la conférence toutes mesures sanitaires qui leur paraîtraient opportunes.

ARTICLE 13.

La conférence pourra avoir recours à des experts, qui devront toujours être en nombre égal du côté britannique et du côté français.

ARTICLE 14.

Les Hauts-Commissaires britannique et français désigneront leurs représentants à la conférence dans le mois qui suivra la ratification de la présente convention.

[E 2213/146/89]

No. 227.

Acting Consul-General Mayers to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 7.)

(No. 59. Confidential.)

Beirut, March 21, 1926.

Sir,

ON the approaching return of His Majesty's consul-general it may not perhaps be inappropriate to offer a few observations on the general march of affairs in Syria as seen from Beirut.

2. All things considered it must be confessed that, in spite of a good deal of earnest work and a use of various expedients, there is still no very real improvement in the situation. The removal of General Sarrail undoubtedly put the French in a much better position with regard to the revolt. It was, in a way, a fresh start. Certain of the old disadvantages remained, it was true, and those disadvantages were unfortunately fundamental—the special historical relationship between France and the Christian sects and the corresponding tendency of the Moslems to view that *entente* with distrust and apprehension.

3. However, apart from this permanent disability, a fresh start was undoubtedly made when M. de Jouvenel landed in Syria. It is not yet peace, nevertheless. It is not yet peace even in the Lebanon. Only last week an officer newly arrived in the country was ordered to conduct a detachment of some fifty men, partly French, partly colonial troops, to Rashaya. He was told to wait at Shtora, on the Beirut-Damascus road, until measures of protection for the onward journey of the party should be completed. Instead of waiting he pushed on independently towards Rashaya, with the result that the detachment was attacked by a strong band of rebels and practically wiped out. The whole of the Lebanon border area, in fact, between the Damascus road and the Palestine frontier is still refractory.

4. In Beirut itself the Moslem leaders are no nearer conciliation. An attempt was recently made by a local notable to bring the different political leaders together and search for common ground. The meeting ended in confusion and mutual defiance.

5. A Lebanese paper has asked that, before the promised military offensive starts, all prominent men in the Lebanon who are for the French mandate should stand up and say so. I have not heard yet of any such declarations of faith. Most people believe in a foreign mandate; many believe in a French mandate; but all are waiting to see what will happen next. There is no clear conviction one way or the other, unless it is in the minds of the few who want complete independence. In ordinary intercourse one hardly has the opportunity of seeing or hearing a representative of the last category. Probably of all sections of the population they are the only ones who know their own minds. The predominant tone of public opinion is confused and hesitating. Self-interest is largely there, as everywhere in the world. I doubt if ever in the Lebanon there will emerge a real sense of patriotism. The country seems too small and divided, too far committed to European influences of various sorts, educational, social, political, for that. At least, one never hears the sterling ring of disinterested conviction in public utterances.

6. M. de Jouvenel, therefore, in the four months that he has been here, has not effected as much as was hoped of him. He is generally credited with intentions which appear generous and liberal after the administrations of General Weygand and General Sarrail. He is himself a little disillusioned about his task and his mandatory charges. The forces of rebellion have not yet melted away before his

earnestness. He is the kind of man who, unlike the parrots of the press, can still convince that France has a civilising work to do in Syria. Yet the obstinate situation continues to elude him.

7. On the other hand, it is open to discussion whether he did not strike the wrong note when he first landed at Beirut, and whether in the first few weeks of his administration he did not say too much. He offered peace to those who desired peace, and war to those who chose war. It is thought by some that it would have been wiser to maintain a discreet silence, while beginning, at once, to work quietly for peace everywhere, even in the hostile camps. Such negotiations would necessarily have had to start from the assumption that General Sarrail's conception of the mandate and administrative methods had been a mistake and a failure. I cannot see far enough into the political future to imagine what the distant consequences of such an admission would be; but it is at least possible that even if a temporary confession of fault had momentarily resulted in loss of prestige, it would not have taken long to build up again the old position of European influence on the foundations on which throughout the world it is permanently based.

8. M. de Jouvenel has done much but, so far, accomplished little. I suppose that he is nearer peace than he was when he first came to Syria, but only in the military sense. The question of Franco-Syrian harmony seems as far off solution as ever. The next word has been given to General Gamelin, operating in the Damascus region. To a man of M. de Jouvenel's temperament, that is in itself a disappointment.

9. The Christians greeted the arrival of the new High Commissioner with undisguised joy. They imagined they were returning to the good old days when the mandatory Power could do no wrong. M. Méliat (see my despatch No. 40, paragraph 2), soon proved that it was possible to be French and a friend of M. de Jouvenel, and yet to ignore the fact that the politics of the Near East pivot on the intangibility of the Lebanon. That somewhat discredited reconnoitring party has now gone home to France, but his activities leave a lingering disillusionment behind. Moreover, loss of ground with the Christians does not appear to have been compensated by any gain in influence over the Moslems, who maintain their demand for unity with Syria. They are still asked what they fear to lose by inclusion in the Great Lebanon, and they still reply rather aptly by asking what the Christians fear to lose by inclusion in a unified Syria.

10. It is open to supposition that France's inability to make progress with the nationalist forces is the result of her not having any policy in sympathy with the Arabs in this part of the Near East. In conversation the other day, M. de Jouvenel remarked that he thought the "Lawrence idea" was wrong. The proper people to support in this part of the world were not the Arabs, but the Turks. He did not of course mean this in connection with the Great War, nor, in view of the fact that at the time he was talking generally of Anglo-French co-operation, in connection with his recent visit to Angora. His meaning was, I think, that he felt some impatience over Arab pretensions, and thought the Turk more of a man to merit them. It is possible that, conceiving Syria in the atmosphere of the heterogeneous atmosphere of the coastal strip, or feeling that the Arab world is monopolised by Great Britain, the French have never sufficiently taken into their calculations, when they have framed their Syrian policy, the growing insistency of the Arab world.

11. M. de Jouvenel's plan at present is obviously to ring round the rebellion by a series of friendly conversations with his neighbours. That with Angora is completed, those with Jerusalem and Bagdad are imminent. The results of these conversations, even should they effect no fundamental change, will be announced with a fanfare of publicity intended to force on the imagination of the rebels the sense of a wall closed round them.

12. M. de Jouvenel's neighbourly friendliness thus fits in with his plan of action for mating the Syrian rebellion. I should not, however, like to give the impression that his repeatedly expressed desire for co-operation with Great Britain is merely an expedient forced upon him by the needs of the moment. He has astonishingly large schemes for Anglo-French co-operation in the Near East long after the present rebellion is liquidated. He imagines, for example, the great air routes of the future to the Far East as bound to pass through Syria. France would exploit the European half, Great Britain the Asiatic half of these immense concerns. His Beirut to Saigon race, now postponed until next spring, is intended as an advertising demonstration in this connection, and the rival is Germany, who will push her competing air routes eastward through Russia, and south-eastward

through Persia, where she is already working, or about to work, in one disguise or another.

13. As far as one can judge, the High Commissioner does not consider that he has to choose between Great Britain and Turkey. He thinks that he can be friends with both, and his agreement to the provisional Syro-Irakian frontier suggested between Rumeilankui and Feishkhabur (see my despatch No. 47 of the 1st March last) is perhaps an indication that, although he was then just freshly back from Angora, he is not bound hand and foot to the French Ambassador in Constantinople. In the dealings over a variety of matters which I have had with M. de Jouvenel, I have found him friendly, desirous to help, and free from absurd suspicions.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem, Bagdad, Damascus and Aleppo.

I have, &c.
NORMAN MAYERS.

[E 2215/52/89]

No. 228.

Acting Consul Smart to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 7.)

(No. 108.)

Damascus, March 21, 1926.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 18th instant I was able for the first time since my return from Transjordan and Palestine to have a long conversation with M. Pierre Alype, who had been absent at Beirut and temporarily indisposed after his return.

2. I endeavoured to remove the apprehensions entertained by him regarding Transjordan. I felt sure, I said, that M. de Jouvenel would return from Jerusalem with the same impression as I had brought back from Palestine and Transjordan, namely, that the British authorities were doing all that was possible to preserve the neutrality of our mandated territories. I added that there was one aspect of the case which, though not so evident to us at Damascus, had been brought home to me during my journey, namely, that, after all, it was for Syria to close her own frontier against political undesirables or contraband arms and ammunition. The fact that France had lost possession of a great part of the southern Syrian frontier threw on Transjordan the burden of what was really Syria's business. Nevertheless, I was convinced that there was great exaggeration in the reports given to the French regarding the circulation of rebel notables between the Jebel Druse and our mandated territories as well as regarding the arms traffic between Transjordan and the mountain. I mentioned that I had been told in Palestine that much of the arms contraband had been effected on the coast between Nakoura and Beirut and via Mount Hermon. Anyhow, reports in Transjordan seemed to show that the rebels were short of ammunition, and this was proof manifest of the efforts made by our authorities to check this traffic.

3. M. Alype said that French information was that the rebels had a large supply of munitions, but that the entry of new supplies had recently become more difficult owing to the strengthening of the preventive arrangements in Transjordan. There had been contraband traffic by the coast between Nakoura and Beirut, but it had been entirely stopped by the measures of control adopted on land and sea. The main traffic had been through Transjordan.

4. M. Alype asked me what impression I had got during my journey as to the possibilities of Druse resistance to the forthcoming French offensive. I replied that my impression was that the Druses would fight. M. Alype said that he had been receiving very optimistic reports to the effect that the French advance would be the signal for very general Druse submissions, but he did not attach too much importance to these prognostics. He, indeed, thought that it would be better if the Druses were to resist, and this would give the French an opportunity of showing their power. A French victory, which was beyond doubt, would greatly facilitate the subsequent general settlement.

5. M. Alype asked me for news of Sir Gilbert Clayton's negotiations with Imam Yahia, and enquired whether they were directed towards some form of Arabian unification. He thought that any such Arabian unification was bound to react unfavourably on Syria, where the people were at present only demanding Syrian unity, but might, were any strong unifying force to appear in the Arabian

Peninsula, return to their old demands of Arabian unity, which was obviously incompatible with the French mandate in Syria.

6. I said that I had no information about Sir Gilbert Clayton's mission in the Yemen, but I imagined that his negotiations were of purely local consequence. I suggested that any form of Arabian unification was a very distant fatality and, anyhow, seemed to menace our mandated territories before those of France.

7. There is no doubt that the French are seriously alarmed by the prospect of an Arabian Power growing up in the Arabian Peninsula under the auspices of Ibn Saud. They believe that we still cherish the dreams associated with the name of Lawrence and that an United Arabian Empire, under our influence and including Syria, is still a goal of British policy. I doubt whether we will be able to rid the French of these apprehensions.

8. M. Alype and General Andréa maintain their apparently invincible optimism as regards the rebellion in Syria. Neither they or any other French authorities appear to realise that the problem in Syria is political rather than military.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 94), Amman (No. 92), Bagdad (No. 88), Beirut (No. 105) and Aleppo (No. 76).

I have, &c.

W. A. SMART.

[E 2249/146/89]

No. 229.

The Marquess of Crewe to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 7.)

(No. 607.)

Sir,

Paris, April 1, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the question of the situation in Syria was raised in the Chamber of Deputies on the 29th March during the debate on the provisional credits to be accorded to the Government for the month of April. The credit asked for by the Government to meet expenses which were expected to be incurred in Syria amounted to the sum of 23,485,239 fr., whereas the figures for January, February and March were respectively 37 millions, 37 millions and 23.5 millions.

2. The debate was opened by M. Desjardins, a member of the Right, who, not unexpectedly, seized the occasion once more to launch a bitter attack upon the late High Commissioner, General Sarrail, whom he professed to regard as solely responsible for the present unsatisfactory situation in Syria. He complained in particular that the report of General Duport, who had been sent out to Syria to enquire into the Michaud disaster, had never been published, and that no adequate disciplinary action had ever been taken against General Sarrail. M. Desjardins' speech was received with constant interruptions from the members of the Left and Extreme Left, who greatly resented his attacks upon the former High Commissioner.

3. Following upon M. Desjardins, M. Baron, a member of the Socialist party, moved an amendment proposing that the credit which, as drafted, included sums required for operations both in Syria and Morocco, be reduced by 10 million francs. Later in the debate, M. Baron agreed to alter his amendment and to move that that part of the credit relating to Syria be reduced by 1 million francs. M. Baron declared the object of his amendment was to show the objection which his party felt to the position which France had acquired in Syria, and to demonstrate their desire that she should abandon this position as soon as possible. In his eyes the Syrian mandate would never be an economically sound proposition, and far from France gaining in material profit thereby there would be a steady drain on her resources caused by the necessity of meeting the requirements of Syria. It was essential, and more especially at the present time, when France's finances were in so parlous a state, that this unsatisfactory situation be brought to an end. Apart, however, from the economic aspect of the question, the Socialist party was deeply concerned by the continuance of active military operations in Syria and by the fact that so many French lives were being lost. It insisted that an end should be put to this state of affairs, and, indeed, to all such colonial expeditions which were entirely contrary to the party's political ideals.

4. M. Berthon then addressed the House on behalf of the Communist party, and, after declaring once more the favourite Communist thesis that Syria must be

evacuated without delay and an independent State set up, enquired whether the Government was prepared to take steps to come to terms with the Druses.

5. Replying to these various speeches, M. Briand once more pointed out that in Syria, as in Morocco, the French had not been the aggressors, and that they were now endeavouring to restore a situation which had been in the first place disturbed by rebels. He emphasised the fact that the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations at its recent meeting in Rome had approved the manner in which France had fulfilled the conditions of the mandate, and added that the great majority of the Syrian population was contented with the present system of administration. He declared that if the Druses would stop sending their bands to harass the French troops and peaceful native populations and would consent to enter into negotiations for "une administration largement autonome," they would be met half-way by the French Government. It was, however, quite out of the question for the French to withdraw from Syria; such a proceeding would in no way ameliorate the situation, and would in fact irreparably damage the interests of the native population itself.

6. In spite of M. Briand's appeal and of M. Painlevé's declaration that to reduce the credit would cause embarrassment to the Government and serve no useful purpose, M. Baron's amendment was adopted by 268 votes to 265. The Communists and the Socialist party voted against the Government, together with a large number of the members of the other groups of the Left. The remaining members of the Left, together with the Centre and the Right, who declared that in view of the national interests involved they were prepared to support the Government, voted against the amendment.

7. No particular attention has been paid to this vote, and it would no doubt be a mistake to consider that the Government's position has been in any way weakened thereby. The fact, however, that the Government cannot obtain a majority in such a matter can hardly fail to encourage both the Druses and, indirectly, the Riffians, to continue their opposition to the French.

I have, &c.

CREWE.

[E 2398/12/89]

No. 230.

Consul Vaughan-Russell to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 119.)

Sir,

Damascus, April 1, 1926.

IN continuation of Mr. Smart's despatch No. 107 of the 19th ultimo, I have the honour to report that the column under General Marty (comprising also that under Colonel Massiet) returned to Damascus on the 26th ultimo.

2. The reoccupation of Nebk has been heralded in the press as a fine feat of French military prowess. In reality the rebels were outnumbered and obliged by overwhelmingly superior military equipment to evacuate the town. Whatever may be said by the subsidised press, I am informed that the rebels had not made life intolerable for its inhabitants by their forced levies. I gather from a good source that the column under General Marty was somewhat severe in its treatment of Nebk, and that damage, which might perhaps have been avoided, was inflicted on it. The Danish hospital there was used as a shelter for some of the troops, and a regrettable amount of wanton looting and destruction took place.

3. A fairly strong garrison was left in Nebk, and the French authorities have intimated to the officials of the Syrian Government, who had been absent from their posts since the occupation of the district by the rebels, that they should immediately return and resume their duties. It is not yet certain, however, to what extent the establishment of a garrison at Nebk will restore security in that region. Much will depend on whether or not the garrison is maintained at a strength sufficient to carry out reconnaissances, patrols and, above all, operations against bands which must still infest the Anti-Lebanon and the regions east of the main Homs-Damascus road, not yet touched by French military operations.

4. The return of this column to Damascus does not appear to have calmed the ardour of the rebels in the Ghouta (east of Damascus) and in the whole region surrounding the city. Exchanges of rifle fire take place every night, and by day the French artillery in and around Damascus (on an average of three or four days during the week) shell villages close to the city, that is within the range of the guns. Most

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of the villages surrounding Damascus have either been bombed by aircraft or destroyed by artillery or by the incendiarism of the forces operating around the city, chiefly irregulars, whose savagery and predatory proclivities the French authorities seem unable or find too irksome to check.

5. Thus does the work of attrition ruthlessly proceed; the French policy is evidently to crush the rebellion by the maximum use of every mechanical contrivance and with the minimum use of French soldiers, whose lives are not risked where other troops (i.e., Circassian, Armenian, Kurdish or other irregulars) can be employed. The French have since last autumn undertaken few serious military operations, and have contented themselves with taking purely defensive military measures. It has been left to the rebels, purposely, it seems, to attack, and thus to break up their strength and moral by losses suffered in successive futile assaults.

6. The rebels, however, do not yet seem disposed to give up the struggle. From various sources one obtains the impression that, having suffered so much, they have decided to continue fighting for their cause to the end—until their terms are accepted by the mandatory authorities. Opinions vary as to exactly what terms they would accept, but all rebels consider a general amnesty as the one essential condition of peace. The French, of course, decline to consider negotiations on this point.

7. The spring offensive, which the French military authorities are about to begin, will continue actively the work passively begun of crushing the rebellion. Eventually, no doubt, at great cost of blood and money, and with disastrous consequences to the country financially and economically, the French authorities will break down the resistance and impose some form of peace. It is difficult to see how the mandatory authorities, after all the hatred and bitterness which they have stirred up, can for many years find any responsible Syrians to collaborate whole-heartedly with them in the task of governing the country. The initial problem of crushing the rebellion—which may be none too easy with only the present hardly adequate forces in Southern Syria—is a fairly simple one compared with the numerous problems which, after peace is declared to have been restored, will confront the mandatory authorities.

(Copies of this despatch have also been sent to Jerusalem (No. 102), Amman (No. 100), Bagdad (No. 96), Beirut (No. 115) and Aleppo (No. 81).)

I have, &c.

J. R. VAUGHAN-RUSSELL

No. 231.

Acting Consul, Damascus, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 26.)

(No. 23.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Damascus, April 26, 1926.

FRENCH column recaptured Sueida on the afternoon of 25th April. Druses forced to retire after a heavy engagement in which they suffered severe losses. Estimated French casualties, 100 killed, 300 wounded.

(Repeated to Jerusalem, No. 6; Bagdad, No. 3; and Cairo.)

[E 2709/146/89]

No. 232.

The Marquess of Crewe to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 792.)

Sir,

Paris, April 29, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that, during the discussion in the Senate on the budget of the Ministry of War on the 27th April, M. Victor Bérard, a member of the *Gauche démocratique radicale et radicale socialiste* and vice-president of the Senate Foreign Affairs Commission, pressed the Government to send a joint parliamentary commission to Syria in order to obtain information as to the real facts of the situation in that country.

2. Replying to M. Bérard, M. Painlevé stated that the Government would have no objection to such a commission proceeding to Syria when once the military operations which were now in progress had been brought to an end. He begged the

Senate to agree to this postponement and not to cause any embarrassment to the Government at the present time. M. Bérard stated that he was prepared to accept M. Painlevé's undertaking, and in consequence withdrew the amendment which he had previously tabled reducing the credit for the Ministry of War by 100 fr.

I have, &c.

CREWE

[E 2932/146/89]

No. 233.

Consul Vaughan-Russell to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 148.)

Damascus, April 27, 1926.

Sir,

WITH reference to Mr. Smart's despatch No. 65 of the 12th February last, I have the honour to report that the presidency of the State of Syria has been conferred by the French High Commissioner upon Damad Ahmed Nami Bey, a wealthy landowner and Moslem notable of noble Turkish extraction, who for some time past has lived in the Lebanon.

2. The above appointment has been anticipated for a long time and the candidature of Ahmed Nami Bey has been urged with much warmth and persistency in the Syrian papers subsidised by the French—particularly in the Great Lebanon.

3. The new President has, according to reports, shown little ambition or enthusiasm for the difficult and thankless task which his appointment as President will give him. Although he is reported to be popular among Moslems in the Lebanon, he is practically unknown to the mass of Damascene Moslems, who, I gather, are not very favourable to the appointment. As it is specified that the appointment is merely provisional and that the definite election of the President of the State of Syria will be carried out later by the Syrian Parliament when it has been properly elected, Damascenes are, however, not actually hostile to this appointment. It is considered, at least, to be a step forward out of the *impasse* into which the administrative situation of the country had drifted since the 10th November last, when Subhi Bey Barakat, the ex-President, resigned.

4. The High Commissioner's decree announcing the appointment, the terms of which I have the honour to enclose herewith,* specifies that Ahmed Nami Bey will be free to elect his own collaborators. The former President, Subhi Bey Barakat, also enjoyed the same facilities, but ran counter to Syrian Nationalist feeling by surrounding himself with collaborators and friends distinguished rather by their pro-Turkish sympathies than by any real devotion to the service of the Syrian State, of which they were supposed to be Ministers. It is to be hoped that the new President—he himself of Turkish origin—will exercise discretion in the choice of his collaborators. From a reliable source I am informed that Ahmed Nami Bey is likely to choose colleagues in his Cabinet who are well known to be Nationalists in sympathy—some moderate and others inclined to be extremists. It is strongly rumoured that it was only on the condition that he should be free to include among his collaborators a number of Syrian Nationalists that he consented to allow the French authorities to put forward his candidature to the presidency of the State of Syria.

5. It is stated by some Syrians that Nami Bey has asked the French authorities to agree to terms similar to those already put forward by Sheikh Taj-ed-Dine and refused. It is confidently hoped that the demand for a general amnesty and a rectification of the frontiers between the State of Syria and the Great Lebanon will on this occasion be agreed to by the French authorities.

6. It is too early yet to foresee what effects this new appointment will have upon the general situation here. Ahmed Nami Bey has not yet arrived here to take up his post. I shall not fail to acquaint you with further developments in due course.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 117), Amman (No. 124), Bagdad (No. 111), Beirut (No. 140) and Aleppo (No. 94).)

I have, &c.

J. R. VAUGHAN-RUSSELL

* Not printed.

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[E 2933/12/89]

No. 234.

Consul Vaughan-Russell to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 149.)

Sir,

Damascus, Syria, April 27, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to confirm my telegram No. 23 of yesterday's date reporting the capture of Sueida, the capital of the Jebel Druse, on the afternoon of the 25th instant by the French military forces of General Andréa.

2. No doubt you will obtain through the Air Ministry or War Office a full report on the matter, prepared by the British liaison officer at Beirut, who was present during the operations which resulted in the capture of Sueida. I will, therefore, not venture to describe the military operations in any detail, but confine my remarks to the events leading up to the above operations, and to the results which may be expected to follow the above military event.

3. Preparations for the attack on the Jebel Druse—so long threatened by the French authorities—had been held until the last possible moment. I am inclined to think that the French authorities had hoped that the threats of a campaign which they held over the heads of the Druses, would induce the latter to surrender before the spring, and thus obviate the destruction of their villages and crops—a disaster which a campaign would assuredly bring upon them.

4. For a long time, every effort had been made to undermine the *moral* of the Druses and their allies, the Syrian revolutionaries, by spreading news and reports likely to discourage them. The most important reports spread alleged that there were serious defections within the ranks of the leaders of the rebellion, that there were numerous surrenders of leaders of the rebel movement, that large numbers of villages were capitulating, and that the losses suffered by the rebels in every engagement or skirmish where French columns came into contact with them were exceedingly heavy. Whether the foregoing reports were really true is open to some doubt, but even so, they were evidently exaggerations of the truth.

5. In any case, if these reports were multiplied and broadcasted with a view to frightening the Druses into surrendering, and with a view to making the Druses fear the consequences of a French campaign in the Jebel, the result has been a failure. The Druses knew all along that the French reports concerning their *moral*, their casualties and their resisting powers were inaccurate, and that the French army as well as French public opinion in France would not relish a punitive expedition into their mountainous country.

6. I am inclined to think that in the same way as the French hoped that the Druses would surrender before they should be crushed, the Druses also hoped that the French would not put into execution their threats against them.

7. As the Druses had not surrendered by the middle of March, the preparations for the present expedition against the Jebel, so far hardly commenced, were pushed forward with much vigour by the French military command. Operations between Homs and Nebk in the latter half of March were succeeded by sweeping movements simultaneously to the east and west of Mount Hermon, which resulted in the recapture by the French of large stretches of country-side, of which the rebels (Druse or Syrian) had virtually been masters since the end of last October. Villages around Damascus were bombarded by artillery and aeroplanes, and many of the rebels lurking in them were forced to move either southwards into the Jebel Druse or north-westwards into the Anti-Lebanon, where a large stretch of country still remains out of French control. The result which, I think, the French military authorities hoped to (and to a certain extent did) achieve was to drive the rebel elements scattered in various parts of Syria into a corner and there to round them up. Many rebels were killed in these operations, but also large numbers escaped and found their way to the main body of the rebel forces in the Jebel.

8. Reinforcements and stores were sent down by rail to the French centres on the railway in the Hauran plain, west of the Jebel, notably Ezra, Deraa, Ghazaleh and also Bosra Eski Sham. While the troops which had participated in the operations near Nebk and Mount Hermon were resting, and the reinforcements and material from Beirut were being collected at the bases mentioned above, heavy preliminary aerial bombardments of Druse centres were carried out. I am informed that these bombardments were on a very large scale and that they must have wrought great havoc among the Druses.

9. It may conceivably have been hoped by the French authorities that the foretaste of ruthless war thus administered by them to the Druses would have

brought them to their knees. It did not have that effect, if it was hoped that it would.

10. By mid-April both sides realised that their enemy would not surrender, and that the only alternative was war. The French planned to execute their move on Sueida, advancing in two columns simultaneously from Bosra Eski Sham and from Ezra. Their forces in these two columns totalled roughly 12,000 men, and the capture of Sueida appears to have been effected without serious difficulty and according to the pre-conceived French plan.

11. The Druses, realising that their failure to surrender would bring upon them and their mountain the severest punitive measures which a modern mechanically-equipped army could administer, seem to have resigned themselves with extraordinary but typical stubbornness and heroism to what they must have known was likely to be eventual annihilation. In spite of their inferiority in numbers and of the great difference in the matter of equipment between the French and themselves, the Druses prepared to put up a fight so that the move on Sueida should not be a triumphal progress through their country. Estimates place the number of Druses which engaged the two columns at about 4,000 to 5,000 men. Their casualties appear to have been heavy, but only approximate figures can be hazarded.

12. French estimates which are generally admitted to be somewhat exaggerated place the total Druse casualties at 2,000. Perhaps 600 killed and 800 wounded might represent an approximate estimate of the Druse losses. The French losses are in the neighbourhood of 100 or perhaps 120 killed and 300 or 350 wounded.

13. With the recapture of Sueida the first phase of the Druse campaign has opened with a success for the French arms. It is impossible to predict whether this initial success will deal a mortal blow to the *moral* of the Druses. The French seem to think that the capture of Sueida will produce a considerable moral effect upon the rebels not only in the Jebel but also throughout Syria. Much will depend upon what further measures are taken in the Jebel Druse to prosecute the war to a successful end. Any moral effect gained by the French by the recapture of Sueida is, I fear, likely to be nullified if other operations in the Jebel (which are expected to follow soon) are not conducted with care, foresight and success, and simultaneously supported by clever political work.

14. General Andréa, having reoccupied Sueida, the capital of the State of the Jebel Druse, of which he has been titular Governor for several months past, is expected to establish himself there and to endeavour to set up again a Government administration.

15. Perhaps the situation in the Jebel Druse, which is now in the grip of war, will be eased by the appointment to-day of a new (but provisional) President of the Syrian State. Great hopes are entertained that this appointment will bring to Syria and the Jebel Druse an amnesty and peace, without which the whole population seem as determined as ever to prolong the present struggle.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 118), Amman (No. 125), Bagdad (No. 112), Beirut (No. 141), and Aleppo (No. 95).)

I have, &c.

J. R. VAUGHAN-RUSSELL.

[E 2936/146/89]

No. 235.

Consul-General Satow to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 87.)

Sir,

Beirut, April 28, 1926.

THE local press announced the day before yesterday both that the French troops had captured Soueida and also that his Highness Damad Ahmed Nami Bey had been appointed Chief of the State of Syria until such time as a regularly-elected Parliament could itself choose a permanent Chief of State. The implication is, of course, that with the French success a definite turning-point has been reached and that from henceforth a new era has begun.

2. The local papers naturally publish panegyrics of Ahmed Nami Bey, who is declared to possess all the necessary qualities to carry through a difficult mission, and of M. de Jouvenel, who has had the sagacity to select him for that mission. It is not for me to express an opinion as to how this appointment will be received in Damascus nor as to the extent to which the glowing predictions now made will be fulfilled. That is

for Mr. Russell; but, as Ahmed Nami has been resident in Beirut for some time, I venture to record what I know of him.

3. His first appearance in public was, as far as I am concerned, shortly before the arrival of General Sarrail, when as president of a committee he organised on behalf of the people of Beirut the reception of the late High Commissioner. From the prominence which Ahmed Nami then gained it was at the time thought that some public appointment was in store for him. There was even a talk that he might be appointed Governor of the Great Lebanon, as there was then some question of appointing a native Governor. However, nothing happened, and Ahmed Nami retired into an obscurity from which he has now once more emerged.

4. Ahmed Nami is said to have been born on the 27th November, 1878. He married a daughter of the late Sultan Abdul Medjid, from whom he was later divorced and by whom he acquired two sons, who are being educated in France, and the title of Highness. His father, Fakhri Bey, who was possibly of Turkish or Turco-Albanian origin, was aide-de-camp to the Khedive Ibrahim of Egypt and appears to have come to Syria in the reign of that sovereign. His mother was a Circassian and he himself was born in Beirut, of which his father, after being Governor of Nablous, was at one time mayor. It is his descent on his mother's side which has given rise to the statement sometimes made that Ahmed Nami is a Circassian by race.

5. As already stated, he has taken but little part in public life here, and it is in his favour that he has not been one of the crowd of office-seeking sycophants who have been so prominent since the arrival of the French. According to the local papers, he has demanded and obtained from M. de Jouvenel more or less a free hand and has been authorised to choose freely his Ministers and collaborators. I happened recently to mention Ahmed Nami to a local Moslem notable and asked what he thought of him. He replied that, while he had perhaps no very outstanding qualities, he was at any rate honest. I understand that he has left to-day for Damascus with the High Commissioner, who, on the occasion of his installation of head of the Provisional Government of Syria, is to make an important speech.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Bagdad, Jerusalem and Damascus.)

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

[E 2976/12/89]

No. 236.

Consul Vaughan-Russell to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 151.)

Sir,

Damascus, April 29, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your information, copy of a notice issued on the evening of the 27th instant by the "Bureau de la Presse" of the French delegation here, for publication in the Damascus newspapers.

2. The notice, it will be seen, is couched in the vaguest possible terms. Most probably it would seem to have been issued with the intention of providing justification or excuse later for the French military authorities for damage to life and property resulting from their present measures of coercion.

3. The notice contains no indications as to which villages or which quarters of Damascus might, without prior warning, be subjected to the measures of coercion anticipated but not described. It makes no provision for conveying timely warning to the consular corps of the intentions of the French military authorities in this matter. Further, the notice is noteworthy for the unsatisfactory manner in which the French military authorities—by a simple announcement in the press—announce their inability to accept any responsibility for "accidents" which might result from their measures of coercion.

4. For the last six months indiscriminate bombing and bombarding of villages and quarters of Damascus have been carried on without, to the best of my knowledge, any warning to enable women, children and old men to withdraw ever having been given. It is almost incomprehensible that, after the lapse of over six months, it should now even be thought necessary that warning should be given for any repressive or coercive measures to be taken.

5. "Coercive measures" which should necessitate the prior evacuation of women and children from villages near or quarters in Damascus cannot but mean bombing or

bombarding. As bombing and bombarding without the giving of prior notice has been the rule from the outset, it is difficult to understand what the motives of the French military authorities are by causing this notice to be published. It is difficult to believe that the publication of the notice has been actuated solely by a sincere desire to minimise the loss of life and property, for, if genuine consideration had been the keynote of the notice, some provision for the safety of foreigners might well have been introduced into it.

6. A further point worthy of consideration is the reason given which may render necessary measures of coercion, namely the failure of certain persons to pay a fine. I do not know whether the failure of inhabitants to pay a fine (whatever its nature) constitutes a sufficient reason to justify the use of coercive measures such as are contemplated. By stretching international law a point it might, perhaps, be arguable that the refusal to pay a war indemnity constitutes a menace to the public security, and that when martial law is in force any such menace may be dealt with by such "measures of coercion" as may be considered most effective by the competent military authorities.

7. At a meeting of the consular corps yesterday, my colleagues and myself discussed the above notice, and a note has to-day been addressed to the French delegate, copy of which I have the honour to enclose. The note requests that full explanations may be given to the consular corps as to the nature of the measures of coercion envisaged, and requests information as to what villages or quarters may be affected by the measures contemplated. The note requests that measures should be taken by the mandatory authorities to ensure that consuls may be given sufficient time to remove their subjects living in the threatened zones into places of safety, and it also expresses the disagreement of the consular corps with the attitude of the French Military Governor as regards his declaration that he can accept no responsibility for accidents which may occur as the result of his measures of coercion.

8. It is doubtful if the above note will exercise much, if any, effect upon the policy of the French military authorities. General Vallier, the new but temporary Military Governor of Damascus, told me a few days ago that hitherto only half-hearted measures have been taken to destroy the rebels and crush the rebellion, and that he now intended starting really ruthless operations against the rebels. Protests are, I fear, hardly likely to change the policy of the French military command. I am inclined to think that the notice just published is the direct outcome of General Vallier's decision to develop and increase the repressive measures for crushing the revolution. It is also more than likely, in my opinion, that the warning notice has been issued merely to provide an excuse which can be quoted later.

9. Damage done already might quite easily be grouped by the French military authorities indiscriminately with that done after the issue of this warning, and the publication of the above notice might quite conceivably be quoted as the justification for the refusal by the French authorities to consider claims previously submitted as well as those made in the future.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 121), Amman (No. 128), Bagdad (No. 115), Beirut (No. 144) and Aleppo (No. 97).)

I have, &c.

J. R. VAUGHAN-RUSSELL.

Enclosure 1 in No. 236.

Communiqué pour la Presse.

UN certain nombre de villages de la Ghouta ou de quartiers de la ville, se trouvant sous le coup d'amendes, peuvent être l'objet de mesures de coercion en cas de non-exécution. Comme ces mesures de coercion se produiront sans aucun préavis par le seul fait de la non-exécution des clauses entendues, le général commandant les troupes de la région invite instamment les autorités syriennes locales intéressées à faire sortir, en temps utile, desdites localités les femmes, les vieillards et les enfants, car le Gouverneur militaire, après cet avis, n'entend avoir aucune responsabilité, même morale, quant aux accidents qui pourraient survenir.

Damas, le 27 avril 1926.

Enclosure 2 in No. 236.

Mr. Keeley to M. Alype.

*Décanat du Corps consulaire, Damas,
le 28 avril 1926.*

M. l'Envoyé extraordinaire,

JE suis chargé par le corps consulaire de vous informer que, selon un communiqué publié dans les journaux arabes, les autorités militaires françaises ont annoncé qu'un certain nombre de villages de la Ghouta ou de quartiers de la ville peuvent être l'objet de mesures de coercition, en cas de non-exécution du paiement d'amendes, et, comme ces mesures de coercition se produiront sans aucun préavis par le seul fait de la non-exécution des clauses entendues, M. le Gouverneur militaire, après cet avis, n'entend avoir aucune responsabilité, même morale, quant aux accidents qui pourraient survenir.

Ce communiqué étant susceptible de plusieurs interprétations, même équivoques, le corps consulaire aimerait connaître d'une façon plus précise quelle est la nature des mesures de coercition envisagées. Il espère que ces mesures ne seront pas de telle nature que la vie ou la propriété des étrangers soient mises en danger.

Si les autorités mandataires croient ne pas être en état de lui donner des assurances formelles à ce sujet, le corps consulaire a toute confiance que ces mesures de coercition ne seront pas mises en vigueur sans que les consuls soient avisés directement en temps suffisant pour leur permettre de retirer leurs ressortissants hors de tout danger.

En cas que les autorités mandataires décident que certains villages et quartiers de la ville doivent être l'objet de mesures de coercition, le corps consulaire les prie de bien vouloir lui notifier exactement quels villages et quartiers seront exposés à ces mesures, ainsi que quels villages et quartiers seront assurés, afin que les consuls puissent se concerter avec les autorités françaises pour mettre les ressortissants étrangers dans les lieux indiqués comme sûrs. En même temps, le corps consulaire vous saurait gré de bien vouloir lui faire connaître quelles sont les mesures que les autorités mandataires ont l'intention d'adopter pour mettre les consuls à même d'assurer la protection efficace de leurs ressortissants dans les villages ou quartiers exposés aux mesures de coercition.

Le corps consulaire ne partage pas l'avis de M. le Gouverneur militaire qu'il pourrait, par la simple publication de ce communiqué, décliner toute responsabilité quant aux incidents qui pourraient survenir à la suite des mesures de coercition envisagées et tient toujours la Puissance mandataire responsable de la sauvegarde de la vie et des biens des étrangers.

Le corps consulaire, ayant à cœur de faciliter autant que possible la tâche des autorités mandataires et tout en reconnaissant la sollicitude bienveillante montrée dans le passé par les autorités françaises à l'égard des étrangers, renouvelle ses assurances de n'être inspiré que par le désir de vouloir collaborer avec la Puissance mandataire dans ses efforts pour assurer la protection des étrangers.

Veuillez, &c.

J. H. KEELEY, JR.,
Consul des États-Unis à Damas,
Doyen du Corps consulaire.

[E 3038/146/89]

No. 237.

Consul Vaughan-Russell to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 161.)

Sir,

Damascus, May 6, 1926.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 155 of the 3rd instant, I have the honour to report that the new President of the State of Syria yesterday announced that he had formed a Cabinet, and the following are the names of the new Ministers:—

Minister of the Interior	...	Husny Bey El Barazy.
Minister of Finance	...	Shakir Nimat Bey Shaabany.
Minister of Education	...	Faris Bey El Khoury.
Acting Minister of Justice	...	Yussef Bey El Hakim.
Minister of Agriculture	...	Wathik Bey El Muayad.
Minister of Public Works	...	Lutfi Bey El Haffar.

2. Three out of the six Ministers mentioned above, namely, the Ministers of the Interior, Education and Public Works, are members of the "Party of the People," which has been identified with the present rebellion.

3. Husny Bey El Barazy is a Moslem notable of Hama, of Kurdish extraction (a fact of which he is reputed to be very proud). He has little claim to fame in Syria, where he is chiefly known as a rich landowner, with little administrative experience. The portfolio of the Interior is considered by many persons here to be almost the most important of all, as the Minister of the Interior will be expected to arrange the vital electoral machinery, to organise the all-important new elections and above all to frame the new Constitution of the State of Syria. The fact that he is little versed in administrative matters may well throw the organisation of the elections upon the shoulders of the French authorities, who, no doubt (whatever the outward appearances may be), will continue to a large extent, if not to the degree of virtually controlling them, to influence the course of the elections. Husny Bey El Barazy's appointment is, therefore, likely to find little disfavour among all parties interested, whether French or Syrian—at least until the elections actually commence.

4. As regards Shakir Nimat Bey Shaabani, I would invite a reference to Aleppo despatch No. 20 of the 26th January last (paragraph 4). He is not known to be a member of the Party of the People, but his past record is such as to credit him with no particular Francophil feelings.

5. Faris-el-Khoury is one of the leading lights of the Party of the People. He is a Christian, a lawyer and the chief of the "Ordre des Avocats." He is, moreover, popular with all sections of the Syrian nation and is known to be Francophobe.

6. Yussef-el-Hakim is of Lattakia origin and a judge of the Court of Cassation; he is popular, but has had little previous experience of service in a Syrian Ministry.

7. Wathik-el-Muayad was formerly in the Turkish diplomatic service, and is a fairly polished if not a clever person. He has an English wife and is popular among all sections of Damascenes, among whom the Muayad family has been well known and respected for generations. Until recently he was the director of the Syrian Department of Land Registry.

8. Lutfi-el-Haffar, the new Minister of Public Works, has been for the past three or four years vice-president of the Damascus Chamber of Commerce. He is a member of the Party of the People and president of the Moslem Refugees Relief Committee here. He is popular and a fairly capable official.

9. None of these persons can be identified as purely and simply creatures or puppets of the French authorities. They are men of intelligence and of average reasonableness; moreover, the Cabinet shows signs of being fairly well balanced in its composition, having neither too many members with sympathetic leanings towards the Nationalists nor a majority of Ministers likely to be unduly subservient to the mandatory Power's least dictate.

10. The feeling in Damascus is now much more optimistic than it has been for the past four months, that is, since the peace negotiations in the Jebel Druse, undertaken by Amir Amin Arslan, raised Syria's hopes only for them to be dashed to the ground. It is too early yet to prognosticate and to foresee what course events here will take. Unquestionably we are on the eve of events of great importance; the future of the country will to a great extent be decided as the result of the deliberations and negotiations of the next few weeks.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 128), Amman (No. 134), Bagdad (No. 121), Beirut (No. 151) and Aleppo (No. 102).)

I have, &c.

J. R. VAUGHAN-RUSSELL.

[E 3243/12/89]

No. 238.

Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 27.)

(No. 165.)

Sir,

Damascus, Syria, May 15, 1926.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 151 of the 29th ultimo, I have the honour to report that the French authorities have not yet replied to the consular corps' note of the 28th ultimo. The only reply, if it can thus be described, has been a bombard-

[15026]

2 E

ment of the Meydan quarter on a large scale (about 300 aeroplane bombs, apart from shells, having been dropped on this quarter). The area newly laid waste is vaster than that destroyed during the historic bombardment of the 18th to 20th October last, but I am given to understand that the value of the property damaged on this occasion is not so great as before.

2. As anticipated by me in paragraph 8 of my despatch under reference, the consular note of the 28th April last does not appear to have influenced in the least the policy of the French authorities. On the contrary, the above bombardment shows that the measures of coercion are being carried out with redoubled vigour and with little, if any, increased consideration for the lives and property of foreigners or of Syrian women and children.

3. I have the honour to report hereunder such details as I have been able to collect concerning the above bombardment of the Meydan quarter of Damascus.

4. In the first place, I have the honour to transmit herewith the French official version of this bombardment.* It is contained in two official communiqués published in the Syrian press on the 9th and 11th instant respectively, and explains that the bombardment was carried out to save Damascus from the menace of an attack by brigands who had concentrated in the Meydan quarter. This concentration of rebels (a few hundred at the most) is quite likely, but opinions must differ as to whether their presence constituted a menace to the safety of Damascus so grave as to justify a bombardment such as that which took place on the 7th instant.

5. The version given by the Damascus public and by persons who escaped from the Meydan quarter is somewhat different. It is to the effect that on the 6th instant a column, composed of about 500 irregular and French native troops, was sent to the Meydan quarter, and from there continued its march to the villages of Yalda and Babila, situated 3 or 4 miles to the east of the Meydan quarter outside the city. While on its way through the Meydan, and beyond it, the column was fired upon by rebels, who, it is said, eventually obliged the column to return to Damascus. Of course, it is possible that the object of the column was to effect a reconnaissance, and that it was intended to return to Damascus in any case, but, even so, it suffered some casualties, and in retaliation the troops are said to have set fire to some houses in the Meydan and to others between Meydan and Yalda. The same day, in the afternoon, a number of rebels surrounded the military post manned by Circassian irregulars near the Ziftiyeh Camel Market at Meydan, killed seven and captured the rest, who, it is said, were subsequently killed.

6. Damascenes state that, in revenge, the Meydan quarter was heavily bombed and shelled between 4.45 A.M. and 6.15 A.M. on the 7th instant, and immediately afterwards tanks and armoured cars, accompanied by a body of irregulars and French native troops, were sent to the Meydan to follow up the attack upon the inhabitants of that quarter. The soldiers set fire to several houses. I have confirmation from an absolutely reliable source of the fact that the troops deliberately set on fire many buildings in the Meydan, after having sprinkled them with kerosene. The fire brigade was forbidden by the French authorities to go to the Meydan to attempt to extinguish the fires which, at least six in number, raged from Bab Musallah to Bawabtullah, that is, the whole length of the Meydan, a distance of over three-quarters of a mile. It was only on the 10th instant that the Damascus fire brigade was allowed to attempt to subdue the fires, which by this time had almost burnt themselves out, not before they had, however, laid waste practically half the Meydan quarter. It is estimated that at least 500 or 600 houses and two mosques were destroyed either during the bombardment or as a result of incendiarism. Many estimates place the number of destroyed houses and shops at well over 1,000. Damascenes maintain that the number of people killed, without exaggeration, is at least 200, in which figure are included a large percentage of women and children. They claim that the troops killed indiscriminately anybody whom they saw in the Meydan during their sortie, and that the majority of victims were not persons actively engaged in fighting against the French, but people who quietly stayed in the cellars of their homes while the bombardment had taken place. They maintain, moreover, that prior notice for women and children to leave the Meydan was not properly circulated, and that only a negligible fraction of the population in the Meydan were warned by the French that the quarter was about to be bombarded and that women and children should be evacuated. After the attack on the Meydan, pillaging and looting was indulged in by the troops, who again, in broad daylight, carried their spoils through the streets of Damascus with an effrontery which it is impossible to describe.

* Not printed.

7. I learn from a reliable source that the newly-formed Syrian Cabinet met on the evening of the 7th instant, and made strong representations to the French authorities on the subject of this Meydan bombardment. M. Pierre Aylpe is stated to have replied that, as the French military authorities had learnt that 500 rebels had gathered in the Meydan and were planning to attack Damascus, the measures had been taken to save the Damascenes themselves, as well as the French colony, from the atrocities which the rebels would certainly have committed if they had been given a chance of attacking the city.

8. After the bombardment the survivors of the Meydan quarter, in a stream of cowed and wretched humanity, moved into other parts of Damascus (where they could find temporary shelter), bearing the few objects which they had been able to save from the destruction of the bombardment and the flames and the rapacity and cruelty of the irregulars. The refugees gathered on the 7th and 8th instant in front of the police headquarters and demanded the return of the things which had been pillaged. Eventually orders were given to the police to collect such pillaged property as could be found for return to the rightful owners. Little could be recovered, however. A crowd of women and children gathered on the 8th instant in front of the Serail (Government Buildings), asking the Government to put an end to this cruel state of affairs. About fifty wailing women gathered in front of this consulate on the 8th, and again on the 12th instant, demanding the intervention of this consulate; similar demonstrations took place outside the other consulates in Damascus.

9. Owing to the fact that the area destroyed lies outside the barbed-wire defences of the city and is still, as it was before, virtually a battle-zone, it has been difficult to visit it and to form by personal inspection an estimate of the extent of the havoc wrought and of the value of the property destroyed. In any case, it would appear that, fortunately, little, if any, damage has been done to British interests, so a tour of inspection of the ruined Meydan seems to me hardly necessary. The areas destroyed contained chiefly Arab residential property of no outstanding merit or value. If one assumes that the loss amounts to 500 houses of an average value of £300, the total destruction of property alone would aggregate £150,000. If merchandise, valuables, carpets and furniture be added to this total, I would estimate the total loss in the neighbourhood of £300,000. This figure is, of course, quite arbitrary, and is only submitted as a provisional, but I think conservative, estimate.

10. The losses suffered by foreign nationals are, I think, not likely to be very great, as for some time past the majority of inhabitants of the Meydan, both foreigners as well as Syrians, have been abandoning their homes in that quarter, which has long enjoyed the deserved reputation of being an unhealthy place to live in. There are, however, many Iraklis and Transjordanians in the Meydan and also a considerable number of Nejdians. I have already received claims from three British-protected persons whose houses (with the contents) were destroyed or pillaged during the bombardment, but up to the present I have received no report of any loss of life among British nationals as a result of the Meydan bombardment.

11. I am very loath to express any opinion upon the bombardment of the Meydan or upon the reasons or events which provoked it. That there were rebels in the Meydan is undisputable, for this quarter has unquestionably been in rebel possession since last November. The French authorities might argue, therefore, that the quarter could well have been subjected to coercive measures at the outset, and that the bombardment of the 7th instant was a punishment delayed only until it became necessary to avoid the danger of a menace to the city of Damascus itself. I am personally of opinion that the menace from rebels in the Meydan has never been really dangerous to the city, nor was there any real danger of Damascus being attacked on the 6th or 7th instant. The French military authorities, no doubt, had their own reasons for supposing otherwise, and, in the state of war and martial law existing here, had ample justification for putting into execution strong coercive measures against the Meydan, where the rebels have undoubtedly been sheltering owing to the destruction of their villages in the Ghouta.

12. One cannot help feeling that the punitive measures taken were unnecessarily severe and that little serious effort was made to exercise discrimination when the killing of inhabitants of the Meydan was carried out. It is open to doubt whether the wanton incendiarism and destruction wrought in the Meydan will succeed in breaking the resistance of the rebels as soon as the French expect. The French evidently hope that by the wholesale destruction of life and property a feeling of hopelessness in continuing the struggle will be engendered in the minds of the population of Syria, and the rebellion will thus collapse. This hope will probably be realised

eventually, but, in view of the bitterness of feeling provoked by the present French policy of "frightfulness," it is to be feared that after the country has been subdued the mandatory authorities will be confronted with new problems directly arising out of the present short-sighted policy of terrorism.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 134), Amman (No. 137), Bagdad (No. 124), Beirut (No. 156) and Aleppo (No. 105).

I have, &c.

J. R. VAUGHAN-RUSSELL.

[E 3305/146/89]

No. 239.

Consul-General Satow to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 106.)

Sir,

Beirut, May 18, 1926.

TWO local papers, the "Orient" and the "Syrie," have to-day published what purports to be the programme, consisting of ten points, of the newly formed Syrian Ministry. It is for the acting British consul at Damascus to comment on this programme, and if I call attention to it at all it is because, as published here, it raises a point which is certainly of very general interest.

2. The second plank in the platform of the Ministry is defined in the following terms:—

"Donner au mandat les formes d'un traité qui sera passé entre la France et la Syrie pour une période de trente ans, traité qui fixera les droits, les obligations et les relations réciproques des deux nations. Il s'inspirera de celui conclu entre la Grande-Bretagne et l'Irak et ne deviendra exécutoire qu'après sa ratification par le Parlement syrien. Il réservera à la France l'influence politique et la *priorité économique* [the italics are mine] seulement, sans porter atteinte à la souveraineté nationale."

3. The "Syrie," which has for years, and not without success, attempted to create the impression that it is a semi-official organ, and which certainly is in the receipt of a regular subvention, in commenting on the suggestion, writes:—

"Nous sommes fort touchés de la priorité que le nouveau Gouvernement entend réserver à la France: priorité économique seulement, spécifie la déclaration. Qu'est-ce à dire? Voilà qui devra être étroitement défini par des traités en bonne et due forme."

4. It seems not unreasonable to assume that the Syrian Ministry, in drawing up its maiden programme, kept in touch with the French authorities. If this is so, those authorities would, like the newspaper writer, seem to see nothing improper in the grant to themselves of "economic priority" in Syria. The idea is, however, so patently contrary to the spirit of the mandate that I think it well at once to call attention to the matter.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

[E 3349/77/89]

No. 240.

Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 168.)

Sir,

Damascus, May 18, 1926.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 165 of the 15th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith the copy of the reply from the French Envoy Extraordinary at Damascus to the consular corps' note of the 28th ultimo, copy of which I forwarded under cover of my despatch No. 151 of the 29th ultimo.

2. I have the honour also to forward herewith copy of the reply of the consular corps to the above note from the French delegation here.

3. General Vallier's reply to the consular corps' note is, I venture to think, as satisfactory as can be expected in the present difficult situation. The last paragraph of his letter, in particular, holds out hopes that the lives and property of foreigners will

be safeguarded in the future. If General Vallier will indeed furnish to the consular corps a copy of all notices sent to villages near Damascus or to the quarters of the city upon which fines are imposed, and if these notices can be circulated to consuls in sufficient time to permit them to withdraw their nationals from the possible danger of coercive measures in the event of the non-payment of these fines, there should be a reasonable chance of safeguarding the lives and property of foreign nationals.

4. A further satisfactory feature of General Vallier's letter is the general helpful tone of its expression. Hitherto offers to collaborate with the mandatory authorities made by the consular corps have met with little or no response. In this case, General Vallier would seem to be desirous of collaborating and to be willing to make concrete proposals which, if carried out, should facilitate the work of the consuls here to protect their nationals. It is to be hoped that these promising measures for the protection of foreign interests will, even at this late stage, be carried out by the French authorities.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 136), Amman (No. 138), Bagdad (No. 126), Beirut (No. 157) and Aleppo (No. 106).)

I have, &c.

J. R. VAUGHAN-RUSSELL.

Enclosure 1 in No. 240.

M. Pierre-Alype to Mr. Kceley.

Damas, le 14 mai 1926.

M. le Doyen,

ME référant à votre lettre du 28 avril, j'ai l'honneur de vous adresser, ci-jointe, la réponse que m'a fait parvenir M. le Général Vallier, chargé du maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité dans la région de Damas.

Je suis persuadé que les indications données par cet officier général apaiseront les inquiétudes manifestées par le corps consulaire de cette ville.

Veuillez, &c.

PIERRE-ALYPE.

Enclosure 2 in No. 240.

General Vallier to M. Pierre-Alype.

Damas, le 8 mai 1926.

M. l'Envoyé extraordinaire,

EN vous faisant retour, ci-joint, de la lettre, en date du 28 avril, de M. le doyen du corps consulaire de Damas que vous avez bien voulu me faire parvenir pour éléments de réponse, j'ai l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance:

1. Que le communiqué inséré dans la presse du 28 avril ne vise que les villages auxquels des amendes en armes et numéraire sont infligées en représailles de faits déterminés, tels que complicité ouverte et répétée avec les bandes ou attaque de nos troupes ou de représentants des autorités françaises ou syriennes;
2. Que, loin de constituer une nouvelle menace contre les villages, il ne vise qu'à épargner la vie des femmes, des vieillards et des enfants en avertissant les populations intéressées que la non-exécution des conditions qui leur sont imposées les expose à des actions de contrainte susceptibles d'amener la perte de vies humaines;
3. Que ces actions de contrainte peuvent consister soit en des bombardements sans préavis à l'issue des délais imposés, soit en opérations offensives suivies éventuellement de saisie de biens destinés à être vendus au profit du budget syrien et en remplacement des amendes non payées.

Je vous serais reconnaissant de bien vouloir intervenir auprès de M. le doyen du corps consulaire pour lui faire connaître:

1. Que le fait de donner un délai pour l'exécution des conditions imposées à un village déterminé constitue en lui-même un préavis permettant aux populations coupables de prendre toutes mesures pour échapper à des sanctions éventuelles;
2. Que je ne puis mettre évidemment le corps consulaire au courant des opérations de répression que je me verrais dans l'obligation de monter et pour la réussite desquelles le secret est absolument nécessaire;

3. Mais que je demeure entièrement disposé à favoriser sa mission de protection des ressortissants étrangers en lui faisant tenir un exemplaire des avis envoyés aux villages ou quartiers auxquels des amendes sont imposées, afin de permettre aux consuls intéressés d'aviser en temps voulu lesdits ressortissants des dangers qu'ils peuvent courir en cas de non-exécution.

Veuillez, &c.
VALLIER.

Enclosure 3 in No. 240.

Mr. Keeley to M. Pierre-Alype.

Décanat du Corps consulaire, Damas,
le 18 mai 1926.

M. l'Envoyé extraordinaire,

JE suis chargé par le corps consulaire d'accuser la réception de votre lettre du 14 mai 1926, par laquelle vous avez bien voulu me transmettre la réponse de M. le Général Vallier à la note du corps consulaire en date du 28 avril 1926, au sujet de la protection des étrangers, surtout les mesures à être prises pour éviter aux étrangers les périls auxquels ils pourraient être exposés par les mesures de coercition dont un certain nombre de villages de la Ghouta ou de quartiers de la ville pourraient être l'objet.

Le corps consulaire vous prie de bien vouloir transmettre à M. le Général Vallier ses remerciements pour les indications qu'il a bien voulu lui donner et qui seront très utiles aux consuls vis-à-vis de leurs ressortissants respectifs.

Le corps consulaire est particulièrement heureux de noter que M. le Général Vallier est disposé à accepter sa collaboration afin d'assurer la protection des étrangers en lui faisant tenir un exemplaire des avis envoyés aux villages ou quartiers qui peuvent être l'objet de mesures de coercition, afin de permettre aux consuls d'aviser leurs ressortissants des dangers qu'ils courraient en temps suffisant pour leur permettre de se retirer hors du danger. Il croit que cette collaboration n'aurait pour résultat que de mieux sauvegarder la vie et les biens des étrangers sans porter aucun préjudice aux opérations que les autorités mandataires trouveraient nécessaire de monter.

Tout en réservant le droit de leurs Gouvernements respectifs à tenir responsables les autorités mandataires pour tout dommage causé aux personnes et aux biens des étrangers, le corps consulaire voudrait vous rassurer, M. l'Envoyé extraordinaire, qu'il ne désire point et n'a jamais voulu entraver l'exécution de la tâche de la Puissance mandataire en Syrie. Étant intéressés seulement de la protection adéquate de leurs ressortissants et voulant autant que possible faciliter l'œuvre des autorités françaises à cet égard, les consuls à Damas espèrent que dorénavant ils pourront se concerter avec elles pour sa réalisation.

Veuillez, &c.
J. H. KEELEY, JR.,
Consul des États-Unis à Damas,
Doyen du Corps consulaire.

[E 3350/146/89]

No. 241.

Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 2.)

(No. 169.)

Sir,

Damascus, May 19, 1926.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 161 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to report that, after much delay, the President of the Syrian Government, Ahmed Nami Bey, has announced the programme of his Government and Cabinet. I enclose herewith the text of the "déclaration ministérielle" published in the Syrian press of yesterday's date.

2. The aims of the new Syrian Government are many and their scope is very wide. While this programme will rejoice the hearts of all Syrians by the fact that it holds out hopes that the carrying out of so many reforms and popular demands is envisaged, it is equally certain that the vagueness of the wording of the programme has created an unfavourable impression in many circles here.

3. The French High Commissioner has approved "in principle" of the programme, as it is well known that it was submitted to him before its promulgation. M. de Jouvenel, who arrived here yesterday and whose arrival here was the signal for an ovation by crowds of Damascenes, who were in a most expectant mood, is expected to make important pronouncements during the course of the next day or two regarding the new Syrian Government's programme.

4. It will, of course, be impossible for the Syrian Cabinet to put into execution this programme, or even a part of it, unless the mandatory authorities agree to make large concessions on numerous and fundamental questions. I am inclined to believe that many concessions will be made in order to avoid the further loss of French lives in the guerilla warfare which has been going on and with a view to the re-establishment of some semblance of order without further delay.

5. The French authorities would seem to have still avoided making a definite promise that any one condition put forward by the Syrians will be agreed to by them and the Syrian Government empowered to carry it out. It seems probable that the present Syrian Government, however much it may strive to carry out the ten points of its programme, will find itself powerless to make a single move or to realise the execution of any of the promises contained in its programme unless the course is agreed to beforehand by the mandatory authorities. After the Syrian Constituent Assembly has been elected and the question of national sovereignty and the relations between France and the State of Syria have been fixed or established by a treaty, it may perhaps be possible to estimate what the chances are that the Syrian Government's programme will be carried out. Until then speculation on the matter would appear idle and futile, although it is possible that the speech which M. de Jouvenel is expected to make to-day or to-morrow may throw some light upon the views of the mandatory Government as regards the programme of the new Syrian Cabinet.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 137), Amman (No. 139), Bagdad (No. 127), Beirut (No. 158), and Aleppo (No. 107).)

I have, &c.

J. R. VAUGHAN-RUSSELL.

Enclosure in No. 241.

Extract from the "Syrie" of May 18, 1926.

LA DÉCLARATION MINISTÉRIELLE.

LE Gouvernement syrien communique à la presse le programme suivant :

"Notre Gouvernement s'efforcera de réaliser le programme suivant qu'il a adopté comme base de son action :

"1. Convoquer une Assemblée constituante qui se chargera de l'élaboration de la Constitution du pays sur la base de la souveraineté nationale.

"2. Donner au mandat les formes d'un traité qui sera passé entre la France et la Syrie pour une période de trente ans, traité qui fixera les droits, les obligations et les relations réciproques des deux nations. Il s'inspirera de celui conclu entre la Grande-Bretagne et l'Irak et ne deviendra exécutoire qu'après sa ratification par le Parlement syrien. Il réservera à la France l'influence politique et la priorité économique seulement sans porter atteinte à la souveraineté nationale.

"3. Réaliser l'unité syrienne par des moyens déjà entrepris et qui, nous l'espérons, ne tardera pas à donner à la nation des résultats fructueux.

"4. Unifier le régime judiciaire sur la base de la souveraineté nationale, de façon à sauvegarder les droits des nationaux aussi bien que ceux des étrangers.

"5. Créer une armée nationale de façon à permettre aux troupes françaises l'évacuation progressive du pays.

"6. Demander l'admission de la Syrie à la Société des Nations ainsi que le droit de représentation extérieure analogue à celui concédé à l'Irak.

"7. Étudier la réforme du système monétaire actuel et rétablir progressivement la base or pour la monnaie officielle du pays.

"8. Obtenir l'amnistie pour tous les délinquants politiques, sous réserves des droits privés.

"9. Obtenir une décision déchargeant Damas ainsi que les autres localités de toute amende de guerre.

"10. Rechercher des moyens en vue de dédommager les sinistrés de la révolution."

[E 3475/12/89]

No. 242.

Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 152. Confidential.)

Sir,

Damascus, April 30, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the copy of a letter which I have received from the Rev. W. J. McFarland of the Irish Presbyterian Mission at Damascus relative to the present bitter feeling felt by Moslems against Christians in Damascus, largely as the result of the ruthless policy of the French military authorities and particularly as the result of the wholesale pillaging and looting of which troops (of all arms and races) under French command have been guilty.

2. I have ventured to forward the enclosed letter from Mr. McFarland as it provides irrefutable evidence, given by a neutral, unbiassed eye witness of unimpeachable character, of the looting which has been going on around and in Damascus for the past few months.

3. Mr. Smart in various despatches (notably No. 212 of the 15th October last (paragraph 5) and No. 84 of the 25th February last (paragraph 8)) has reported upon the looting which has been going on by French and irregular troops. I personally could quote numerous occasions when I have seen French, native African or still more frequently irregular troops carrying with them in the middle of the town, shamelessly in broad daylight, property obviously looted. An occasion most easily and accurately recalled when I have seen troops with looted property, is the entry into Damascus of General Marty's column from Homs and Nebk on the 26th March last. Livestock, in addition to articles of household furniture, were being led or carried by the troops as they filed into and through the town with their officers. There is no doubt whatever that looting and pillaging has been going on, unchecked, I am sorry to say, under the very eyes of the French military authorities, and the denial of M. de Jouvenel that such abuses ever occur (see the enclosure to Beirut despatch No. 67, Confidential, to you dated the 6th instant) do not correspond with the notorious facts so generally known to everybody in Damascus.

4. I do not propose to comment upon the other questions regarding the French policy of brutality and "frightfulness" raised in the letter addressed to me by Mr. McFarland.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 122), Amman (No. 129), Bagdad (No. 116), Beirut (No. 145) and Aleppo (No. 98).)

I have, &c.

J. R. VAUGHAN-RUSSELL.

Enclosure in No. 242.

Rev. W. J. McFarland to Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell.

Dear Mr. Russell,

Irish Mission, Damascus, April 29, 1926.

HOW much longer are the bombing and plundering of villages round Damascus to go on? Last week, as you may have heard, Berze and district about was attacked by French forces, and in the evening the Christian quarter was in a state of excitement when the troops returned bringing with them loot of every description—cows, donkeys, goats, sheep, bedding, kitchen utensils, rugs, in fact anything portable or capable of walking. These things were sold "for a song" by the lucky looters. Evidently leave was given to plunder. Now, I am not defending the villagers. It is quite possible, and probable even, that they gave shelter to the "bands." But how could they refuse to do so if an armed band demanded such shelter—they, the villagers, having no arms. It is quite possible even some, or all, of these villages sympathise with the "bands." But again, it is an invidious act to punish people for their sympathies—to condemn for

a feeling that they at the most can be only supposed to entertain, if there is no overt act which plainly shows that feeling. And besides, in all such communities there are always many, very many sometimes, poor folks whose main pre-occupation is but to get enough food for themselves and their families, for whom politics is but a name—a sort of game for chiefs and leaders to play at, with unfortunately the lives and livelihoods of these humble people as only counters in the game.

As I said, the Christian quarter was greatly excited by the procession referred to above, as the village is outside of our quarter. It is possible, too, that some of the loot was bought by them—the temptation to get something valuable for next to nothing is pretty well irresistible to people themselves poor and passing through such times as you know all of the working classes are doing, and for the last six months owing to the terrible lack of employment in all trades. Where the Moslems see these Christians, even though they are but few, thus apparently eager to profit by the distresses of their fellow-Moslems, is it any wonder there is growing up a certain hostile feeling towards them—not dangerous now, perhaps, but very dangerous under certain imaginable conditions? In any case, a very undesirable state of things.

Of course, I know very well that the above incident was not an isolated one. It is but one of many similar ones that took place during the winter and early autumn. And it would seem, too, as if many more such are in store for us. As I write, reports and rumours are being circulated as to what took place at Kafr Sus this morning—of wholesale looting, burning the houses, &c. It is bad enough to hear about these things *en masse*, but sometimes I think we are really more impressed by a simple event that comes under one's own notice. Here is one regarding Jobar—so often shelled and bombed. An old man from there has supplied us with butter for a long while. Meeting him on the street one day, I enquired about his affairs. He told me he had to leave the village, his wife had been killed in one of the bombings, and some of his children also, his cows also were killed or smashed up. Now there remained of the family just himself and one girl.

I know all the difficulties of the situation, and I trust you do not think I am wishing to say a word which would trench on politics—even mandatory politics. Still, one must wonder if this policy of "frightfulness," which we used to speak so hardly about when put into remorseless practice by its modern inventors, is just the policy contemplated by the liberators of these lands from "the tyranny of the Turk," and one cannot believe that it is in accord with the idea, or ideals, of the best elements in French political thought. It is certainly not in line with a statement I read in a recent copy of the Near East from M. de Caix, made, I think, at the League of Nations, setting forth his views as to the duties of a mandatory Power.

Can anything be done? I know, of course, your hands are tied as a British official—I know equally well that it is not my business, living under a mandatory Power, a British subject under your charge, to express my feelings openly—I am afraid my command of the English language is so insufficient that I could not do myself justice if I tried to express them adequately—but I write this to relieve my feelings somewhat and hoping that may be somehow or other, something can be done soon to stop the worst at least of these exhibitions—and deeds—which do not present European civilisation in a very favourable way to the people of Syria.

Yours faithfully,

W. J. McFARLAND.

[E 3555/12/89]

No. 243.

Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 179.)

Sir,

Damascus, Syria, May 28, 1926.

IN my despatch No. 177 of the 26th instant I had the honour to refer to a speech delivered by the French High Commissioner at Damascus on the 20th instant, in the course of which he announced among other things that the fine of £T. 100,000 gold imposed on Damascus would be annulled, and that he agreed that the new Syrian Government should proclaim a general amnesty to all persons who laid down their arms by the 15th June next.

[15026]

2. The French High Commissioner during his speech congratulated the new Syrian Government upon the fact that they had shown confidence in France and her policy in Syria, and said that he would return confidence for confidence. As a reward, he would agree to the carrying out of certain points in the Syrian Government's programme.

3. M. de Jouvenel may be right when he gives expression to the feelings of confidence felt by the French authorities towards the Syrian Government. He may also be right when he asserts that the new Syrian Government have placed their confidence in the mandatory Power, but I fear that he is quite wrong if he believes that he has now won over the feelings of the Syrian nation and gained for France their confidence. After the events of the past nine months, such few concessions and such vague flimsy promises as M. de Jouvenel has made to the Syrian nation can hardly be expected to have won it over.

4. Most of the programme put forward by the Syrian Cabinet cannot be realised until elections have been held and the Constituent Assembly has been formed. These measures of reform are being deferred until the country is in a state of sufficient calm to carry out free elections. In turn, the restoration of order and calm, which is still to be realised, depends upon the amnesty, unless it is intended that a military solution to the problem should be found.

5. M. de Jouvenel's announcement on the subject of the amnesty has been considered too vague by Syrian Nationalists to enable them to acclaim it. To endeavour to persuade the extreme Nationalists and the rebels that an amnesty on more general and comprehensive lines would shortly be proclaimed, the President, Ahmed Namy Bey, issued a proclamation on the 25th instant, urging all Syrians to have patience and confidence in his Government and they would obtain an amnesty based on acceptable grounds. In the meantime, discussions and negotiations on the subject are being pursued between the Syrian Government and the mandatory authorities. Pessimism prevails in Damascus, however, as a result of the lack of confidence felt in the new Syrian Government, which Syrians appear to think is not representing to the Mandatory Power sufficiently strongly their feelings on this matter.

6. Since M. de Jouvenel's speech there has been a slight falling off in the military activity, both on the part of the French and of the rebels. The French are, however, still bombing villages in the Ghouta, where Dr. Shahbandar is now taking refuge. The rebels seem to be clinging to the hope that, by continuing to resist, they will eventually extract from the French authorities a general amnesty. A certain section of the population of Damascus undoubtedly still sympathises with the rebels who are refusing to surrender, but there is the possibility that the numbers of sympathisers will gradually decrease when they begin to realise that the actions of a small minority of rebels are impeding the re-establishment of peace.

7. The situation is therefore a rather difficult one for everybody at the present moment. M. de Jouvenel has left Damascus and Syria with a report upon his stewardship which will, no doubt, create an excellent impression in French and European circles, and probably also at Geneva. There is little doubt that he has tried to force the pace during the past few weeks. I fear that the measures taken to facilitate the re-establishment of peace here have not been planned out very carefully, and with due regard to their effects in the future. I am inclined to think that due consideration has not been given to each individual phase of the pacification plan, if such a plan exists. The result is that there seems to be a hitch in the proceedings, and nobody seems to know quite what the next move for the best should be. Meanwhile M. de Jouvenel will no doubt exploit the successes which he has achieved here, though they can be only partial.

8. The Syrian Government are faced with an extremely difficult task, as their programme contains so many points which are bound to place them in an embarrassing position *vis-à-vis* the Syrian nation and the mandatory authorities. Ahmed Namy Bey will require much courage and tact to be able to overcome the exaggerated demands of the Nationalist elements. So far, he has had little scope to show his capabilities in this respect, or to show to what extent he and his Cabinet can negotiate with the mandatory authorities on matters where Syrian interests seem opposed to those of the French authorities or of their Lebanese protégés. If the French authorities will live up to the words pronounced by M. de Jouvenel and treat the Syrian problem in a generous spirit, if they will bear in mind that many of the points in the Syrian Cabinet's programme represent legitimate and reasonable aspirations of the Syrian people and that by agreeing to the carrying out of the reasonable points in the programme they will not necessarily suffer loss of prestige,

the mandatory authorities will succeed in solving the Syrian problem without having recourse to force of arms.

Copies to Jerusalem (No. 142), Amman (No. 145), Bagdad (No. 131), Beirut (No. 165), and Aleppo (No. 110).

I have, &c.

J. R. VAUGHAN-RUSSELL.

No. 244.

Consul-General, Beirut, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 9.)

(No. 24.)

(Telegraphic.)

Beirut, June 8, 1926.

FOLLOWING from liaison officer for Air Ministry:—

"Your telegram of 31st May.

"French propose to organise gendarmerie to occupy post [?between] Nisibin and Euphrates. This has not yet been done.

"(Sent to Bagdad.)"

No. 245.

Acting Consul, Damascus, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 11.)

(No. 29.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Damascus, June 11, 1926.

FRENCH General Officer Commanding by proclamation declares Ghouta a dangerous zone, and requests that people there unconnected with rebels should evacuate their homes in view of imminence of military cleaning operations.

About fifty Indians inhabit one of the villages in Ghouta. Propose informing them that they remain at their own risk, although their homes, if abandoned, risk being pillaged.

Please telegraph instructions as to what action, if any, can be taken to alleviate distress of homeless, if destitute, and to safeguard British interests against probable losses from rebellion and French measures.

[E 3605/146/89]

No. 246.

The Marquess of Crewe to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 1096.)

Sir,

Paris, June 11, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that M. de Jouvenel, the High Commissioner in Syria, who recently returned to France on leave, attended a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Chamber on the 9th June and made a statement regarding the present situation in Syria.

2. One of the members of the Commission, M. Berthon, a Communist, having refused to agree to the proceedings of the meeting being kept secret, M. de Jouvenel was compelled to restrict himself to certain non-confidential explanations. According to the newspapers, after explaining the steps which he had taken to deal with the difficulties with which he had met on his arrival and to restore the situation to the normal, the High Commissioner went on to give in detail the measures which he intended to take with a view to preparing the future political organisation of the country. The commission is reported to have unanimously congratulated M. de Jouvenel on the work which he had accomplished.

3. In this connection it may be of interest to report that M. Painlevé, on leaving a recent meeting of the Cabinet, stated to certain newspaper correspondents that, in his opinion, the resistance of the Druse tribes in revolt might be considered as having been finally broken down. There only remained, according to the Ministry for War, a few minor centres of disaffection to be dealt with.

I have, &c.

CREWE.

[E 3645/12/89]

No. 247.

Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 14.)

(No. 185.)

Sir,

Damascus, June 2, 1926.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 149 of the 27th April last, I have the honour to report that the work of subduing the Jebel Druse has been continuing, apparently successfully, during the past month.

2. Since the capture of Sueida on the 25th April last, the French authorities have been consolidating their position there, and the troops under General Andrea have carried out reconnaissances in the western and northern regions of the Jebel Druse, penetrating as far as Chahba, just over 10 miles to the north of Sueida. Columns have been sent in various directions to subdue the rebel Druses and to regain possession of the territory which, since July last, had been completely out of their control.

3. A large number of villages have surrendered without resisting. Official communiqués state that the total number of villages which have surrendered is forty at least. At the present time the greater part of the richest, i.e., cultivated, portion of the Jebel Druse no longer remains in the control of Sultan Pasha Attrash and the rebel Druses, who have withdrawn to the mountainous districts of the east and south-east of the Jebel.

4. It will be remembered that the French armed and subsidised the Leja Bedouins during last winter in order that they should attack and harass the Druses and at the same time guard their lines of communication. In the winter and early spring, while the Druses were still in a position to attack French posts and garrisons around Damascus and along the Hejaz Railway, these Bedouins were only half-hearted and ineffective supporters of the French authorities, and did little more than defend their own villages against the Druses, whom they feared too much to attack. The frequency with which Druse bands cut the railway under their very noses is sufficient testimony to this. There is even good reason to believe that many of these Bedouins actually joined the Druse bands on some of their expeditions against the French.

5. Since the pendulum has swung in the opposite direction and the Leja Bedouins see that the French are gaining ground, they have more boldly espoused the French cause and joined in the campaign against the Druses. It is to be feared that feuds—many of which perhaps were long forgotten—between these Bedouins and the Druses will be revived in the future as a result of the French policy of stirring up against one another these factions, which differ alike in race and religion. The French, having gained the support of the Leja Bedouins and assured with fairly reasonable certainty their communications and left flank, have now simplified the Druse problem. They should now be able to continue with greater confidence operations against the unsubdued Druse country. At the present moment a French attack on the Druse town of Salkhad is imminent, and if successful (as it is expected to be) a mortal blow against the Druses will have been struck.

6. The Druses would now seem to be in a desperate position. Their Syrian allies are wavering as a result of the French promises (whether realisable or not) that an amnesty, independence and other terms will be granted to them. Their future food supplies seem to have been cut off, and their losses in lives and material must have been very heavy after nearly a year's hard and gallant struggle against hopeless odds. Furthermore, the rumours of disaffection within the Druse chieftains' ranks, so long exaggerated in the press, have at last become real facts, and the supply of war funds and munitions, whether from abroad or from other rebel sources in Syria, threatens to be cut off. Finally, the surrender of Abd-el-Krim in Morocco has certainly weakened the Druse moral, while at the same time this event has increased French prestige throughout the country. Apart from that, the French will be able, if necessary, to send more troops to the Jebel Druse now that the situation in Morocco has been eased.

7. In view of the foregoing considerations it is difficult to see how Sultan Pasha Attrash and his supporters can hope to pursue their struggle to a successful conclusion. It is even now strongly rumoured that he is still cherishing the hope of Nejdian intervention and aid; this hope would no doubt help to buoy up the spirits of the rebel Druses. One other rumour is frequently heard here, and that is to the effect that the rebel Druses are purposely allowing the French to occupy the Jebel Druse. They thereby hope to give their co-religionists in the zone occupied by the French authorities time to gather in all the crops and at the same time hope to lull the French authorities in the Jebel Druse into a sense of false security. Later, when peace has supposedly

been restored in the Jebel Druse the villagers in the occupied areas will, at a given signal, recommence the struggle and aid the rebel Druses. This rumour is probably only Druse propaganda, and as such not to be taken at all seriously. I have, nevertheless, thought it sufficiently interesting to mention it to you.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 145), Amman, (No. 149), Bagdad (No. 134), Beirut (No. 171), and Aleppo (No. 113).)

I have, &c.

J. R. VAUGHAN-RUSSELL.

[E 3647/3647/89]

No. 248.

Consul-General Satow to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 14.)

(No. 122.)

Sir,

Beirut, June 4, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 8th May Abdallah Medawar, a well-known merchant of Beirut, was stabbed outside his house by a young man and that he died the next day. The assassin is believed to be a certain Nadim Abdallah, who has fled the country.

2. On the 10th May M. Georges Hadad, the honorary Roumanian consul, was arrested as having been the instigator of the crime. He, too, is well known in Beirut, and is a member of the firm Ibrahim Hadad et Fils. He was the brother-in-law of the deceased. The main reasons which led the French judicial authorities to order M. Hadad's arrest appear to have been (1) that there was a long-standing commercial dispute between the parties, involving a large sum, which had reached a critical point; and (2) that a cawass discharged by M. Hadad had, with two other persons of the baser sort, made a sworn declaration that they had been charged by M. Hadad to murder M. Medawar. The deceased appears to have informed the High Commission some months ago that his life was threatened, and on his death-bed to have accused M. Hadad of having caused his death, but the deceased's belief that M. Hadad was plotting against him and his telling different people so seem in the end to repose on the story told to him by the discharged cawass, who, when M. Hadad refused to take him back, had threatened to take his revenge.

3. M. Hadad, on his arrest, appealed to the United States consul-general, as dean of the consular corps, and the latter therefore had two interviews with the Secretary-General of the High Commission in the matter. Mr. Knabenshue took the line that, although under the procedure indicated in General Weygand's circular No. 1933 of the 11th July, 1924 (see Beirut despatch No. 98 of the 16th July, 1924), a consular officer is not, in the event of a crime, immune from arrest, the position of a foreign consul and the importance of the interests which he represents render it necessary that no arrest should be made except on very convincing proof, and that in the case of M. Hadad such proof was, to people who had lived some time in the East, non-existent. He therefore urged that in these circumstances, and in view of M. Hadad's well-known position, it should be found possible to release him on heavy bail which would be forthcoming. The matter was discussed at great length, but Mr. Knabenshue did not succeed in making any impression upon M. de Reffye. He did, however, surprise the latter by telling him that the accused was being kept in solitary confinement, and that his lawyers were refused access to him. This M. de Reffye found on enquiry to be the case, but I understand that permission was then given to the accused to prepare his defence. It was also pointed out to M. de Reffye that all consuls were, in the ordinary course of their duties, liable to make enemies who might wish to take their revenge. M. de Reffye stated that a distinction must be drawn between honorary and career consuls, and that any question concerning the latter would be naturally examined with greater care. He later explained that he had meant that the personalities of the representatives of the Great Powers gave such a guarantee that in the event of one of them being involved in a criminal affair he would naturally only be arrested if caught in the very act.

4. As this was the first case of the arrest of a foreign consul since the suspension of the Capitulations, a meeting of the consular body was called. It approved its dean's intervention with M. de Reffye, and, after discussing the whole question, decided to express its views in a resolution of a general character. The resolution adopted, for which I was mainly responsible, was as follows:—

"The Beirut consular body, at its meeting of the 12th May, taking into consideration the terms of the High Commissioner's circular No. 1933 of the

11th July, 1924, recognises that a consul can be arrested in the case of a crime, but it is of the opinion that the arrest of a consul, whether career or honorary, is only justified in the case of a 'flagrant délit' or where proof of guilt exists, and that an arrest based on suspicions or mere presumptions is not justified."

A copy of this resolution was later handed unofficially to the Secretary-General by the United States consul-general.

5. Shortly after I saw M. de Reffye and, without going into details, urged upon him the vital importance, not only from the French, but also from the European, point of view, that there should be no miscarriage of justice in a case which had provoked so much public comment and dissatisfaction and which was in charge of French magistrates. He seemed considerably perturbed about the matter, and confided to me that, if he had had to deal with the case, he would not have ordered the arrest of M. Hadad. At the same time, there had in the past been too much outside interference with justice, and the French High Commission wished to set a good example and to leave the case entirely in charge of the magistrates who were dealing with it.

6. A most unpleasant feature of the business has been the scandalous campaign which the almost semi-official paper, the "Syrie," which is owned by an undesirable named Vayssié and edited by another undesirable named Chevalier, has been conducting against M. Hadad. Starting from the assumption that he was guilty of the charge laid against him, it proceeded for four days after his arrest to occupy the best part of its front page, under flaring headlines, with articles urging his guilt and marshalling what it alleged to be the proofs against him. Elsewhere the paper would have been charged with grave contempt of court, but the French judicial authorities took no notice of the matter. On the face of it, it looks like an attempt at blackmail, and a rival paper, the "Orient," has just said so quite frankly. It will be interesting to see now whether, as it threatens to do, the "Syrie" will dare to take the "Orient" into court.

7. The moral of this sad affair is, I fear, that foreigners in Beirut are not yet likely to be protected by the presence of French judges against possible miscarriages of justice. I do not wish in any way to call in question the honesty or good faith of the French judges, but they are new to the East and its devious ways, and they are ignorant of the Arabic language, and for these reasons they are likely in all good faith to be misled by the intrigues which thrive in a place like Beirut.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

No. 249.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Acting Consul, Damascus.

(No. 20.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, June 15, 1926.

YOUR telegram No. 29 of 11th June: Possible evacuation of Ghouta.

In case of absolute need you may expend up to £50 on destitute Indians, but while this sum should in no circumstances be exceeded, you should keep total expenditure as low as possible.

His Majesty's Government cannot dispute right of French to take all military measures necessary to put down the rebellion, and French alone can judge when such necessity exists. Since they have warned you that Ghouta is dangerous zone and requested that well-disposed people shall withdraw, His Majesty's Government would not be able to make claims for personal injuries on behalf of British Indian subjects who ignore the warning and remain in Ghouta.

On the other hand, I am advised that French warning by proclamation will not exempt them from claims for damages, directly caused by military operations, to property which these British Indian subjects may have been compelled to leave behind in response to French warning.

[E 3680/12/89]

No. 250.

Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 189.)

Sir,

Damascus, June 5, 1926.

WITH reference to the first paragraph of my despatch No. 96 of the 6th March last, I have the honour to report that, although since the month of March no official delegation has been despatched to the rebel Druses to urge them to consent to surrender and to negotiate peace, several unofficial messengers have been sent to the Ghouta and to the Jebel Druse by Damascene notables and by the more influential Syrian Government officials. No results have hitherto been achieved.

2. A serious effort at inducing the Druses to surrender and thus to avoid useless further bloodshed would appear to be imminent. A certain Osman El Charabati, well-known here as an extreme Nationalist, is reported to be leaving for the Jebel Druse in the course of the next few days, probably accompanied by other Nationalists, with the tacit consent of the French authorities and with the approval of the Syrian Government.

3. Osman El Charabati, although only a modest merchant of Damascus, is reputed to possess some influence in rebel circles. He has twice been deported and released, once to Hassatcheh and once to the Island of Roaad, by the French authorities. As a result of the sufferings and sacrifices resulting from the above deportations, he is said to be popular among the rebels, and it is possible that he may succeed in influencing the Druses to surrender.

4. Sultan Pasha Attrash, although he has lost the support of a large percentage of the population of the Jebel Druse, still appears to be able to hold together a fairly large body of the most patriotic Druses. Having burned their boats, the latter seem determined to resist to the end, unless a general amnesty is granted to them. It will be interesting to see whether Osman El Charabati can in any way influence the determination of Sultan Pasha Attrash and his followers.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 146), Amman (No. 150), Bagdad (No. 135), Beirut (No. 176) and Aleppo (No. 114).)

I have, &c.

J. R. VAUGHAN-RUSSELL.

[E 3678/12/89]

No. 251.

Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 16.)

(No. 190.)

Sir,

Damascus, June 7, 1926.

WITH reference to paragraph 9 of my despatch No. 165 of the 15th ultimo, reporting the bombardment of the Meydan, I have the honour to report that on the 27th ultimo I visited this quarter and spent over an hour examining the ruins there.

2. My estimate of the extent and of the value of the damage done appears to have been accurate. The number of houses destroyed can be estimated at between 400 and 500, and the number of small shops destroyed at between 300 and 400. The value of the damage done may, in my opinion, be conservatively estimated at about £300,000. I estimated the number of persons killed in the bombardment at 200. I am unable to obtain information from any reliable source to confirm the above figure; I believe that it is slightly exaggerated, and that perhaps the number of killed might be more accurately estimated at between 100 and 150.

3. The Meydan quarter now presents a very sorry spectacle. The area destroyed being so large, and consisting as it does of several separate and scattered areas in ruins, it appears vaster than it is in reality. The fact that so much of the damage has been done to shops on the main road of the Meydan lends colour to the statements generally current here that shops were deliberately set on fire by the troops which attacked the quarter. If all the shops and houses in the Meydan had caught fire as a result of the indiscriminate dropping of bombs or shells, the property fronting on the main road would presumably have suffered in the same proportion as the property situated off the main road.

4. During my visit I noticed that a military post manned by irregulars and formerly situated at Jezmatieh (Kourashii) at the northern entrance to the Meydan

was no longer established there. This, in my opinion, tends to confirm the statement that the above post was overwhelmed (see the last sentence of paragraph 5 in my despatch under reference).

5. One striking feature was the absence of human life there. This large and formerly busy and prosperous quarter of Damascus formerly contained about 60,000 inhabitants, but it is now virtually a deserted ruin. Although I traversed the Meydan from end to end and visited numerous side streets off the main road, I do not think I saw more than fifteen persons during the hour I spent there.

6. Allowing for the dispersal of a small number of the Meydan population among the bands outside the city, it is certain that about 55,000 persons from the Meydan quarter have moved into quarters situated in the remaining part of Damascus. As a result of this exodus from the Meydan into Damascus, the overcrowding in the city has become really shocking. In addition to the above refugees, there has been an influx into Damascus of the population from the ruined villages in the Ghouta and around the city, and also from the destroyed or abandoned Christian villages in the Hauran and the Wadi-el-Ajam districts. The city is now teeming with refugees, all of whom are living in a state of acute misery and bordering on starvation.

7. The French seem to have made no efforts or appear unwilling to alleviate the distress by any form of relief work. On the contrary, they would seem to be depending upon the spread of the general state of misery which the rebellion is creating to drive the rebels and the population into submission. Whether their calculations in this respect will succeed or not it is impossible to say, but in the meantime there is an ugly and dangerous feeling fermenting within the minds of the vast majority of the Damascus population which bodes ill for the future. There is abundant proof of this feeling; the most noteworthy evidence being the open and general complicity and sympathy of the population of the city with the bands operating around it.

8. In conclusion, it is difficult to estimate the practical or tangible results which the French military authorities have achieved by their destruction of the Meydan. They have certainly succeeded in "cleaning up" the quarter, but the value of this operation is practically nullified by the fact that they have not occupied the Meydan themselves. The French military authorities have not succeeded in breaking the moral of the Syrian rebels if they supposed that they would achieve this result by the bombardment and all the "frightfulness" that accompanied it. Finally, the French military authorities have, in my opinion, rendered the task of the French civil and administrative authorities immeasurably more difficult by embittering to a further degree the feelings of the Syrians against the mandatory Power, particularly at a time when peace negotiations might have had some chance of succeeding.

(Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 147), Amman (No. 151), Bagdad (No. 136), Beirut (No. 177) and Aleppo (No. 115).)

I have, &c.

J. R. VAUGHAN-RUSSELL.

[E 3841/12/89]

No. 252.

Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 23.)

(No. 195.)

Sir,

Damascus, June 11, 1926.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 168 of the 18th ultimo, I have the honour to report that a notice was issued on the 7th instant and published on the 8th instant in the local Arabic press to the effect that the village of Jobar (1 mile north-east of Damascus) might be bombarded on the 10th instant at 6 P.M. if certain conditions were not carried out by the inhabitants. I enquired, early on the 9th instant, from my American colleague whether he, as doyen of the consular corps, had received any official notice on this matter from the French authorities, but learned that he had not done so. The French authorities having expressed their readiness to notify the consuls in good time of impending coercive measures, it was anticipated that an official notification of the possible measures against Jobar would almost certainly be sent to the consular corps in due course. My American colleague therefore deprecated, rightly in my opinion, any action on his part as doyen to elicit information on this subject from the French delegation.

2. In view, however, of the little time available to warn British subjects in Jobar of their possible danger, I telephoned during the morning of the 9th instant

to the French headquarters and asked for official confirmation of the notice which had appeared in the Arabic press. I was assured by the Chief of the Staff that the notice was official and that General Vallier had issued it through the French delegation, which had been requested to transmit the notice to all consuls. I said that neither the doyen nor myself had received any official notice, and that I considered that it was unsatisfactory from my point of view that I should find myself obliged to obtain news on such a matter through the native press. I pointed out that the translation of the Arabic notice made by this consulate might differ in some detail from the official French text and that misunderstanding could conceivably arise therefrom. He agreed, but maintained that the French delegation had been informed on the 7th instant, and that the notice must certainly be on the way. I informed him that I was then proposing to warn British subjects to leave Jobar in case of a possible bombardment, and he agreed that this course was advisable.

3. I accordingly drew up a notice warning British subjects of possible danger and posted it in the waiting-room of the consulate. I have the honour to enclose herewith copy of the notice in question. At the same time a message was sent to some of the British subjects from Jobar who had taken refuge in Damascus, asking them to send word at once to the other British subjects still remaining in and near Jobar of the possible danger that might befall them if they remained there after 6 P.M. on the following day (the 10th instant).

4. As I have received no news that any harm has befallen any British subjects, I am fairly certain that the six or seven British Indians who lived in the neighbourhood of Jobar received warning of danger in good time, whether through the local authorities and the Arabic press or through my message.

5. The required conditions not having been fulfilled by the Jobar villagers, at 6 P.M. on the 10th instant the bombardment took place. It lasted, with short intermissions, for about twenty minutes, but well over 100 shells were fired into the village or its surroundings. At the time of this bombardment I was in the Christian (north-eastern) quarter of Damascus, in a part of the city facing Jobar, and I can testify to the heaviness of the bombardment while it lasted. There is no doubt that the bombardment of Jobar—a notorious centre of rebel activity in the outskirts of Damascus—after due warning, was entirely justified.

6. I think, at the same time, that mention should be made of the fact that during the bombardment, and actually while it was in progress, a French military band was playing lively music in the Christian quarter of Damascus, at a distance of little more than a mile from the area where the shells were exploding. This quarter is at present full of homeless refugees from the Ghouta villages. I myself heard the band playing, and I cannot conceive any action more callous, tactless, provocative and in bad taste towards the miserable population of the city than the above action on the part of the French authorities.

7. As stated earlier, no official notification of the impending bombardment was conveyed to the consular corps. However, on the 10th instant, at 6 P.M., the very hour at which the bombardment was scheduled to begin, my American colleague received from the French delegation a confidential letter, in which the presence of a large number of rebels in the Ghouta was reported, and in which the necessity for urgent and energetic military measures was made clear. I enclose herewith the copy of this letter. This letter would seem to have been addressed to the consular corps with the object of covering up the omission of the French authorities in not having conveyed any warning of the impending bombardment of Jobar. At the same time, by emphasising the gravity and menacing nature of the situation in the Ghouta, it may have been intended to disarm criticism from the consular corps and to provide justification for all the military measures foreshadowed.

8. It is to be regretted that the French authorities still show themselves disinclined to collaborate with the consular corps in the work of assuring the protection of foreigners. Previous experience has shown that protests or arguments in this case may not be expected to elicit any sympathetic response from the French authorities, so no protest from the consular corps is contemplated at present. The position of foreign nationals in the Damascus district is, however, most disquieting, and, unless the rebels capitulate soon, likely to become quite untenable, in view of the military measures which are now imminent.

Copies of this despatch have been sent to Jerusalem (No. 150), Amman (No. 155), Bagdad (No. 140), Beirut (No. 181) and Aleppo (No. 118).

I have, &c.

J. R. VAUGHAN-RUSSELL.

Enclosure 1 in No. 252.

Notice.

THE French Military Governor of Damascus published in the local press on the 7th instant a notice warning the inhabitants of the village of Jobar that, unless certain conditions were fulfilled by them, before 6 P.M. to-morrow, the 10th instant, the village and its surroundings would be liable to be bombarded.

British nationals are hereby warned that they may run great danger if they remain in Jobar and its surroundings after 6 P.M. to-morrow, Thursday. If British nationals remain in the dangerous area indicated above after the hour and date when the French military punitive measures may be put into execution, they will do so at their own risk and peril.

J. R. VAUGHAN-RUSSELL.

Damascus, June 9, 1926.

Enclosure 2 in No. 252

M. Pierre-Alype to the Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps (Damascus).

(Confidentiel.)

M. le Doyen,

Damas, le 10 juin 1926.

DES informations recueillies tout récemment et de plusieurs sources indiquent que les rebelles se disposent à reprendre des opérations offensives contre la ville de Damas. Ces renseignements sont corroborés par tout un ensemble de faits qui ne peuvent laisser aucun doute sur le caractère et la réalité de leurs projets.

Devant cette nouvelle menace et conformément aux pouvoirs que lui confère l'état de siège, M. le Général Gouverneur militaire est résolu à prendre, sans aucun retard, toutes les mesures qu'il est de son devoir de réaliser pour garantir la sécurité.

Dans l'esprit de courtoisie qui m'a toujours animé à l'égard du corps consulaire, je m'empresse de vous informer de cette situation. Les dispositions arrêtées par l'autorité militaire lui enlèvent, d'ailleurs, toute gravité immédiate. Mais il est bien entendu que, si des faits nouveaux se produisaient, je ne manquerais pas de vous en tenir informé.

Je me tiens à la disposition du corps consulaire pour lui fournir, s'il le désirait, toutes autres indications qui pourraient éventuellement l'intéresser.

Veuillez, &c.

PIERRE-ALYPE.

[E 3842/12/89]

No. 253.

Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 23.)

(No. 196.)

Sir,

Damascus, June 12, 1926.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 195 and my telegram No. 29 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a further proclamation by General Vallier, Military Governor of Damascus, relative to the imminent French operations in the Ghouta. The above proclamation was transmitted to the consular corps through the French Envoy Extraordinary and received by me yesterday afternoon.

2. On its receipt I at once telephoned to M. Pierre-Alype and asked him the date when the proclamation came into force. He said that it came into force on the date of its publication, the 10th instant, and added that the French authorities, finding that Damascus was confronted with a serious menace of attack from the rebels in the Ghouta, had now decided actively to take the strongest possible military measures.

3. The French military command had been patient, and had not hitherto made full use of the means at its disposal to crush the rebels. Now, in view of the offensive preparations of the rebels, who had dug trenches in the Ghouta and mined roads around Damascus, swift and sudden attacks on and bombardment of villages in which rebels were known to collect would be carried out. No warning could or would be given.

4. I remarked that digging trenches and mining roads were not signs indicating an offensive against Damascus, but that they were rather of a defensive nature. He replied that rebels had no status, and had no right to be on the offensive or the defensive. As there was no official state of war, the rebels could not be treated as belligerents.

5. After careful study of the question, the French authorities had decided that, as the zone of the Ghouta was a war zone, no warnings of impending bombardments were necessary. I asked M. Pierre-Alype to be good enough to let me have this decision of the French authorities in writing. He said he could not, and turned the conversation upon the impossibility of giving warning of bombardments, as, in that case, the guilty would leave the locality and escape punishment.

6. I pointed out to M. Pierre-Alype that, by the mere fact of their presence in the Ghouta, British subjects might be liable to be considered as guilty, according to the new proclamation. He then urged that they should leave their homes in the Ghouta as soon as possible to avoid any possible mistake. I replied that this seemed the safest course, though its application presented some difficulty; for that reason, I wished to find out General Vallier's views on the situation of the fifty odd British subjects in the village of Beit Sawa, and what steps should be taken to warn them of the new French plans to clean up the Ghouta. M. Alype retorted that five days ago the National Syrian Government had undertaken to warn all persons concerning the imminent French offensive, and that all the villages had undoubtedly been warned well before this.

7. I replied that the British Indians in the Ghouta had hitherto not felt themselves bound to take the advice of the moukhtars of the village, and had up to the present always sought the advice of this consulate. In the present case, also, it appeared to me important that they should receive instructions from this consulate, as the danger with which they were confronted now seemed greater than before. The French Envoy Extraordinary agreed that I should discuss the question with General Vallier, and I accordingly went to see him.

8. The general was not at his office, so I saw the chief of staff. I explained my apprehensions concerning the Indians at Beit Sawa as a result of the new proclamation. He was courteous, but not very helpful, and remarked that when military operations were in progress it was frequently if not generally impossible to pick out foreigners in a village that was being attacked. He added, however, that up to the present he had received no reports which showed that the village of Beit Sawa was a retreat for the rebels and that shots from that direction had ever been fired at French troops in the past. He did not think that any harm would come to this village, but he could obviously give no guarantees for the future. If rebels later on made Beit Sawa a place of refuge, the village would be shelled or bombed in the same way as other hostile villages. He suggested that the British Indians should stay in their village, as they had been safe in the past, but on my pressing him to give guarantees for their safety, he said he could not do so, and that it would be safer if they withdrew from the Ghouta. All British Indians who elected to remain in Beit Sawa would, I told him, keep together as far as possible in one large, conspicuous house. I would endeavour to obtain details of the house in question, and would cause its exact position and details of it to be communicated to the French military authorities to obviate, as far as possible, the danger of its being attacked or destroyed. The chief of staff promised to do his utmost to spare the village and, above all, the house of the Indians in it.

9. As indicated in my telegram No. 29 of yesterday's date, I fear that the Indians of Beit Sawa are likely to find themselves in an extremely critical position. If they remain in their village, they run the probable and very grave risk of being bombarded. If they leave their houses, they run the risk of losing all the movable property in them, which spells ruin for them. I have explained to them that if they remain in the village they do so at their own risk and peril. Presumably many of them will now decide to leave their homes and seek shelter in Damascus. Many will be very poor, and, having left their farms, most of them will be without work or means of livelihood here. When their small savings have been spent, these persons will be destitute and will turn to this consulate for relief.

10. I should be grateful for your instructions as to what action, if any, can be taken to alleviate the distress among the most needy of the above Indians, and to safeguard British lives and property in the Ghouta, in view of the danger which now unquestionably threatens them as a result of the new coercive measures which are about to be carried out.

11. The French authorities evidently are determined to quell the rebellion by carrying out a vigorous offensive which may entail the losses of British lives and

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property. Protests from the consular corps have been consistently ignored in the past, and it would seem inadvisable further to invite humiliation by making another protest which, if ignored (as it probably would be), would emphasise still further the negative results of consular representations.

I have, &c.

J. R. VAUGHAN-RUSSELL.

Enclosure 1 in No. 253.

M. Pierre-Alype to the Doyen of the Consular Corps (Damascus).

M. le Doyen,

Damas, le 11 juin 1926.

J'AI l'honneur de vous adresser, ci-joint, copie d'une proclamation que M. le Général Vallier adresse aux habitants de la Ghouta pour les inviter à cesser toute complicité avec les bandes sous peine de sanctions militaires.

Veuillez, &c.

PIERRE-ALYPE.

Enclosure 2 in No. 253.

Avis aux Habitants de la Ghouta.

LE Général Vallier, Gouverneur militaire de la ville de Damas, commandant les troupes de la région de Damas et du Hauran, porte à la connaissance des populations de la Ghouta et du Merj qu'il les rend solidairement responsables de l'état de fait insupportable existant depuis de longs mois dans cette région.

Il ne saurait tolérer plus longtemps, alors qu'un Gouvernement national régulier fonctionne à Damas, l'installation dans la Ghouta d'un comité insurrectionnel et la création d'organisations défensives dirigées contre les troupes de la Puissance mandataire.

Les attaques incessantes menées contre les postes de la ceinture de défense extérieure de Damas constituent, en outre, autant d'actes d'hostilité qu'il ne saurait admettre.

Le général, Gouverneur militaire, somme, en conséquence, les habitants de la zone intéressée d'avoir à livrer ou à éloigner immédiatement les meneurs du mouvement insurrectionnel et leurs bandes que leur complicité ou simplement leur passivité ont seules encouragés à poursuivre leurs méfaits.

Soueida, Chaaba, Salkhad sont tombées successivement aux mains de nos troupes victorieuses. La paix est en voie de naître au Djebel-Druze.

Il faut qu'à son tour la banlieue de Damas retrouve sa sécurité et sa prospérité menacées et déjà compromises par les agissements d'intrigants sans aveu.

Le Général Vallier, reprenant son entière liberté d'action, avertit les villages de la Ghouta et du Merj qu'il est prêt à employer les moyens militaires à sa disposition pour y ramener rapidement l'ordre et invite les populations innocentes à évacuer une région qu'il déclare zone dangereuse pour leur sécurité.

LE GÉNÉRAL VALLIER,

Commandant les Troupes de la Région
de Damas et du Hauran.

Damas, le 10 juin 1926.

[E 3850/146/89]

No. 254.

Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 23.)

(No. 198.)

Sir,

Damascus, June 14, 1926.

WITH reference to paragraph 4 of my despatch No. 191 of the 9th instant, I have the honour to report that, owing to wide differences of opinion between the three "Nationalist" Ministers in the Syrian Government who are members of the "Party of the People" on the one hand and the President of the State of Syria and his "Moderate" Ministers on the other hand, the President dissolved the Cabinet on the

12th instant. Immediately afterwards, the French authorities arrested the above three Nationalist Ministers, namely, Fares Bey-el-Khoury, Husni Bel-el-Barazi and Lutfi Bey Haffar, and sent them under military escort to the Lebanon, where they are imprisoned, it is understood, at Beit-ed-Dine.

2. From the very day it came into existence, the Syrian Cabinet has been divided against itself and never had the slightest chance of achieving unanimity or any question or any policy of real importance. It must have been evident to M. de Jouvenel that this Cabinet, composed of members of opposite views and sympathies, could not exist for long. So far from admitting this, however, the formation of the Cabinet was heralded as a definite forward step towards pacification and the peaceful settlement of the rebellion. I am inclined to think that M. de Jouvenel formed the Cabinet with the sole idea of providing an easily recognisable outward and visible sign which he could point out, with self-satisfaction, to the French Government and to the world in general, to prove how well the Syrian situation was developing towards peace as a result of his masterly, political manoeuvres.

3. The three arrested Ministers have from the outset shown independence of character and a desire to obtain relief for the Syrian nation from the severe military repressive methods employed by the mandatory authorities. At the time of the bombardment of the Meydan on the 7th ultimo, the Cabinet nearly fell, owing to the fact that the above three Ministers threatened to resign as a protest against these French military tactics. It was only after the French military authorities had warned these Ministers that if they persisted in opposing the efforts of the mandatory Power they would be considered as rebels themselves and dealt with accordingly.

4. When General Vallier announced, on the 11th instant, that in future all villages in the Ghouta and elsewhere where rebels were reported to resort would be bombarded without further notice or warning, they again urged that the Syrian Government should protest against this decision of the French authorities, and suggested that, as the Cabinet was not unanimous, the President, Nami Bey, should form a Cabinet entirely of Ministers from the Party of the People, and then the Cabinet would be homogeneous and better able to deal with this matter and all questions in the future. Obviously this suggestion, when put forward to the French authorities by Nami Bey, was found quite unacceptable. It was then that the expulsion of the three Extremist members and the formation of a new Cabinet was decided upon as the next move of the National Syrian Government.

5. It is at this stage that the three Extremist Ministers were arrested on the night of the 12th. At the same time, four other members of the Party of the People were arrested and imprisoned, and many other arrests are reported to be imminent. On the 13th the President, Ahmed Nami Bey, announced the composition of his new Cabinet, which is as follows:—

Minister of the Interior: Wassek Bel-el-Moayad.

Minister of Justice: Joseph Bey-el-Hakim.

Minister of Public Works and Commerce: Chakib Bey Moyassar.

Minister of Finance: Abdel Kader Bey-el-Azm.

Minister of Agriculture and Economic Services: Wassek Bey-el-Moayad

Minister of Education: Chaker Bey Hanbali.

The new Ministers are all Moderates of average qualifications and known to be Francophile, so that the Syrian Cabinet is now entirely subservient to the policy and control of the mandatory authorities.

6. It would seem useless to follow the fate and fortunes of this new National Syrian Government in the future as it has no independent character, except in its name, and its future course of action is already mapped out beforehand. The Syrian rebels have now no mediators between them and the mandatory authorities, so it only remains to them to decide either to abandon the uneven struggle at this stage or to continue their struggle in the face of all the military operations which the French military authorities have decided to carry out during the past few days.

7. It is appalling to contemplate what carnage and wholesale destruction to property will result from a continuance of the struggle. The French seem determined now to ride rough-shod over the country and to impose upon it their will and peace by destroying it if necessary unless the insurgents surrender unconditionally. The causes which provoked the rebellion have long since been consigned to oblivion by the French authorities, and the blame for the existence of the rebellion and for its prolongation is continually attributed to the rebels, who are usually described as

bandits, murderers and such like. The existence of any national and patriotic feeling among the rebels seems to be studiously ignored by the French, though it always has been present and is every day growing in intensity, while at the same time its character is becoming increasingly Francophobe.

8. Since the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations approved last February the action of France in Syria, the French authorities seem to have assumed that the military methods employed by them are justifiable and above criticism. I cannot help feeling that some of the coercive measures now enforced by the French authorities, would scarcely be considered by an international military tribunal as justifiable in the circumstances of their application. Bombardments are the order of the day nowadays, and scarcely a day or night passes but Damascus reverberates with the crack and roar of artillery and with the explosions of bombs and shells in the vicinity or outside the city. The rebels, however, show no signs of capitulating at present.

Copies to Jerusalem (No. 152), Amman (No. 157), Bagdad (No. 142), Beirut (No. 185), and Aleppo (No. 120).

I have, &c.

J. R. VAUGHAN-RUSSELL.

[E 3949/12/89]

No. 255.

Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received June 29.)

(No. 200.)

Sir,

Damascus, June 16, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to invite a reference to paragraphs 8 and 9 of my despatch No. 196 of the 12th instant, and to forward herewith, for your information, a copy of a letter which I have addressed to General Vallier, through the French Envoy Extraordinary, relative to the British Indians living in the village of Beit Sawa.

2. Apart from giving to the French military authorities as precise details as possible concerning the location of the houses of the British Indians in the above village, I have deemed it advisable to point out to them the danger which now attends the withdrawal of British nationals from the Ghouta. It was all very well for the French military authorities to proclaim on the 10th instant that all persons who remained in the Ghouta would be considered, as from that date, as rebels. Since the above proclamation, it has become very dangerous to move about in the Ghouta, as persons so doing are more than ever before regarded with suspicion and liable to be shot at from a distance by the irregulars.

3. It should, I think, be remembered that only a few weeks ago the French were urging and coercing the villagers to leave Damascus and to return to their villages, as all was safe and the rebel bands had been driven out of the Ghouta. Under pressure, many persons returned to their villages in the Ghouta; they now find themselves confronted with a completely different situation there, and that, if they wish to, returning to Damascus virtually means running the gauntlet of rebel rifle fire and of French artillery, machine-gun and rifle fire.

4. The British Indian subjects of Beit Sawa have risked their lives and property by remaining in the Ghouta for the past nine months, owing to the repeated assurances of the French military authorities that they would be safe if they remained there provided that they did not help the rebels. The French military authorities have admitted to me on several occasions that they have never had occasion to complain that the village of Beit Sawa has fired upon their troops, and that they have received no reports to show that the British Indian subjects have been aiding the rebels. The proclamation of the 10th instant rendered at once British Indians in the Ghouta liable to be considered as rebels and to be treated accordingly. No chance was given them of leaving their homes beforehand while a withdrawal was possible with a reasonable chance of safety. As they have been encouraged by the French authorities to remain in Beit Sawa, and withdrawal now presents such danger, I trust that my letter to General Vallier will be considered as justifiable and that my action meets with your approval.

I have, &c.

J. R. VAUGHAN-RUSSELL.

Enclosure 1 in No. 255.

Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell to French High Commissioner.

M. l'Envoyé extraordinaire,

Damas, le 15 juin 1926.

ME référant à votre lettre du 11 courant à l'adresse de M. le Doyen du corps consulaire, j'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre, sous ce convert, une lettre que je viens d'adresser à M. le Général Vallier au sujet des ressortissants britanniques qui habitent le village de Beit Sawa dans la Ghouta.

Je vous prie de bien vouloir la faire parvenir à son destinataire.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

J. R. VAUGHAN-RUSSELL.

Consul de Sa Majesté britannique par intérim.

Enclosure 2 in No. 255.

Acting Consul Vaughan-Russell to General Vallier, Military Governor of Damascus.

M. le Général,

Damas, le 15 juin 1926.

Me référant à mon entretien avec le chef de votre état-major dans l'après-midi du 11 de ce mois, j'ai l'honneur de vous préciser la situation des maisons des sujets indiens britanniques dans le village de Beit Sawa.

La plupart de ces maisons se trouvent groupées tout autour de la mosquée de ce village. Il m'est impossible de vous fournir une carte qui démontrerait clairement la topographie du village. Des renseignements qui me sont parvenus, il est certain que la mosquée susindiquée se trouve au nord et sur la rue principale qui traverse Beit Sawa dans le sens ouest à est. La mosquée se trouve, semble-t-il, presque au milieu du village, à un tiers de la distance entre sa lisière occidentale et son extrémité orientale.

Les maisons de mes ressortissants, étant tout à fait contiguës à la mosquée, il semblerait assez facile de les identifier, surtout vu que leurs habitants y ont hissé des pavillons britanniques. Je reconnais largement tous les efforts que vous avez déployés dans le passé pour soustraire autant que possible mes ressortissants des conséquences dangereuses de leur séjour dans la Ghouta. Je tâcherai de persuader mes ressortissants de rentrer en ville pour qu'ils puissent éviter le risque d'être surpris par un bombardement, mais l'évacuation de leurs maisons par les sujets indiens susindiqués présente maintenant de grandes difficultés, vu que la circulation dans la Ghouta est devenue extrêmement dangereuse dernièrement, surtout depuis votre proclamation du 10 juin.

Vu la probabilité qu'un certain nombre de ressortissants britanniques, surtout des femmes et des enfants, craignent de se hasarder hors du village de Beit Sawa pour effectuer le trajet dangereux entre Beit Sawa et Damas, je vous saurais gré de bien vouloir me faire savoir s'il y aurait des moyens de les soustraire de danger.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

J. R. VAUGHAN-RUSSELL.

Consul de Sa Majesté britannique par intérim.

CHAPTER IV.—GENERAL.

[E 952/37/44]

No. 256.

M. de Fleuriau to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 9.)

LE Président du Conseil d'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane vient d'appeler l'attention du Gouvernement français sur le fait que les États du Hedjaz, du Yémen et du Nedj, constitués par des territoires détachés de la Turquie à la suite de la guerre, n'ont pas exécuté les obligations financières mises à leur charge par le Traité de Lausanne. Alléguant des motifs divers, inconciliables d'ailleurs avec les dispositions formelles du traité, ces États se sont refusés à assumer une part quelconque de la dette publique ottomane.

2. D'autre part, l'État de l'Assyr, qui figure parmi les États appelés à contribuer au capital et aux annuités de la dette publique ottomane, a disparu par suite de son rattachement à un autre État et le Conseil de la Dette s'est trouvé dans l'impossibilité de lui faire la notification prévue à l'article 47 du Traité de Lausanne.

3. Cette situation, à laquelle le Conseil de la Dette trouve hors d'état de porter remède, n'est pas sans causer un préjudice aux porteurs de la dette publique ottomane; la part de ces quatre États dans les annuités est, en effet, évaluée à environ £215,000 et, le traité ayant exclu toute solidarité entre les États débiteurs, cette perte serait supportée par les porteurs déjà gravement éprouvés.

4. En signalant cette situation au Gouvernement français, le Conseil de la Dette a fait appel à son intervention afin que les droits des porteurs, consacrés par le Traité de Lausanne, cessent d'être méconnus par les États arabes précités.

5. Une démarche semblable aurait été faite auprès du Gouvernement britannique et du Gouvernement italien.

6. Le Gouvernement français estime, en ce qui le concerne, que la situation signalée par le Président de la Dette publique ottomane porte préjudice aux intérêts des porteurs français et qu'elle est de nature à aggraver les sacrifices qui leur sont déjà demandés.

7. M. de Fleuriau a été chargé de demander à Sir Austen Chamberlain de bien vouloir lui faire connaître les vues du Gouvernement britannique sur cette question et en particulier sur les moyens qui seraient, à ses yeux, de nature à en faciliter le règlement.

L'Ambassadeur de France saisit, &c.

*Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 5 février 1926.*

[E 998/37/44]

No. 257.

Marquis della Torretta to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 11.)

(Translation.)

THE Italian Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, with reference to the identic communication which the President of the Council for the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt addressed on the 15th ultimo to the British, French and Italian Governments on the subject of the alleged failure of the States of the Hejaz, Yemen and Nejd to fulfil the financial obligations imposed upon them by the Treaty of Lausanne of the 24th July, 1923, and also with regard to the State of Asir, has the honour to request that he will, if it is possible, be so good as to state what action the British Government have taken or propose to take with regard to the request of the President of the Council for the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt.

Italian Embassy, London, February 3, 1926.

[E 999/37/44]

No. 258.

Marquess della Torretta to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 11.)

(Translation.)

THE Italian Ambassador presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, with reference to the identic communication which the President of the Council for the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt addressed on the 15th ultimo to the British, French and Italian Governments on the subject of the alleged failure of the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes to fulfil the financial obligations imposed upon them by the Treaty of Lausanne of the 24th July, 1923, has the honour to resort to his Excellency's habitual courtesy with the request that he will be so good as to state what action the British Government have taken or propose to take with regard to the request of the President of the Council for the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt.

Italian Embassy, February 3, 1926.

[E 1081/37/44]

No. 259.

M. de Fleuriau to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 15.)

LE Président du Conseil d'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane vient d'appeler l'attention du Gouvernement français sur le refus de l'État serbe-croate-slovène d'exécuter les obligations financières mises à sa charge par le Traité de Lausanne.

Le Gouvernement de Belgrade s'est prévalu à cette occasion du fait qu'il n'était pas signataire du Traité de Lausanne. Le Conseil de la Dette est, au contraire, d'avis que tous les États qui ont acquis des territoires turcs à la suite des guerres balkaniques ou de la guerre générale sont tenus de contribuer aux charges annuelles de la dette publique ottomane.

Le refus de l'État serbe-croate-slovène d'exécuter les obligations financières qui lui incombent de ce chef se traduit pour les porteurs de la dette publique ottomane par un préjudice important, la part de cet État dans les annuités se montant à environ £405,000 et le traité excluant toute solidarité entre les États débiteurs.

En signalant cette situation au Gouvernement français, le Conseil de la Dette a fait appel à son intervention afin que les droits des porteurs consacrés par le Traité de Lausanne cessent d'être méconnus par le Gouvernement de Belgrade.

Une démarche semblable aurait été faite auprès du Gouvernement britannique et du Gouvernement italien.

Le Gouvernement français est d'avis qu'en raison du motif invoqué* par l'État serbe-croate-slovène, la question soulevée par le Conseil de la Dette ne pourra être réglée, le moment venu, que par une intervention diplomatique. Il estime qu'il y aurait lieu de subordonner l'ouverture de négociations dans ce sens au développement des pourparlers actuellement engagés avec la Turquie et les autres États successeurs. L'éventualité d'un règlement d'ensemble dont il demeurerait volontairement exclu pourrait en effet inciter le Gouvernement de Belgrade à modifier son attitude.

M. de Fleuriau a été chargé de demander à Sir Austen Chamberlain de bien vouloir lui faire connaître le point de vue du Gouvernement britannique à cet égard.

L'Ambassadeur de France saisit, &c.

*Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 13 février 1926.*

* *I.e.*, non-signature of the treaty.

No. 260.

Acting Consul-General, Beirut, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 25.)

(No. 11.)

(Telegraphic.)

Beirut, February 25, 1926.

FOLLOWING message for Air Ministry from liaison officer:—

"Consul at Aleppo reports that seven 15-ton wagons, aviation hangar material and three 15-ton wagons, artillery, have been signalled as going east. "Twenty-two cases of gas masks in eastward train at Mamoura, 20th February. Quantity of poison gas believed, but not confirmed. "I have requested details."

No. 261.

Consul-General, Beirut, to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

Beirut, February 27, 1926.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 11.

Following from liaison officer for Air Ministry:—

"Consul, Aleppo, now reports artillery believed to be anti-aircraft and mountain guns; aviation material, knock-down hangars for erection."

(Repeated to Aviation, Bagdad.)

No. 262.

The Marquess of Crewe to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received March 2.)

(No. 83.)

(Telegraphic.)

[By Bag.]

Paris, March 1, 1926.

MY despatch No. 369 of 24th February.

2. M. Berthelot informed Mr. Phipps to-day that the agreement initialled at Angora was only being despatched to-day to Paris, as M. Sarraut was anxious to annex thereto a report giving a comprehensive account of the negotiations leading up to it.

3. M. Berthelot spontaneously assured Mr. Phipps that the French Government had enquired of M. Sarraut whether the agreement was in all respects in harmony with the assurances given by the French Government to His Majesty's Government in regard to (a) the frontier between Syria and Turkey; and (b) the transport of Turkish troops over the Syrian railways. No reply had yet been received from Angora.

No. 263.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 10.)

(No. 53.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, April 9, 1926.

I SENT message to Angora through delegation asking that an Irak plenipotentiary be associated with me in forthcoming negotiations, and urging on behalf of His Majesty's Government that this request be agreed to. I have received answer to-day. Minister for Foreign Affairs says that Treaty of Lausanne stipulates that frontier shall be settled between Great Britain and Turkey, and that therefore participation of Irak delegate in its negotiation could not be admitted. If, however, in the course of discussions other questions touching Turco-Irak interests arise presence of an Irak plenipotentiary could be agreed to.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 9.)

No. 264.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 10.)

(No. 54.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, April 9, 1926.

MY immediately preceding telegram and Bagdad telegram No. 132.

As I told you in London, I expected Turkish Government would refuse any Irak representative. Their reply admitting the possibility of one to discuss other than frontier question is better than I hoped. It gives rise, however, to following practical point:—

You are aware that omitting the question of territorial cessions will represent to Turks about 95 per cent. of value of the whole and remaining articles only about 5 per cent. I foresee that if agreement can be reached on frontier line there may be immense pressure to finish off remaining articles rapidly, and that possibly there may not be time for Irak plenipotentiary to arrive in time to take part in the actual negotiations. This point, however, may not arise, as I still think it likely that Turkish Government will reject proposed readjustment of frontier as insufficient.

Turkish reply about plenipotentiary and contents of immediately preceding paragraph will show Irak Government how impossible it will be in practice to reserve beforehand projected cession of territory.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 10.)

No. 265.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 10.)

(No. 55.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, April 9, 1926.

BAGDAD telegram No. 132.

I will refer by telegram any question of substantial modifications of draft, but trust you will endeavour to send replies rapidly.

I will say nothing about Irak full powers, but I greatly appreciate honour King Feisal does me in sending them.

As to subsidiary treaties, I do not know what is required as regards customs beyond what is stipulated for in article 21 of draft treaty.

Provision for a sanitary convention could be put into article 22. Is anything else wanted in this line, e.g., insect plagues, veterinary matters?

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 11.)

No. 266.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 16.)

(No. 61. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, April 15, 1926.

BAGDAD telegram No. 152 reached me to-day only owing to being wrongly addressed. It is very corrupt.

Frankly, I should prefer not to have Irak plenipotentiary for discussion of frontier. I should mind his presence far less for remainder of treaty. I should propose to telegraph urgently the moment it appears likely that a settlement about frontier was in sight and would try to keep back other questions for his arrival. I should think it probable in any case that he would be able to arrive in time for signature.

Above is all on the assumption that Turks are ready to admit Irak as party to treaty.

It is logical to assume this from their reply, but it does not necessarily follow that they will.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 14.)

No. 267.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 19.)

(No. 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Angora, April 18, 1926.

I SAW Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday and Prime Minister to-day. To the former I gave general sketch of draft treaty and proposal of a cession of territory comprising all of area No. 1 and northern half of area No. 3. This he was unable to understand without technical advice, and his remarks were entirely non-committal. As regards treaty, he had criticisms to make of some details as to which I will refer to you as and when necessary. He appeared to accept broad principle, especially association with Irak as co-signatory.

Prime Minister said he had not yet completely realised what proposed cession amounted to, but he said that to transfer territory "was the whole thing," and that cession proposed was "nothing at all." He talked a good deal about security and was disposed to attribute all Turkey's troubles in the East to activities of British agents in Irak.

I prefer not to draw any deductions from these two conversations, but I think Prime Minister's demeanour was that of a man worried and grieved rather than indignant.

(Sent to Bagdad. Figures by post to Constantinople.)

No. 268.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 22.)

(No. 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Angora, April 21, 1926.

I SAW Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday, and frontier negotiations took a surprising turn.

Minister stated that what Turkey desired was not territory in itself, but security. The latter might be obtained by a large accession of territory or by other means. It was now clear that considerable transfer was [?omitted: not] to be contemplated, and the Turkish Government must turn to other methods to secure its object. It therefore declined offer made to cede territory to it, while expressing appreciation of friendly sentiments which had actuated that offer.

As substitute, Turkish Government had three proposals to make by which it might receive satisfaction. He put them forward unofficially, not as coming from the Government, but said he had consulted his most influential friend. It is inconceivable to me that he can have formulated them without approval of the Prime Minister and the President of the Republic. I take them in order:—

1. He proposed an undertaking of mutual neutrality on model of recent French and Russian treaties. I replied that this had been carefully considered in London and discarded for three reasons. Firstly, it really meant nothing, but aimed at creating in the public mind impression of a condition of affairs that did not exist. As such we should dislike it. Minister agreed that mutual neutrality agreement was really only "propaganda." Secondly, it would necessitate our inserting so many stipulations and reserves as to our duties under pact that document would be complicated and difficult to understand. I had seen a draft and felt sure it would be most distasteful to Turkish Parliament. The Minister agreed that National Assembly would only accept simple and easily comprehensible engagements. Thirdly, I said that opinion in England was unprepared at present for entanglements involving widespread ramifications, and His Majesty's Government could now only contemplate agreement dealing with frontier under discussion. I then restated what was contained in article 5 of draft treaty, adding that if he wished terms might be drafted in even more solemn form. He considered that this was just as good as mutual neutrality proposal, which he then dropped.

2. Minister's second idea changed its form in course of discussion. As first put forward, he proposed that Turkey should formally cede the whole territory south of Brussels line to Irak, but that sovereignty should only pass when special relations with Great Britain cease. After surprisingly little discussion, this changed into a proposal that both territory and sovereignty should finally and definitely pass to Irak on ratification of treaty. This cession would be made to Irak as to a "fully

self-governing State," in words of article 1, paragraph 2, of pact (see especially French text passage). There was no desire to affect in any way existing special relations between Great Britain and Irak, nor was there objection on his part to arrangement being embodied in tripartite treaty formed as contemplated in our draft. Object of this curious proposal is even more curious than proposal itself. Minister wishes that in its present difficult position Turkish Government shall be able to face Assembly in best possible posture. He intends saying to it in substance: "Here is Irak, a recognised self-governing State, young and revolutionary in character like ourselves. By our Constitution we are debarred from hampering in any way development of such a State, and we can therefore only wish it well and happy." With such arguments he believes Assembly will easily be convinced.

Minister for Foreign Affairs had prepared no text embodying his idea, but said he would gladly consider one.

3. Last proposal of Minister for Foreign Affairs was that Turkey should be given a participation in Irak oil. A guaranteed supply would be no good, and he would want an allotment of shares. He had no idea how many shares he wanted. Object of this was not merely pecuniary profit, but also to foster the feeling of security all round, for he maintained that if Turkey were materially interested in Irak oil industry she would clearly be indisposed to disturb the tranquillity of the country. If required, he would have no objection to engagement by the Turkish Government not to alienate its interests in the company. I strongly expressed the view that this was unpractical. The company consisted of various groups of different nationality who quarrelled freely and would never be able to agree as to where a Turkish participation was to come from. He expressed some doubt as to this, and hinted that as a *quid pro quo* Turkish Government would be able to provide documents disproving claims of civil list heirs, thus removing last doubts as to validity of Turkish Petroleum Company's concession. I remarked that Irak oil was highly speculative, and that at the best years might pass before any profit could be realised. He answered that Turkey could afford to wait in the same position as other participants. Discussion was entirely on the basis of allotment of shares. There was no mention of participation in royalties.

I undertook to refer this suggestion to you, but warned the Minister that if it were not turned down immediately it would probably be several weeks at least before anything definite could be said about it.

As regards other articles of our draft treaty which I had sketched to him previously, the Minister stated that they would probably present no difficulty.

(Repeated to Bagdad; figures by post to Constantinople.)

No. 269.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Angora (via Constantinople), April 21, 1926.

MY telegram No. 2.

It is most remarkable that Turkish Government should have abandoned claim for territorial concessions in such a manner that it will be difficult to revive it effectively, and that they should have done so without first making sure that there is some chance of their obtaining a *quid pro quo*. The turn negotiations have now taken indicates absolute surrender by Turks, which is somewhat confirmed by the desperate straits in which the State now finds itself and by the extraordinary amiability with which we have been received here this time by everyone from the President of the Republic downwards. There is only one opinion here, namely, that the Turks are most anxious to come to terms.

As to Minister for Foreign Affairs' second proposal, the danger is in the underlying idea that Turkish sovereignty, even in a nominal form, should be kept alive. I presume this to be quite inadmissible. It is true that Minister abandoned it so completely that it is now difficult to see what virtue even of a face-saving nature remains in his proposal, but I cannot feel nominal [group undecypherable] of Turkish sovereignty may not be plan of Government, and that, that being so, crop up again and perhaps be pressed more strongly. Yet, as Minister left it, idea seems to me innocuous, and, if you agree, in order to put the matter to the test, I would ask you if you could have a text drafted and telegraphed to me.

As to oil proposal, I do not know what is or is not possible with company. Minister for Foreign Affairs gave me impression that he knew more about feasibility of proposal than he cared to say, but I may well be mistaken. It is possible that in this too it is hoped to introduce some vague recognition of principle of Turkish sovereignty, though I cannot now see how, and, if so, it might be easier for them to do so if participation in royalties were accorded instead of in shares. I do not think share in oil can have same face-saving advantages in Turkey as cession of territory we were prepared to offer, but it is quite possible that Turkish Government really believe it would bring them large accession of wealth in short time. Possibly it may have effect of increasing their prestige in Irak.

I am much vexed that Turkish Government should now have introduced into discussions a topic which I presume must cause, at the best, several weeks' delay because time is of more value here than in London in this negotiation. Atmosphere here is at present extraordinarily favourable and has been created by Turkish Government, as I think, with genuine purpose of bringing things to a satisfactory end. I should therefore be grateful if you could give me very soon some sort of interim reply about oil, indicating whether something may possibly be done in this line, and how much time must elapse before any concrete proposal is to be expected. (Sent to Bagdad.)

No. 270.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 23.)

(No. 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

MY telegram No. 2.

Angora, April 22, 1926.

I [group omitted] Minister for Foreign Affairs last night and referred again to his proposal about the oil question, and said I did not know whether His Majesty's Government would find it practicable at all, but if they did, the more I thought about it the more sure I was that it would be many weeks before any engagement on the subject could be entered into. I thought he ought to realise this quite clearly, especially as atmosphere for negotiations at this moment seemed to me so particularly favourable.

Minister's face fell visibly at this, and he asked almost at once whether there was any other similar concession that could be made by which Turkey might be materially interested in peace and well-being of Irak. I said that I knew of none.

I hope very much that something may be possible in the direction of oil, and that a decision on the point may be come to quickly. The situation for reaching a settlement could not be more favourable than it is now, but there is no telling what it may be three weeks hence.

(Part 2.)

It seems to me there are very great advantages in meeting Turkish wishes over oil:—

- (a.) We should reach settlement on terms suggested by Turkish Government themselves and against which they could not afterwards cavil.
- (b.) It would save Irak all the trouble involved by disturbing present territorial settlement.
- (c.) If we could first get Turkish Government to accept satisfactory formula for cession of sovereignty and territory to Irak, there would be no danger of giving them a percentage of Irak Government royalties.
- (d.) This would associate Turkish Government closely with Irak Government in oil interests in the manner Minister for Foreign Affairs affects to desire, and it could be effected quickly and without disturbing the constitution of Turkish Petroleum Company.
- (e.) It is worth while to remember that idea of paying Turkey off in oil was first hinted at by Sir P. Cox at Constantinople in 1924, so that it is rather difficult now to reject their suggestion of it.

If you agree with above, it becomes urgent for you to send me a formula about transferring sovereignty and territory.

(Sent to Bagdad. Figures by post to Constantinople.)

No. 271.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Angora).

(No. 6.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 24, 1926.

REFERENCE your telegrams Nos. 2, 3 and 4 of 21st and 22nd April.

You may be sure that His Majesty's Government will do their utmost to respond to new spirit of conciliation shown by Turkish Government, which coincides entirely with our own desire for restoration of really friendly relations.

As regards their first proposal, we are already preparing a text, which when completed and approved by Cabinet I will telegraph to you.

As regards oil, we are similarly engaged in endeavour to frame practicable scheme which would meet Turkish wishes. I incline to securing for Turkey participation in royalties, since this involves consent only of the three Governments immediately concerned, whilst any attempt to redistribute share interest must involve prolonged and most difficult negotiations with private interests, French and American as well as British, which we have only just succeeded in reconciling and might well provoke objection from French and American Governments.

You may be certain and assure the Turkish Government that we will not be responsible for a moment's unnecessary delay, but you will be able to explain convincingly that a little time is necessary for communication with Irak, in addition to that required for working out practical schemes and their embodiment in appropriate texts.

You are of course right in holding that we cannot directly or indirectly recognise continued Turkish sovereignty or suzerainty, but subject to this condition and to observance of our obligations as a mandatory under the treaty, I am now very hopeful of reaching an early and mutually satisfactory solution, but it will be obvious to you that in matters of such consequence I must have time to consult Cabinet.

In my conversation on Friday with Turkish Ambassador he showed liveliest anxiety about Italian intentions and supposed Italian-Greek Pact. I did not seek to play upon these fears, though most Governments would have done so. I do not myself believe that Signor Mussolini intends to break the peace by embarking upon a policy of adventure. I have, however, no doubt that if peace were once broken he would seize the opportunity to further Italian ambitions and to secure the outlet for its surplus population which Italy will eventually need. Turkey's best security against unprovoked aggression by another Power lies in securing good relations with her present neighbours in Irak and Syria, and thus preventing any incident which would invite or encourage intervention by another State. You should bear these considerations in mind, for it is not possible wholly to exclude the thought that the sudden change in the Turkish attitude may be due to fear of Italian action, and that their attitude may change again if that fear is removed by assurances which Signor Mussolini has volunteered.

Not repeated to Constantinople.

No. 272.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 28.)

(No. 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Angora, April 27, 1926.

I SAW Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday, who was very satisfied at the conversation between you and Turkish Ambassador.

He asked me about Russo-German Treaty, and I stated the view of His Majesty's Government as I had gathered it from telegram sections. He said that he was very glad at its conclusion. He had been attacked for concluding December agreement with Russians. It opened a gulf between Turkey and the League of Nations.

This had not been his intention, and the fact that Germany, who is about to enter the League of Nations, is signing a precisely similar treaty proves that this would not be its effect. I asked for information about resumption of payments of bridge tolls to National Bank. He said that he had heard and knew nothing about it. Surprising as it may seem, this may be true. If so it is a good sign, as showing

that Ministry of Finance, independently of Ministry for Foreign Affairs, is anxious to conciliate His Majesty's Government.

Minister said that if and when our frontier negotiations reached a favourable point he intended to ask His Majesty's Government to use their good offices to bring about a settlement between Turkey and her bondholders. I explained how much more interested the French were than we, and he said he would address himself both to British and French Governments.

His tone was very friendly and intended to suggest he desired rapprochement with Great Britain all along the line. There was no hint of any reversion to territorial concessions.

No. 273.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Angora).

(No. 8.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, April 28, 1926.

BAGDAD telegram of 25th April to you: Presence of an Irak plenipotentiary at Angora.

It seems to me that turn which negotiations have taken not merely justifies but requires for early success *immediate* attendance of an Irak plenipotentiary, more particularly in view of (a) Turks' apparent desire to emphasise the independence of Irak and to give the new treaty a Turco-Irak character, and (b) satisfactory settlement of oil participation.

Please telegraph your views.

(Not repeated to Constantinople.)

No. 274.

Sir R. Lindsay (No. 8) to High Commissioner, Bagdad.—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received April 29.)

(No. 9.)

(Telegraphic.)

Angora, April 29, 1926.

BAGDAD telegram No. 178 to Colonial Office.

I fear there is still great danger that Turkish Government may reverse their attitude and revive demand for some territorial cession, and I think it undesirable that Irak plenipotentiary should be here while negotiations are in progress, from which Turks would pointedly exclude him. I will telegraph as soon as I think this danger may be ignored. Moment may come very soon after Anglo-Irak ideas about oil have been formulated to Turkish Government.

[E 2560/37/44]

No. 275.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to M. de Fleuriau.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, April 29, 1926.

FROM my note of to-day's date in regard to the refusal of certain States non-signatory of the Treaty of Lausanne to recognise liability for their share of the Ottoman Public Debt, your Excellency will see that His Majesty's Government are in agreement with the suggestion put forward in your note of the 13th February that diplomatic representations should eventually be addressed to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

2. You suggest that until the outcome of the negotiations actually in course between the bondholders and Turkey and the succession States is known, representations should not be made to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State.

3. As the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government refused to sign both the Treaty of Sévres and the Treaty of Lausanne owing to their unwillingness to assume responsibility for a share of the Ottoman Public Debt, it will no doubt be a matter of difficulty to induce them to reconsider their attitude, and it may be possible to connect representations in regard to this matter with negotiations on other matters on which some concessions are being made to the Serb-Croat-Slovene State. In this connection

it will be recollected that in the course of the recent unofficial exchange of views with your Government in regard to ceded properties under the Treaties of Saint-Germain and Trianon and to liberation debts, it has been agreed that it will be desirable to stipulate that the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government should assume responsibility for their share of the Ottoman Public Debt in return for their release from liability of ceded properties and liberation debts.

I have, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[E 2564/681/65]

No. 276.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to the Marquess della Torretta.

Foreign Office, April 29, 1926.

Your Excellency,

WITH reference to my note of the 5th January and previous correspondence regarding the assurances to be given to Italy in connection with the Palestine mandate, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that His Majesty's Government are now in a position to give the Italian Government the explanations and assurances relating to the mandate for Palestine, contained in the memorandum attached to the present note.

2. His Majesty's Government have taken note of the intention of the Italian Government, as expressed in your note of the 19th July last, to take the necessary steps for the simultaneous registration with the League of Nations of the assurances which have already been given to the Italian Government in regard to Irak and of the present assurances in regard to Palestine.

3. I shall be glad if you will be so good as to acknowledge the receipt of this communication.

I have, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

Enclosure in No. 276.

Memorandum respecting the Mandate for Palestine.

HIS Britannic Majesty's Government assure the Italian Government that nothing will be done in establishing a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine which might prejudice the civil or religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.

2. Article 11 of the mandate for Palestine is not intended to preclude the participation of Italian enterprises in public works, services and utilities and in the development of the national resources of the country so far as these matters are not directly undertaken by the Administration. In the event of such participation His Britannic Majesty's Government are prepared favourably to consider a special arrangement being negotiated with the Italian Government to regulate the conditions of such Italian labour as might consequently be admitted into Palestine.

3. His Britannic Majesty's Government inform the Italian Government that they have included provisions in the Palestine Order in Council of the 10th August, 1922, in virtue of which foreign nationals, including, of course, Italian citizens, have the right to be tried by a court consisting of a single British judge or containing a majority of British judges, except in trivial cases in which these provisions would lead to administrative inconvenience, and that in such cases foreign nationals have the special right to appeal to the district court.

4. His Britannic Majesty's Government assure the Italian Government that the use of the word "maintain" in article 15 of the mandate was not intended to restrict the opening of new Italian schools or to restrict the right of such schools to admit pupils of another community.

5. His Britannic Majesty's Government assure the Italian Government that the second clause of article 16 of the mandate is intended to show that the supervision of the mandatory will be strictly limited to that required for the maintenance of public order and good government. They add that there is no intention of permitting arbitrary interference in the internal affairs of any religious community.

[15026]

6. His Britannic Majesty's Government assure the Italian Government that in the event of the Italian economic zone in Asia Minor materialising, and in the event of any customs arrangement being concluded with the French Government in respect of sea-borne commerce between Palestine and Syria, His Britannic Majesty's Government would give favourable consideration to any proposals for a similar arrangement to be entered into with the Italian Government in respect of sea-borne traffic between Palestine on the one hand and the Italian economic zone and Rhodes on the other.

7. His Britannic Majesty's Government assure the Italian Government that consignments imported for the use of Italian schools, orphanages, asylums, hospitals and dispensaries in Palestine will be admitted free of duty. Consignments addressed to other institutions, such as hospices, wine industries, printing presses, bookbinding establishments, &c., will, however, be chargeable with full import duties. Consignments intended for the use of places of worship, monastic orders (not engaged in any form of trade, profession or commerce) will be admitted free of duty. Goods intended for the personal use of all members of any ecclesiastical institution will be admitted free only up to a limited sum. It is clearly understood that these privileges are only accorded so far as and so long as the conditions of their grant are strictly adhered to in the letter and in the spirit.

8. His Britannic Majesty's Government agree that article 18 of the Palestine mandate shall be regarded as applying to Italy.

[E 2560/37/44]

No. 277.

*Sir Austen Chamberlain to M. de Fleuriau.**

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, April 29, 1926.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I have given careful consideration to your notes of 5th and 13th February in regard to the action to be taken on the protests formulated by the President of the Council of the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt against the failure of the States of the Hejaz, Yemen, Nejd and Asir, and of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State to fulfil their financial obligations in connection with the Ottoman Public Debt.

2. His Majesty's Government consider that it is a matter of the highest importance that the interests of the bondholders should be safeguarded, and that every effort should be made to support the inviolability of debt contracts as recognised by treaty and by international law. At the same time they consider that the present moment is not opportune for making representations to the States referred to by the Ottoman Debt Council. Negotiations are at present taking place between the Turkish Government and the bondholders, and the meetings of the commission summoned under article 48 of the Treaty of Lausanne have been suspended pending the outcome of these negotiations. Should it be possible to conclude the negotiations with the Turkish Government at an early date and to settle definitely the methods whereby the obligations of the other signatory Powers which are represented on the commission will be met, the moment would be a favourable one for making representations to the States which did not sign the Treaty of Lausanne.

3. The position of these latter States (*i.e.*, the Arab States, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and Albania) is complicated by the fact that, as they are not signatories of the Treaty of Lausanne, it is not possible to maintain that they are bound by article 48 or by any other article of that treaty. On the other hand, the principle that States which have been formed as the result of the break up of a large State of which they originally formed part, should accept responsibility for a proportionate share of the public debt of the old State, has been so regularly followed of recent years—and particularly in the various settlements after the war—that there is a strong case for holding that it is now a generally accepted principle of international law. On this principle, then, as apart from treaty grounds, it is possible to contend that defaulting States, which were not signatories of the Lausanne Treaty, are bound in equity to accept responsibility for a proportionate share of the Ottoman Public Debt.

4. The position of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and of Albania differs from that of other States non-signatory of the Treaty of Lausanne in that they accepted

* Also to Italian Ambassador, *mutatis mutandis*.

in principle responsibility for a proportionate share of the Ottoman Public Debt at the commission which met in Paris in 1913 to distribute the Ottoman Public Debt after the Balkan wars, but never completed its work owing to the outbreak of the European war in 1914. Serbia also accepted the obligation to assume a share of the Ottoman Public Debt by the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, but never took any steps to carry out this obligation; while Albania accepted the principle at the Lausanne Conference, though she stipulated for unacceptable conditions.

5. The position of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State is also one of special importance to the bondholders, as the share of the Ottoman Public Debt which will fall upon it is more considerable than the amounts attributed to other States non-signatory of the Treaty of Lausanne and as its financial position is comparatively stable.

6. I shall be grateful if your Excellency will communicate the foregoing to the French Government, and inform me in due course of their views. A similar communication is being addressed to the Italian Ambassador in reply to similar enquiries.

I have, &c.

AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

No. 278.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 10.)

(Telegraphic.)

Angora, April 29, 1926.

MY telegram No. 8 addressed to Bagdad, and your telegram No. 8.

I have since sounded Minister for Foreign Affairs, and he said he would leave to me to decide when Irak plenipotentiary should arrive. Yesterday a press article appeared, obviously inspired, indicating that no territorial concession was to be expected and that solution would be found in other ways.

Danger referred to in my telegram referred to above is therefore diminished.

Nevertheless, I am still very reluctant to see plenipotentiary arrive yet awhile. His presence cannot help and may be a drawback. It will make it more difficult for us to break off negotiations in case of Turkish recalcitrance, and will have the effect of putting up Turkish Government's terms. He will be to some extent hostage in their hands. Moreover, when he arrives the personal conversations I have had with Minister for Foreign Affairs, and in which we have got on well, may turn into conferences, in which business may be far more difficult.

I cannot yet feel sure that principle of [treaties of agreement: *sic*] are yet securely laid, and I should have greatly preferred that arrival be postponed, at any rate till I had seen how Turkish Government took the *proposals* about sovereignty and oil.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 9.)

No. 279.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Angora).

(No. 13.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 1, 1926.

YOUR telegram No. 10 of 29th April: Irak plenipotentiary at Angora.

I am content to be guided by your advice.

No. 280.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Angora).

(No. 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 4, 1926.

MY telegram No. 6 of 24th April: Negotiations for Turco-Anglo-Irak Treaty.

As regards the oil question, redistribution of the share capital in the Turkish Petroleum Company would raise well-nigh insurmountable difficulties and the

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company will not agree to any increase in the amount of the royalties payable by them to the Irak Government. His Majesty's Government have therefore decided that all efforts must be concentrated on obtaining assignment to Turkey of a certain percentage of Irak Government's royalties. It appears to His Majesty's Government that preferable scale would be for whole period of concession at minimum rate of 10 per cent., which you are authorised to raise to 15 per cent. if essential.

An alternative on which you will report after exploring the ground would be a limited period, *e.g.*, twenty-five years, to coincide with maximum period of our special relations with Irak as defined by recent Anglo-Irak Treaty. In that case percentage must naturally be higher up to maximum of 25 per cent. In either case Turks will appreciate fact that oil may not be workable for first few years and that there may in consequence be no royalties for similar period.

Irak Prime Minister favoured an alternative scheme whereby His Majesty's Government would offer Turkey assistance to effect an improvement in communications between Turkey and Irak, and in particular the construction of railway between Nisibin and Mosul, a fixed percentage of oil royalties of Irak Government being set aside annually for this purpose. It would, however, be understood that on completion of the railway the Turkish section thereof would be made over to the Turkish Government free of cost. His Majesty's Government are unaware of any desire on part of Turks themselves for such railway development. On contrary, Turks might in our opinion regard it with suspicion as a disguised form of British penetration into Turkish territory, even though railway would be begun at Turkish end. Attitude of Turks has, however, recently changed so completely that even this scheme may now be palatable at Angora, especially in view of enquiry by Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs reported in your telegram No. 4 of 22nd April, paragraph 2.

You are therefore authorised to bear this proposal in mind in oral negotiations and to make such use of it as may appear to you desirable. Should Turks rise to this fly, you would let them understand that royalties to be earmarked for this purpose would be on similar terms as first proposal, *viz.*, 25 per cent. for twenty-five years or at lower rate for longer period.

Objection to this proposal is possibility that *tracé* would cross Syrian territory, in which case prior negotiations with French would be essential and considerable delay might thereby be involved.

If danger foreshadowed in your telegram No. 9 of 29th April, that territorial cession may be revived, materialises, you are authorised to adhere to offer of territorial adjustment within limits already approved. You will of course abstain from taking initiative on this point, which would, in view of great concession in matter of royalties, embarrass His Majesty's Government *vis-à-vis* of Irak Government.

If we read situation aright, Turks are obsessed with fear of isolation, and they desire above all security. I am not unmindful of your previous remarks regarding Turkish view of League of Nations. It seems to me, however, possible that in their present temper their attitude on this subject may have changed. You should therefore, if opportunity offers, explain to them that membership of League would furnish all advantages in matter of security which Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs had in mind when he asked for pact of mutual neutrality.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 2.)

No. 281.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 7.)

(No. 17.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Angora, May 7, 1926.

I AM proceeding to Constantinople for three days and shall be back here on 13th May. You will see from my immediately following telegram that this will not prejudice negotiations.

No. 282.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 18.)

(Telegraphic.)

Angora, May 7, 1926.

I SAW Minister for Foreign Affairs last night and negotiations took another surprising turn.

Before receipt of your telegram No. 14 I had warned him that allotment of shares would be most difficult, and that participation in royalties might be possible. He had expressed unofficially readiness to accept this and even preference for it.

Last night when I was about to talk in the sense of your telegram referred to above, he began to urge allotment of shares. I said that I had come to inform him definitely and officially that this was impossible. He then said that what Turkish Government desired was to turn their participation immediately into cash. I pointed out that no basis exists on which such a transaction could be calculated, but he answered that he hoped the two Governments would arrange it somehow, and agreed with me when I said that in fact the whole treaty thus came down to fixing a lump sum of money. He had no idea what that sum should be. When I observed that Turkey would thus lose all her material interest in peaceful development of Irak he replied that it was not so, as pipe line to Mediterranean would almost certainly have to traverse Turkish territory and come out at Alexandretta or Payas. Turkish Government had already received proposals in this sense from some oil companies. I asked if he was speaking officially, and he answered that this was a proposal put forward in the course of negotiations, that he could not divest himself of his character of Minister for Foreign Affairs, and that he regarded himself as bound by his proposal.

I elicited from him that it would be hurtful to Turkish *amour-propre* to put down any lump sum of money in the treaty. Procedure should be to provide in it for some participation in royalties, with stipulation that if Turkey wish to capitalise she should approach Irak and/or British Governments. Capitalisation would then be arranged by exchange of notes effected simultaneously with signature of treaty.

I have had no discussion as to figure of participation in oil; and railway proposal falls to the ground, as it is obvious that Turkish Government only want money.

I pointed out to him that any figure of payment would have to fall on Irak Government, whose financial position was now extremely difficult [?group undecipherable] in view of burden of Ottoman Public Debt falling on it. His present proposal was so unexpected by me that I could give him no idea how it would strike His Majesty's Government, but I would telegraph it to you immediately. Comments follow.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 14.)

No. 283.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 19.)

(Telegraphic.)

Angora, May 7, 1926.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Amidst these bewildering changes of aim one is necessarily forced back on conjecture. In spite of its extraordinary conduct I think it would be wrong to conclude that Turkish Government was acting otherwise than seriously according to its lights. Minister for Foreign Affairs' precipitate procedure is characteristic of his own personality. He did not even give me time to formulate the idea in your telegram [? No. 14] which I had come to communicate, but plunged headlong into his own theme. He had, he explained, come from a Cabinet meeting which had lasted seven hours and in which as he gave me to understand affairs of his own department had been discussed.

I really think latest development is due to extreme financial embarrassment of the Government, combined with the fear of Italy (or) urgent desire to come to terms with His Majesty's Government.

Present Turkish proposal has great advantage of making for a settlement of the whole problem. If His Majesty's Government agreed in principle nothing remains to be decided except the sum.

On reading your telegram No. 14 I personally came to the conclusion that we ought forthwith to be able to reach terms on basis at the utmost of 20 per cent. participation for a period of twenty-five years.

Thinking to-day in terms of lump sum I should surmise that Turkish consent might be purchasable for not less than £300,000 and not more than £500,000.

Both above estimates are of course pure guesswork.

I need hardly say that though delay of negotiations is entirely due to mind of Turkish Government the importance of rapid progress remains undiminished.

(Addressed to Foreign Office No. 19, repeated to Bagdad, No. 15.)

No. 284.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 21.)

(Telegraphic.)

Angora, May 8, 1926.

I SOUNDED Minister for Foreign Affairs on 5th May on question of railway from Mosul to Turkish railhead, but ventured only to proceed very tentatively.

All I elicited was that the idea was entirely novel to him; that this railway would be far less important to Turkey than several others; and that it would be at least serious drawback if line had to pass through French territory.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 17.)

No. 285.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople).

(No. 50.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 10, 1926.

YOUR telegrams Nos. 18 and 19 of 7th May: Turkish request for allotment of shares in Turkish Petroleum Company.

Data here are inadequate to form even rough estimate of possible output or consequent royalties.

On what, then, do you base your figures of £300,000 and £500,000?

They appear too high for annual payments, and too low for capitalised total payment.

Pending receipt of reply to this telegram, detailed answers to points in your telegram No. 16 of 6th May appear unnecessary.

No. 286.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 12.)

(No. 77.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, May 11, 1926.

YOUR telegram No. 50.

Both estimates in my telegram No. 19 were purely empiric and represent my judgment of Turkish feeling. I think they would regard 20 per cent. participation for twenty-five years or, alternatively, a capital payment of from £300,000 to £500,000 as satisfactory. These two estimates were put forward by me independently of each other. I have never had any idea how they compare with each other in value. The truth is that 20 per cent. is a good percentage and half a million sterling is a good figure, and I have nothing on which to base estimates of what Turks will take except conjecture.

I spoke seriously to Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 8th May about Turkish changes of mind, and said that they would give you the impression of frivolous

behaviour. I hoped Turkish Government had now come to end of this and that their last suggestion was to be taken seriously. He assured me most positively that he would not go back on his last proposals.

I have been enquiring here about financial position of Turkish Treasury. It is undoubtedly very bad. They have abolished tithes and are only just getting new compensation taxes into working order. Latter will produce some immediate revenue, but are really more calculated to ruin trade than to restore the finances of the State. Financially, Turkish Treasury is just now at a very low point, but it should be in an easier position a month or six weeks hence, temporarily at any rate, though probably not permanently. Taken all together, I think they should reach a point where we should endeavour to bring negotiations to a rapid conclusion. I should recommend that I be authorised to offer Turkish Government a lump sum with an intimation that it could not be increased. I really think with present Minister for Foreign Affairs, especially in his frame of mind of to-day, it should be possible to drive a bargain without haggling. I feel fairly confident that half a million would be acceptable. Still, as I may be quite wrong, and this also might prove a great disappointment to Turkish Government, I should like to be authorised to say to them that they can of course take participation in royalties for a term of years instead. You will in any case have to put into the treaty a formula embodying principle of participation (see my telegram No. 18, paragraph 5). It would be well, therefore, that this formula should more or less correspond in value to capital payments which you would authorise me to offer; but I also feel fairly confident that if Turkish Government have to choose between two alternatives, they will have a strong preference in principle for lump sum.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 21.)

No. 287.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople).

(No. 55.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 17, 1926.

YOUR telegram No. 77 of 11th May: Angora negotiations.

If on return to Angora you find your surmise about Turkish attitude correct and see that a deal is feasible it is essential that so favourable an opportunity be not missed. His Majesty's Government agree to the payment by Irak of a sum of £300,000, or if necessary any sum up to maximum of £500,000, and you are authorised to negotiate with Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs with a view to immediate settlement on this basis.

You will understand that this financial proposal is in lieu of and cannot be additional to territorial cession, and can only be admitted if it creates a complete settlement.

If Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs prefers participation in oil royalties up to maximum of 20 per cent. for twenty-five years, or, as Irak would prefer, up to a maximum of 15 per cent. for the whole period of the concession, your Excellency is at liberty to accept. You are already aware that in this event there would be no royalties for first few years and that even later amount is entirely problematical.

Settlement on a lump sum basis would be in effect compensation for final extinction of Turkey's interest in Irak oil. Had Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs not objected to mention of lump sum in treaty, no difficulty would have arisen in drafting formula. In present circumstances formula in treaty might be that His Majesty's Government and Irak Government, recognising Turkey's desire to participate in development of Irak oil, are prepared to agree to Turkey having an annual charge of £ over a term of years in lieu of active participation or royalties.

This would be followed by clause making provision for commutation of annuity by lump sum payment. The amount of annuity would of course depend on the exact lump sum for which you settle. In any case payment will not be made until treaty enters into force.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 3.)

No. 288.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 22.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Angora, May 18, 1926.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs tells me that Assembly will finish off budget debates in two or three days and then adjourn till November, and that ratification of any treaty will therefore be impossible till then. This is a considerable disappointment to me. I had hoped that budget, which has only just begun, would have lasted till end of the month.

Bagdad informed.

No. 289.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Angora).

(No. 22.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 20, 1926.

YOUR telegram No. 16 of 6th May: Turkish participation in Irak Government's oil royalties.

The royalties mentioned in my telegram No. 55 of 17th May, paragraph 3, in which the Turkish Government may be offered participation are those which will accrue to the Irak Government from exploitation of the area of the Turkish Petroleum Company's concession as defined in article 3 thereof.

Basra Vilayet and the "transferred territories" are therefore excluded from the scope of the offer.

The Turkish percentage will be on all royalties which may from time to time be received by the Irak Government under article 10 of the concession, either from the Turkish Petroleum Company, or from any of the lessees referred to in article 6, or from the subsidiary companies which company may form under article 33.

If future amendments to royalties are introduced into the present concession by agreement between the company and the Irak Government, the Turkish Government will nevertheless receive the percentage of the royalties now agreed on between the company and the Irak Government or its equivalent.

Furthermore, in the event of the termination of concession before its normal term, *e.g.*, under articles 4, 5, 13, 36 and 38 of the convention, Turkey is to continue to receive the equivalent of the percentage of royalties now agreed on.

You should not volunteer information in immediately preceding paragraph, but may so reply should Turkish Government raise the point.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 5.)

No. 290.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 21.)

(No. 25.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Angora, May 20, 1926.

MY telegram No. 77.

Last night I officially offered Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs maximum sum named by you for complete settlement. I will explain reasons for my procedure by despatch, but I feel confident that it was wisest course. He quite understood that offer will not be increased. He expressed great disappointment, but said he must refer matter to the Head of Government. No question of any alternative offer arose. He will give me an answer to-morrow or Saturday.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 21.)

No. 291.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 21.)

(No. 27.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Angora, May 21, 1926.

BAGDAD telegram No. 221.

I have strongly urged Minister for Foreign Affairs to arrange for immediate ratification, and if necessary keep Assembly for the purpose. I used all the obvious arguments.

He expressed his own desire for immediate ratification, but doubted possibility of keeping Assembly sitting but promised to try.

If he succeeds Turks might fairly ask for insertion of an article stipulating for ratification within a certain time after signature, say six weeks. Could Irak and His Majesty's Government agree to this if necessary?

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 23.)

No. 292.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 21.)

(No. 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

Angora, May 21, 1926.

YOUR telegram No. 55, paragraph 4.

I find that Minister for Foreign Affairs has no objection to formula you suggest. His idea is that just as Turkey cedes territory and sovereignty for nothing, so she cedes interest in Irak oil for a sum of money which may be expressed in the treaty.

Could you telegraph a draft?

(Repeated to Bagdad.)

No. 293.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 22.)

(No. 31. Part 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

Angora, May 21, 1926.

MY telegram No. 25.

Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for me to-day and a long conversation ensued. He said he had consulted his colleagues and Prime Minister. All were agreed that [? £500,000] was entirely inadequate, and Government could not face Assembly and public opinion with such a proposal. Turkey could not make a settlement less favourable to herself than that concluded with Austria over Bosnia in 1909. He therefore had an alternative proposal to make, viz., that when Turkey came to a settlement with her bondholders, the first three years' interests due by her under eventual arrangement, whatever they might amount to, should be paid for her by Great Britain and Irak.

I said, in view of offer already made to bondholders by Turkish Government which had been rejected, this meant a payment to Turkey of about £T. 4½ million gold. He said that, what with delay which would supervene before agreement could be reached and having regard to moratorium which bondholders would have to grant, he calculated present value of this commission at 2½ millions.

(Part 2.)

I refused absolutely to admit that there was any comparison whatever between Austrian case and present question, and I reminded him of strong protests which His Majesty's Government had addressed at the time to the Austrian Government on its illegal action. As to his new proposal, His Majesty's Government would not look at it for a moment.

Why should Irak question be mixed up with that of Turkish debt? This was merely a way of confusing issues and would postpone any settlement of frontiers indefinitely. If he wanted more money he should say so openly, but I would repeat what I had said before, viz., that His Majesty's Government would not give more

than maximum figure I had offered. He must have no illusions on these points. Only possible alternative was royalties, which was still open to Turkish Government, but I must warn him that Turkish public opinion would get no stronger satisfaction out of percentage which could be offered than out of lump sum which had been offered.

I must beg him to consult his colleagues again.

Above is short summary of very long conversation, but it includes all essential points.

(Part 3. Confidential.)

This is another of Minister for Foreign Affairs' brilliant improvisations, but I am not yet convinced he means indefinite postponement or breakdown of negotiations. He let out real object of his manœuvre when he said to me that in his most pessimistic moments he had never expected His Majesty's Government to offer less than £1 million. This is clearly sum he is aiming at.

I recommend that you send me a telegram in due course bluntly refusing present proposal, and that you leave me to carry on awhile on basis of sum and royalties within limits already laid down.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 27.)

No. 294.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 23.)

(No. 32.)

(Telegraphic.)

Angora, May 23, 1926.

I HAVE seen Prime Minister to-day. Neither of us yielded anything in discussion of capital sum, but I am convinced that he is desirous of early settlement and immediate ratification by Turkey. He said he would keep Assembly sitting if in two or three days' time it became evident that settlement could be reached.

Difference between real Turkish demand and our offer is now half a million (see penultimate paragraph of my telegram No. 31). In order to get immediate settlement could I have authority to go to £775,000?

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 29.)

No. 295.

Sir P. Loraine to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 23.)

(No. 124.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, May 23, 1926.

MY telegram No. 120, last paragraph.

Reuter's telegram of 22nd May contained undated message from Geneva to the effect that, according to semi-official information, Mosul agreement is imminent and will be supplemented by non-aggressive pact between Turkey, Irak and Great Britain "in which Persia will participate." I assume this message to be unauthorised by His Majesty's Government, and, in view of bad impression which would be created here if it were felt that Persia's attitude in an important question of foreign policy was being taken for granted, I have withheld message from publication.

Please acquaint me with true position. If any such non-aggressive pact is actually contemplated, my impression is that Persian Government, if properly approached, might be willing to participate.

(Sent to India. Repeated to Bagdad, No. 67.)

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No. 296.

Lord Lloyd to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 314.)

Sir,

Cairo, May 15, 1926.

THE Cairo newspapers of the 9th November, 1922, quoted the Aga Khan as foreshadowing a pan-Moslem Conference in Egypt, convoked to discuss the implications of the decision, taken by the Grand National Assembly of Angora on the 1st November, 1922, to suppress the temporal authority of the Sultan-Caliph.

2. Sultan Mohammed VI had fled from Constantinople; his successor, Abdul Majid, had followed him into ignominious exile; the Grand National Assembly had, by the law of the 3rd March, 1924, abolished the office of Caliph; and King Hussein had been proclaimed Caliph in Mecca, before steps were taken in Egypt to make the Aga Khan's prophecy effective. In his despatch No. 211 of the 20th March, 1924, Lord Allenby reported the resolution of the Grand Ulama of Al Azhar to summon a congress of representatives of the Moslem world, which should discuss in Cairo, in March 1925, the general question of the Caliphate, and should proceed to the election of a successor to this high office.

3. Opposition to the terms of this resolution, which, it will be recalled, acquiesced in the collapse of Abdul Majid, soon declared itself and inspired the formation of a rival Committee of Ulama known as the "Supreme Caliphate Committee," under the presidency of a certain Sheikh Mohammed Madi Abu'l Azaïem, who possesses not even the qualifications of an 'Alim. This committee declined to accept the abolition of the Ottoman Caliphate, and worked for the recognition of Abdul Majid as Caliph pending the decision of a Caliphate Congress, preferably sitting outside Egypt, which it endeavoured to organise. It enjoyed the patronage of Prince Omar Toussoun, who announced to the press on the 21st April, 1925, that the decisions taken by the Azhar Committee were premature, and the sympathies of leading members of the Watanist party; also of Sheikh Mohammed Bekhit, ex-Grand Mufti of Egypt. An energetic member of this committee was the Emir Khalid Abdul Kader-el-Hassani, now in Damascus, who established friendly contact with the Indian Caliphate Committee and with other Moslem organisations abroad.

4. In early May 1924 the Azhar Caliphate Committee announced the formation of its Administrative Council, under the presidency of the Sheikh of Al Azhar. At the same time Prince Omar Toussoun opened with a donation of £1,000 a fund for the financial support of "the Caliph, Abdul Majid."

5. It soon became apparent that the Committee of Al Azhar alone enjoyed official approval and the benefit of recognition by the authorities. Public meetings of Sheikh Abu'l Azaïem's Committee in Cairo and of the Alexandria Branch Committee were prohibited by order of the Public Security Department.

6. The month of March 1925 found Egypt in the throes of parliamentary elections, while Mecca and Medina lay in the hands of rival potentates, and the Holy Country was a theatre of war. Pleading these considerations and the difficulty of collecting delegates from distant corners of the Moslem world, the Azhar Committee postponed its Cairo Caliphate Congress until March 1926.

7. During the past twelve months the attitude of the rival Caliphate committees and of the general public towards the Caliphate has been affected by various factors which were not present in March 1924.

8. The influence exercised by Hassan Nashat Pasha over leading dignitaries of Al Azhar, and the alleged dependence of the ulama upon palace favour, have led to a belief that King Fuad is working through the Azhar Committee to secure his own election to the Caliphate. His ambitions in this respect were hinted at in the "Temps" so long ago as the 7th January, 1924. The "Liberté" of Cairo, a palace organ, called for the return of the Caliphate to Egypt in a special number of the 10th October, 1925, commemorating His Majesty's accession. In the present state of Egyptian politics such a candidature could not but arouse keen opposition, even though it existed in the malice of imagination only. This animosity has embittered the hostile criticism of the Azhar Committee's purpose, while criticism of Cairo as the meeting-place of the congress—already based on such different grounds as the British quasi-protectorate over Egypt and the existence in Egypt of bars, banks, brothels and other material infringements of Sharia law—took therefrom a sharper edge. (In this context it is interesting that Sheikh Abu'l Azaïem, at a meeting of his committee on the 28th February last, made the announcement that Egypt, "as being a constitutional Power," was not fitted to be the scene of a Caliphate Congress.)

9. On the other hand, the fundamentalist doctrines and military success of Wahabism have won many sympathies for Ibn Saud. Sheikh Mohammed Madi Abu'l Azaïem and his friends appear to have definitely forsaken the cause of Abdul Majid and to incline strongly to the proposal of a Caliphate Council, which, sitting in Mecca to support and advise a titular Caliph, is designed, in fact, to be an application of democratic methods within Islam and the nucleus of a Moslem League of Nations.

10. The comments and assurances of various Indian leaders (see, for example, your despatch No. 1004 of the 19th September last and my despatch No. 735 of the

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25th October last) and the reactions of the Indian Caliphate Committee to the ebb and flow of Ibn Saud's orthodoxy, have also not been without effect in Egypt.

11. Of particular importance to the Cairo Congress has been the circumstance that Ibn Saud has summoned a pan-Moslem Conference to meet on the 28th June next at Mecca. It is by no means improbable that the mandates of many of the delegates to the Cairo Congress are for Mecca primarily, and that events in Cairo are of incidental interest only to them.

12. The congress summoned by the Azhar Committee opened on the 13th May under the presidency of Sheikh Mohammed Abu'l Fadl-el-Guizawy, Grand Sheikh of Al Azhar. It sits behind closed doors. Discussions are in Arabic, interpreters from among the Azhar students being available for foreign delegates.

13. The programme laid down by the congress, which is only to sit for ten days, is the following:—

- (a.) To define the Caliphate and the conditions of the Caliphate in Islam.
- (b.) To discuss the necessity of the Caliphate.
- (c.) To define the conditions of aptitude for the Caliphate.
- (d.) To decide whether it is possible now to establish a Caliphate fulfilling all the conditions prescribed by Koranic legislation.
- (e.) If the answer to (d) be in the negative, to decide what measures should be taken.
- (f.) If the congress decides that a Caliph should be appointed, to consider how this decision is to be put into effect.

14. It will be observed as significant that the election of a Caliph, which was to have been the main object of the congress when its convocation was first mooted, does not figure on this programme. Sheikh Mohammed Shakar, a former Wakil of Al Azhar, has called upon the congress secretariat, through the press, to explain this modification of the congress programme.

15. The Ittehadist newspapers report that the congress is attended by delegates from Poland, Java, India, Palestine, Syria, Mesopotamia, Transjordan, Tripoli, Cyrenaica, Assir, Tunis, Morocco and South Africa, and that delegates from Nejd and the Hejaz may shortly be expected. The congress having become, owing to its alleged association with the ambitions of King Fuad, almost a matter of internal Egyptian politics, the local press is unreliable in this particular. Newspapers of the Opposition are interested in diminishing, newspapers of the Ittehadist party in enhancing, its success. I enclose typical articles from the "Liberté" (Ittehadist) and the "Espoir" (Zaghlulist), which indicate how these cross-currents act.*

16. On the whole, the Opposition criticisms probably reflect fairly accurately the state of Egyptian public opinion. The Azhar Caliphate Congress is unlucky in its place and in its time. Vital to the Moslem world as are the doctrinal questions which learned men of all Moslem communities have assembled to debate, the atmosphere of Cairo is unfavourable to their discussion, and the taint of palace—and, it may be assumed, of British—intrigue will be held to cling to their deliberations and to their decisions.

I have, &c.

LLOYD, High Commissioner.

[E 3179/1511/65]

No. 297.

Lord Lloyd to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 315.)

Sir,

Cairo, May 15, 1926.

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch, on the subject of the Cairo congress convoked by the Caliphate Committee of Al Azhar, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a report on the attitude of the rival Caliphate Committee, presided over by Sheikh Mohammed Madi Abu'l Azaem, which contains matter of interest.

2. The disqualification of Egypt, "en sa qualité de Puissance constitutionnelle," from being the seat of a Caliphate Conference contrasts oddly with the recommendation of Angora as an alternative.

3. The references to Turkey are significant as showing the desire to keep Turkey within the Islamic orbit for purposes of nationalist rather than religious solidarity.

* Not printed.

4. Sheikh Mohammed Madi Abu'l Azaem is a vigorous opponent of the Azhar Caliphate Congress now in session. He is likely to attend the World Islamic Conference convened by Ibn Saud at Mecca on the 26th June.

I have, &c.

LLOYD,

High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 297.

Ministry of the Interior to the Oriental Secretary, the Residency.

(Secret.)

The Oriental Secretary,

Cairo, April 11, 1926.

I FORWARD herewith for your information copy of a note which has been handed to me by the French authorities regarding the activities of the Khalifate Committee under the presidency of Sheikh Mohammed Madi Abu'l Azaem.

A. W. KEOWN-BOYD,

Director-General.

Enclosure 2 in No. 297.

Réunion de la Société du Khalifat musulman, dans la Vallée du Nil, à l'occasion de la Nuit de la mi-Chaaban.

A L'OCCASION de l'anniversaire de la nuit de la mi-Chaaban et parce que la Société du Khalifat a été formée dans cette nuit bénie en 1342, après la suppression du Khalifat et la destitution du Khalife, le comité préparatoire supérieur s'est réuni dimanche 15 Chaaban 1344 (28 février 1926) sous la présidence de son Excellence Mohammed Madi Abou-el-Azem, dans son siège, à El Hanafi en Égypte, et après délibération et discussion de ce qui a été publié par la presse sur le Khalifat et sur les musulmans, dans tous les pays, a pris la décision suivante:

1. Protester énergiquement contre les actes barbares de la France, qui rappellent aux musulmans la destruction de la nation andalouse et aux Orientaux celle des indigènes de l'Amérique et de l'Australie. Les actes de la France en Syrie et dans le Rif sont si intolérables que les montages elles-mêmes ne sauraient les supporter. Les Orientaux sont à bout de patience. Que la France se rappelle que la moitié de ses troupes dans sa guerre contre l'Allemagne étaient des musulmans et que sans ses combattants elle aurait disparu. Elle devrait éviter le danger qui la menace à cause de ses injustices. L'Orient se rend compte que la France récompense l'aide qu'il lui a apportée par la destruction des nations musulmanes.

Il a été décidé qu'une délégation sera chargée de remettre la protestation du Comité exécutif supérieur au représentant de la France en Égypte.

2. Le comité préparatoire supérieur annonce, au monde musulman en général et aux Égyptiens en particulier, la bonne nouvelle que les personnes réfléchies et clairvoyantes des nations et, en particulier, les penseurs d'Égypte et ses publicistes libéraux (Es Suassa, Wadi-el-Nil, El Ahram, El Balagh et El Kaoukab) ont fait remarquer que l'Égypte, en sa qualité de Puissance constitutionnelle, ne saurait convenir à la réunion, dans son territoire, d'un congrès du Khalifat. La Société du Khalifat de la Vallée du Nil, avait gardé le silence durant tout ce temps, sur ce motif, par crainte de susciter les discordes. Car le but unique du comité est l'union générale entre tous les peuples musulmans. Il maintient son point de vue exprimé dans la décision de la nuit du mercredi 27 Rajab 1344. La vérité se révélera bientôt à toute personne qui a des yeux pour voir (la mousse s'évapore, tandis que la substance utile aux hommes demeure en terre).

3. Le comité préparatoire supérieur a approuvé le rapport envoyé par son Excellence le président de la Société du Khalifat de la Vallée du Nil, au grand Moujahed, Omar Said Jekrou Aminoukou et à son confrère Saïed Fakhreddine, chefs du mouvement islamique à Kawa.

4. Remercier Sa Majesté le Sultan du Nejd, le Roi du Hedjaz, pour les lettres adressées par Sa Majesté à son Excellence le Président de la Société du Khalifat, lettres démontrant que Sa Majesté estime à leur juste valeur les efforts des travailleurs fidèles.

5. Engager les comités à inviter les fidèles à l'accomplissement du pèlerinage de cette année et d'envoyer leur rapport au comité exécutif supérieur sur le nombre des fidèles désireux de faire le pèlerinage pour que le comité puisse leur offrir l'aide nécessaire.

La séance a été levée à 1 heure du matin.

LE COMITÉ EXÉCUTIF SUPÉRIEUR.

No. 298.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir P. Loraine (Tehran).

(No. 78.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 26, 1926.

YOUR telegram No. 124 of 23rd May: Press reports of Turco-Anglo-Irak pact of non-aggression in which Persia is to participate.

There is no foundation for the message from Geneva.

All we have done as regards non-aggression in our negotiations at Angora is to propose to the Turks an article whereby Great Britain, Irak and Turkey accept the existing Turco-Irak frontier (Brussels line) as final and definitive, and undertake that they will make no attempt to alter it. His Majesty's Government have definitely decided against inviting Persia or any other neighbour of Turkey to participate in this undertaking, and also against extending it to any other frontiers of Turkey.

It is impossible to say when, if ever, negotiations will be concluded.

No. 299.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Angora).

(No. 25.)
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, May 26, 1926.

YOUR telegram No. 32 of 23rd May: Capitalised amount of possible oil royalties to attain settlement.

His Majesty's Government authorise you to go to maximum of £775,000 in case of need.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 6.)

No. 300.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 27.)

(Nos. 34 and 35.)
(Telegraphic.)

Angora, May 26, 1926.

I HAVE communicated to Minister for Foreign Affairs copy of complete [? omitted: draft treaty]. He is producing a re-draft, which I fear will make rather a mess of it, but, so far as I can see, affects the form rather than the substance.

1. Chief point is first paragraph of article 16. He will not admit stipulation that Irak comes under establishment convention unless most-favoured-nation treatment is accorded to Turks in Irak. I have explained why this is impossible, and he realises how small foreigners' privilege is, but says that it is impossible for modern Turkey to accept inferior position in a treaty. He suggested complete omission of convention. As this would not prejudice Irak's rights under article 19, perhaps it might be accepted.

2. As regards commercial convention, he proposes that Turkey and Irak should merely accord each other most-favoured-nation treatment. If this is done without limitation as to time it might be advantageous, as convention only lasts till 1929.

3. Preamble is simplified, and paragraph 1 is made to refer only to article 3 of Lausanne Treaty.

4. In article 3, first and last paragraphs, he cuts out League of Nations. For first he substitutes Swiss President and for second he says that His Majesty's Government alone must notify League of Nations. Probably reference in article 20 is similarly treated.

5. He accents article 5 unchanged.

6. An article in part 2 is proposed by which the two parties undertake to prohibit propaganda against each other by their own subjects or by subjects of other States. This should prevent use of Turkish territory by Russian agents.

7. There is some difficulty about last sentence of article 9.

8. And also over article 19, which I cannot at present explain.

9. He seems inclined at present even to increase importance of frontier commission in article 15.

Above is result of verbal discussion only and must be taken with reserve.

I am still trying to persuade Turkish Government to accept capital sum already offered.

(Sent to Bagdad, Nos. 32 and 33.)

No. 301.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 37.)

Angora, May 28, 1926.

(Telegraphic.) R.

TURKISH Government specially request that rectification of frontier be made so as to leave to Turkey the road connecting Alamun and Ashuta.

I believe this is a proposal which might be accepted. If so please instruct me as to form in which this should be arranged. Turkish Government is indifferent as to procedure.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 35.)

No. 302.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Angora).

(No. 26.)

Foreign Office, May 28, 1926.

(Telegraphic.)

YOUR telegram No. 34 of 26th May: Draft Turco-Anglo-Irak Treaty. I will await text of Turkish re-draft before deciding whether proposed amendments can be accepted. Please telegraph re-draft of preamble as soon as you receive it, and also text of any other important amendments.

No. 303.

Sir Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Angora).

(No. 28.)

Foreign Office, May 28, 1926.

(Telegraphic.) R.

YOUR telegram No. 30 of 21st May: Anglo-Turkish negotiations. You should propose following text:—

"His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of Irak, recognising the desire of the Turkish Government to participate in the development of such oilfields as may be found to exist in Irak, agree that the Government of Irak shall pay to the Turkish Government, in lieu of active participation in the development of the said oilfields or a share in the royalties derived therefrom, an annual sum of _____ for a period of _____ years from the coming into force of the present treaty.

"At the request of the Turkish Government, the said annual payments will be commuted for a lump sum of _____. Such sum will be paid within a period of _____ months from the date of the Turkish Government's request, which must be made within _____ months after the coming into force of the present treaty."

You may, if you prefer, substitute the following passage for the last sentence given above:—

"Such sum will be paid forthwith on receipt of the Turkish Government's request, which must only be made on the coming into force of the present treaty."

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 7.)

[E 3304/1511/65]

No. 304.

Lord Lloyd to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received May 31.)(No. 338)
Sir,

Cairo, May 22, 1926.

IN my despatch No. 314 of the 15th instant I had the honour to report the opening of the Caliphate Congress summoned by the Azhar Committee. This congress was adjourned *sine die* on the 19th instant, after having held only four plenary sessions.

2. The congress met behind closed doors, and no press men were admitted, but from what has leaked out it is apparent that the meetings were stormy and, from the first, ineffectual.

3. Various delegates, notably those from Palestine and Syria, worked hard to make the congress a platform for the ventilation of political grievances; and it was partly the unwillingness of the Azhar divines, whose attachment to the palace is notorious, to permit this importation of politics into a religious discussion that brought the congress to so abrupt a close.

4. The unfavourable political atmosphere of Egypt, the fact that most of the delegates had no official mandate and represented nobody but themselves, the impending World Islamic Conference in Mecca, and the untiring mockery of the Opposition press in Egypt combined to make a fiasco of what in other circumstances might have been an event of world importance.

5. The press announces that the congress can only show for its labours a definition of the qualities pertaining to a Caliph. The "Liberté," however, which is an organ of the palace, publishes what are alleged to be the findings of the different commissions set up to examine the six questions which formed the congress programme. How far these findings represent any work actually done by the commissions, and how far they reflect the decisions which the organisers of the congress would like to have seen taken, I cannot say. As a matter of interest, and in order to complete my despatch under reference in which the objects of the congress were set forth, I enclose copies of the relevant article in the "Liberté."*

I have, &c.

LLOYD,

High Commissioner

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* Not printed.